Reordering diplomatic theory for the twenty-first century: a tripartite approach. by Murray, Stuart
Bond University
DOCTORAL THESIS






Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.




Reordering diplomatic theory for the twenty-first century:  











Department of International Relations and Diplomacy 
Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences, Bond University 
 
 
Submitted in total fulfillment of the requirements  













To the best of my knowledge and belief the thesis entitled: Reordering diplomatic 
theory for the twenty-first century: A tripartite approach, represents my own work 
and contains no material which has been previously submitted for a degree or diploma at 
this University or any other institution, except where due acknowledgement is made.  
 
Signature:     Date:  
 iii
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements         i  
 
Abstract          iii 
 
Preface          v 
 
Chapter One: Establishing precedence 
 
1.0 The poverty of diplomatic theory      1 
1.1 De Callieres will tell us all we need to know:  
the essence of diplomatic theory      5 
1.2 The shape of the modern diplomatic environment    12 
 
Chapter Two: Traditional Diplomatic Theory (TDT) 
 
2.0 The origins of traditional diplomacy      21 
2.1 The central tenets of traditional diplomatic theory    28 
2.2 Typical assumptions of traditional diplomatic theorists 
2.3 The range within traditional diplomatic theory:  
exclusive to inclusive        35 
2.4  Evidencing TDT within the canon of diplomacy studies   43 
2.4.1 Diplomacy defined from a TDT’s perspective    43 
2.5 Specific examples of Traditional diplomatic theory    48 
2.5.1 TDT counter to declining state arguments    48 
2.5.2 The impact of Inter-Governmental  
Organisations on traditional diplomacy    52 
2.5.3 The questionable efficacy of summit diplomacy   57 
2.5.4 The proliferation of Non-Governmental Organisations   61 
2.5.5 Diplomacy and commerce      65  
2.5.6 Diplomacy and the information technology  
and communication revolution     68 
2.6 The merits of the TDT       72 
2.7 The limitations of TDT       77 
2.7.1 Implications for diplomatic theory: A caveat for TDT  84 
 
Chapter Three: Nascent Diplomatic Theory (NDT) 
 
3.0  The origins of nascent diplomacy      89 
3.1  The central tenets of Nascent diplomatic theory    96 
3.2 The general characteristics of Nascent diplomatic theorists   99 
3.3 The range of nascent diplomatic theory: moderate to orthodox  102 
3.4 Diplomacy defined from a Nascent theorist’s perspective    109 
3.5 Specific examples of Nascent diplomatic theory    112 
 iv
3.5.1 Nascent theorists as advocates of the  
declining state argument      112 
3.5.2 The Nascent theoretical portrayal of IGOs  
as distinct diplomatic actors      118 
3.5.3 Diplomacy as theatre: the Nascent theorist’s  
dismissal of summit diplomacy     124 
3.5.4 The central Nascent actors:  
Non-Governmental Organisations     127 
3.5.5 Another nail in the traditional coffin:  
globalisation and multi-national corporations   136 
3.5.6 Diplomacy and the information revolution    141 
3.6 The merits of NDT        148 
3.7 The Limitations of NDT (Implications for diplomatic theory)  152 
Chapter Four: Innovative Diplomatic Theory (IDT) 
 
4.0 The origins of IDT        156 
4.1  The central tenets of IDT       159 
4.2 The characteristics of innovative diplomatic theorists   164 
4.3  A literature review of IDT: definitions and examples    167 
4.4 Specific examples of IDT       176 
4.4.1 The ambiguity of declining state arguments    176 
4.4.2 The impact of IGOs on traditional diplomacy   178 
4.4.3 Research wanted: diplomacy by summit    183  
4.4.4 The symbiotic relationship between states and NGOs  188 
4.4.5 Open for business: The traditional diplomatic 
institution and commerce      193 
4.4.6 Diplomacy and the information evolution    202 
4.5 The merits of IDT        206 
4.6 The Limitations of IDT (Implications for diplomatic theory)  208 
 
Chapter Five: Reconciling divergence amongst TDT, NDT and IDT 
 
5.0 Introducing reconciliation       211 
5.0.1  The current relationship between 
 the three diplomatic theories      212  
5.0.2  Confirming the existence of fundamental  
theoretical disagreement       214 
5.0.3  The motivations driving theoretical disagreement   229 
5.0.4  Consequences of theoretical disagreement for  
diplomatic theory       231 
5.0 Redirection of the relationship between the three groups   239 
5.1.1  Learning from IR theory:  
Making room for the three diplomatic theories   240 
5.1.2  Reconciling the three diplomatic theories through  
an interdisciplinary confluence with IR theory   244 
 v
5.1.3 TDT and Realism        245 
5.1.4 NDT and Liberalism       250 
5.1.5 IDT and Constructivism      256 
5.2  Implications (now) for diplomatic theory:  
benefits of reconciliation       261 
 
Chapter Six: Using TDT, NDT and IDT to better understand the modern diplomatic 
environment 
 
6.0  Methodology: using the three theories together    267  
6.1 The modern diplomatic environment seen through  
the three lenses: TDT, NDT and IDT      274  
6.1.1 The ongoing evolution of the state and  
its traditional diplomatic institution      274 
6.1.2 Do IGO’s ‘really matter’?        285 
6.1.3 Diplomacy by summit       296 
6.1.4 The niche diplomacy of NGOs      302 
6.1.5 The mutual relationship between commerce and diplomacy   314 
6.1.6 What revolution? The information evolution     325 
6.2 The lucidity of tripartite diplomatic theory     335 
6.3 The necessity of tripartite diplomatic theory     340 
   
 Selected Bibliography        344  
 Interviews         366 





 While there are many people I would like to thank for their wide and varied forms 
of assistance during the PhD process, the following people command particular attention. 
In terms of my host institution, Dr. Anne Cullen has been a constant source of 
motivation, a control on some of the more fanciful ideas I have proposed, and a hard but 
fair task master. Without her time, consideration, help and tenacity there is no doubt I 
would have made it this far. Dr. Rosita Dellios, Maggie Grey, Dr. James Ferguson were 
also of valuable assistance throughout; without their sage and intermittent counsel I 
would have become lost in the project. The Document Delivery staff at Bond University 
Library, in particular Joseph and Lynn, also deserves special mention.  
 The staffs of many other institutions were also instrumental in the PhD journey. In 
particular, Dr. Pauline Kerr of the Australian National University was a distant but 
worthy reviewer of sporadic ideas. Dr. Donna Lee of Birmingham University was most 
approachable, and always extensive in her comments in correspondence, as was Dr. Paul 
Sharp of the University of Minnesota, who similarly took the time to address any issues I 
raised. For their assistance in helping me gain access to the inner sanctums of the 
professional diplomatic world, I cannot thank Dr. Frank Thompson of AUSAID and 
Lyndall Sachs of DFAT enough. I would also like to express gratitude to the many 
diplomats (official and unofficial) that took the time out of their busy schedules to discuss 
the central tenets of the thesis. Particular thanks go to Ambassador Robert Gordon of the 
British FCO, Ambassador Claude Laverdure of Canada’s DFAIT, and Ambassador Joe 
Thwiates of Australia’s DFAT.  
 ii
 I must also thank my friends, who reminded me that life exists outside the PhD. 
The Maluish Family, Annette, Andy, Cat and Lou, have been most generous with their 
advice, encouragement, camaraderie and hospitality. Thanks also to my friends Louise 
Matthews and Micha Lerner in particular. Finally, if words suffice, I must express my 
deepest appreciation to my family, who despite being camped on the other side of the 
globe, in Scotland, were never far from my daily thoughts. My father, Cameron, was a 
constant source of pride, drive and determination, and my mother, Ray, my greatest 
believer. My big brother, Alan, is never short of sound and educated advice, thanks for 
continually setting the benchmark Braer! With each passing day, I think of some way in 
which to thank my family, friends and colleagues. Hopefully, this small gesture expresses 




The central aim of this thesis is to deconstruct and reconstruct the dominant 
theoretical perceptions of diplomacy, by reworking radically existing theories of 
diplomacy. This thesis achieves reconceptualisation of diplomatic theory by critiquing 
the thoughts and ideas of theorists postulating on modern diplomacy. Consequently, this 
thesis is concerned (largely) with the theoretical terrain of diplomacy studies. 
The purpose of this intended deconstruction and reconstruction is to introduce and 
construct three lucid types of diplomatic theory. These three types or categories 
introduced in this thesis are Traditional, Nascent and Innovative Diplomatic Theory. By 
categorising these three distinct types of theories, it is hoped that the diplomatic scholar 
will have a choice of lenses through which to interpret the complexities of the modern 
diplomatic environment. Ultimately, this thesis aims to strengthen Traditional Diplomatic 
Theory (TDT) and introduce/construct two alternate forms of diplomatic theory, Nascent 
Diplomatic Theory (NDT) and Innovative Diplomatic Theory (IDT). 
To date, diplomatic theory as a specific topic has not been simply and rigorously 
explored. This thesis takes on this responsibility. No simple attempt has been made to 
establish what diplomatic theory actually is and if existing works on diplomatic theory 
remain relevant to the modern diplomacy. The notion of updating diplomatic theory, so 
that it remains applicable to the complex, modern diplomatic environment, is one central 
motivation of this thesis.  
Two central arguments are prevalent throughout the thesis. Firstly, that diplomatic 
theory can be viewed as tripartite. This thesis argues that within the diplomatic studies 
literature three distinct forms of diplomatic theory can be evidenced. At first, these three 
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divergent theories appear to share an adversarial relationship, with each championing a 
vastly different impression of what constitutes the modern diplomatic environment. 
However, this thesis aims to consolidate, strengthen and reconcile each type of theory, 
with the purpose of confirming their complementary relationship. If a method of 
incorporating all three types of theories under the banner of diplomacy studies can be 
proposed then the diplomatic studies field will have a truly modern approach to 
diplomatic theory. This tripartite approach tells the whole modern diplomatic story, from 
both the state and non-state perspective. In addition, this approach accounts for the 
complexities of modern diplomacy, completes a frank stock-take of the diplomatic 
studies field and is aimed at ultimately strengthening diplomatic theory.   
The second argument suggests that an innovative approach to theorising on 
diplomacy can yield substantial theoretical rewards. Tripartite diplomatic theory is one 
example of innovation. A second example is this thesis’ assertion that there is a more 
compelling relationship to be realised between International Relations (IR) and 
diplomatic studies. This thesis demonstrates how an interdisciplinary approach can result 
in robust and enriched theories of diplomacy. The similarities between TDT and Realism, 
NDT and Idealism and IDT and Constructivism demonstrate the value of an 
interdisciplinary confluence. By broadening the field of enquiry to IR theory, this thesis 
argues for the coexistence of three alternate but complementary theories on diplomacy. 
Just as IR theory has room for several different types of theory so too does the discipline 
of diplomatic studies. 
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Preface 
This thesis aims to deconstruct, strengthen and modernise diplomatic theory. To 
do so, means broadening the field of inquiry for diplomatic theory to incorporate non-
state as well as state actors. Ultimately, this approach is aimed at enhancing 
understanding of the complex multi-actor nature of the modern diplomatic environment. 
Essentially, this approach suggests that ‘the concept of diplomacy can and must be 
reconstructed’.1 Validating this approach means challenging dominant and enduring 
assumptions of existing diplomatic theory.  
In order to distance itself from the dominant assumption of diplomatic theory – 
that diplomacy is a practice, primarily an exclusive activity between state actors – 
requires this thesis to introduce an innovative approach to theorising on diplomacy. In 
doing so this thesis does not intend to abandon ‘what we know’, instead it seeks to 
introduce a method that consolidates existing knowledge on diplomatic theory while 
incorporating alternate but equally valuable theories on diplomacy. This thesis argues that 
three different types of diplomatic theory can be evidenced within and constructed from 
the existing diplomatic studies literature. In all, three distinct categories of diplomatic 
theorists and theory are presented in chapters two, three and four: Traditional Diplomatic 
Theory; Nascent Diplomatic Theory; and Innovative Diplomatic Theory. 
One reservation with categorising or branding various types of theorists is the 
danger of constraining scholars to a rigid classification. Hocking, for example, was wary 
of confining theorists to a ‘conceptual ghetto’.2 However, imprisoning theorists is not the 
intention of this thesis. Categorising different opinions on diplomacy is intended to 
                                                 
1 John Hoffman. (2003). Reconstructing Diplomacy. British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 5 (4), p. 541. 
2 Correspondence with Brian Hocking. July 15th, 2005. 
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organise and distinguish various theories on diplomacy, which in turn allows an appraisal 
of strengths and weaknesses of these theories.  
There are a number of benefits to placing, not confining, diplomatic theorists and 
theories into ‘rigid disciplinary pigeon holes’.3 For example, by constructing the three 
categories, different types of diplomatic theory can be better understood. Organising 
different types of theories is important in terms of clarity of academic focus within the 
diplomatic studies field.  Of diplomatic theorists, ‘anyone of us who has attempted to 
give an honest answer to the question, “So what exactly is it that you do?”’ is unable to 
give a concise answer.4 Categorisation provides a concise and informative answer to this 
question by developing a better understanding of the respective produce of diplomatic 
theorists. In other words, this approach introduces order to the diplomatic studies field. 
With the diplomacy studies field enjoying a recent renaissance, the need to clarify 
respective theoretical focuses is greater than before. 
Once respective diplomatic theories are categorised, each group can be appraised 
and their contribution to understanding the modern diplomatic environment recognised. 
Categorisation allows recognition of the merits, as well as the limitations, of each type of 
diplomatic theory. This approach can illustrate weaknesses in the diplomacy studies field, 
potential areas in need of further research – for example the much-needed analysis of 
non-state diplomatic actors - and research opportunities within the field.  
                                                 
3 John L. Gaddis. (1987). Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists and the Enrichment of 
Security Studies. International Security, 12 (1), p. 5. 
4 Paul Sharp. (1999). For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations. 
International Studies Review, 1 (1), p. 35.  
 vii
Thus, categorisation permits us to ascertain where the field currently lies on 
the ‘diplomatic continuum’.5 Essentially, this approach constitutes a stock take of the 
diplomatic studies field, an appraisal of what we know or think we know in relation to 
diplomatic theory. This appraisal of diplomatic theory is long overdue when 
compared to other disciplines. For example, IR theorists ‘have often shown an interest 
in evaluating the state of their discipline; its practitioners have produced a steady 
stream of research appraisals’.6 Since the end of the Cold War and the close of the 
millennium, this exercise has been apparent in the broader IR domain but has not 
been conducted with diplomacy studies in mind.7 In relation to diplomacy studies and 
diplomatic theory, this thesis shoulders that responsibility.   
The stock take is timely too. For example, today IR theorists are re-examining 
‘their basic assumptions about world politics and re-evaluating the usefulness of the 
mental maps they have relied on to make sense of its complexity’.8 To reduce further 
marginalisation of the diplomatic studies field, there is a need for diplomatic theorists 
to follow suit. Central to this revaluation of the diplomatic theorists ‘mental maps’ is 
questioning the relevance and adequacy of existing diplomatic theories to account for 
the complexity of the modern diplomatic environment.  
                                                 
5 ibid, p. 44. 
6 Colin Elman and Miriam Elman. (2003). Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the 
Field.  Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 3. For examples of IR theorists appraising their discipline, see R. N 
Lebow and T. Risse-Kappen. (1995). International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War. New 
York: Columbia University Press; M. W. Doyle and G. J. Ikenberry. (1997). New Thinking in International 
Relations Theory. Boulder: Westview Press; D. B. Bobrow. (1999). Prospects for International Relations: 
Conjectures About the Next Millennium. Malden: Blackwell. 
7 The 2000 International Studies Association annual convention illustrated such a trend. Entitled 
‘Reflection, Integration, Cumulation: International Studies Past and Future’ it invited ‘self-critical, state-of-
the-art reflection within epistemologies, perspectives and sub fields’ and suggested that without such 
reflection, ‘the promise of International Studies cannot be fulfilled’. The Diplomatic Studies field was not 
subjected to such an examination.  See, www.isanet.org/archives/ 
8 Glenn P. Hastedt and Kay M. Knickrehm. (2003). International Politics in a Changing World.  
Boston: Pearson Education, p. 29. 
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Finally, the categorisation of different types of theorists within the diplomatic 
studies field has not been attempted so far. This thesis demonstrates the value of 
innovation and originality of approach to fixed methods of theorising on diplomacy; even 
if this thesis’ approach promotes criticism, at least debate is encouraged, and argument is 
injected into a discipline dominated by restrictive state-centric approaches to diplomatic 
theory.9 This thesis argues that Debate, innovation and a frank appraisal of the diplomatic 
studies field are preferable to further marginalisation. 
Innovation in diplomatic theory is particularly important. In order to understand 
the complex twenty-first century diplomatic environment it may be beneficial to distance, 
but not abandon, theory from the traditional, statist perspective on diplomacy. Today, 
state and non-state actors can be said to engage in diplomacy but we have little 
knowledge on the latter while theory abounds on the former.  By the end of the next three 
chapters, the reader will be able to elucidate the central tenets of not only the most 
recognisable form of diplomatic theory (Traditional) but also two alternate and equally 
valuable forms of diplomatic theory (Nascent and Innovative).  
Before categorisation can occur, it is important to contextualise this thesis. 
Chapter one identifies the explicit area of theoretical terrain this thesis will attempt to 
navigate. Precedence is first established, by relying on insights of diplomatic theorists 
who have noticed the paucity of diplomatic theory but have not directly addressed the 
problem. Following this discussion is a frank appraisal of existing diplomatic theories, 
which largely consist of traditional, statist approaches to postulating on diplomacy. These 
statist theories are somewhat limited in their application to the modern diplomatic 
                                                 
9 For a lively, if somewhat parochial, discussion on the notion of disciplinary insecurity/neurosis see, 
Kurth, James. (1998). Inside the Cave: The Banality of IR Studies. National Interest, 53, 29 – 40. 
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environment. The final section in this chapter highlights six themes, factors and forces 
prevalent in the modern diplomatic environment and the diplomatic studies literature. 
When these six themes, factors and forces are introduced, it becomes apparent that 
existing diplomatic theories are unable to account for the increasing complexity of 
modern diplomacy. The chapter finishes by arguing that in order to understand this 
complexity the diplomatic studies field needs more than one traditional, statist body of 
theory.  
Chapter two introduces the most recognisable type of diplomatic theorist: the 
Traditionalist. Traditionalists are engaged in a similar enterprise: endorsing the centrality 
of the state and the diplomatic institution to their theory of diplomacy. This chapter 
builds a comprehensive profile of this type of diplomatic theorist from the canon of 
diplomacy studies. In doing so, the chapter extracts the historical origins of Traditional 
Diplomatic Theory (TDT), the type of diplomacy Traditionalists theorise upon, their 
central theoretical tenets, common assumptions and definitions of diplomacy.  
Traditional diplomatic theory on six modern themes within the diplomatic studies 
literature is also presented in chapter two, allowing a comparison to be drawn between 
their theory and alternate emerging theories on diplomacy. In all of the three of the 
different categorical chapters (2, 3 & 4), these six themes are employed to highlight 
divergence of opinion among the three categories of theorists presented in this thesis. 
Moreover, by providing specific examples of each group’s theories on diplomacy one 
may further distinguish the three respective categories of diplomatic theory. These six 
themes are prominent and consistent in modern diplomatic literature. They concern the 
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impact of changes and challenges upon the traditional diplomatic institution.10 The six 
themes are: 1) the withering state, and its traditional diplomatic institution; 2) the role of 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) in the modern diplomatic environment; 3) the 
impact of summit diplomacy; 4) the proliferation of nongovernmental organisations 
(NGOs); 5) the relationship between commerce and diplomacy; and 6) the affect of the 
information revolution on diplomacy. Each group of theorists has a different opinion on 
these six themes, allowing this thesis to distinguish between different groups of theorists.   
Chapter three introduces, constructs and profiles a second body of distinct theory: 
Nascent Diplomatic Theory (NDT). Nascent theorists postulate on diplomacy by 
dismissing the importance of the state and the traditional diplomatic institution in the 
modern diplomatic environment. Instead, they focus on emerging non-state diplomatic 
actors, hence the moniker nascent diplomatic theorists. This chapter builds the profile of 
Nascent theorists by constructing an alternate body of diplomatic literature (to the canon 
of diplomacy studies). The purpose of chapter three is to extract the historical origins of 
Nascent theorists, the type of diplomacy they theorise upon, their central theoretical 
tenets, common assumption and definitions of diplomacy. Following this, Nascent 
theorist’s opinion on six modern themes within the diplomatic studies literature is 
presented, which further illustrates the differences between this group of theorists and the 
dominant Traditionalists.  
                                                 
10 For similar usage of the term institution, and the reasons behind the employment of this term in place of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Christer Jonsson and Martin Hall. (2006). Essence of Diplomacy. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 39 – 42.   
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Certain theorists can fit into both TDT and NDT categories. Sharp, for example, 
in the article Who needs diplomats?11 builds an argument that incorporates the traditional, 
statist theory of diplomacy alongside the value of theory on nascent diplomatic actors. 
How do we then classify Sharp, or Hocking (1999, 2000 and 2004) or Cooper (1997, 
2000)? The answer is to introduce a third categorisation of theorists, which is the focus 
and purpose of the fourth chapter. 
Chapter four introduces the distinct category of Innovative Diplomatic Theory 
(IDT). These theorists, the Innovators, theorise on both state and non-state actors, 
incorporating and evidencing a symbiosis between the two as central to their particular 
type of diplomatic theory. This approach – privileging both the state and the non-state – 
is novel, hence the ‘Innovative’ label. Innovators can be distinguished by their historical 
origins, the type of diplomacy they theorise upon, their central theoretical tenets, 
common assumptions and definitions of diplomacy. These characteristics are described at 
length in this chapter, alongside IDT on the six themes prevalent in modern diplomatic 
studies literature. Innovators offer an alternative interpretation of modern diplomacy from 
TDT and NDT.  
Chapter five is concerned with tackling a consequence of categorisation; the need 
to reconcile these three divergent theories on diplomacy. If the notion of three different 
types of theories within diplomacy studies is accepted then the existence of three 
different and often-conflicting opinions on modern diplomacy must also be accepted. 
Chapter five continues by offering a tentative solution. This chapter argues that to 
produce a comprehensive body of theory on modern diplomacy, the reconciliation of the 
                                                 
11 See, Paul Sharp. (1997). Who needs diplomats? The problem of diplomatic representation. International 
Journal, 52 (4), 609 – 634. 
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three diplomatic theories is paramount. This chapter suggests that the key to reconciling 
tripartite diplomatic theory lies with learning from another discipline that has 
encountered and overcome similar problems. The discipline employed is IR, where 
divergent theories are inherent to the field.  
Chapter five is also concerned with exploring the relationship between TDT and 
Realism, NDT and Liberalism and IDT and Constructivism. The simple premise is that 
just as these three theories are central to IR, so to must TDT, NDT and IDT become 
central to diplomacy studies. In chapter five, the similarities between each diplomatic 
theory and IR theory are explored and found to be quite remarkable. IR theory is 
employed to not only reconcile the three divergent diplomatic theories but also to further 
strengthen each of the different types of diplomatic theory. Through reconciliation, this 
thesis is able to banish disagreement between the three types of diplomatic theory by 
arguing all three types of theory have validity. This thesis proposes that just as IR theory 
needs Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism to understand the modern IR system, then 
diplomatic theory needs TDT, NDT and IDT in order to understand the modern 
diplomatic environment. The presence, consolidation and reconciliation of all three 
different theories ultimately strengthens diplomacy studies and diplomatic theory in the 
modern era. 
The final chapter of the thesis, chapter six, demonstrates how this tripartite 
approach – using TDT, NDT & IDT in eclectic fashion - to theorising on diplomacy can 
enrich analysis of the modern diplomatic environment. In other words, this chapter tests 
the applicability of tripartite diplomatic theorising against empirical evidence. After all, 
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‘theory tested against data is more powerful than theory alone’.12 The central assumptions 
of each of the three diplomatic theories are juxtaposed with empirical evidence relating to 
the six realities of the modern diplomatic environment. The aim of chapter six is twofold: 
firstly to demonstrate the value of tripartite diplomatic theorising; and, secondly, to 
introduce a subsequent set of theoretical observations that better helps understanding the 
modern diplomatic environment.   
 
                                                 
12 Bates in Rudra Sil. (2000) The Foundations of Eclecticism: The Epistemological Status of Agency, 
Culture, and Structure in Social Theory. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12 (3), p. 375. 
  Chapter One 
 1
Chapter One: Establishing Precedence 
1.0 The poverty of diplomatic theory 
In 1966, Martin Wight’s essay ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ was 
concerned with addressing and alleviating the ‘theoretical impoverishment’ of 
international theory.1 Central to his observations was the claim that ‘international theory 
does not, at first sight, exist’ as it has a ‘recalcitrance to being theorised about’.2 For 
Wight international theory was an ‘impression’ or an assumption that international 
relations scholars had taken for granted; consistently they failed to question the origins, 
rigor or depth of the ‘notion of international theory’.3 According to Wight, works written 
on international theory were ‘marked, not only by paucity but also by intellectual 
poverty’.4  
Wight’s observations continue to resonate with diplomacy studies and diplomatic 
theory in particular. In the field of diplomacy studies we too have the ‘impression’ that 
diplomatic theory is a robust and vibrant topic which has been deeply explored.5 The fact 
that many ‘theorists’ ranging from De Callieres (1716) to Berridge (2002) have written 
on diplomacy reinforces this assumption. However, herein lies the central concern 
relating to diplomatic theory: we assume diplomatic theory exists. 
The ‘paucity’ and ‘poverty’ of diplomatic theory has gone largely unnoticed in the 
diplomatic studies field.6 One reason is that until the end of the Cold War the diplomatic 
                                                 
1 M. Wight. ‘Why is there no International Theory?’, in M. Wight, and H. Butterfield (eds.). 1966. 
Diplomatic Investigations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 20. 
2 ibid., pp. 17 – 33. 
3 ibid., p. 19. 
4 ibid., p. 20. 
5 ibid., p. 17. 
6 ibid., p. 19. 
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environment was largely predictable and dominated by one actor: the state.7 However, 
there now exist several unconventional, non-state diplomatic actors such as NGOs or 
multinational corporations (MNCs) alongside the traditional state actor. In the complex, 
multi-actor and modern diplomatic environment the ‘impression’ of a solid body of 
diplomatic theory is no longer adequate. Weaknesses in diplomatic theory have become 
more apparent as the diplomatic environment becomes more complex. As the 
environment becomes more complex there is need for diplomatic theory to react and 
change accordingly. This thesis takes on the responsibility of deconstructing, 
modernising and strengthening diplomatic theory.  
Attempts to address the frailty of diplomatic theory are not novel. They are, 
however, rare. For example, the weakness of diplomatic theory prompted James Der 
Derian to firmly ‘assert the need for a theory of diplomacy’.8 Adopting a similar line of 
aggressive enquiry as Wight, Der Derian argued that:  
 
diplomacy has been particularly resistant to theory9…theories of diplomacy, when they do 
exist, usually consist of underdeveloped and implicit propositions…neither is there to be found 
                                                 
7 For a discussion on the origins of the term ‘actor’, when describing an international entity, see Arnold 
Wolfers. (1959). The Actors in International Politics, in William Fox (ed.). (1959). Theoretical Aspects of 
International Relations. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 83 – 106. For the development 
and employment of an alternate term - states as people - see Patrick Jackson. (2004). Hegel’s House, or 
People are states too. Review of International Studies, 30 (2), pp. 281 – 288; Alexander Wendt. (2004). The 
state as person in and actor in international theory. Review of International Studies, 30 (2), pp. 289 – 317.  
8 J. Der Derian. (1987). Mediating estrangement:  a theory for diplomacy. Review of International Studies, 
13 (2), p. 92. 
9 Der Derian’s ‘notion of the resistance to theory’ was ‘borrowed from Wight’s celebrated essay’ (Costas 
M. Constantinou. (1993). Late Modern Diplomacies. Millennium, 22 (1), p. 90). Der Derian’s work begins 
where ‘Wight left off, to interrogate present knowledge of international relations through past practice, to 
search out the margins of political theory, to listen for the critical voices drowned out by official discourses, 
and to conduct an enquiry into the encounter of the given text.’ (Der Derian, On Diplomacy, pp. 6 –7). 
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a substantial theoretical work on the subject in the contemporary literature of international 
relations…diplomacy has suffered from theoretical neglect.10  
  
For Der Derian, existing theories of diplomacy tend to be underdeveloped and 
lacking in theoretical rigor. In addition, Der Derian felt that explicit and substantial works 
on diplomatic theory are conspicuous by their absence in the diplomatic studies field. Der 
Derian decided it was time to embrace diplomatic theory sui generis. In essence, Der 
Derian sought to ‘fill a gap in the field: the gap of diplomatic theory’.11 His approach 
would endorse ‘a different method of conceptualising diplomacy’.12  
Der Derian certainly introduced a different method to theorising on diplomacy. In 
the 1987 publication, Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement, Der Derian 
combines theory on diplomacy with the philosophical theory of alienation,13 covers over 
3,000 years of diplomatic evolution and produces six distinguishable theoretical 
classifications of diplomacy ranging from Mytho-diplomacy to Techno-Diplomacy.14 In 
terms of the focus of this thesis, it is important to ask if Der Derian achieved his intended 
purpose: to ‘fill the gap of diplomatic theory’?15  
                                                 
10 Costas M. Constantinou. (1993). Late Modern Diplomacies. Millennium, 22 (1), p. 91. 
11 J. Der Derian. (1987). On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 5. 
12 ibid. 
13 For a full explanation of Der Derian’s adaptation of alienation theories to diplomacy see Der Derian, On 
Diplomacy, pp. 8 – 30. 
14 In total, Der Derian forwards ‘six interpenetrating paradigms to analyse the origins and transformations 
of diplomacy’ (p. 5). Mytho-diplomacy (chapter 4) locates the origins of symbolic reciprocity between 
‘foreign’ entities in mythology and religion. Proto-diplomacy (chapter 5) identifies prototypes of diplomacy 
that developed during the middle ages. Diplomacy (chapter 6) presents an account of state forms of 
diplomacy to emerge after the peace of Westphalia. Anti-Diplomacy (chapter 7) refers to the idealist 
rejections of state boundaries and raison d’etat, as in Christian universalism and various sixteenth and 
seventeenth century utopian writings. Neo-diplomacy (chapter 8) occurs when anti-diplomacy is 
politicised, as in socialist internationalism. And techno-diplomacy (chapter 9) describes situations in which 
diplomatic interactions can no longer contain new kinds of interactions made possible by new technologies. 
15 Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 5. 
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 If anything, Der Derian overwhelms the gap. His work is so extensive and so 
exhaustive that claims of ‘intellectual overkill’ were leveled at Diplomacy; the work was 
subject to both sycophantic adulation and hostile criticism.16 Der Derian certainly 
expanded diplomatic theory however his observations are ‘largely repellant and 
intractable in form’ not to mention ‘mostly inaccessible to the layman’.17 Furthermore, by 
leaning heavily on the theory of alienation as ‘endorsed by Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, 
Sartre, and others’ meant the core of his new diplomatic theory was a mixture of 
philosophy and diplomacy, rather than pure diplomacy.18  In other words, Der Derian’s 
attempt to radically (re)conceptualise diplomatic theory was too ambitious.  
 However, Der Derian’s book has relevance to this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, 
he demonstrated that embracing diplomatic theory as an independent topic was a viable 
and productive field of enquiry. Secondly, Der Derian highlighted that approaching 
diplomatic theory in an innovative and original fashion resulted in new insight. By 
tackling diplomatic theory in this fashion, Der Derian ‘breathed fresh life’ into diplomatic 
theory.19  
This thesis adopts a similar approach to diplomatic theory as Wight and Der 
Derian. This thesis tackles diplomatic theory as an independent topic, in an original 
fashion and proposes an innovative solution to strengthening diplomatic theory.  This 
                                                 
16 For example of some book reviews of Der Derian’s hallmark work, see On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of 
Western Estrangement by James Der Derian. 1989. Reviewed by Mark Warren, Journal of Politics, 51 (1), 
208 – 211; On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement by James Der Derian. 1987. Reviewed 
by Christopher Hill, International Affairs, 64 (1), 104; Constantinou, Costas M. (1993). Late Modern 
Diplomacies. Millennium, 22 (1), pp. 89 – 96. One critic described On Diplomacy as ‘an ambitious 
consideration of diplomacy’ (Warren, Book Review, p. 208) and another, more cuttingly, as ‘largely 
tedious to read, larded as it is with pretentious language and displays of cultural one-upmanship’ (Hill, 
Book Review, p. 104). 
17 Wight, Why is there no International Theory?, p. 20. 
18 Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 9. 
19 Constantinou, Late Modern Diplomacies, p. 90. 
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thesis is not suggesting that ‘there is no diplomatic theory’, nor does it suggest that 
‘diplomacy is resistant to theory’.20 Works on diplomatic theory do exist within the canon 
of diplomacy studies, but are ‘scattered, unsystematic’ and hardly prominent.21 In 
addition, this thesis argues that far from being resistant to theory the subject of diplomacy 
is a promising, important and largely unexplored area of enquiry.  
 
1.3 De Callieres will tell us all we need to know: the essence of diplomatic theory. 
In order to establish the essence of diplomatic theory (what diplomatic theory is?) 
several well-known books on diplomatic theory are examined here.22 These explicit 
theoretical works are only a recent occurrence in the diplomatic studies field. In addition, 
they are hardly numerous, which could suggest, as does Hocking, that existing theoretical 
works on diplomacy ‘tell us all we need to know’ in relation to modern diplomacy.23 The 
aim in this section is to test this claim and elucidate the central tenets of diplomatic 
theory from these works.  
The title of Lauren’s Diplomacy: New Approaches History, Theory, and Policy 
(1979) suggests that a least a third of the book is devoted to diplomatic theory.24 The 
inclusion of a thorough explanation of diplomatic theory would also be expected. 
However, this is not the case. Only the introductory chapter, written by the editor himself, 
explicitly mentions diplomacy and theory. Within this chapter it is clear that Lauren is 
                                                 
20 Der Derian, Mediating estrangement, p. 91 
21 Wight, Why is there no International Theory?, p. 20. 
22 These works are ‘briefly’ examined here to highlight the difficulty in extracting the central tenets of 
diplomatic theory. In the following chapter these works are incorporated in an extensive literature review, 
where, conversely, they are employed to demonstrate the strength of a particular type of diplomatic theory: 
Traditional Diplomatic Theory.  
23 Brian Hocking. (1997). The end(s) of diplomacy. International Journal, 53 (1), p. 170. 
24 P. G. Lauren (ed.). (1979). Diplomacy: New Approaches History, Theory, and Policy. New York: Free 
Press. 
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discussing the relationship between diplomatic history, IR theory25 and foreign policy, 
and the need for an interdisciplinary confluence between all three. At no point does 
Lauren clearly explain what he considers diplomatic theory to be. Lucid and simple 
postulations on diplomatic theory are absent in this work. The reader is left pondering 
what Lauren’s ‘new approach’ to diplomacy and theory is. Relying on Lauren’s work, we 
are no closer to understanding the essence of diplomatic theory.  
A similar avoidance of the basic tenets of diplomatic theory is apparent within 
Berridge’s Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger.26 Berridge relies upon the 
‘classic texts’27 to illustrate ‘the evolution of diplomatic theory’ from the 15th century till 
the 20th.28 For Berridge, modern diplomatic theory relates to ‘the business of a 
multiplicity of states’ and the practical activity of diplomacy, which is heavily influenced 
by a slow historical development.29 Berridge does elucidate several concise theoretical 
observations on diplomacy, which include: diplomacy has ‘no true end or purpose’; 
‘negotiation should wait for the right season’; diplomats ‘need not keep their promises to 
foreign governments if this does not serve the interests of their own states’; diplomacy is 
about ‘permanent rather than sporadic negotiation conducted with wartime enemies as 
well as peacetime friends’; and finally, that ‘lobbying, gleaning information and 
                                                 
25 According to Lauren IR theory comes in three forms: firstly, empirical theory, which ‘tries to explain 
processes, develop propositions, and discover correlations in the world of interaction among nations’; 
secondly, normative theory, which ‘possesses an inescapably philosophical dimension, and addresses the 
“ought” rather than the “is” of international affairs’; finally, policy science theory, which ‘attempts to 
provide explicit guidance for the specific task of policy makers’ (Lauren, Diplomacy, p. 8). These three 
theories are, naturally, relevant to IR but in terms of diplomatic theory have questionable application. In the 
modern era diplomatic theory can and must be considered sui generis. 
26 G.R. Berridge. (2001). Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissenger. London: Palgrave. 
27 In this work the authors consider the classic texts as those written by Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Grotius, 
Richelieu, Wicquefort, Callieres, Satow, Nicolson and Kissenger.  
28 ibid., p. 2. 
29 ibid., p. 3. 
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negotiation are staple functions’ of diplomacy.30 While all of these theoretical 
observations are correct, Berridge is actually telling us what diplomacy does, rather than 
what diplomacy is. At no point does Berridge explicitly explain what he considers 
diplomatic theory to be, what diplomacy is. 
That both Berridge and Lauren fail to elucidate the central tenets of diplomatic 
theory exemplifies a common occurrence in the diplomatic studies field. Where the 
explicit diplomatic theory literature is concerned a concise bullet-point description is 
difficult to extract. Such deficiency in diplomatic theory is apparent when compared to 
the rigour of IR theory, for example. Each of the established IR theories is able to 
elucidate its central tenets and assumptions in simple and lucid fashion.31 Where 
diplomatic theory is concerned, no concise presentation of its central tenets exists. This 
failure to engage with the foundations of diplomatic theory confirms the impression of 
diplomatic theory as robust, concise and rigorous.32  
The impression of diplomatic theory as robust is understandable. Within most 
diplomatic works implicit references to the foundations of diplomatic theory do exist. 33 
Commonly, there are four central tenets of diplomatic theory that can be extracted with 
some difficulty. Firstly, that diplomatic theory is applicable to the state system and the 
traditional diplomacy that ‘greases’ it. This form of diplomacy is, secondly, conventional, 
                                                 
30 ibid., p. 4. 
31 For example, see John Bayliss and Steve Smith. (2005). The Globalization of World Politics: An 
Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp, 161 – 297. Bayliss and Smith 
present extensive and concise information on Realism, Liberalism, Neo-Realism, Neo-Liberalism, 
Marxism, and Constructivism. Similarly, see Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf. (2004). 
World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 9th Edition. Thomson Wadsworth, pp. 29 – 59. These authors 
also present the central tenets of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism in a clear and simple fashion.   
32 Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 6. 
33 For example, see G. R. Berridge. (2002). Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. London: Palgrave; Francois 
De Callieres. (1983). The Art of Diplomacy. Edited by H. M. A. Keens-Soper and K. W. Schweizer. 
Leicester: Leicester University Press; Johan Kaufmann. (1998). The Diplomacy of International Relations. 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International; Henry Kissinger. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
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official and professional and executed primarily through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
or an equivalent diplomatic institution. Thirdly, this form of diplomacy is influenced by a 
long period of historical development, where evolution has been incremental rather than 
radical. Familiarity and continuity of diplomatic method are thus, fourthly, central to 
theorising on state-to-state diplomacy. 
Within diplomatic studies, the state, and its traditional diplomatic institution, is 
thus endorsed as the ‘only diplomatic actor of significance’ in the modern diplomatic 
environment.34 This approach to theorising on diplomacy has several synonyms: ‘statist’ 
or ‘state-centric’ being the most popular.35 Reliance on this statist approach suggests that 
diplomatic theory is largely concerned with the practical interaction between traditional, 
state actors. Elman and Elman refer to this state focus as ‘theory on the practice’ of 
diplomacy rather than ‘theory on the theory’.36 There is a major difference between these 
focuses, which several diplomatic theorists highlight. Der Derian, for example, claims 
that we assume that some of the more famous guides37 on the practice of diplomacy are in 
essence diplomatic theory. For Der Derian, this assumption is incorrect, which prompted 
him to observe of pure diplomatic theory ‘that such knowledge is not readily available. 
The major subject of concern in the field of diplomacy has been its practice.’38   
 This practical focus in diplomatic textbooks is significant, after all diplomacy is a 
profession and it is important to postulate on its professional nature. However, by 
                                                 
34 K. J. Holsti. (2004). Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 19. 
35 For the origins and usage of the both terms see, Hannes Lacher. (2003). Putting the state in its place: the 
critique of state-centrism and its limits. Review of International Studies, 29 (4), pp. 521 – 542. 
36 Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. (2003). Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising 
the Field.  Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 7. 
37 Der Derian’s famous guides are: ‘Abraham de Wicquefort’s L’Ambassadeur et ses functions (1681), 
Francois de Callieres’ De la maniere de negocier avec les souverains (1716), Ernest Satow’s Guide to 
Diplomatic Practice (1917) and Harold Nicolson’s Diplomacy (1939)’ (Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 2). 
38 Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 2. 
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focusing on the practical nature of diplomacy, diplomatic theory is largely ignored. In the 
former case, we theorise on a profession and an insitutionalised activity, in the latter on 
the ‘thoughts and ideas’ of academics involved in the diplomacy studies field.39 The 
focus on the practical aspect of diplomacy, rather than the theory of diplomacy, is 
perhaps the most obvious occurrence within the field.  
Textbooks claiming to be diplomatic theory are in fact geared towards the many 
practical aspects of diplomacy. Such ‘conventional accounts’ of diplomacy usually 
include:  
 
a narration of the progressive story of diplomatic history; the organisation of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; the formulation of foreign policy; the functions of the embassy; the qualities of 
the diplomat; and different accounts dealing with issues ranging from negotiation to 
immunities, and from international trade or law to etiquette and protocol.40 
 
This formulaic approach (with an emphasis on the practical) is a broad 
generalisation of the type of diplomatic theory that De Callieres, Satow, Nicolson and 
Berridge espouse, for example. Not all works published on diplomacy and diplomatic 
theory adopt this approach. However, the majority relate primarily to the state, the 
traditional diplomatic institution and the practice of diplomacy. As a result, there are 
several problems with a continued reliance on this type of statist and practical diplomatic 
‘theory’.  
                                                 
39 Robert Jackson. (2002) Martin Wight’s Thought on Diplomacy. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 13 (4), p. 20. 
40 Constantinou, Late Modern Diplomacies, p. 89. 
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Firstly, and most obviously, a concise answer to the question ‘what is diplomatic 
theory?’ remains elusive. If focus on the practical aspects of diplomacy endures then 
works devoted to pure diplomatic theory will remain on the fringe of the discipline. Lucid 
observations on diplomatic theory, when rarely encountered, are usually described in 
fleeting and perfunctory fashion. Observations on diplomatic theory therefore tend to be 
vague, what Nicolson referred to as ‘precise, although wide’.41 In other words, lucid 
postulations on the basic tenets of diplomatic theory will continue to escape the 
diplomatic studies field. 
 A second problem relates to the field’s general treatment or attitude towards 
diplomatic theory as an independent topic. In the explicit diplomatic theory texts no 
attempt is made by the authors to stop and ask ‘what is diplomatic theory?’ Perhaps they 
have no answer; perhaps we cannot speak of a distinct, recognisable and extractable form 
of diplomatic theory or perhaps we simply assume that diplomatic theory is statist, 
historical and traditional. If Lauren and Berridge, two adroit observers on diplomacy, are 
unwilling or unable to convey the essence of diplomatic theory then the assumption that 
diplomatic theory does not merit deeper exploration may be correct.  
For these types of theorists, there is nothing ‘inherently interesting in examining 
what modern diplomats do because there is nothing of significance in what is new. In 
fact, there is nothing new. De Callieres will tell you all you need to know’.42 Such a 
flippant attitude results in practical, one-dimensional and state-centric theories of 
diplomacy. This reliance would be appropriate if the modern diplomatic environment was 
composed only of traditional, state actors.  
                                                 
41 Harold Nicolson. (1950). Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5. 
42 Hocking, The end(s) of diplomacy, p. 170. 
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However, in the modern era the diplomatic environment is composed of not only 
traditional state actors but also non-state actors such as NGOs and MNCs. In addition, 
‘unconventional’ arenas for state and non-state diplomatic exchange, such as multi-lateral 
IGOs, are now a permanent feature of the modern diplomatic environment. Therefore, it 
can be argued that the majority of statist works on diplomatic theory fail to account for 
the complexity and multi-actor nature of modern diplomacy. In other words, statist 
diplomatic theory only tells us part of the modern diplomatic story.  
Subsequently, the area of diplomatic theory has become a target for claims of 
‘theoretical impoverishment’ by several diplomatic and International Relations (IR) 
theorists.43 For example, the ‘unrealistic narrative’ of contemporary diplomacy led Craig 
to complain that diplomacy, as a field of theoretical study, has ‘failed to engage the 
attention of the International Relations profession’.44 Puchala also wrote of his 
‘frustration with the intellectual sterility of many present-day renderings’45 concerning 
diplomacy and Sharp complained that ‘the study of diplomacy remains marginal to and 
almost disconnected from the rest of the IR field’.46  
The source of these authors’ frustration is that the few existing works on 
diplomatic theory are statist in constitution and, subsequently, focus on the practice of 
diplomacy. For Craig, Puchala and Sharp, the continuing dominance of statist diplomatic 
theory is unreflective of modern diplomacy, where state and non-state actors can co-exist 
                                                 
43 Ben D. Mor. (2003) Strategic Self-Presentation in Public Diplomacy. Paper presented at the annual 
conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 3 – 6, p. 2. 
44 Gordon A. Craig. (1983). The Historian and the Study of International Relations. American Historical 
Review, 88 (1), p. 2. 
45 Donald J. Puchala. (1995). The Pragmatics of International History. Mershon International Studies 
Review, 39 (1), p. 2. 
46 Sharp, For Diplomacy, p. 34. These complaints are not entirely novel. Similar laments have been levelled 
at diplomacy studies for some time now. For one example, see Smith Simpson. (1986). Perspectives on the 
Study of Diplomacy. Occasional Paper, Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. 
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in symbiotic diplomatic partnerships. The marginalised or ‘troubled state of diplomatic 
studies’ is a direct result of the state-centric domination of diplomatic theory, and the 
aligned theorist’s desire to regard diplomacy and diplomatic theory in singular, partial 
and narrow terms.47 Susan Strange accuses those state-centric theorists of practicing a 
form of ‘intellectual apartheid’, and warns that ‘the study must move with the times, or 
be marginalized as narrow specialism’.48 
 For diplomatic studies to ‘move with the times’ there is a need to modernise 
diplomatic theory. Central to updating/modernising diplomatic theory is to first 
acknowledge the complex, multi-actor environment it seeks to address.  
 
1.4 The shape of the modern diplomatic environment 
In the modern era, a thorough exploration of diplomatic theory is overdue; we no 
longer have the luxury of assuming diplomatic theory exists. In addition, where it exists 
diplomatic theory tends to be statist in constitution and is therefore relative to only one 
actor in the modern diplomatic environment. This environment is becoming increasingly 
complex and there is a need for diplomatic theory to mirror the multi-actor nature of the 
IR system. Today, ‘we find the diplomatic milieu inhabited by a growing diversity of 
actors, which certainly poses a far more complex image of international interaction than 
does the traditional intergovernmental perspective’.49 
Hocking, therefore, suggests that the modern diplomatic environment is no longer 
one where traditional diplomacy between states is the sole conduit for diplomacy. A 
                                                 
47 Paul Sharp. (2001). Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats. DSP Discussion Papers, Leicester: Centre for 
the Study of Diplomacy, p. 1. 
48 Susan Strange. (1992). States, firms and diplomacy. International Affairs, 68 (1), p. 11. 
49 Brian Hocking. (2004). Privatizing Diplomacy? International Studies Perspectives, 5, p. 147. 
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snapshot of the modern diplomatic environment reveals a plethora of state and non-state 
actors practicing wide and varied forms of official and unofficial diplomacy. There are 
six actors, environments and phenomena that this thesis, and the diplomatic studies field 
in general, considers as central to the modern diplomatic environment.  
 The first actor in this environment is a familiar one: the state. A state can be 
defined as a legal territorial entity composed of a stable population and a government; it 
possesses a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, and its sovereignty is recognised 
by other states in the international system.50 Currently, there are 191 states operating in 
the modern diplomatic environment.51 In this environment, a state typically pursues a 
foreign policy: the goals that officials representing states seek abroad, the values that 
underlie these goals and the means or instruments used to pursue them.52  
Chief among a state’s foreign policy instruments is the activity of diplomacy, 
housed physically in the traditional diplomatic institution. This form of diplomacy refers 
to the ‘official channels of communication employed by the members of a system of 
states’.53 In this context, diplomacy’s chief purpose is to ‘enable states to secure the 
objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or law’.54  
The number of traditional diplomatic institutions is hard to estimate as each state 
has several abroad, depending on the size and budget of the state at any given time. The 
British Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), for example, finances and manages 233 
                                                 
50 John Bayliss and Steve Smith (eds). (2005). The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 30. 
51 This figure was obtained from the United Nations, retrieved 4th February 2006, 
<http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html> 
52 Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf. (2004). World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 9th 
Edition. California: Thomson Wadsworth, p. 63. 
53 Berridge, Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger, p. 1. 
54 Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, p. 1. 
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embassies, High Commissions, Consulates and Missions to International Organisations.55 
These are linked to the Foreign Office in London in a single, global network that employs 
almost 6,000 UK-based staff and 10,000 local staff.56 This network operates with a total 
annual budget of 1.5 billion pounds.57 The large numbers of diplomatic institutions and 
states means that these traditional entities remain central actors in the modern diplomatic 
environment.  
 The second type of actor operating in the modern diplomatic environment is an 
NGO. An NGO is any group of people ‘relating to each other regularly, in some formal 
manner and engaging in collective action, provided that the activities are non-commercial 
and non-violent, and not on behalf of a government.58 The purpose of NGOs is wide and 
varied. Some NGOs have a political purpose, some a humanitarian function, and others 
an economic or technical intention. All seek, however, to influence government policy 
and to fill gaps left by the government in policy execution. 
The number of NGOs in the modern diplomatic environment has increased 
significantly, growing from 997 in 1954 to 20,928 in 2005/6.59 What makes NGOs 
increasingly prominent in the modern diplomatic environment is that their activities are 
now shaping responses to issues that were once determined exclusively by traditional 
state actors. For example, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and other global issues-
                                                 
55 The FCO Annual Report. (2004). UK: Public Records Office, p. 4. Of the FCO’s 233 Posts, 153 are 
Embassies or High Commissions in foreign capitals and ten are UK Representatives or Delegations to 
international organisations or conferences. The others are Consulates, Deputy High Commissions and 
British Offices. In addition, 38 Posts are staffed entirely by local staff. The FCO also has resident 
Governors in 9 of the 14 Overseas Territories such as Australia or Canada. 
56 ibid., p. 6. 
57 ibid., p. 12. 
58 Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, p. 134. 
59 From Part A: Statistical Data Graphics, Figure 1.1.1. (a): Overview of number of international 
organisations by type [types A-G,] of the Yearbook of International Organisations, Edition 42, 2005/2006, 
edited by the Union of International Associations, Lausanne, Switzerland.  
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advocacy groups use their technical expertise, organisational flexibility, and grassroots 
connections to affect most stages of the development of international regimes, from 
problem recognition through to policy implementation. NGOs also involve complex 
networks of people, who ‘coalesce in myriad combinations at different times, for various 
purposes’.60  Their presence and influence demonstrates that modern diplomacy is not 
merely the interaction of sovereign, territorial states. The increasing numbers of NGOs 
and their widespread popularity suggests that they are now an integral part of the modern 
diplomatic environment.  
 The third type of actor in this environment is also a non-state entity: Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs). MNCs are business enterprises organised in one state with 
activities or affiliates in a foreign country.61 These affiliates may be branches of the 
parent company, separately incorporated subsidiaries or associates, with large minority 
share holdings.62 The number of MNCs and their international scope has grown 
dramatically since the end of the World War II. At the beginning of the 21st century there 
are more than 53,000 MNCs, which have over 450,000 foreign affiliates.63 These ever-
growing numbers suggest that MNCs exercise significant clout in the modern diplomatic 
system, with global assets in excess of $13 trillion (USD) and global sales of more than 
$9.5 trillion (USD).64  
 These figures suggest that MNC’s financial clout rivals or exceeds the Gross 
National Product of many countries, which means these immense corporations affect the 
ability of sovereign state actors to ‘control their own economies and therefore their own 
                                                 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid., p. 173. 
62 Bayliss and Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, p. 430. 
63 Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, p. 173. 
64 ibid. 
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fate’.65 Large MNCs thus ‘develop their own task-defined diplomatic structures to serve 
their particular needs and develop local expertise that national diplomatic services find 
hard to rival’.66 Because of their financial strength, global reach and emerging 
political/diplomatic structures, MNCs exert great influence in the modern diplomatic 
environment. The interests of these large corporations doing business globally do not 
necessarily correspond with any one state’s interest. Some MNCs may even act against 
their home government and many control greater resources, and operate internationally 
with greater efficiency than many small states. As MNCs increase in size and influence, 
they ‘begin to act like states in certain respects’.67  
 A fourth actor prominent in the modern diplomatic environment is the 
International Government Organisation (IGO). IGOs are purposely created by states to 
solve shared issues, which gives them whatever authority they possess for the purposes 
that their members states assign them.68 The growth of IGOs in the last hundred years has 
been significant. In 1909, there were 37 IGOs, by 1962 this number had risen to 163 and 
by the years 2005/6 the modern diplomatic environment had 1,963 IGOs.69 This 
expansion of IGOs has created a complex network of overlapping international 
organisations which cooperate with one another to deal with a wide range of global 
issues.70 
                                                 
65 ibid., p. 141. 
66 ibid. 
67 Hocking, Privatizing Diplomacy?, p. 149. 
68 Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, p. 137. 
69 From Part A: Statistical Data Graphics, Figure 1.1.1. (a): Overview of number of international 
organisations by type [types A-G,] of the Yearbook of International Organisations, Edition 42, 2005/2006, 
edited by the Union of International Associations, Lausanne, Switzerland. 
70 These issues are diverse and varied. Some examples are trade, defence, disarmament, economic 
development, agriculture, health, culture, human rights, the arts, illegal drugs, tourism, labour, women’s 
rights, education, debt, the environment, international crime, humanitarian aid, civilian crisis relief, 
telecommunications, science, globalisation, immigration and refugees.  
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IGOs can also be characterised by their permanence and institutional organisation; 
IGOs meet at relatively regular intervals and have specified procedures for making 
decisions and a permanent secretariat or headquarters staff. A final characteristic of IGOs 
is the diplomacy they practice, which is of a multi-lateral nature. Multilateral diplomacy 
is now a valuable form of diplomacy because in certain circumstances (where member 
states have a common interest) it provides the best chance for a successful and speedy 
negotiation. In certain cases multi-lateral diplomacy is cheaper, faster and more effective 
than traditional bi-lateral diplomacy. Subsequently, IGOs, and their multilateral 
diplomacy, are now a common feature of the modern diplomatic environment.  
A fifth feature of the modern diplomatic environment is not another actor but an 
alternate environment for diplomacy: diplomacy by summit. Summitry is a term that 
applies only ‘to meetings between incumbent heads of government and/or heads of state, 
or political leaders’.71 The summit embodies Lloyd George’s emphasis on face-to-face 
meetings of the upper echelons of power. He stated firmly that ‘if you want to settle a 
thing, you see your opponent and talk it over with him. The last thing to do is write him a 
letter.’72 
The growth of summitry in the twentieth century has been impressive. In the 
modern era, foreign leaders are familiar with both the demands and necessity of 
summitry, and are ‘increasingly performing diplomatic roles on the international stage’.73 
Beside the ‘enormous symbolic and propaganda potential’, the participation of the head 
                                                 
71 Jan Melissen. (2003). Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age. Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, p. 4. 
72 ibid., p. 2.  
73 ibid., p. 1. 
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of state (the diplomat-in-chief) can act as a catalyst to negotiation at a lower level.74 
Summits, and the presence of statesmen, can give negotiations ‘an extra push’, ‘sustain 
diplomatic momentum’ or ‘serve to break remaining deadlocks by virtue of authority’.75 
Alongside ‘providing some impetus’76 to sluggish negotiations, the presence of statesmen 
and their ultimate authority can set firm deadlines for the ‘completion of an existing 
negotiation’.77 Summits therefore can kick-start stalled negotiations or end negotiations 
that are unlikely to produce a worthwhile result for those states involved. Their value and 
frequency makes diplomacy by summit an important and visible feature of the modern 
diplomatic environment.  
 Influencing all five features of the modern diplomatic environment is a sixth and 
final phenomenon: the revolution in Information and Communications Technology (ICT). 
This phenomenon is often referred to as the ‘information revolution’ in the diplomatic 
studies literature.78 Advances in ICT provide new communications tools, demand new 
organisational processes, and alter existing hierarchies and power relationships among 
global diplomatic actors.79 The ‘revolution’ has made information itself a crucial source 
of national power and influence.  The information revolution has had a substantial impact 
on diplomacy, affecting both the content and the conduct of the diplomatic enterprise 
necessary for success in the transformed international arena.  The modern diplomatic 
                                                 
74 Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, p. 173. 
75 ibid., p. 176. 
76 Johan Kaufmann. (1998). The Diplomacy of International Relations. Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, p. 60. 
77 Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, p. 174. 
78 For discussion on the information revolution and diplomacy, see Richard Burt and Olin Robison. (1998) 
Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age: A Report of the CSIS Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the 
Information Age. Washington: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies; G. Kramarenko and A. 
Krutskikh. (2003). Diplomacy and the Information Revolution. International Affairs, 49 (5), 115 – 123; 
Jovan Kurbaliga. (1999). Knowledge and Diplomacy. Valetta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic 
Studies. 
79 Jeffery R. Cooper, ‘Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries’, 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, 
<www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html> 
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environment – dominated by rapid improvements in ICT -   ‘intensifies the exchange of 
information, view, ideas, services, goods and helps create various virtual communities 
united by common interests’.80   
 All six of these themes are prevalent in the modern diplomatic environment. The 
visibility and impact of these six themes confirms that singular, statist and practical 
works on diplomatic theory only account for one actor (the state) in an increasingly 
complex environment. In other words, statist works on diplomatic theory are restrictive; 
‘De Callieres’ does not ‘tell us all we need to know’ in relation to modern diplomacy.81 
State-centric diplomatic theories and theorists tend to avoid the multi-actor nature 
of modern diplomacy, preferring to endorse the questionable omnipotence of their 
beloved traditional diplomatic institution. Thus, state-centric theorists appear to be adroit 
at ‘perfecting and embellishing familiar bricks in a long-established wall whose 
foundations are crumbling’.82 State-centric diplomatic theorists continue to emphasise the 
one-dimensionality of diplomacy, endorsing a sentimental vision of the past when 
diplomacy had ‘the monopoly on foreign policy’.83   
Statist or ‘traditional textbooks’ fail to recognise that ‘diplomacy amounts to more 
than what is traditionally attributed to it, they are both too narrow and too exclusive’.84 
Existing diplomatic theory accounts only for official, conventional and traditional 
diplomacy.  However, TDT remains a profitable area of enterprise within the diplomatic 
                                                 
80 G. Kramarenko and A. Krutskikh. (2003) Diplomacy and the Information Revolution. International 
Affairs, 49 (5), p. 116.  
81 Hocking, The end(s) of diplomacy, p. 170. 
82 Sharp, For Diplomacy, p. 50. 
83 Richard Langhorne. (1998). Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State. Diplomatic Studies Program, 
Leicester University, No. 43, p. 1. 
84 Costas M. Constantinou. (1996). On the Way to Diplomacy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
pp. 89 - 90.  
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studies field. The statist focus remains valuable as the traditional diplomatic institution 
endures at the heart of modern diplomacy. It is important to continue theorising on this 
age-old diplomatic actor. In addition, by categorising this type of diplomatic theory, TDT 
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Chapter Two – Traditional Diplomatic Theory 
The aim of this chapter is to evidence Traditional Diplomatic Theory (TDT) 
within the canon of diplomacy studies.1 This chapter will survey the general 
characteristics of a Traditional Diplomatic Theorist. From this survey a comprehensive 
profile of this type of diplomatic theorist is constructed. Each of the following sections 
will add layers to the profile of TDT. The construction of the TDT categorisation allows 
this thesis to appraise its strengths, weaknesses and relevancy to the modern diplomatic 
environment.  
 
2.0 The origins of traditional diplomacy  
The type of diplomacy on which Traditionalists2 theorise is state-qua-state 
diplomacy, a practice that is influenced by historical tradition. Familiarity and continuity 
for the state and its official diplomatic institution are important; ‘in the often 
                                                 
1 Within the canon the following works are prominent: Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein and Richard 
Langhorne. (2002). Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy. London: Continuum; Keith Hamilton 
and Richard Langhorne. (1995). The Practice of Diplomacy. London; Routledge; G. Ball. (1976). 
Diplomacy for a Crowded World. London: Bodley Head; P. G. Lauren. (1976). Diplomats and 
Bureaucrats. California: Stanford; G. R. Berridge. (2002) Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. London: 
Palgrave; Francois De Callieres. (1983). The Art of Diplomacy, edited by M. A. Keens- Soper. Leicester: 
Leicester University Press; H. Nicolson. (1950). Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Henry 
Kissinger. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster; Adam Watson. (1982) Diplomacy: The 
Dialogue Between States. London: Eyre Methuen; Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield. (1966). 
Diplomatic Investigations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; H. Nicolson. (1998) The Evolution of the 
Diplomatic Method: Being the Chichele Lectures delivered at the University of Oxford in November 1953. 
Leicester: Diplomatic Studies Programme; Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George. (1995). Force and 
Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Sir Ernest Satow. (1922). 
A Guide to Diplomatic Practice. London: Longman; A. de Wicquefort. (1997) The Ambassador and His 
Functions. (translated by J. Digby in 1716 and reproduced by the Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 
University of Leicester, 1997). In the canon, more general (Traditionalist) texts on diplomacy are: R. P. 
Barston. (1997). Modern Diplomacy. London: Longman; A. Eban. (1998). Diplomacy for the Next Century. 
New Haven: Yale University Press; C. W. Freeman. (1997) Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy. 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press; A. George. (1991) Forceful Persuasion: Cooercive 
Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press; P. G. Lauren. 
(1979) Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy. New York: Free Press; Kenneth W. 
Thompson. (1992). Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. Louisiana: 
Louisiana State University Press.  
2 For the remainder of this thesis traditional diplomatic theorists will be referred to as ‘Traditionalists’ (with 
a capital T) as this thesis evidences and builds a distinct group within the diplomatic studies field.  
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cacophonous political life tradition is certainly a factor to be reckoned with; none more so 
than in diplomacy’.3 The emphasis on tradition in diplomacy relates to a long historical 
period of development.       
 Preceeding the traditional form of diplomacy was a long period of evolution, 
commonly described as Roman to Greek, Greek to Byzantine, Byzantine to Venetian, 
Venetian to French, French to European.4 However, in tracing the origins of traditional 
diplomacy, the French period of evolution in the 17th century is especially significant.5  
Traditional diplomacy emerged in Europe following the ultimate cessation of the 
Thirty Years War in 1648.6 This was the year that the one hundred and ninety-four 
belligerents signed the Treaty of Westphalia. 1648 was the year of ‘the emergence of the 
modern states system in International Politics’.7 This period marked the medieval to 
modern shift, the transition of European society from feudalism to a system of sovereign 
territorial states. The acceptance of 1648 as the inception of the state system is not 
                                                 
3 T. J Otte. (1998) Harold Nicolson and Diplomatic Theory: Between Old Diplomacy and New. DSP 
Discussion Papers, No. 44 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy), p. 125. 
4 Within the diplomatic studies field there exists agreement on the evolution of diplomacy. For an 
informative account of the evolution of diplomacy see Raymond Cohen. (1999). Reflections on the New 
Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500 BC to 2000 AD, in Melissen, Jan (ed.). (1999). Innovation in 
Diplomatic Practice. New York: Macmillan, pp. 1 – 18; Richard Langhorne in Jovan Kurbaliga (ed.). 
(1999). Modern Diplomacy. Valetta: Mediterranean Academy Diplomacy Studies; H. Nicolson. (1957). 
The Evolution of Diplomatic Method. London: Cassell Publishers; Charles Roetter. (1963). Diplomatic Art: 
An informal history of world diplomacy.  Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, pp. 21 – 33. 
5 For a through exploration of the evolution of diplomacy from the fifteenth century to the early 20th 
century see, M. S. Anderson. (1993). The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450 – 1919. London: Longman; 
Josh Goldstein. (1988). Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, pp. 281 – 374; Garret Mattingly. (1955). Renaissance Diplomacy. Mineola: Dover Publications.  
6 For a discussion on the causes, outbreak and resolution of the Thirty Years War see, Maurice Ashley. 
(1963). Golden Century: Europe 1598 – 1715. Troy: Phoenix Press, pp. 84 - 101; Geoffrey Mortimer. 
(2002). Individual Experience and Perception of the Thirty Years War in Eyewitness Personal Accounts. 
German History, 20 (2), pp. 141 – 160; Charles W. Kegley jr. and Gregory A. Raymond. (2002). 
Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp. 12 – 83.  
7 Richard Langhorne. (2000). Full Circle: New principles and old consequences in the modern diplomatic 
System. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 1 (1), p. 33. 
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without controversy,8 however during the seventeenth century significant changes to 
international relations can be evidenced.9 In short, the Treaty of Westphalia ‘established 
principles that have endured and remained at the heart of contemporary international 
politics’.10 One of these principles was diplomacy. 
The emerging state system needed a method to mitigate the conflict that had 
dominated Europe for a large part of the seventeenth century. This method was traditional 
diplomacy.11 Both diplomacy and the state system emerged and evolved in mutual 
reciprocity. So much that the origins and development of diplomacy, along with 
international law and a balance of power, were fundamental to the early evolution of the 
European state system. 
From the outset, European diplomacy espoused formal, ceremonial and pragmatic 
interaction based upon diplomatic norms.12 In addition, European diplomacy was elitist, 
secret and confirmed the ‘remoteness of the ordinary citizen from foreign policy’.13 
European diplomacy was pessimistic, realist, distinctly undemocratic and ‘was predicated 
                                                 
8 This thesis avoids entering the debate over the relevancy of the Treaty of Westphalia (1646 – 1648) as the 
inception of the modern state system. Instead this thesis employs the Treaty of Westphalia as a convenient 
date to classify a paradigm shift – from medievalism to modernism - in International Relations. There exists 
a wealth of literature on this particular debate however, notably see Stephen D. Krasner. (1995/96) 
Compromising Westphalia. International Security, 20 (3), pp. 115 – 151; Andreas Osiander. (2001). 
Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth. International Organisation, 55 (2), pp. 251 
–287; Daniel Philpott. (1999). Westphalia, Authority and International Society. Political Studies, pp. 566 – 
589.  
9 This thesis employs the Treaty of Westphalia, as Caporaso suggests, as a ‘valuable point of departure’ in 
chronologically classifying a significant development or shift in the formation of a distinct opinion on 
contemporary diplomacy. For more on the central features of the Westphalian state see, Charles W. Kegley 
jr. and Gregory A. Raymond. (2002). Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia. New Jersey: Prentice Hall; 
James Caporaso. (2000) Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority and Sovereignty. 
International Studies Association, pp. 1 – 28; James Caporaso. (1996) The European Union and Forms of 
State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (1), pp. 29 – 52. 
10 Anon., (1999, December 30th). States and Sovereignty.  The Times, London, UK, p.16.  
11 In this section traditional and European diplomacy are presented as one and the same. 
12 F. Gilbert. (1951). The “New Diplomacy” of the Eighteenth Century. World Politics, 4, pp. 6 – 7. 
13 Kenneth Younger. (1964). Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy. International Affairs, 1, p. 22. 
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not on the peace-loving nature of states but on their propensity for war, which needed to 
be discouraged or balanced.’14 
The system that discouraged war and managed relations between states was the 
balance of power.15 This system was greased by traditional diplomacy and was backed up 
by the intimidating military power of the five dominant European states: Britain, France, 
Germany (Prussia), Austria and Russia. 16  
The characteristics of this historical/traditional type of diplomacy - constitutional 
monarchies, mass colonialism or the distance of the public from international affairs, for 
example – cease to exist today, but the fundamental tenets of sovereignty, national 
interest, state representation and national security lie at the heart of traditional diplomacy. 
In addition to these tenets, there are also two necessary qualifications of traditional 
diplomacy. 
The first qualification for diplomacy is that there must be more than one state. 
These states must be sovereign political units, able to exercise supreme authority within, 
                                                 
14 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 222. 
15 In essence the ‘rule’ of the European balance of power system was that each of the five great powers 
(Britain, France, Germany (Prussia), Austria and Russia) should cooperate as necessary to preserve the 
balance, for this system was the principle means for discouraging any one state from seeking hegemony. 
Amongst the great powers, it was understood that considerable flexibility in making alliances and shifting 
alliance partners was necessary to this end. Permanent, rigid alliances were to be avoided, a rule violated 
with terrible consequences in the variant of the system before the Great War. For discussion on the efficacy 
of the Balance of Power system see Craig, Gordon A. and George, Alexander L. (1995). Force and 
Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25 – 43; Kissinger, 
Henry. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 168 – 201. 
16 For more information of the shape of the Balance of Power system, see M. Wight and H. Butterfield. 
(1966). Diplomatic Investigations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Butterfield describes the system 
as a loose association of powerful states, distrustful of one another (‘secret agents, political adventurers and 
the adroit manipulators flourished’ under the Balance of Power system according to Butterfield in 
Diplomatic Investigations, p. 186) but keen to ensure affiliation of some sort. He notes that ‘the states 
within the system (however bitter their rivalries) belonged to a recognisable cultural group, and were 
members of the same ‘club’ – ready to compete for position within the ‘club’, but anxious not to destroy 
the club’ (Butterfield, Diplomatic Investigations, p. 189).  
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and independence outside, the unit.17 A second qualification is the existence of shared 
values and interests, which allow states to develop some regular pattern of interaction if 
these qualifications are to constitute a diplomatic system.18 The regular pattern of 
interaction, determined by national interest and facilitated by diplomacy, is a continuous 
rather than a sporadic activity.19  
Guiding the pattern of state interaction is a coherent set of diplomatic rules that 
each state adheres to. These rules are designed to mitigate the complexity of the IR 
system through commonality.  Different states have different languages, cultures, 
religions, histories and social values, for example, and diplomacy is the common 
currency running throughout the state system. Often, these differing state values can lead 
to conflict. In order to reduce this friction between states, traditional diplomacy is 
                                                 
17 Hedley Bull. (1977). The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics. New York: Columbia 
University Press, p. 8. 
18 Der Derian, Mediating Estrangement, p. 109. 
19 For expansion of this theme, see  M. S. Anderson. (1993). The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450 – 1919. 
London: Longman, pp. 1 – 20; Garrett Mattingly. (1955). Renaissance Diplomacy. Mineola: Dover 
Publications, pp. 181 – 192. The need for continuity in foreign relations led to the creation of the resident 
ambassador, a development accredited to the period after the Thirty Years War. Although the Italian city 
state system had earlier generated the resident earlier and produced a clear statement of what it meant (‘the 
first duty of an ambassador is exactly the same as any other servant of a government, that is, to do, say, 
advise and think whatever may best serve the preservation and aggrandizement of his own state’) it was not 
until after the Thirty Years War that the resident Ambassador housed in the diplomatic embassy became a 
permanent feature of international relations (Barbaro, c1490 in Richard Langhorne. (2000). Full Circle. 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, 1 (1), p. 35). The need for diplomacy to be a continuous activity and not an 
occasional necessity, led to the permanent institutionalisation of the resident ambassador, and diplomacy as 
the primary means of state-qua-state interaction. The permanent institutionalisation of diplomacy and the 
notion of continuity is largely associated with France under the guidance of Richelieu and his successor, 
Mazarin. Both men were keen to develop a continuous flow of information, both inward and outward, from 
Paris. However, the realisation of such vision required a ‘unified system of management, under consistent 
and identifiable control, derived from a single source’, a notion unheard of and untried before in Europe 
(Langhorne, Full Circle, p. 37). Furthermore, France was keen to centralise foreign policy and distance 
herself from the practice that foreign policy was managed from the edge of the realm and open to 
interpretation by the whim of the autonomous resident. With France rapidly gaining major-power status, 
the significance of external relations was becoming increasingly important. This led to the creation of a 
centralised foreign ministry, a single, separate, office for the keeping of records and the control of French 
foreign affairs (Hamilton and Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, p. 72). 
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governed by a ‘constitutive framework of principles, rules and organised behaviour in 
interstate relations’.20  
Commonality, familiarity (of rules) and standardisation are central to traditional 
diplomacy. This type of diplomacy: 
 
is something they [states] have in common that enables them to communicate in a predictable 
and organised manner. Diplomats are the primary guardians and promoters of national interests 
of the states they represent but are at the same time members of a transnational group of 
professionals with a shared corporate culture, professional language, behavioral codes, entry 
procedures, socialisation patterns, norms and standards.21 
 
The official practitioners of diplomacy are guided by these standardised norms of 
state interaction, designed to promote and protect national interest as well as lessening the 
anarchical nature of the IR system through the established diplomatic tools of 
negotiation, bargaining and communication.  
These diplomatic rules took many years before they were codified. Today, the 
framework governing relations between states is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations (VCDR), which came into existence in 1961.22 The VCDR has several basic 
functions developed over time: to represent and protect national interests; negotiation; 
                                                 
20 Jozef Batora. (2003). Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy? Discussion 
Papers in Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’. No. 87, p. 1.  
21 ibid. 
22 For discussion on the pre-history and significance of the VCDR, see Richard Langhorne. (1992). The 
regulation of diplomatic practice: the beginnings to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. 
Review of International Studies, 18, 3-17. 
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reporting and gathering of information; and the promotion of friendly relations, including 
economic, cultural, scientific and commercial interests.23 
All of the notions described above are insitutionalised in a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (or equivalent institution), which is characterised by: a hierarchically ordered 
standardised system of diplomatic ranks, a culture and practice of secrecy, one-way 
communication with the public and specialised processes of recruitment, socialisation 
and re-socialisation (the system of rotation between assignments at home and abroad).24 
These characteristics, like the diplomatic rules, slowly developed in the centuries 
following the Treaty of Westphalia. This long period of evolution confirms the 
importance of tradition and continuity to this form of diplomacy.  
In the modern era, state-qua-state diplomacy remains wedded to tradition, and is 
heavily influenced by the historical development described above. In the modern sense, 
traditional diplomacy remains the ‘expression of a shared logic of appropriateness 
informing actions of and identities of states, distributing shared structures to all states’.25 
The notions of a shared logic, framework and structure endure at the heart of diplomacy 
allowing us a conceptualisation of tradition in diplomacy.  
 In light of this history, a definition of traditional diplomacy can be introduced. 
Traditional diplomacy can be described as an activity where ‘the foreign ministry and the 
national diplomatic systems over which it presides acts as a gatekeeper, monitoring and 
controlling the interactions between domestic and international policy environments and 
                                                 
23 The VCDR is available from the United Nations, retrieved, 4th February 2006, 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/diplomat.htm> 
24 Batora, Does The European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?, p. 7. 
25 ibid., p. 3. 
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funnelling information between them’.26 In this thesis traditional diplomacy is defined as 
a nationally endorsed system of diplomatic representation made up of overseas missions 
overseen by a central government department, typically designated as the Foreign 
Ministry.27 
 
2.1 The central tenets of traditional diplomatic theory 
Tradition is equally important to diplomatic theory. Traditionalists, as their 
moniker suggests, also stress tradition in diplomatic theory. Inherent to their theory is a 
belief in the centrality and omnipotence of the state and the diplomatic institution to 
diplomatic theory. Hence, a Traditionalist theorist endorses, advocates and relates the 
historical and modern omnipotence of the state to diplomatic theory.   
 Traditionalists contend that the state, and consequently the diplomatic institution, 
remain the most important political units in the modern diplomatic environment. A strong 
relation to the Westphalian state principles of territoriality,28 authority, sovereignty,29 
                                                 
26 Hocking, Privatizing Diplomacy?, p. 150. 
27 ibid. 
28 For a discussion on the historical origins and contemporary relevance of territoriality, see K. J. Holsti. 
(2004). Territoriality, in K. J. Holsti. (2004). Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International 
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 73 – 112. 
29 See, Jean Bodin. (1992). On Sovereignty Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth. 
Franklin Julian, ed. & translator, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 4. In the 16th century Jean 
Bodin provided the first systematic approach on national sovereignty. In his work, Six Books of the 
Commonwealth, in 1576, he defined sovereignty as ‘the absolute and perpetual power of a 
Commonwealth…’ and stated that ‘he is absolutely sovereign who recognises nothing, after God, that is 
greater than himself.’ According to Bodin the central notion of absolute sovereignty – of being the judge in 
your own cause – meant ‘the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a 
commonwealth’. For a discussion on the modern relevancy of the concept of sovereignty, see Andrew 
Coleman and Jackson Maogoto. (2003). After the Party, is there a Cure for the Hangover? The Challenges 
of the Global Economy to Westphalian Sovereignty. Legal Issue of Economic Integration, 30 (1), pp. 35 – 
38. The modern IR system, according to Coleman and Maogoto, is based on the notion of absolute 
sovereignty. Of Sovereignty, they write that ‘what nation states mean and what they desire to protect most 
of all, when they refer to sovereignty, is primarily that within the context of their borders their government 
has the competence to organise the nation-states domestic management at its own discretion’  (p. 36). In 
other words, state sovereignty determines freedom from external influence, which is a form of political 
independence from external forces. For further discussion ,see also, Charles W. Kegley jr. and Gregory A. 
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power and legitimacy underlies much of the Traditionalist’s theory, and consolidates their 
argument that states are the primary actors in the modern diplomatic environment.  
 There are several historical examples of TDT. Each example has subtle variations 
but all export a similar message: the state, and its historical development, is central to 
diplomacy. For example, Butterfield describes traditional diplomacy as ‘historical’ 
diplomacy, reaching its zenith in the ‘golden age’ of eighteenth century Europe.30 
Historical diplomacy was characterised by ‘the virtue of power, complicated techniques 
and detailed practices and governed by rules or maxims possessing a permanent validity 
so long as policy is being operated within a system of states’.31 Wight prefers the term 
‘classical diplomacy’, as a ‘civilised and civilising’ activity relating to ‘the nature of the 
international states-system’ and lubricated by the traditional diplomatic institution, ‘the 
master institution of international society’.32 Nicolson employs the term ‘old diplomacy’, 
which he describes as distinctly Euro centric and based on state principles to emerge 
following the treaty of Westphalia.33 The common assumption in these observations on 
traditional diplomacy is that diplomacy is an activity associated with states. 
More recent works on diplomacy convey a similar statist message. For example in 
his 2003 book Diplomacy, Riordan refers consistently to ‘traditional diplomatic 
structures’, which he associates with the Westphalian system dominated by a highly rigid, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Raymond. (2002). Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp. 131 – 132; K. J. 
Holsti. (2004). Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 112 – 143; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk. (1992). The End of 
Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmented Globe. Aldershot: Ashgate, Edward Elgar, pp. 1 
– 13. 
30 Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations, p. 183. 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid., pp. 10 – 12. 
33 Nicolson, Diplomacy, p. 28. 
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hierarchical policy formulation and decision making process.34 And Kissinger writes that 
three centuries after Westphalia ‘there is little evidence to suggest that this age old model 
of diplomacy has changed, or is likely to change in the decades ahead’.35 Kissinger’s 
views suggest that diplomatic theory embodies continuity and evolution, rather than 
revolution. Revolution ‘is hardly the dominant metaphor in the field, there has been 
relatively little genuine innovation’ in terms of diplomatic theory.36 Therefore, it could be 
argued that traditional diplomatic theory focuses on ‘explaining not change, but rather 
enduring regularities’ in diplomacy.37 In other words, diplomatic theory is concerned 
with maintaining continuity and tradition in scholarship. 
Attempts to convey the essence of diplomatic theory have the state at their core, 
which further reinforces the notions of continuity and tradition.38 In Diplomatic Theory 
from Machiavelli to Kissinger (2001), Berridge, for example, correlates the inception of 
diplomatic theory to the emergence of the Westphalian State system. He writes ‘when it 
became clear that the rulers of Europe had a common interest in regulating their 
frequently bellicose ‘foreign’ relations, diplomatic theory acquired an explicit political 
flavour’.39 Consequently, diplomatic theory explains ‘diplomacy by reference to the 
business of a multiplicity of states, and [the theorists] who are persuaded of its 
                                                 
34 Shaun Riordan. (2003). The New Diplomacy. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 13. Riordan highlights that the 
key points of the Westphalian diplomatic system – that came to prominence in the 19th century - were that 
nations had complete jurisdiction over their domestic affairs; there was no superior jurisdiction to the 
nation state; international law existed only in so far as it permitted the minimal rules of coexistence 
between states; and war was permitted to resolve disputes between states, ‘might is right’ being a key 
principle of international relations. (Riordan, The New Diplomacy, p. 12) 
35 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 19. 
36 Miles Kahler. (1997). ‘Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory after 1945’ in 
M. Doyle and G. J. Ikenberry. (eds), New Thinking in International Relations Theory, p. 42. 
37 ibid. 
38 For example, see G. R. Berridge. (2002). Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. London: Palgrave; P. G. 
Lauren. (ed.). (1979). Diplomacy: New Approaches History, Theory, and Policy. New York: Free Press. 
39 Berridge, Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, p. 2. 
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indispensable usefulness – amounting to necessity – to the European states-system’.40 
Although Berridge argues that over time the work of diplomatic theorists41 suggests an 
‘evolution of diplomatic theory’, he later notes that many of the observations of the 
earlier theorists ‘have remained points of departure for diplomatic theory to the present 
time’.42 Therefore, evolution of diplomatic theory is slight, rather than dramatic.  
The majority of diplomatic theorists, ranging from De Callieres (1716) to 
Berridge (2002), endorse the central tenets of diplomatic theory described above. These 
tenets are broad rather than specific and are evident in most works that this thesis labels 
as Traditional.   
 
2.2 The typical assumptions of a Traditional Diplomatic Theorist 
There are certain assumptions that qualify diplomatic theorists as Traditionalists. 
These are broad assumptions, but not every Traditionalist will demonstrate all of these 
characteristics. However, consolidating these characteristics is fundamental to developing 
the category of TDT.    
The first assumption is that Traditionalists describe diplomacy as an exclusive 
state function. They infer ‘that diplomacy is the privileged domain of professional 
diplomats, conducted almost exclusively by Foreign Service personnel and officials from 
Foreign Ministries’.43 In other words, Traditionalists champion an exclusive, statist focus 
on a type of diplomacy practiced by official government representatives. In the modern 
                                                 
40 ibid., p. 3. 
41 See G. R. Berridge. (2001). Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger. London: Palgrave. The 
diplomatic theorists under consideration are Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Grotious, Richelieu, Wicquefort, 
Callieres, Satow, Nicolson and Kissinger.  
42 Berridge, Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, p. 2. 
43 Donna Lee and David Hudson. (2004). The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy. 
Review of International Studies, 30, p. 345. 
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era, this traditional practice is one where professional, officially accredited state 
representatives are portrayed as the gatekeepers of a sacrosanct historical tradition.  
 Secondly, Traditionalists interpret diplomacy as the study of the international 
realm of sovereign states, with the central purpose of diplomacy being to overcome the 
anarchical nature of that system and facilitate peaceful relationships amongst sovereign 
states. Traditionalists promote the notion of the state operating in an anarchical 
environment and attempting to mitigate the uncertainty and turbulence of the system 
through familiar, historical channels of diplomacy.44  In this light, TDT:  
establishes the idea that diplomacy is constituted by, and also constitutes, state sovereignty. 
State sovereignty, in turn, constitutes the anarchic systemic structures characterised by a 
separation of the domestic from the international, the economic from the political, and the 
private from the public.45 
This separation of the high political agenda from the low political agenda allows 
Traditionalists, thirdly, to focus on diplomacy’s role in relation to classic political-
military agenda. This traditional high agenda can be described as a:  
 
conception of international relations, where states are motivated by considerations of 
measurable power. Thus, foreign affairs among states is fundamentally concerned with war and 
peace, and the employment of state power vis-à-vis other states. These traditional political-
                                                 
44 For diplomacy’s role in mitigating the anarchical setting of IR, see Hedley Bull. (1977). The anarchical 
society: a study of order in world politics. New York: Columbia University Press; M. Wight and H. 
Butterfield. (1966). Diplomatic Investigations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; and Adam Watson. 
(1982). Diplomacy. New York: Eyre Methuen. 
45 Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 354. 
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military concerns, which include issues such as force balances, demarcation of territories, arms 
control negotiations and alliance cohesion, have not been replaced.46  
 
Traditionalists therefore focus largely, but not exclusively, on diplomacy’s role in 
relation to the high political agenda. Low political issues – socio-economics or 
humanitarian aid, for example – are considered ‘peripheral, rather than central to 
diplomatic practice’ and, subsequently, traditional theoretical understanding.47  
 Fourthly, Traditionalists consider diplomatic history central to their theory.48 The 
study of diplomacy, they argue, demands an embracing of the distant as well as the recent 
                                                 
46 Jeffery R. Cooper, ‘Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries’, 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, 
<www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html> 
47 Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 347. 
48 Alongside the three diplomatic theories this thesis introduces there is a case for, similarly, introducing 
diplomatic historians as an independent category within diplomatic studies. However this thesis has 
avoided their inclusion because they are historians and not theorists. Their scholarship has ‘tended to be 
descriptive rather than analytical’ (Gordon A. Craig. (1983). The Historian and the Study of International 
Relations. American Historical Review, 88 (1), p. 7.). Like the Traditionalists, Diplomatic historians 
endorse the dominance of the state in historical considerations of diplomacy. They offer a reinterpretation 
of historical events or narrative, and enforce a perception of diplomacy as a statist, traditional activity. If 
analysis is forthcoming in diplomatic history it is a re-examination of the historical narrative. Scholarship 
in Diplomatic History began in the 19th century with the release of a great series of international treaties 
and diplomatic documents. Diplomatic History is the study of a ‘sort of official handwriting, the archives, 
constitutes the greater part of the method of the diplomatic historian’ (Sharp, For Diplomacy, p. 37). 
Diplomatic historians concern themselves with the study of statecraft and the conduct of foreign policy at 
the highest level of the state, the purpose being to record a ‘formal narrative of what actually happened, and 
at the same time reveal the pattern of secret strategies of monarchs and statesmen’ (Juliet Gardiner. (1988). 
What is History Today? London: Macmillan, p. 131). Understanding of past events and behaviour, through 
the study of original documents, remains the backbone of the discipline. As such the produce of diplomatic 
historians can offer a rigorous narrative insight into the complex interaction of states, diplomats and 
statesmen. With regard to research activities, diplomatic historian’s source material is traditional 
diplomatic documents, correspondence between governments and instructions to embassies. The nature of 
this material however is restrictive, due to the secretive necessity of protecting state interest and the slow 
release of official documents by governments, for example the British Government has a thirty-year rule 
before releasing documents to the Public Records Office (PRO). For discussion on the past, present and 
future of Diplomatic History, see, Colin Elman and Miriam Elman. (1997). Diplomatic History and 
International Relations: Respecting Differences and Crossing Boundaries. International Security, 22 (1), 
pp. 5 – 21; P. Schroeder. (1977) Quantitative Studies in the Balance of Power: An Historian’s Reaction. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21 (1), pp 3 –22; J. L. Gaddis. (1987) Expanding the Data Base: Historians, 
Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies. International Security, 12 (1), pp 3-21; Stephen 
Haber. (1997). Brothers Under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations. International 
Security, 22 (1), pp 34-43. For a classic example of a work devoted entirely to diplomatic history, see, Rene 
Albrecht-Carrie. (1967). A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna. London: Metheun 
and Company. 
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past. TDT is heavily influenced by history; rigorous theoretical testing grounds are to be 
found in the distant past as well as the recent. For Traditionalists, considering the rich 
tapestry that diplomacy has woven since its inception at the ‘dawn of history’, there is an 
intrinsic link between history and modern diplomatic theory.49 This ‘propensity to treat 
the future as an extension of the past’ is a central feature of TDT, and suggests that the 
Traditionalist’s attitude is ‘psychologically more comforting than living with an uncertain 
future’.50 Therefore, Traditionalists endorse historical continuity in diplomatic theory, 
which suggests a reluctance to incorporate innovation and originality to concepts of 
diplomatic theory.  
Fifthly, Traditionalists write prescriptive guides to diplomacy where they theorise 
on the practice of diplomacy.  Satow’s Guide to Diplomacy (1957), Berridge’s 
Diplomacy, Theory and Practice (2002) and Rana’s The 21st Century Ambassador (2004) 
can be classified as such. These types of books are ‘manuals of diplomatic procedure, in 
the tradition of the guides that made their appearance early in the European system, and 
continue to dominate the field’.51 They convey a view of diplomacy as a specialised skill 
of negotiation, the vocation of the select few and are beneficial for the novice entering the 
profession.52 These works are guides on the practice of traditional diplomacy, how to 
conduct diplomacy, and naturally reinforce statist interpretations of diplomacy. In terms 
of informing the academic and practitioner as to the rules, procedures and processes of 
traditional diplomacy, their contribution is valuable. 
                                                 
49 Harold Nicolson. (1957). The Evolution of Diplomatic Method. London: Cassell Publishers, p. 2. 
50 Luc Reychler. (1996). Beyond Traditional Diplomacy. DSP Discussion Papers, (Leicester: Centre for the 
Study of Diplomacy), p. 4. 
51 Adam Watson. (1982) Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States. London: Eyre Methuen, p. 11. 
52 Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 2. 
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Sixthly and finally, Traditionalists have a sentimental view of diplomacy. They 
describe diplomacy as an art, the vocation of the privileged and select few and portray the 
traditional diplomatic institution in a nepotistic fashion. Traditionalists endorse a classical 
view of diplomacy, heavily influenced by the historical refinement of diplomacy since 
the 17th century.  Traditionalists are unconcerned with the impact of alternate actors or 
environments on traditional diplomacy, preferring to endorse fierce loyalty to their 
beloved traditional diplomatic institution. These six common characteristics are evident 
in the majority of TDT.  
 
2.3 The range within Traditional diplomatic theory: exclusive to inclusive 
So far, this chapter has highlighted commonality amongst Traditionalists. 
However, there are different types or ranges of TDT. These can range from an exclusive 
state focus (with no consideration of alternate diplomatic actors) to a more inclusive state 
focus (concentrating centrally on the role of the state, but acknowledging emerging non-
state diplomatic actors).  
Differentiation in TDT becomes apparent when the eras in which respective 
Traditionalist’s work are identified. When De Callieres’ work was first published (1716) 
he focused exclusively on the fledgling diplomatic institution. When Satow (1917) and 
Nicolson (1939, 1954) were writing, the traditional diplomatic institution was also 
central, however both authors incorporated observations on emerging international 
organisations. In the modern era, Berridge (2002) too has the state in mind, but devotes 
attention to the proliferation of NGOs, summitry and multilateral diplomacy.  
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Despite this exclusive to inclusive range, state-centrality is natural for all 
Traditionalists. This continuity allows each generation to build on the foundations laid by 
their theoretical forefathers. Each of the Traditionalists relies on, develops and expresses 
an admiration for the work of their predecessors. A few examples illustrate this trend.  
One of the earliest Traditionalists is Francois De Callieres, who published On the 
Manner of Negotiating with Princes in 1716. It is De Callieres who: 
 
most tellingly explains diplomacy by reference to the business of a multiplicity of states, and 
who is persuaded of its indispensable usefulness – amounting to necessity – to the European 
states-system.53   
 
Alongside De Callieres’ affinity to the state system, his testament to diplomacy 
demonstrates several hallmarks of TDT. Firstly, the book is largely prescriptive and is 
written with the practitioner in mind. In the 18th century, this work became ‘one of the 
standard references on diplomatic practice’ and was ‘considered essential reading for 
prospective diplomats’.54 Secondly, De Callieres demonstrates a belief in the intrinsic 
link between history and diplomatic theory. He advises any young diplomatist to: 
 
                                                 
53 Berridge, Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, p. 3. 
54 Maurice Keens-Soper, ‘Francois De Callieres and Diplomatic Theory’, in Berridge, G.R,  (2001). 
Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger. London: Palgrave, p. 107. The Chapter ‘Callieres’ 
(written by Maurice Keens-Soper, in Berridge, G. R. (2001). Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to 
Kissinger. London: Palgrave) is a revised version of an earlier paper: Keens-Soper, Maurice. (1973) 
Francois De Callieres and Diplomatic Theory. The Historical Journal, 16 (3), 485 – 508. 
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inform himself of all the treaties that have been made since that time [the fifteenth century] but 
more especially of those which have been concluded between the chief potentates of Europe, 
beginning with the treaties of Westphalia, down to the present time.55 
 
According to Keens-Soper, ‘De Callieres is not interested in past events solely for 
themselves. Their usefulness is to point a lesson, he calls on two centuries of foreign 
affairs to drive home and illustrate the abiding predicament of states’.56 That abiding 
predicament is the ‘haphazard coexistence of several states’.57 In other words, for De 
Callieres, states exist under anarchical conditions, which is a third characteristic of the 
Traditionalists. The three premises – prescription, history and mitigating anarchy - of De 
Callieres clearly identify him as an early Traditionalist. His work was to provide a strong 
foundation for, and to have great influence on, later generations of Traditionalists.  
Satow (when writing two centuries later), for example, considered the work of De 
Callieres as a ‘mine of political wisdom’.58 Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice (1917) 
is certainly a Traditionalist work, which is to be expected considering the era when it was 
first published. The dominance of traditional diplomacy as the foremost conduit for 
international intercourse between states was irrefutable. Non-state diplomatic actors and 
environments were not of the size or scope they are today, and attracted only fleeting 
attention from Satow. His ubiquitous definition of diplomacy as ‘the official relations 
between the governments of independent states’ and the subsequent ‘conduct of business 
                                                 
55 Francois De Callieres. (1983). The Art of Diplomacy. Edited by M. A. Keens-Soper and K. W. 
Schweizer. Leicester: Leicester University Press, p. 57. 
56Maurice Keens-Soper, ‘Francois De Callieres and Diplomatic Theory’, in Berridge, G.R, (2001). 
Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger. London: Palgrave, p. 110.  
57 ibid. 
58 Satow in T.G. Otte, ‘A Guide to Diplomacy: The Writings of Sir Ernest Satow’, in Berridge, G.R,  
(2001). Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger. London: Palgrave, p. 129. 
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between states’ demonstrates his emphasis on diplomacy as a traditional state activity.59 
The Guide is largely a testament to traditional diplomacy’s preoccupation with strict rules 
of protocol and appropriate diplomatic conduct. Alongside this emphasis on the 
appropriate rules of diplomacy, runs a thorough historical evolution of diplomacy in 
respect to the state, and the professional diplomat within the state system.  
The Guide primarily relates to traditional diplomacy’s insistence on diplomatic 
appropriateness. For example, Satow includes chapters on the historical, traditional 
privileges and immunities of the head of a foreign state,60 the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs,61 the strict rules of diplomatic precedence among states and the language and 
forms of diplomatic intercourse,62 which includes the appropriate fashion in which a 
diplomat should communicate through letters, memorandum and notes all governed by 
strict ‘rules and conventions’.63  
Satow, like De Callieres, writes with the novice diplomat in mind and aims to 
provide a comprehensive overview of the sacrosanct intricacies of traditional diplomacy. 
Satow’s work is a sound example of a prescriptive guide to diplomacy, with a strong 
emphasis on the practical and regulatory aspects of how best to manage inter-state 
dialogue through diplomacy. Lord Butler encapsulates the intended audience of The 
Guide, describing it as ‘invaluable to any young man entering the service’.64 Otte agrees, 
writing of Satow’s Guide that the audience was intentional, that he ‘placed special 
emphasis on the practical aspects of diplomacy’ with the desire to ‘impart practical 
                                                 
59 Sir Ernst Satow. (1957). A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, 4th edition. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 
p. 3.  
60 ibid., pp. 9 – 11. 
61 ibid., pp. 12 – 19. 
62 ibid., pp. 21 – 26. 
63 ibid, pp. 38 – 54. 
64 ibid., Introduction. 
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advice to budding diplomats’.65 The Guide is one of the classic texts on diplomacy, not 
only for its usefulness to the practitioner but also for the continuation of TDT.  
Harold Nicolson extends this trend. In The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method, 
(1957) he too expresses admiration for the work of his traditional forefathers, regarding 
De Callieres’ work as ‘the best manual on diplomatic method ever written’.66 Nicolson 
naturally demonstrates several theoretical similarities to both De Callieres and Satow – 
the centrality of the state, the value of history and the anarchical nature of the system to 
diplomatic theory. His admiration of previous Traditionalists illustrates the long line of 
continuity in their writings. Rather than regurgitate similar observations of De Callieres 
and Satow, Nicolson’s comments on a nascent diplomatic environment – conference 
diplomacy - illustrate the centrality of the state to his writings, despite a radical 
environmental change.67 In his final summation, however, Nicolson was unconvinced of 
the efficacy of conference diplomacy over traditional diplomacy, writing it was ‘perhaps 
the most unfortunate diplomatic methods ever conceived’.68 Nicolson accepted that ‘there 
was no turning back to the good old days of old diplomacy’ but his sentimentality did not 
lessen his tirade against conference diplomacy.69 One of Nicolson’s most eloquent 
                                                 
65 Otte in Berridge, Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, p. 128. 
66 Nicolson, The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method, p. 62.  
67 Nicolson, like De Callieres and Satow, writes with the state in mind. An excerpt from Nicolson, H. 
(1970). The Congress of Vienna, illustrates in a broad sense his observations of diplomacy, he writes: 
‘Foreign policy is based upon a general conception of national requirements; and this conception derives 
from the need of self-preservation, the constantly changing shapes of economic and strategic advantage and 
the condition of public opinion as affected at the time…diplomacy.. is not an end but a means; not a 
purpose but a method. It seeks, by the use of reason, conciliation and the exchange of interests, to prevent 
major conflicts arising between sovereign States. It is the agency through which foreign policy seeks to 
attain its purposes by agreement rather than by war’ (p. 164).  
68 T. G. Otte, Nicolson, in Berridge, G. R. et al. (2001). Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, 
London: Palgrave, pp. 151 – 181. 
69 ibid., p. 152. 
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testimonies (according to Otte he ‘never wrote a boring line in his life’) to conference 
diplomacy can be found in The Evolution, he writes:70   
 
These conferences…do much to diminish the utility, guile and wisdom of statesmen as they 
entail much publicity, many rumours and wide speculation - in that they tempt those involved 
to achieve quick, spectacular and often fictitious results – they tend to promote rather than allay 
suspicion, and to create those very states of uncertainty which it is the purpose of sound 
diplomatic interaction to prevent.71 
 
Nicolson’s disdain for conference diplomacy is obvious, as is his admiration for 
the historically refined techniques of traditional diplomacy. The above quote also 
demonstrates the Traditionalist disdain for revolution in diplomatic theory and practice. 
The subtle inference above speaks of continuity and evolution, familiarity and 
commonality, which are central qualities of a Traditionalist. Always writing with the state 
in mind, Nicolson was said to view the world ‘only through the embassy window’.72  
Continuing the long line of Traditionalists, Berridge provides a sound modern 
example. He too describes diplomacy from a prescriptive, practical and state focus. In the 
introduction to his hallmark work, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (2002), this statist 
focus is unmistakable: 
 
Diplomacy is an essentially political activity and, well resourced and skilful, a major ingredient 
of power. Its chief purpose is to enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign 
                                                 
70 ibid., p. 151. 
71 Nicolson, The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method, p. 89. 
72 Wilson in Berridge, Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, p. 151.  
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policies……it follows that diplomacy consists of communications between officials designed to 
promote foreign policy.73  
  
While a statist tone is clear, Berridge also demonstrates his modernity and 
inclusivity, specifically the need to acknowledge less traditional diplomatic actors and 
environments. He even writes that:  
 
Diplomacy is not merely what professional diplomats do. It is carried out by other officials and 
by private persons under the direction of officials…it is also carried out through many different 
channels besides the traditional resident mission.74  
 
However, Berridge is quick to realign state focus, informing the reader that 
‘together with the balance of power, which it both reinforces and reflects, diplomacy is 
the most important institution of our society of states’.75 From the outset, the reader is left 
in no doubt that the focus of the book is on traditional diplomacy. Within Diplomacy, 
Berridge adroitly discusses the art of negotiation, prenegotation, around the table 
negotiations, diplomatic momentum and packaging agreements before presenting in the 
second part of the book the modes of diplomacy, from bilateral to multilateral, summitry 
and mediation. The state and traditional diplomacy are central throughout. For Berridge, 
the ongoing state reliance on traditional diplomacy is understandable and comforting, 
inasmuch as the traditional diplomatic institution ensures continuity, familiarity and 
predictability.  
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In his concluding remarks, Berridge typifies the moderate inclusivity of a modern 
TDT, noting that ‘while there remains a state system – international diplomacy, bilateral 
or multilateral, direct or indirect, at the summit or below, remains essential’.76 Even in the 
conclusion, however, Berridge is keen to remind the reader of the importance of the state 
and traditional diplomacy to diplomatic theory.  
All of the above Traditionalist contributions illustrate a preference for continuity 
and gradual evolution of diplomatic theory over change and revolution. The different 
types of traditional diplomatic theorists are not really so different. Instead, the evolution 
of diplomatic theory from De Callieres to Berridge demonstrates a reaction to changes in 
the diplomatic environment. Despite the broadening of the diplomatic environment to 
include non-state actors and environments all of modern Traditionalists advocate the state 
as central to their theory, just as their predecessors did.  Their abhorrence towards 
radicalism and the centrality of the traditional diplomatic institution are the foundations 
of TDT.  
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2.4 Evidencing TDT within the canon of diplomacy studies 
The purpose of the following sections is to evidence the central tenets and 
common assumptions of TDT within the canon of diplomatic studies. The aim is to locate 
and evidence Traditionalism within the canon of diplomacy studies. The characteristics of 
the Traditionalists are then consolidated and some broad examples of their work 
introduced, which adds validity to the argument that we can speak of a distinct faction of 
Traditionalists within the diplomacy studies field.   
 
2.4.1 Diplomacy defined from a Traditionalist perspective  
A literature review of the traditional canon of diplomacy studies illustrates the 
centrality of TDT to diplomacy studies. The longevity and modern prominence of 
Traditionalism remains important for diplomacy studies, for ‘at the heart any worthwhile 
theory of international relations must lie a theory of traditional diplomacy’.77 The statist 
focus is important in attempting to understand the modern diplomatic environment, for 
the state and the traditional diplomatic institution will remain important diplomatic 
actors, and merit continued attention. 
Each of the following definitions of diplomacy distinguishes itself by subtle 
nuances, however each fundamentally impresses upon the reader the now familiar 
message: that the state is central to any theoretical understanding of diplomacy. That 
message describes diplomacy as a method of dealing with international problems through 
traditional diplomatic channels. Diplomacy is portrayed as a conservative, change 
resistant activity, concerned primarily with negotiation and communication. These 
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definitions are widely employed, popular and immediately recognisable as the core of 
TDT. 
Hedley Bull defines diplomacy as ‘the conduct of relations between sovereign 
states with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means’.78 Bull’s 
definition endorses a state-centric view of diplomacy, which has the advantage of being a 
concise, simple and manageable interpretation.  Similarly, for Wight, diplomacy is best 
understood in statist terms. Wight considers diplomacy as ‘inextricably connected to the 
existence and operation of a state system’.79 For example, Wight notes of diplomacy that:  
 
the various activities and institutions of diplomacy, such as the exchange of resident 
ambassadors, the activity of communication between states, the practice of diplomatic 
immunity, the holding of congresses and conferences, the negotiation of treaties and 
agreements of various kinds, are not only distinguishing features of diplomacy but also a 
foundational element of any society of independent states.80 
In this statement, Wight once more demonstrates the central features of a 
traditional approach to diplomacy; that diplomacy is an activity between states based on 
historical principles and governed by regulated practice. 
G.R. Berridge also packages diplomacy simply and in statist terms. He writes that 
‘diplomacy is the term given to the official channels of communication employed by the 
members of a system of states’.81 He adds that ‘the chief purpose of diplomacy is to 
enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, 
                                                 
78 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 156. 
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80 Wight and Butterfield, Diplomatic Investigations, p. 22. 
81 Berridge, Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, p. 1. 
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propaganda, or law’.82 Berridge recognises that ‘diplomacy is the most important 
institution of our society of states’, like Wight, his definition enforces a view of 
diplomacy as a traditional, statist activity.83  
Nicolson’s definition of diplomacy differs slightly from Bull, Wight and Berridge 
in that he emphasises the importance of the role of ambassadors and envoys when 
defining diplomacy. According to Nicolson, ‘diplomacy is the management of 
international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted by 
ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist’.84 Portraying diplomacy 
in this fashion is perhaps too simple a depiction. By describing diplomacy through its 
traditional function – negotiation – Nicolson is confining diplomacy to a singular activity. 
However, diplomacy is not only about negotiation. Many diplomats perform other key 
tasks such as information gathering and dissemination and many seasoned international 
negotiators are not professional diplomats. Diplomacy portrayed as simply negotiation 
seems therefore ‘to capture only part of the riches of diplomatic life’.85 
Besides restricting diplomacy to negotiation, Nicolson also writes from a 
traditional, statist viewpoint, which is indicative of the period during which he wrote.86 
Moreover, Nicolson describes diplomacy as the ‘management’ of IR, suggesting that it is 
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within diplomacy’s obligation to the state system to monitor, control and guide individual 
states through peaceful management of the system.                                                                                             
Satow develops this peaceful management aspect of diplomacy further. He 
defines diplomacy as ‘the application of intelligence or tact to the conduct of relations 
between the governments of independent states; or more briefly still, the conduct of 
business between states by peaceful means’.87 Satow adds that ‘persuasive argument, if 
applied skilfully and sensitively at the right time, may achieve a better result than 
persuasion too obviously backed by the threat of force’.88 He claims that diplomacy is 
‘the best means devised by civilisation for preventing international relations from being 
governed by force alone’.89 In other words, diplomacy is concerned with mitigating the 
anarchical nature of the IR system, which can occasionally erupt in conflict. For Satow, 
diplomacy and conflict are mutually exclusive, with diplomacy conceptualised as a far 
more pacific and preferable alternative to conflict. Therefore, diplomacy and war can be 
misinterpreted as exclusive forces, rather than ‘activities which can take place 
simultaneously or may follow from one another’.90     
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 These definitions are useful as they confirm a trend amongst Traditionalists: they 
appear reluctant to engage in revolutionary study. Modern Traditionalists prefer to 
slightly tweak these simple observations of their theoretical forefathers. The widely 
employed and lasting definitions cited above demonstrate subtle nuances but are 
fundamentally conveying a straightforward message: that diplomacy is a traditional, 
conservative activity between states. In this respect there is nothing inherently interesting 
in the modern diplomatic environment because there is nothing of significance in what is 
new.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Europe before 1914. International Security, 22 (1), 125 -161. And for empirical evidence (mostly from 
Eastern Europe during the Balkan Crisis) of the inclusivity of force and diplomacy see, Carl Bildt. (2000). 
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2.5 Specific examples of TDT 
To illustrate the different types of diplomatic theory presented in this thesis the 
opinions of Traditionalists on six themes is presented. These six themes are evident in the 
majority of modern diplomatic literature. They concern the impact of changes and 
challenges detrimentally affecting the traditional diplomatic institution. These themes are 
employed to highlight divergence of opinion among the various categories of theorists 
constructed in this thesis. The provision of specific examples of TDT further informs this 
category of theorists. 
 
2.5.1 TDT counter to the declining state argument 
Traditionalists are not concerned with declining state arguments.91 They argue 
that the increasing complexity of the IR system demands more familiarity, stability and 
continuity through traditional diplomacy, not less. Indeed, as ‘the number of states 
increases, the complexity of the problems confronting them multiplies and the urgency 
attending them grows’ the diplomatic institution continues to demonstrate its versatility 
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and relevance.92 The diplomatic institution is optimally placed to grease the complex IR 
system by promoting shared norms and ideas that ‘help promote confidence, stability, 
predictability, and the trust that are the foundations’ of a stable IR environment.93 
Traditionalists advocate several responses to the ‘withering’ state arguments.94 
Their main criticism of these arguments is that they are paradoxical. The state’s demise is 
predicted yet there is little evidence to support these claims. Traditionalists claim that ‘we 
still do not have ways of comprehending the diminished role of states without at the same 
time privileging them as superior to all actors in the global arena’.95 In other words, 
arguments of the declining state are forwarded by non-statist authors while the state 
system endures and expands. This contradiction does not occupy much print space in the 
traditional canon. Quite simply, Traditionalists argue that if the state system, and the 
diplomacy that lubricates it, are irrelevant or obsolete then why do they continue to exist 
and endure?  
 For Traditionalists, the portrayal of the state as obsolete or irrelevant rests upon 
broad and ill-founded stereotypes. The portrayal of states as archaic or Westphalian, 
obsessed with the politics of a bygone era, sowing the seeds for inevitable conflict fuelled 
by clashes of national interest, territorial discrepancy and ideological differences, is a 
simplistic misperception. According to Traditionalists, the state’s reliance upon archaic, 
traditional and outdated practices is misunderstood. They argue that if a practice is 
archaic or traditional it does not necessarily mean that the practice is obsolete or 
ineffective. Rather the reason that the state system, greased by traditional diplomacy, 
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endures is that no alternative system has promised to be as effective (at mitigating the 
anarchical nature of the IR system). 
Furthermore, Traditionalists also counter that the state’s reluctance to change or 
evolve is misinterpreted as a resistance to change. Traditionalists highlight that not only 
is this misrepresentation problematic it also encourages dangerous thinking; rhetoric that 
advocates a shift from the stability, order and continuity of the state system to the 
uncertainty, confusion and chaos of a stateless IR system. According to Traditionalists, 
states are evolutionary, and just slower at changing than the rapidity that seems to 
dominate the 21st century.  
Modern challenges to the traditional diplomatic institution, such as the 
information revolution, do not ‘affect the core of the organisation of political power; the 
central role of territorially defined states’.96 Traditionalists broadly agree that there is 
little currency in the notion that the international political system is in the midst of 
transition towards a fundamentally different political order where the state will be 
replaced by an alternative form of political management.97 States control the bulk of the 
power – they continue to posses an important stock of resources including control of 
territory, military and infrastructure - and therefore remain the dominant actor in 
international relations. 
Traditionalists inform us that the state is able to determine its own future; a 
feature of the state’s historical development has been its autonomy and its tendency to go 
its own way and resist pressures upon it.  In times of crisis or uncertainty it is the familiar 
methods of state interaction through traditional diplomacy that the international political 
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system comes to rely upon. The notion that we are witnessing a ‘systemic transformation 
of the state and the state system’ is unlikely.98 The major decisions that affect 
international stability are ‘taken by those who possess power and are prepared to exercise 
it’; at the moment, those power-broking actors are states.99 
 The fundamental premise of diplomacy is that it is an activity between states, and 
the governments of states. After all, ‘he who has power conducts diplomacy’ and any 
development in diplomacy must be analysed from an ‘evaluation of the power factor in 
international relations’.100 According to Traditionalists, states endure as ‘the focal points 
which makes diplomacy possible’.101 
Traditional diplomacy does not seem to ‘suffer from real decline’ despite the 
appearance on the international scene of new actors and new working methods.102 
Traditionalists argue that the role of non-traditional actors in IR is ‘of secondary 
importance to that of national governments’ and therefore their presence is peripheral and 
inconsequential to traditional diplomacy.103 For Traditionalists, the state and the 
traditional diplomatic institution will survive any challenge that the 21st century will 
offer.   
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2.5.2 The impact of Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs) on traditional 
diplomacy 
 
According to Traditionalists, IGOs are constructed by states, for states. Within 
IGOs ‘key decisions are made by governments representing states’.104 In other words, 
IGOs are ‘little more than state ciphers’.105 Traditionalists believe that IGOs are only as 
great as the sum of their state parts. 
Traditionalists are dismissive of the notion of IGOs as distinctive diplomatic 
actors; they warn that ‘it is misleading to think of international institutions as outside 
forces or exogenous actors, they are the self-conscious creation of states’.106 
Consequently, ‘states rarely allow international institutions to become significant 
autonomous actors’.107 For example, the effectiveness of the United Nations:  
 
does not rest on any intrinsic power within that organisation, but on the readiness of member 
states….its will is in fact none other that the joint wills of the states which make up its voting 
majorities….International organisations, in other words, reflect state initiatives, rather than 
determine them.108 
 
In this context, Traditionalists suggest certain advantages of IGOs and the multi-
lateral diplomacy that greases them. For example, Koremenos, Lipson and Snidely write 
that IGOs are valuable in that they facilitate the dissemination of information, the 
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reduction of bargaining and transaction costs and the ability to enhance collective 
enforcement of a common course of political action.109 And Berridge notes that IGOs 
provide several ‘obvious advantages’ for state members.110  
For Traditionalists, one specific IGO advantage is the opportunity and impetus 
that multilateralism provides for traditional bilateral diplomacy.111 IGOs provide a 
meeting place for state representatives, a forum to voice concern or rally support for a 
particular position or predicament. IGOs can kick-start negotiations, end negotiations or 
provide a diplomatic avenue bypassing ‘normal diplomatic channels’.112 In other words, 
multilateral IGOs can speed up the traditional diplomatic process. Multi-lateral 
diplomacy through IGOs can be faster, cheaper and more efficient that bi-lateral 
diplomatic exchange, if a common interest exists between state members.  
Traditionalists, however, do not provide an exhaustive list of benefits relating to 
IGOs and multilateral diplomacy. Any benefits appear to be an indication of IGOs in an 
ideal sense, rather than a practical one. From a practical angle, Traditionalist criticism of 
IGOs abounds. Broadly, they argue that the universal makeup of an IGO’s state 
membership means they are often ineffective and reduced to little more than glorified 
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‘state coffee mornings’.113 More specific Traditional criticism of IGOs is rife within the 
canon.  
Berridge, for example, notes that the cumbersome size and swelling state ranks of 
IGOs has prompted a contemporary ‘crisis in multilateralism’ where the ‘fashion for 
creating intergovernmental organizations has passed and existing numbers dropped’.114 
One reason behind the crisis is the sheer complexity of multilateral negotiation. The 
universality of IGO membership leads to large numbers of state participants, who can 
‘complicate cooperation’ and stall complex negotiations through ‘uncertainty’.115 The 
swelling numbers of states and the ‘technicality of the issues’ makes IGOs ‘extremely 
complex’, which vitiates ‘the advantages of conducting diplomacy by this method’.116 In 
short, complexity (one state, one vote) leads to complication, which can frustrate multi-
lateral negotiation.117 
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 A second Traditionalist criticism of IGO’s universal membership is that states can 
meddle needlessly in the affairs of other states, whereas in the past they would rarely 
have come into contact with one another. By ‘throwing the doors of a conference wide 
open permits, and may even encourage, each participant to have a say in the affairs of all 
the others, whether they have a direct interest or not’.118 Therefore, the universal nature 
of IGO membership is ‘anti-diplomatic, gratuitously worsening relations between states 
that in an earlier era would either have had little contact at all or would have had contact 
only on issues where both had a direct interest’.119 
 Thirdly, the very public nature of the IGO forum and the subsequent obligation 
for transparency is uncomfortable for Traditionalists as these notions run contrary to their 
affinity for closed or secret conventional diplomacy. The IGO does offer possibilities for 
positive propaganda, however this publicity of diplomacy negates confidentiality and 
concession, which underscore successful bi-lateral negotiations. After all: 
 
when debate takes place between a large number of delegations in a public setting without any 
serious attempt to achieve a prior agreement in private, the political necessity of playing to the 
audience outside is inescapable and the give and take of genuine negotiation goes out the 
window. The result is that propaganda is substituted for diplomacy.120  
 
Consequently and fourthly, multi-lateral diplomacy facilitated by IGOs creates 
fictitious state cooperation. This cooperation plays a ‘modest role’ in the anarchical IR 
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system, according to Traditionalists, who remind us that cooperation is ‘very brittle in the 
real world’.121 In multilateral environments, states become ‘reluctant to disclose vital 
information that could make them more vulnerable’.122 Alongside this unwillingness to 
harm national security, states are unwilling to encourage centralisation of decision-
making that could ultimately affect their sovereignty. IGOs are thus viewed as ‘politically 
and conceptually controversial’, because their presence touches on sacrosanct national 
sovereignty.123 Through traditional diplomacy, states are able to guard their domestic 
authority and their exclusive control over foreign policy, therefore ‘they are suspicious of 
encroachments and strongly resist any shift of sovereign responsibilities to superordinate 
bodies’.124 Subsequently, IGOs lack broad authority, and the ‘day when sovereign 
countries accept broad international edicts is still far off’.125 In other words, states are 
unlikely to encourage any organisation or diplomatic practice that may engineer their 
downfall.   
 According to the Traditionalists, IGOs are interpreted as another layer added to 
the traditional diplomatic process. This supplementary notion suggests that IGOs are 
essentially state designed frameworks, rather than independent political actors. Viewed 
through the Traditionalist lens the presence and questionable efficacy of IGOs is 
peripheral rather than central to their brand of diplomatic theory. 
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2.5.3 The questionable efficacy of summit diplomacy 
Where summitry is concerned the impact on traditional diplomacy is similar to 
IGOs. Summitry is seen as peripheral or inconsequential to diplomacy by 
Traditionalists.126 Summitry is not to be confused with IGO. Summitry is a term that 
applies only ‘to meetings between incumbent heads of government and/or heads of state, 
or political leaders’.127 The growth of summitry in the twentieth century has, however, 
been impressive. In the modern era, foreign leaders are familiar with the demands and 
necessity of summitry, and are ‘increasingly performing diplomatic roles on the 
international stage’.128 The practice of summitry has ‘become an addictive drug for many 
politicians’.129 The prevalence of summitry in the modern diplomatic environment is 
clear but how do Traditionalists interpret its impact?      
 Broadly, they argue that the direct meeting of statesmen does not affect the 
diplomatic institution where the bulk of meaningful diplomacy takes place. Summits are 
merely the rubber stamp to the prenegotiation work the traditional diplomatic institution 
has undertaken. In other words, summits do not affect the traditional diplomatic 
institution.           
 Instead, summit diplomacy is interpreted as an addition or supplement to 
traditional diplomacy, or as an example of ‘improvised diplomacy’.130 Diplomacy and 
summits are thus interconnected: 
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summit meetings are a supplement to ordinary diplomatic procedures – they are functionally 
connected with those procedures. They follow ordinary diplomatic negotiations as they are 
followed by them, each laying the groundwork for the other.131  
 
While diplomacy and summitry are inextricably linked, Traditionalists are hardly 
complimentary of summits. A Traditionalist presenting a ‘case for the defence’ of 
summitry noted the difficulty of the task: ‘summitry has been so roundly anathematised 
by historians as well as professional diplomats, that it is…not so easy to understand why 
it remains such an important feature of the international scene’.132  
 Summits are perceived as detracting from the valuable role of those in the employ 
of the traditional diplomatic institution. In Traditionalist perceptions of summitry, the 
value of the pre and post negotiation work of the ‘ordinary bureaucrat’ is often 
overlooked.133 With summitry, the tireless prenegotiation work of the diplomat is 
overshadowed, an occurrence which disturbs Traditionalists. For example, Lubers writes 
that summits ‘conceal the text writers, the endless rehearsal and all the other preparatory 
work without which that one performance would not take place’.134 Melissen supports 
this notion by highlighting that ‘the visibility of leaders camouflages the extent to which 
they increasingly tend to rely on professional diplomats, and ergo the increasing 
influence of these professionals on summit outcomes’.135 The infringement of leaders 
(unfamiliar of the intricacies of the art of diplomacy) accounts for Traditionalist hostility 
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towards summitry, while at the same time confirming their desire to remain wedded to 
their time-honoured perception of diplomacy.      
 Within the traditional canon there are consistent and subtle derogatory undertones 
levelled at diplomacy by summit. Summitry not only provokes ‘deep unease among 
professional diplomats’ but also amongst Traditionalist theorists.136 Chief among these 
fears is that the necessity of summitry suggests incompetence on the part of traditional 
diplomats; if the bosses have to meet face-to-face then they must have done something 
wrong? Seen through Traditionalist lens, and bearing in mind their sentimental affiliation 
to all things traditional, any process that detracts from the conventional is treated with 
suspicion. Summitry is no different, as it effectively removes a significant slice of top-
level power from Foreign Ministries and their officials. The subsequent bickering 
between seasoned diplomats, Traditionalists and inexperienced or incompetent statesmen 
is well founded in the canon.         
 The list of statesmen’s uncomplimentary forays into the diplomatic domain is 
seemingly endless within TDT. For example, Berridge employs the opinion of Philippe 
de Commynes who remarked that ‘two great princes who wish to establish good personal 
relations should never meet each other face to face but ought to communicate through 
wise ambassadors’.137 In the same fashion, Watt writes that ‘heads of government, with 
their massive egos, their ignorance of the essential details and their ingrained belief in the 
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value of back-slapping ambiguity, simply mess everything up’ (in Berridge, 2002: 
171).138 And George Ball provides a substantial list of summits, from Chamberlain in 
Munich in 1938 to Nixon in Japan in 1970, which resulted in the need for more 
diplomacy rather than less.139 One of the most memorable examples of a head of state 
damaging a carefully fostered diplomatic relationship was when Boris Yeltsin visited the 
Republic of Ireland on a summit trip:  
Yeltsin, apparently fast asleep, failed altogether to emerge from his Tupolev after it landed at 
Shannon airport. What was going through the mind of Irish Prime Minister, Albert Reynolds, 
who was waiting for his guest on the tarmac, complete with band, red carpet, and local 
dignitaries, is not difficult to imagine.140  
While the behaviour of Yeltsin demonstrates an extreme, Traditionalists claim 
that heads of state adversely affect carefully crafted diplomatic relations. One theorist, 
Eubank, after critiquing the great power summit conferences between 1919 and 1960, 
argued that there was no evidence to suggest that the presence of heads of government at 
these summits produced better agreements than would have been generated otherwise, 
while ‘often the reverse was true’.141 
 Ball typifies the Traditionalist attitude, stressing the value of the traditional 
diplomatic process over the inadequacy of diplomacy by summit. He notes that: 
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summit meetings over the centuries have been a source of grief. The sad fact is that no summit 
meeting has ever resulted in a breakthrough. Every significant gain has resulted from 
painstaking diplomacy pursued through traditional methods.142  
 
 Demonstrating their fierce loyalty to the traditional diplomatic institution, 
Traditionalists maintain that diplomacy is an activity ‘best left to the professionals’, the 
diplomats.143  Therefore, the traditional ambivalence towards summitry in the canon is 
somewhat understandable.  
 
2.5.4 The proliferation of NGOs 
In the twenty-first century, the proliferation of Non Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and their growing impact upon states has become more noticeable. As a result, 
Traditionalists have become ‘ambivalent and often hostile’ on the effectiveness of 
NGOs.144 Consistently, they are dismissive of ‘the challenge posed to inter-state 
diplomacy by the growth of civil society and nongovernmental organisations’.145 For 
Traditionalists, NGOs have ‘virtually no independent impact on international relations 
and diplomacy’.146 There are four common laments that Traditionalists employ to 
validate their dismissive judgment of NGOs.       
 Firstly, the participation of NGOs in the IR system is interpreted as a diplomatic 
nuisance. The infringement of NGOs in international policy environments means that 
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‘already complex issues become more difficult to handle’.147 For Traditionalists, NGO 
participation in negotiation is a hindrance to traditional diplomacy, in that NGOs pose 
unnecessary and ‘thorny questions’.148 In other words, including an actor with an often-
divergent agenda to the traditional-political agenda complicates diplomatic proceedings, 
rather than complements.149       
 Secondly, Traditionalists argue that the existence of NGOs is dependent on the 
generosity of states. Significant NGOs, such as World Vision, are reliant upon the state 
for legitimacy in the international arena and, more importantly, funding. The dependency 
of NGOs upon the state means that ‘NGOs are losing their roots and getting closer to 
governments and more distant from the poor and – perhaps most frightening – possibly 
dis-empowering those whom they seek to assist’.150 For example, World Vision has been 
accused of ‘developing increasingly close ties with government agencies in recent 
years’.151 Traditionalists argue that NGOs are dependent on states financially, and for 
legitimacy. In other words, nongovernmental organisations are becoming less non and 
more governmental.        
 Thirdly, Traditionalists remind us that NGOs can never emulate the broadness of 
representation that democratically elected governments provide. Those in the employ of 
NGOs are, after all, unelected and uninterested in compromise, intent on pursuing their 
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narrow agendas, possibly at the expense of the greater national/international good and to 
the exclusion of others actors’ wishes.152 Traditionalists argue that with NGOs 
concessions to their demands are, all too often, met not with praise and gratitude but with 
demands for further concessions.153 Therefore the parochial focus, determination and 
single-minded devotion, which preclude the formation of an NGO, can hardly be 
constitutive of society as a whole. That is why we have elected governments with a broad 
focus, rather than large numbers of specialised NGOs.    
 In addition to the undemocratic constitution of NGOs, Traditionalists frequently 
illustrate, fourthly, the unprofessional nature of NGOs, specifically their tardiness 
concerning accountability, or lack thereof. NGOs are famous for urging other institutions 
(corporations, governments and international organisations among them) to make 
themselves more accountable, while at the same time being loathe to practice what they 
preach. NGOs have ‘demonstrated a notable reluctance to evaluate how accountable they 
themselves are to the constituencies they purport to represent’.154 It is undeniable that 
NGOs share complex relationships with multiple stakeholders, and the intangible nature 
of the goals they seek to achieve are difficult to account for. However, Traditionalists 
                                                 
152 Eizenstat, Nongovernmental Organizations, pp. 16 – 25. While Eizenstat is largely complimentary of the 
role of NGOs in International Relations, his preference for Traditionalist, statist interpretations of the role 
of NGOs in contemporary diplomacy is clearly evident. This favouritism is hardly surprising considering 
that Eizenstat was Chief Domestic Policy Adviser to President Jimmy Carter. In the Clinton Administration 
he was US Ambassador to the European Union, Under Secretary of Commerce, Under Secretary of State, 
and Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. He was also President Clinton’s Special Representative on 
Holocaust-era issues. For a discussion on his views of NGOs see, Stuart E. Eizenstat. (2004). 
Nongovernmental Organizations as the Fifth Estate. Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International 
Relations, Summer/Fall, pp. 21 – 25. 
153 Eizenstat, cites an example of the persistent and demanding nature of NGOs from his tenure under the 
Carter Administration: ‘I remember how frustrating it was to work with NGOs interested in adding species 
to the Endangered Species Act for a truly environmental president, Jimmy Carter. For his efforts, he was 
blasted by various environmental NGOs for leaving species off the protected list and given very little credit 
for the many species that had been added to it.’ (Nongovernmental Organizations, p. 28).  
154 Eizenstat, Nongovernmental Organizations, p. 19. An exception to this complaint is the NGO 
Transparency International, who lists its funders on its website. Few other NGOs do. See 
www.transparencyinternational.org. 
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argue that this difficulty does not excuse NGO’s distinct unaccountability for the funds 
they demand and the actions they take. NGO funding, spending and accountability tends 
to ‘be shrouded in mystery’.155 Government oversight is needed to regulate NGOs to 
ensure that charities are not used as vehicles for financial exploitation.156 Left to their 
own devices, Traditionalists warn, NGOs are an unpredictable entity.    
 Seen through the Traditionalist lens their response to the growth of NGOs has 
been predictable, with NGOs ‘often portrayed as opponents of government’.157 In 
general, Traditionalists seem unperturbed by the rise of NGOs, a phenomenon that is 
mentioned in passing only in the canon of diplomacy studies.  
 
                                                 
155 Eizenstat, Nongovernmental Organizations, p. 21. 
156 An infamous example of the unaccountability of NGOs reinforce the financial tardiness of some NGOs. 
In 2002, an expose by CBS Evening News revealed that the American Red Cross was anything but 
financially responsible. The news channel reported that local Red Cross fundraisers had used official funds 
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NGOs in IR, which resonates with Traditionalism, was strongly evident at the conference. Participants at 
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of those organisations to undermine sovereignty’ (AEI newsletter, 2003). With such a rigid, prejudicial 
agenda the tirade against NGOs was uncomplimentary. For example, Bate argued that NGOs have been 
undermining effective government processes; they ‘definitely provide benefits in the short run, but in the 
long run the influence is nearly always malign. The effect of NGOs is particularly damaging’ (AEI 
newsletter, 2003).  Anderson, reaffirmed the positive role of the state and the inadequacy of the NGO: ‘the 
sovereign is back not only as a sort of locus of power, but as the ideal to which ordinary people aspire. 
NGOs are destroying much of civil society, undermining governments and good governance, and this is 
holding back developing countries from enjoying the same quality of life that we do. It’s backfired’ (AEI 
newsletter, 2003). 
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2.5.5 Traditional Diplomacy and Commerce 
Where diplomacy and commerce are concerned, Traditionalists draw a clear 
distinction between the political and the commercial, associating diplomacy with the 
former and discounting the latter as inconsequential to diplomatic theory. The reason 
behind the separation of commerce and diplomacy is simple and twofold. Firstly, 
Traditionalists view diplomacy as an activity concerned with high political matters, to 
which commerce bears little importance. The traditional approach ‘to diplomacy 
privileges political transactions and neglects economic transactions’. 158  
The distinction between political and commercial is endorsed by Traditionalists, 
secondly, based on a sentimental historical perception of diplomacy. Lee and Hudson 
originate perseverance of this perception to archaic ‘social and cultural’ factors prevalent 
in the Traditionalist literature.159 They write specifically that:  
 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries diplomats (who in Europe were 
predominantly from aristocratic family backgrounds) held the world of commerce (seen by 
diplomats as a middle class world) in social contempt. These social and class divisions added to 
the prominent perception within Foreign/Diplomatic Services that Commercial departments 
were ‘black holes’, by high ranking diplomats who were horrified by the prospect of wining 
and dining middle-class businessmen and the downturn in their careers that commercial 
postings signified.160  
                                                 
158 Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 358. 
159 ibid., p. 347. For an expansion of this theme, see, D. Lee and D. Hudson. (2004). The old and new 
significance of political economy in diplomacy. Review of International Studies, 30, 343 – 360. The 2004 
article by Lee and Hudson is an excellent account of the historical and contemporary ambivalence of 
Traditionalists towards any relationship between commerce and diplomacy.  
160 ibid., p. 347. For validation and examples of the aristocratic snobbery notion see D. C. M. Platt. (1969). 
Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy 1815 – 1914. Oxford: Clarendon Press; E. 
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A sentimental view of diplomatic history, then, suggests that the separation of 
diplomacy from commerce is – for Traditionalists - a valid claim. Nicolson adds support 
here. He comments of the German mission, of the same era; ‘it was regarded as most 
improper that the German Government should use its embassy at Constantinople to 
obtain concessions for German industrialists’.161 Such a confluence of political and trade 
interests was viewed by diplomats in an unsavory manner, because it was considered 
undignified to concern the diplomat with matters of commerce. More importantly, if 
‘commercial competition’ was to be added to ‘political rivalry, the task of the diplomacy 
would become even more complicated than it was already’.162  
Traditionalists view modern diplomacy in a similar light. Their focus on 
traditional interstate high politics in bilateral or multilateral settings remains valuable, 
however they fail to relate commerce to diplomacy, or vice versa.163 Persevering with this 
portrayal of diplomacy, Traditionalists view commercial work as a departure from the 
more serious concerns of diplomacy: military, security or political negotiation for 
example. Modern Traditionalists do not discount commerce entirely from diplomacy; 
rather they interpret commercial matters as peripheral at best and irrelevant at worst. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hambloch. (1938). British Consul: Memories of Thirty Years Service in Europe and Brazil. London: 
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Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. London: Palgrave; Abba Eban. (1998). Diplomacy for The Next Century. 
US: Yale University Press; Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne. (1995). The Practice of Diplomacy. 
London: Routledge; Elmer Plischke (ed.). (1979). Modern Diplomacy: The Art and Artisans. Washington: 
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Where Traditionalism is concerned, ‘there is no attempt to present commerce as a 
significant and integral part of diplomatic practice’.164   
Traditionalists validate this approach by citing the literature of former diplomats, 
who focus almost exclusively on the high political content of diplomacy when describing 
their time in public office.165 Why Traditionalists, evaluating former diplomats, fail to 
promote the relationship between diplomacy and commerce is problematic, as it 
constitutes a large part of diplomatic activity, especially in the modern era. One reason 
may be that commercial negotiations do not sell books when compared with first hand 
narratives of ‘high’ political diplomacy where tension, intrigue and drama prevail. 
Nevertheless, this is hardly an excuse for Traditionalists to discount the growing 
relationship between commerce and diplomacy. 
 For Traditionalists, the irrelevance of trade to diplomacy can at best be described 
as a theoretical imagining distanced from the practice of diplomacy. Far from being a 
departure from traditional diplomacy, commercial aspects are ‘rudimentary to ancient, 
modern and contemporary diplomacy’.166 Many diplomatic institutions are effectively 
moving towards more commercial focus, where the state remains central to the global 
economy, existing symbiotically alongside Mutli-National Enterprises. This type of 
rhetoric has yet to permeate TDT.  
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2.5.6 Diplomacy and the information revolution167  
The effect of the information revolution does not occupy much print space in the 
canon of diplomacy studies. Traditionalists, keen to stress the art, the importance of 
history or the classical nature of diplomacy, are reluctant to tarnish De Callieres or Satow 
with the triviality of the information ‘revolution’ phenomenon.168     
 A close reading of the Traditionalist literature reveals the reasons behind this 
reluctance. Firstly, Traditionalists remind us that an increase in the quantity of 
information does not necessarily equate to a similar increase in the quality of 
information; that knowledge does not necessarily equate to wisdom. Traditionalists are in 
agreement in relation to this point. For example, Burt and Robison note in jocular fashion 
that ‘more and faster does not mean better’ and that ‘what might qualify one as a 
contestant on Jeopardy is hardly adequate for diplomacy’.169 Kohler adds that ‘more 
paper does not equal better diplomacy. Data or information is not knowledge, even when 
                                                 
167 For an extended discussion on the information revolution see Jeffrey R. Cooper. 
(www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy). According to Cooper the information revolution drove democratisation 
and globalisation of the flow and content of information. Advanced information technologies provided new 
communications tools, demanded new organisational processes, and altered existing hierarchies and power 
relationships among both domestic and global actors, thereby playing a major role in facilitating and 
spurring revolutions in both the political and economic domains. Beyond those enabling effects, the 
information revolution and the new international environment that fostered it have made information itself 
a crucial source of national power and influence.  These trends have already had substantial impacts on 
diplomacy, affecting both the content and the conduct of the diplomatic enterprise necessary for success in 
the transformed international arena.  See also, G. Kramarenko and A. Krutskikh. (2003) Diplomacy and the 
Information Revolution. International Affairs, 49 (5), 115 – 123. Krutskikh and Kramarenko describe the 
information revolution as the set of processes that ‘are shaping the global electronic environment into 
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increasingly transferred. This environment intensifies the exchange of information, view, ideas, services, 
goods and helps create various virtual communities united by common interests. For a similar breakdown 
of the impact of the information revolution on diplomacy, see, Evan H. Potter. (2003). Cyber-Diplomacy: 
Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press.    
168 For example, see Stanley Hoffman. (2001). Classic Diplomacy in the Information Age. Foreign Affairs, 
80 (4), 137 – 142.  
169 Burt and Robison, Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age, p. 16. 
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repeated endlessly on the Internet’.170 For Traditionalists, the quantity of information is 
inconsequential for effective diplomacy. However the quality of the information that a 
government demands is important. A professional diplomat should be appropriately 
trained to interpret and filter information in this desirable and necessary fashion.  
 Secondly, Traditionalists stress that a diplomat is after all a diplomat, and not an 
Information Technology (IT) specialist. Focusing too heavily on the implications of the 
information revolution, therefore, can detract from the traditional role of the diplomat. 
For example, Kohler warns of this danger where a diplomat ‘can collapse under the 
weight of information, or never have time to respond to the hundreds of emails piling up 
in his virtual in-basket’.171 And Kaplan says that he finds more and more American 
diplomats ‘sitting in front of their computer screens, losing contact with the societies 
where they are posted’.172 Under this view, the sheer volume of complex information and 
the increased responsibility to effectively manage more and more information 
overwhelms diplomats, thus detracting from their fundamental purpose (to represent, 
diplomatically, their country abroad).      
 As a result, Traditionalists stress the importance of the human aspect of 
diplomacy. Simply put, revolutionary developments in information gathering and 
dissemination do not promote stable diplomatic relationships; Information Technology 
(IT), for example, is no substitute for personal contact in diplomacy. For Traditionalists: 
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IT is not a substitute for human interaction, but an enabler of it. Seeking the balance between 
human and technological resources is the greatest challenge for diplomacy over the next 
decade. Just as the status quo is unacceptable, so too is a zealous embrace of unstable and 
complicated technology that leads diplomats away from the societies in which they specialize 
to the false comfort of a virtual world.173  
 
Traditionalists inform us that computers are tools to facilitate the business of 
diplomacy, not instruments to replace human judgement, which is a central quality of 
traditional diplomacy.  Olsen supports this, arguing that ‘the internet cannot substitute for 
the interaction of culture, for the taste and feel of foreign lands, for the empathy that 
develops as one learns to appreciate a new society’.174 According to Traditionalists, 
machines cannot replicate the essential personal skills of diplomacy. Kohler confirms this 
by arguing that: 
 
technology does not alter the centrality of the ambassador in the conduct of foreign relations 
because it cannot replace experience, local contacts, and judgements, even as it alters 
everything around it.175   
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Thus, Traditionalists caution on embracing the information revolution with open 
and unsuspecting arms. There is another reason behind this caveat. They argue that the 
traditional diplomatic institution does not have the luxury of implementing sweeping 
information system changes; any changes must be carefully thought out and incremental. 
There are two associated reasons here. Firstly, the sheer size and bureaucratic constitution 
of a modern Foreign Service means change takes time.176 Secondly, and more 
importantly, Traditionalists emphasise that the type of information states deal with is 
exceptional; particularly the necessity for secure communication and information systems 
and the propensity for information to be employed for sinister as well as saintly ends.  
 Kramarenko and Krutskikh, for example, describe the necessity of protecting 
sensitive information as the ‘most important feature’ of the information revolution.177 
They forecast an apocalyptic scenario where:  
 
the entire array of countries’ information resources becomes simultaneously a target for hostile 
attacks and the most powerful weapon in information wars. There is a threat that the colossal 
potential of IT could be used in gaining military and political supremacy on the international 
scene. The building up of military potentials by employing the latest IT is tipping the global 
and regional balance of forces, causing tensions between the traditional and emerging centres of 
strength, and creating new areas of confrontation.178 
 
                                                 
176 The size of modern foreign missions is quite staggering.  The British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, for example, has over 16,000 staff based in the UK and overseas managing a network of  200 
diplomatic offices. See, www.fco.gov.uk. Canada has diplomatic and consular offices in over 270 locations 
in approximately 180 foreign countries. See, www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca. The global distribution of these 
extensive networks means change can be particularly cumbersome.  
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For Traditionalists, the diplomatic institutions should be praised for remaining 
vigilant in international information security matters. Such caution should not be 
misinterpreted as clinging onto outdated methods of information gathering and 
dissemination. The sensitive nature of diplomatic information necessitates an incremental 
information systems change and bestows caution. For Traditionalists, this prudence must 
not be misconstrued as tardiness or reluctance to embrace an information revolution that 
could undermine international security if embraced too hard and too quickly. These 
Traditionalist observations, albeit subtle in the canon, challenge the image of an archaic 
diplomatic institution unwilling or unable to embrace the revolution.  
 
2.6 The Merits of TDT 
 Throughout the six themes, the Traditionalist’s preference to theorise on the 
traditional diplomatic institution over nascent diplomatic actors and environments was 
evident. Their inherent historical, traditional and statist focus is responsible for a 
subconscious dismissal of any form of diplomacy outside the traditional realm.  The 
longevity of TDT can be directly correlated to the omnipotence of the traditional 
diplomatic institution as the predominant conduit for state-qua-state relations. This 
section seeks to establish if this exclusive state focus remains relevant to the modern 
diplomatic environment.  
 In the practical/physical sense, traditional diplomacy has ‘become a growth 
sector’179 and remains the ‘engine room of international relations.’180 The foreign 
embassy remains the leading diplomatic actor, where ‘the conduct of relations on a state-
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to-state basis, via formally accredited resident missions’ forms the bulk of international 
exchange.181 Therefore, a devoted and ongoing theoretical understanding, mirroring the 
increase of practical state-qua-state diplomacy, is required. TDT, with its emphasis on the 
state and its diplomacy, is therefore ubiquitous, valuable and necessary for the diplomatic 
studies field.   
The modern growth of traditional diplomacy confirms the ongoing relevance of 
TDT. In the centuries preceeding the twentieth, state-qua-state diplomacy was a relatively 
specialised vocation and an undervalued activity. For example, Denmark had forty-four 
career diplomats in 1797, twenty-eight in the middle of the nineteenth century, and a 
mere twenty on the eve of the Great War.182 In comparison, the British foreign ministry 
had only fifty employees in 1861183 and the Quay d’Orsay in Paris had 115 in 1873.184 
Embassies and foreign ministries were relatively small, and the value of diplomacy in 
terms of providing peace and security through communication and negotiation was 
largely underestimated. Mirroring this practical apathy towards diplomacy, diplomatic 
theory was not of the strength it is today.185   
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diplomacy as a distinct field of political activity’ (1973: 500). For an excellent account of De Callieres’ 
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The twentieth century, however, has witnessed ‘a veritable explosion’ in 
professional diplomacy.186 The numbers of diplomats, embassies and foreign ministries 
began a dramatic expansion at the turn of the nineteenth century, a phenomenon that 
continues in the modern era. For example, twenty-six states formed the League of 
Nations in 1919, whereas in the contemporary sense we can identify 193 states. 
Traditional diplomacy has grown accordingly; in London today there are 17,000 foreign 
diplomats, their families and staff.187 Similar figures would be apparent in most major 
capitals. In 1950, the world’s 81 states had an average of 26 other states with which they 
maintained a resident ambassador and staff.188 By 1991, 167 states had an average of 46 
other states with similar ambassadorial representation.189      
 Subsequently, the scope of the professional diplomat has also widened, 
encompassing a whole range of issues generated by a more global, interdependent IR 
system. The modern diplomat engages with alternate environments for diplomacy, such 
as international conferences, which averaged approximately three annually in the middle 
of the nineteenth century, increasing to more than 3,000 (annually) today.190 In addition, 
there are approximately 350 IGOs today (compared with 123 in 1951), all of which 
operate as venues for official diplomats to ‘bargain, negotiate, inform, learn and 
exchange views’.191  
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Alongside these environmental changes for diplomacy, we can similarly speak of 
a slight agenda change. Although issues such as trade promotion, commercial reporting, 
security issues and arms control have encroached, the ‘traditional functions of diplomacy 
have remained intact’.192 These include promoting friendly relations, symbolic 
representation, lobbying, clarifying intentions, consular services, reporting, political and 
other types of analysis, negotiation and persuasion, and advice to decision makers.193 
These functions are central to the role of the traditional diplomatic institution and ‘cannot 
be performed as well, if in some cases at all, in its absence’.194 
The omnipotence, scope, flexibility and longevity of the traditional diplomatic 
institution mean that Traditionalists are unperturbed with the declining diplomacy 
arguments.195 The declining diplomacy argument can be summarised as a situation 
where: 
 
new practices such as contracting out governmental tasks to specialists from academia, 
business, the media, and politics, the breakup of foreign ministries’ monopoly over relations 
between governments, and the declining role of ambassadors as the main conduit of 
communication between governments constitute a trend toward obsolescence.196  
 
Traditionalists grant little attention to such argument. They propose, quite simply, 
that more states and more actors require more diplomatic representation. Rather than a 
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diplomatic crisis, the IR system seems to be witnessing a ‘diplomatic inflation’.197 
Traditionalists remain wedded to traditional state diplomacy, and the quantitative growth 
in this type of diplomacy provides the fodder for their continued focus. 
For Traditionalists, the diplomatic institution remains robust and highly relevant 
in the modern diplomatic environment. The traditional diplomatic institution is neither in 
decline nor becoming obsolete, and as such remains an important area of academic focus. 
Holsti agrees, writing that the traditional diplomatic institution:  
 
is based on sets of ideas that find repeated expression and acknowledgement, practices that 
have become routine over centuries, and norms and rules whose pedigrees go back at least two 
hundred years. The evidence does not suggest that diplomacy is yet being replaced by other 
forms of representation and communication, or that it is on the verge of obsolescence.198  
 
For Traditionalists, so long as the physical diplomatic institution endures and 
expands their theoretical input to the diplomatic studies field remains valid, necessary 
and informative. The traditional diplomatic system ‘remains – albeit sometimes disguised 
– at the core’ of the contemporary IR system.199 The diplomatic institution, equally, 
‘remains an excellent means by which to support if not lead in the execution of key 
diplomatic functions’, it is also ‘exceptionally versatile’ and a ‘permanent reminder of the 
importance and traditions of a state’.200 Through ongoing adaptability and historical 
longevity, the future of traditional diplomacy is assured. Therefore, TDT must not be 
abandoned, but consolidated as the core of diplomacy studies.  
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2.7 The limitations of TDT 
Criticism of TDT is common on the fringes of the canon of diplomacy studies. 
This section will present these criticisms, as well as assess their validity. In total there are 
three complaints often leveled at Traditionalist approaches to theory on modern 
diplomacy. 
Firstly, TDT is more concerned with the practice of diplomacy rather than the 
theory on diplomacy. TDT speaks more to the traditional functionality of diplomacy, 
what diplomacy does, rather than the ‘bricks and mortar’ of diplomacy, what diplomacy 
is.201 This reliance on functionality results in a limited theoretical understanding of 
modern diplomacy. For example, Watson notes that in order to foster a clear 
understanding of international relations we must strive for ‘knowledge on how diplomacy 
functions’, rather than attempting to understand what modern diplomacy is.202 Such 
reliance on the functionality of diplomacy is common to TDT. The major concerns in the 
traditional field of theoretical diplomacy ‘have been its functions and practice’.203 As a 
result, Traditionalism has a tendency to be ‘sketchy and rather anecdotal’.204 
Subsequently, Traditional theory is often vague, loose and flowery, what Nicolson 
describes as ‘precise although wide’.205      
 Relating to the above, a second complaint relevant to TDT is that the majority of 
‘classic texts’ or works central to the canon of diplomacy studies are prescriptive. 
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Prescriptive guides to modern diplomacy tend to be oriented professionally, not 
theoretically. While they offer novices an excellent insight into the practicalities and rules 
of diplomatic interaction, they do little to further the quest for theory that reflects modern 
diplomacy. If anything, such prescriptive approaches towards diplomacy ‘perpetuate the 
confusion of what diplomacy is and who diplomats are’, that is they do not further the 
field’s theoretical understanding of modern diplomacy.206  
As a result, several less-traditional theorists argue that the canon must be revised 
and modernised. They argue that the canon is both dated and unreflective of the 
complexity of modern diplomacy.207 Hocking, for example, argues that the prescriptive 
nature of Traditionalist works denies the complexity of the modern diplomatic 
environment. He notes that:  
 
one of the problems confronting any serious evaluation of the changing nature and role of 
diplomacy is the lack of analytical as opposed to descriptive material that surrounds it.208  
 
Hocking is suggesting that a renewed type of analysis is required if we are to 
effectively theorise on modern diplomacy. Writing on a similar theme, Sofer noted that 
                                                 
206 Smith Simpson. (1995). Of Diplomats, Diplomacy and Their Chroniclers. Virginia Quarterly Review, 71 
(4), p. 757. 
207 Broader IR textbooks, which contain dutiful chapters on diplomacy, lack a robust, diffuse and multi-
perspective analysis on diplomacy.  For example see, John Bayliss and Steve Smith. (2005). The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; Kegley Jr., Charles W. and Wittkopf, Eugene R. (2004). World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 
9th Edition. Thomson Wadsworth: USA; Glenn P. Hastedt and Kay M. Knickrehm. (2003). International 
Politics in a Changing World. USA: Pearson Education. If theory is proposed it is  ‘in ways that admit little 
attention to diplomats and diplomacy’ (Sharp, For Diplomacy, p. 34). Traditional and uncontested notions 
of diplomacy are explored or included in a token, almost sympathetic fashion.  
208 Brian Hocking, ‘Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries’, 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, 
<www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html> 
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the conceptual wealth of the literature on (traditional) diplomacy is ‘quite limited and, to 
a great degree, divorced from the development of meaningful diplomatic theory’.209 
The source of both Hocking and Sofer’s frustration stems from the prescriptive 
nature of traditional guides to diplomacy. Traditionalists, engaged in writing these 
prescriptive narratives, revise and update the field’s understanding of practical, traditional 
diplomacy while avoiding more challenging multi-actor theoretical analysis. This limited 
TDT focus means we ignore ‘many of the dynamic and dispersed factors behind the 
constitution of modern diplomacy’, preferring to neatly package diplomacy as a statist, 
historical or bland subject.210   
The ongoing reliance upon the classic texts suggests that there is an absence of 
original and innovative theory on modern diplomacy. The preference to theorise on 
diplomacy in a prescriptive fashion led Watson to lament that ‘no good book on the wider 
aspects of diplomacy, as distinct from foreign policies of individual states and the details 
of diplomatic practice, has been written since Harold Nicolson’s classic Diplomacy 
(1939)’.211  
Lee extends this complaint further, arguing that:  
                                                 
209 Sasson Sofer. (1988). Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited. Review of International Studies, 14, p. 
196. 
210 Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 3. 
211 Watson, Diplomacy, p. 12. The opinion from Watson and Lee serves to make the point on the 
inadequacy of prescriptive works on diplomacy. Similar rhetoric, relating to the paucity of diplomatic 
literature, has consensus in the diplomatic studies field. For example, Martin Wight lamented that there is 
no ‘succession of first-rate books about diplomacy’ and that few scholars have ‘made it their business to 
study the diplomatic community itself’ (Diplomatic Investigation, pp. 18 - 22). Similarly, Sofer notes that 
the ‘wealth of literature on diplomacy is quite limited’ (Old and New Diplomacy, p. 196). Der Derian 
argues that, subsequently, the discussion of diplomacy has become ‘somewhat marginal to international 
relations’ (On Diplomacy, p. 3). Neumann concurs when he adds ‘overall, the scholarly attention paid to 
diplomacy is a disappointment’ (The English School, p. 8). Before answering their own question, Lee and 
Hudson ask ‘why has diplomacy attracted so little attention?’ (The old and new, p. 350). The simple answer 
is that a statist lens is no longer the only available interpretation of diplomacy. A Traditionalist, partial 
focus on diplomacy serves only ‘to impose a contrived understanding of diplomacy’ by ‘binding diplomatic 
identity to a narrow political schema’ (The old and new, p. 345 - 349). 
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The conceptual framework of diplomacy, the definition of diplomacy and the systemic 
environment of diplomacy has been constant in diplomatic studies from Wicquefort (1606 – 
1682). In essence, the very idea of diplomacy – that it is a dialogue between states in an 
anarchic systemic structure of independent political units – has not changed all that much 
during some three hundred and fifty years of scholarship.212  
 
That the diplomatic studies field’s conceptual understanding of diplomacy has 
hardly altered during three and half centuries is enlightening.213 However, this theoretical 
stagnation complaint remains valid in the modern sense. The regurgitation of a familiar 
practical and regulatory narrative is what led Jackson to claim that the majority of works 
in the diplomatic studies field are ‘mistaking repetition for innovation’.214  
Prescriptive guides to diplomacy are ‘both too narrow and too exclusive’, which 
leads to a third criticism of TDT.215 Traditionalists’ greatest strength – a rigorous and 
exclusive focus on the traditional diplomatic institution – is also their greatest weakness. 
The statist focus inherent to TDT results in a partial, singular and parochial form of 
diplomatic theory. TDT by its statist nature is constrictive in the sense that nascent forms 
                                                 
212 Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 354. 
213 Two oft cited works challenging this assumption are James Der Derian (1987). On Diplomacy: A 
Genealogy of Western Estrangement. Oxford: Blackwell. And Costas M. Constantinou. (1996). On the Way 
to Diplomacy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Both works essentially reject essentialist 
formulations of diplomatic ideas in social theory and practice. Der Derian, for example, argues that much 
of diplomacy is about representation, the production and reproduction of identities, and the context within 
which ‘people’ conduct their relations – in a stateless context. Der Derian avoids a statist focus by 
presenting a genealogy of diplomacy, which transcends the institutionalisation of the state system in 17th 
century Europe. He argues, simply, that diplomacy existed before the state and therefore transcends the 
state. Both authors however, due to their social theory focus, can hardly be described as diplomatic 
theorists sui generis. Sharp informs us that ‘they are best regarded as visitors to diplomacy who departed 
before they got bored, but left some very useful and interesting presents’ (For Diplomacy, p. 49). In 
addition, both works are both slightly dated at the time of submission.   
214 Jackson, Martin Wight’s Thought on Diplomacy, p. 20. 
215 Constantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy, p. 90. 
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of non-state diplomacy are discounted, ignored or dismissed. In other words, TDT only 
tells us part of the modern diplomatic story; it reveals only part of the modern diplomatic 
milieu. 
Since the end of the Cold War, diplomacy has ‘become a growth sector’, where 
unconventional, non-state actors have flourished alongside states.216 The recent 
emergence of new actors in the form of IGOs, NGOs and MNCs requires that a sound 
and continuous process of communication, amongst not only state actors but also non-
state actors, is paramount to ensuring international harmony. And yet, a distinct body of 
theory accounting for the growth of nascent diplomatic actors, and the diplomacy they 
practice, is conspicuous by its absence. 
The prevalence of TDT means that ‘people find it hard to think about diplomacy 
in other than state-like terms’.217 Protective of their superior disciplinary status, 
Traditionalists appear loathe to incorporate any theory which challenges their statist bias. 
Despite the inescapable march of ‘global capital forces, the proliferation of non-state 
actors and the communications revolution’, traditional state-qua-state diplomacy remains 
the dominant focus 218 of the diplomacy studies field.219   
                                                 
216 Hocking, The end(s) of diplomacy, p. 169. For a discussion on the emergence of unconventional or 
nascent diplomatic actors see Richard Langhorne. (1998). Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State. 
Diplomatic Studies Program, Leicester University, No. 43, pp. 1 – 11; Richard Langhorne. (2000).  Full 
Circle: New principles and old consequences in the modern diplomatic System. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 
1(1), 33-46. And John Bayliss and Steve Smith. (2005). The Globalization of World Politics: An 
Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 405 – 451. 
217 Sharp, the Civilizing Virtues of Diplomacy, p. 874. 
218 For examples of the state-centric focus see, M. G. Fry, E. Goldstein and R. Langhorne. (2002). Guide to 
International Relations and Diplomacy. London: Continuum; Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne. 
(1995). The Practice of Diplomacy. London; G. Ball. (1976). Diplomacy for a Crowded World. London: 
Bodley Head; P. G. Lauren. (1976). Diplomats and Bureaucrats. California: Stanford; G. R. Berridge. 
(2002). Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. London: Palgrave; Francois De Callieres. (1983). The Art of 
Diplomacy, edited by M. A. Keens- Soper. and K. W. Schweizer. Leicester: Leicester University Press; H. 
Nicolson. (1950). Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Henry Kissinger. (1994). Diplomacy. New 
York. Simon & Schuster; Adam Watson. (1982) Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States. London: Eyre 
Methuen. 
  Chapter two 
 82
The Traditionalist dominance of the diplomatic studies field has failed to grant the 
necessary attention towards nascent forms of diplomacy. The need for a more ‘diffuse, 
multiperspectival’ understanding of diplomacy, mirroring the complex and multi-actor 
nature of the modern diplomatic environment has yet to filter through to the traditional 
diplomatic studies field.220  
One non-Traditionalist theorist, Mor, is concerned with the unevenness of 
diplomatic theory, specifically the lack of multiperspectival and diffuse approaches. He 
notes that: 
 
Diplomatic theory is still dominated by a concern with government-to-government 
communication. Influenced to a large degree by the realist framework, this theory prefers to 
focus on the “hard currency” of international relations, namely objective national power. Thus, 
diplomatic theory is an impoverished concept, which is not sensitive to the changing nature of 
the contemporary international system.221  
 
Mor’s theoretical impoverishment argument is appropriate where TDT is 
concerned, as Traditionalists continue to assume the state is the only diplomatic actor of 
significance. 
The exclusivity of TDT is rife within the canon. The classic texts of diplomacy do 
not take into account ‘the widening of the concept [diplomacy] by the recent emergence 
of a variety of internationally significant actors’.222 This reluctance is perhaps indicative 
                                                                                                                                                 
219 John Hemery. (2002). Educating Diplomats. International Studies Perspectives, 3, p. 140.  
220 Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 362. 
221 Ben D. Mor. (2003) Strategic Self-Presentation in Public Diplomacy. Paper presented at the annual 
conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 3 – 6, p. 2.  
222 Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, p. xvii. 
  Chapter two 
 83
of the era when the classic texts were published, when non-state actors were not as 
prominent, influential or diplomatic as they are today. Nevertheless, in the modern era 
one may ‘wonder what sense it makes to exclude or leave aside the public diplomacy of 
NGOs, the discreet diplomatic maneuvering of international firms, or even the efforts of 
private diplomats, when such actors are recognised by states?’223 The answer to this 
question can be found in the majority of popular definitions, which convey a notion of 
diplomacy as ‘the conduct of relations between states’.224 The affect of unconventional 
diplomatic actors – prominent or insignificant – is portrayed as peripheral and thus 
disregarded. 
TDT confines diplomacy to a sort of academic straightjacket, where the 
conventional, accepted view on diplomacy continues to be endorsed. By focusing 
exclusively on traditional diplomacy, the diplomatic studies field could be accused of an 
IR adage: perpetuating the ‘same old melodrama.’225 This thesis argues that the modern 
canon should include works that focus on original, multi-actor analysis alongside 
accounts of ‘what one clerk said to another’ and how one clerk should address the 
other.226 The recent growth of the diplomatic studies field suggests that there is more than 
enough room for both the traditional, statist works on diplomacy and more innovative, 
original and analytical work within the canon of diplomacy studies. 
  
                                                 
223 ibid. 
224 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 156. 
225 Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. (1977). Systems of States. Leicester: Leicester University Press, p. 9. 
226 D. C. Watt. (1985). What is Diplomatic History? History Today, 34, p. 33.  
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2.7.1 Implications for diplomatic theory: A caveat for TDT 
If the diplomatic studies field is to comprehend fully the complex multi-actor 
nature of the modern diplomatic environment, there is a need for a more diffuse theory of 
contemporary diplomacy. The diplomatic studies field’s reliance upon a partial, singular 
and statist view of diplomacy (TDT) is difficult to comprehend for it serves only to 
‘impose a contrived understanding of diplomacy’.227 The traditional approach avoids 
recognising other diplomatic activity – commercial diplomacy between states and firms 
for example228 – as a core element of modern diplomatic practice. Evidence on the 
linkage between state and non-state actors,229 for example, is as obvious as the 
Traditionalist’s parochialism and yet the dominance of the TDT remains unchecked.230 
Cooper writes of the Traditionalist’s exclusive state focus:  
what is striking about the traditional defence of diplomatic theory is the narrowness of its 
argument. Rather than a dynamic approach to the study of diplomacy, with a solid grasp of the 
changing context in which contemporary diplomacy must be located and a keen anticipation of 
the evolution in the role that professional diplomats play, the image presented is a static one. 
                                                 
227 Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 345. 
228 For an expansion of this theme, see Susan Strange. (1992). States, firms and diplomacy. International 
Affairs, 68 (1), 1 – 15. 
229 See, Brian Hocking. (1997). The end(s) of diplomacy. International Journal, 53 (1), pp. 169 – 172; 
Brian Hocking. (2004). Privatizing Diplomacy? International Studies Perspectives, 5, pp. 147 – 152. For 
two more specific examples on the close relationship between commerce and diplomacy see Bernard E. 
Brown. (2001). What is the New Diplomacy? American Foreign Policy Interests, 23, 3 – 21. Brown 
discusses the success of the Ottawa Process, where over 1,000 NGOs, private interest groups and 155 states 
came together in 1996 to sign and ratify the Treaty to ban land-mines. More recently, see Virginia Haufler. 
(2004). International Diplomacy and the Privatization of Conflict Prevention. International Studies 
Perspective, 5, 158 – 163. The ‘Kimberley Process’ is a solid example of an NGO, Global Witness, acting 
as a catalyst to a process in which national diplomats, the European Union (EU) Commission, came 
together with journalists and De Beers, the global diamond firms. Each of these groups contributed to the 
establishment of a more humane diamond regime.  
230 The sole purpose of this section is to highlight the deficiency of the Traditionalist approach to 
contemporary diplomacy. It is premature to provide overwhelming evidence in support of the symbiotic 
relationships between state and non-state actors here. In the following chapter, Nascent Diplomatic theory, 
evidence is provided to dispel the contemporary debate between the Traditionalist and the emerging, 
opposing faction of critical theorists. 
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Diplomats and diplomatic activity remain associated with a rigid state-centric international 
system.231  
For Traditionalists, such as Berridge, this immovable and ongoing focus on 
traditional diplomacy is understandable, comforting inasmuch as a focus on traditional 
diplomacy ensures continuity, familiarity and predictability. However, the claim that 
Traditionalists are over-protective of their domain is well founded. Hocking agrees, and 
comments that: 
this [view] alone suffices as evidence that all is well within the world; that nothing has 
changed. Attempts to slot the diplomat into an alternative worldview are at best indicative of a 
failure of understanding and at worst akin to heresy. That the nature of diplomacy as an activity 
might be changing is either mistaken (for it denies the essence of the diplomat’s role), or of no 
real interest, froth on the surface of the deep waters of the diplomatic oceans.232  
Traditionalists appear to be in a state of conceptual denial, where they often 
overprotect their theoretical domain, claiming there is only one (statist) interpretation that 
accounts for the majority of diplomatic activity. They are, as Hocking mentions, resistant 
to notions of change that may discontinue or devalue the dominant role of the state in 
theoretical considerations of diplomacy. The emergence of alternative forms of 
diplomacy is described by Traditionalists as nothing more than ‘old wine in new bottles. 
History has witnessed something very much like it before.’233    
 This dismissive rhetoric is problematic for diplomacy studies in that TDT 
parochialism or ‘blindness, produces a partial disclosure of diplomatic practice’.234 In 
                                                 
231 Cooper, Beyond Representation, p. 173. 
232 Hocking, the end(s) of diplomacy, p.170.  
233 Jackson, Martin Wight’s Thought on Diplomacy, p. 19. 
234 Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 360. 
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addition, continuing to endorse TDT as the sole conduit for understanding diplomacy is 
to distance theory from practice. In practical diplomacy, for example, there are increasing 
links between states and NGOs and yet this symbiotic confluence remains absent in 
TDT.235          
 Criticism against the Traditionalists is not to argue that the field must utterly 
abandon a focus that has been frustrating innovation for some time. The state is an 
important, perhaps the most important, diplomatic actor and it is unlikely to disappear 
anytime soon. However, criticism of TDT appears to be a popular pastime amongst less-
traditional theorists. There is a certain validity underlying such criticism. Cooper, for 
example, suggests that the theory of: 
diplomats and diplomacy is too important to be left to the care of many of their keenest 
defenders. When faced with challenges of legitimacy and relevance, the instinctive tendency 
among these supporters has been to place both diplomats and diplomacy in a tight institutional 
shell as a form of protection. To adopt this narrow mode of defence is misguided.236  
What Cooper confirms here is that TDT overprotection can result in a parochial 
theory on diplomacy. Of parsimonious state-centric theories and theorists, Rosenau is 
also keen to stress the limitations of their approach.237 According to Rosenau, 
Traditionalists:  
                                                 
235 Empirical evidence in support of the symbiotic state/NGO relationship is provided in chapter four, 
Innovative Diplomatic Theory. For a discussion of this theme see, Brian Hocking. (2004). Privatizing 
Diplomacy? International Studies Perspectives, 5, pp. 147 – 152. 
236 Cooper, Beyond Representation, p. 178. 
237 Rosenau is an IR theorist but comparison can be drawn between his criticism of the IR field and 
criticism of the Traditionalists within the Diplomatic Studies field. Rosenau cites to the work of a 
traditional IR theorist, Kenneth Waltz as indicative of a state-centric theorist. A closer examination of 
Waltz’s work reveals the reason behind this labelling. Within, the dominance of the state is never far from 
Waltz’s arguments. For example he posits that while ‘states may choose to interfere little in the affairs of 
non-state actors for long periods of time,’ they ‘nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse… When the 
crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate.’ According to Waltz this 
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are prisoners of their paradigm, unwilling to escape the premise of state predominance and 
constantly tempted to cling to familiar assumptions about hierarchy, authority and sovereignty. 
While conceding that actors other than states have become conspicuous in world politics, they 
preserve their paradigm by insisting that this conspicuousness acquires meaning only in the 
context of an environment controlled by states.238  
 
Sharp also warns on the continuation of this exclusive state/traditional focus. He 
writes that: 
by refusing to reflect on where we are on the [diplomatic] continuum, it is possible to maintain 
a general disposition against diplomacy. Until recently, we have been acknowledging that it is 
everywhere, and anticipating its decline while witnessing its expansion, without feeling any 
compelling need to explain.239 
If the diplomacy studies field remains wedded to TDT then the complex nature of 
modern diplomacy will continue to confound. On the other hand, ‘if we accept that states 
and others have arms and legs’, then perhaps we can direct theory towards understanding 
the diplomacy of non-state actors alongside traditional diplomatic actors.240 In doing so, a 
more complex theoretical tapestry can be woven, one that better conveys the essence of 
diplomacy in the twenty-first century. Where modern diplomacy and diplomatic theory is 
                                                                                                                                                 
predominance of states is sufficient to ignore or discount calls for a separate form of theory: ‘A theory that 
denies the central role of states will be needed only if nonstate actors develop to the point of rivalling or 
surpassing the great powers, not just a few of the minor ones. They show no sign of doing that.’ See, 
Kenneth N. Waltz. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, pp. 94 – 95. 
238 J. N. Roseneau. (1980). The Study of Global Interdependence. London: Francis Pinter, p. 244 – 245. 
239 Sharp, For Diplomacy, p. 44. 
240 ibid., p. 50. 
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concerned it is important to realise that ‘traditional or statist diplomacy’ does not mean 
‘diplomacy per se.’241       
Limitations aside, the Traditionalist focus in diplomacy theory is valuable. One 
central benefit is that categorising this dominant and visible group of theorists lays a 
strong foundation upon which to introduce other types of diplomatic theories and 
theorists. Consolidating the category of Traditionalists provides a departure point for 





                                                 
241 Hoffman, Reconstructing Diplomacy, p. 540. 
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Chapter Three – Nascent Diplomatic Theory (NDT)  
The aim of this chapter is to introduce and construct a second type of diplomatic 
theory. This theory, Nascent Diplomatic Theory (NDT), is less prominent than TDT 
within the canon of diplomacy studies.1 This chapter will cement the general 
characteristics of Nascent diplomatic theorists and present examples of their work. This 
chapter aims to build a comprehensive profile of the Nascent theorist, with each of the 
following sections adding layers to this profile.  
 
3.0 The origins of nascent diplomacy 
 The first step in building the Nascent theorist’s profile is to establish the type of 
diplomacy these theorists postulate on.  This type of diplomacy is non-state diplomacy, 
and has several synonyms: new, unofficial, unconventional or alternate diplomacy, for 
example. Nascent theorists acknowledge state-qua-state diplomacy, but they are largely 
uncomplimentary on the traditional conduit for diplomacy.  
This form of diplomacy came into its own in the early twentieth century. 
Although non-state diplomatic actors and environments existed in previous centuries, it 
was not until the twentieth century that they had an impact on the IR system significant 
                                                 
1 A body of work reflecting NDT could include: Costas M. Constantinou. (1996). On the Way to 
Diplomacy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Jovan Kurbaliga (ed). (1999). Modern 
Diplomacy. Valetta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy Studies; Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.). (1995). 
Bringing Transnational Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobsen and R. D. Putnam. (eds.). (1993). 
Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkley: University of 
California Press; Shaun Riordan. (2003). The New Diplomacy. Cambridge: Polity Press; A. L. Kennedy. 
(1922). Old Diplomacy and new, 1876 – 1922. London: J. Murray; Arnold J. Mayer. (1969). Political 
Origins of the New Diplomacy. New York: Meridian Books; John Hoffman. (2003). Reconstructing 
Diplomacy. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 5 (4), 525-542; Richard Langhorne. 
(1997). Current Developments in Diplomacy: Who are the Diplomats Now? Diplomacy and Statecraft, 8 
(2), 1-15; Richard Langhorne. (1998a). Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State. Diplomatic Studies 
Program, Leicester University, No. 43, pp. 1 – 11; Michael Bruter. (1999). Diplomacy without a state: the 
external delegations of the European Commission. Journal of European Public Policy, 6 (2), 183 - 205 
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enough to constitute a form of diplomacy different from the traditional, state-qua-state 
form. There are two significant moments in history for this alternate form of diplomacy: 
its announcement following the Great War and its ultimate breakthrough, which followed 
the end of the Cold War.2  
The Great War of 1914 – 1918 was a pivotal moment for diplomacy.  Before the 
war, little strain was exerted on the traditional diplomatic machinery; it had the 
‘monopoly on foreign policy’.3 However, the outbreak of the First World War was to 
challenge traditional diplomacy’s monopoly.4  The diplomatic system that had dominated 
Europe for over two hundred years had failed to prevent the Great War.5 The balance of 
                                                 
2 This idea stemmed from an article by the IR theorist Hans Kung. Although focusing on broader IR 
themes, Kung’s paradigm shift theory is useful when applied to the inception of nascent diplomacy (2002). 
Kung identifies three symbolic dates that signal a new paradigm in IR that is ‘slowly and laboriously 
establishing itself: its announcement (1918), its realisation (1945) and finally its breakthrough (1989)’. (p. 
8) For Kung, the breakthrough of the new paradigm has finally signified a ‘move away from the 
confrontational politics of national power, self interest and prestige’, and put an end to the types of military 
power politics that lead to the two Great Wars (p.10). Kung notes that that the older IR system (1918 – 
1989) ‘always presupposed an enemy, indeed a traditional or ideological enemy, [while] the new paradigm 
no longer envisions such an enemy. Conversely, the post Cold War system states seek partners, rivals and 
economic opponents for competition instead of military confrontation’ (p.11). Each of Kung’s paradigm 
shifts is useful, in that they resonate with the evolution of NDT. For an expansion of these themes, see 
Hans Kung. (2002). Global Politics and Global Ethics. Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International 
Relations, Winter/Spring, pp. 8 – 20. For a rebuttal to the notion of a new paradigm in IR see, Roberts, 
Adam. (1991). A new age in international relations? International Affairs, 67 (3), 509 – 525. Roberts turns 
a sceptical eye on arguments which suggest that the international order underwent a transformation after the 
Cold War. 
3 Richard Langhorne. (1998). Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State. DSP Discussion Paper, 
Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, No. 43, p. 1. 
4 For a discussion on the causes of the Great War and the shape of the pre-war international relations 
system, see F. S. Northedge. (1976). The International Political System. London: Faber and Faber, pp. 1- 
24; Hudson Meadwell. (2001). The long nineteenth century in Europe. Review of International Studies, 27, 
pp. 165 – 189; David Stevenson. (1997). Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914. 
International Security, 22 (1), pp. 125 – 161; John Keegan. (1993). A History of Warfare. London: 
Random House, pp. 23 – 34. For an excellent account of the pre-war diplomacy between the five great 
powers, see Ralph Menning. (1996). The Art of the Possible: Documents on Great Power Diplomacy, 1814 
– 1914. Toronto: McGraw-Hill; R. B. Mowat. (1931). A History of European Diplomacy, 1914 - 1925. 
New York: Longmans, Green & Co; P. G. Gooch. (1927). Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy. 
London: Longmans, Green & Co.  
5 For a synopsis on the consequences of the Great War see Daniel S. Geller. (1998). Nations at War: A 
Scientific Study of International Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 156 – 190; Arthur 
Walworth. (1986). Wilson and his Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 
1919. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Also, more briefly, see Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene  R. 
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power system was held to be at fault as it ‘provoked rather than prevented wars, was too 
vague or imprecise to be of practical use and…..now seemed decrepit, moribund, a 
tattered and unconvincing ghost’.6 
The outbreak of the First World War was attributed to the inability of traditional 
diplomacy to mitigate the ‘misperception and miscalculation’ amongst European states 
that led to the conflict.7 Traditional diplomacy was thus portrayed as a ‘central cause of 
the outbreak of World War One’;8 it was held ‘as an immoral institution and identified 
with war and intrigue’.9 If the Great War was to be the war to end all wars, the European 
diplomatic system needed to be overhauled and a new international order built from the 
ashes of conflict. While diplomacy changed subtly from ‘ancient times until the twentieth 
century, it now needed radical new techniques for a new world’.10  In this context, the 
period following the Great War was ‘an event of a watershed, allowing us to identify a 
decisive moment in the development of diplomacy’.11 The emergence of a different type 
of diplomacy was certainly a watershed moment.  
The announcement of nascent diplomacy came after the Great War, which 
‘constituted a decisive turning point in the modern era, marking the emergence of a new 
diplomacy, distinct in both essence and style from that which existed previously’.12 After 
the war, as the IR system changed ‘diplomacy, although with a noticeable time-lag, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wittkopf. (2004). World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 9th Edition. California: Thomson Wadsworth. 
pp 101 – 106. 
6 Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, pp. 202 – 203. 
7 David Stevenson. (1997). Militarisation and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914. International Security, 22 
(1), p. 126. 
8 Sofer, Old and New Diplomacy, p. 197. 
9 Morgenthau, Politics Amongst Nations, p. 639.  
10 Paul Sharp. (1997). Who needs diplomats? The problem of diplomatic representation. International 
Journal, 52 (4), p. 625. 
11 Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 106. 
12 Sofer, Old and New Diplomacy, p. 195. 
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changed with it’.13 Several factors were responsible for this change in diplomacy, for 
example ‘a growing sense of the community of nations; an increasing appreciation of the 
importance of public opinion to foreign policy; and the rapid increase in 
communications’.14  This new form of diplomacy was a call for ‘a simpler diplomacy, 
which involved a flexible kind of self-righteousness, and the unhistorical attitude towards 
the past’15            
 One man responsible for the wave of self-righteousness was the then US President 
Woodrow Wilson: 16   
 
saviour of Europe and creator of a new world order, who extrapolated that the great game, now 
forever discredited, of the balance of power was abolished. “There must be, not a balance of 
power, but a community of power; not organised rivalries, but an organised common peace”.17    
 
The Americans, under Wilson, imported a zeal for liberalism and a distrust of the 
European balance of power of system and the diplomacy that lubricated it. Wilson 
endeavoured to ‘fashion a new diplomacy on the basis of a utopian and revolutionary 
vision’.18 At the time, Wilson’s ideas were a departure from undemocratic and belligerent 
                                                 
13 Nicolson, Diplomacy, p. 36.  
14 ibid.,  
15 Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations, p. 182. Butterfield is critical of the transition from old, 
statist and realist beliefs to new, non-state and idealistic virtues. In particular Butterfield was suspicious of 
public involvement in Foreign Policy. Involving the public in foreign policy was dangerous he argued: ‘the 
masses would give way to passions, moral indignations and short-cut forms of reasoning, lacking the 
patience for the understanding of ‘the other party’ (the foreigner), lacking the foresight for the pursuit of 
long-term objects, and failing to realise the things that might be achieved by diplomatic methods’ (1966: 
182). In short, the advent of new diplomacy, or more generally the idealistic mood sweeping Europe post 
World War I, was nothing more than ‘a facile attempt to pander the self-esteem of the masses’ (1966: 182). 
16 For a recent account of Wilson’s influence on the post-World War I IR system see Robert W. Tucker.  
(2004). Woodrow Wilson’s “New Diplomacy”. World Policy Journal. Summer, pp. 92 – 107. 
17 Wilson in Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations, p. 172. 
18 Sofer, Old and New Diplomacy, p. 197. 
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European diplomacy as they embodied the essentially ‘peaceful nature of man and an 
underlying harmony of the world’.19       
 Foreign policy would no longer be a secretive activity, but based on popular 
control, what Nicolson refers to as the ‘democratisation of foreign policy’.20 State 
interaction could not rely upon a balance of power system that would encourage trade 
wars, arms races and colonial rivalries. New diplomacy would eradicate these pre-war 
relics from the IR system and bring about ‘disarmament, free trade and self-
determination’.21         
 After the Great War, a ‘utopian perception of international society, analogous to 
the ideal civil society’, developed.22 Notions of international society entered the political 
vocabulary and the creation of a community of nations, headed by a permanent sovereign 
institution, was championed. This latter notion would manifest in the formation of the 
multi-lateral League of Nations in 1919, where statesmen as well as diplomats, would 
convene in summits. Further significant changes attributed to the announcement of 
nascent diplomacy can be summarised as follows: open as opposed to secret diplomacy; 
notions of collective rather than individual security; a sentiment of idealism incorporated 
into a permanent state of multilateralism; notions of world peace; self-determination for 
all peoples of all nations; and a resurgent belief in the human spirit were championed 
over the somber balance of power system, heavy militarisation and the permissible 
                                                 
19 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 222. 
20 Nicolson, Diplomacy, pp. 21 – 54. 
21 Sofer, Old and New Diplomacy, p. 197. 
22 For the English school approach to International Society see Hedley Bull. (1977). The anarchical 
Society: A study of order in world politics. pp. 96 – 223. New York: Columbia University Press. Also, for 
an excellent synopsis of the contributions of the major theorists of the English School to diplomacy and 
international society, ranging from Manning to Reus-Smit see, Iver B. Neumann. (2002). The English 
School on Diplomacy. Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute on International Relations, 
‘Clingendael’, pp. 1 – 28. 
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conflict of the pre-war period associated with traditional diplomacy.23 These notions were 
a dramatic break from the past.         
Developments in the post World War II IR system continued this trend. To 
discuss the many influences on the shape of this IR system is a complex task. Suffice to 
say that the founding of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Agreement, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, alongside American economic aid for the rebuilding of 
Europe and its incorporation into a free trade system, had a profound effect on the IR 
system.24         
 Similarly, the list of changes to the IR system at the end of the Cold War (when 
nascent diplomacy broke through) is an exhausting task.25 However, four significant 
developments relating to nascent diplomacy can be identified. Firstly, we have witnessed 
                                                 
23 For an expanded account of the differences between old and new diplomacy, the characteristics of new 
diplomacy and the argument concerning the decline of old diplomacy see Sasson Sofer. (1988). Old and 
new diplomacy: a debate revisited. Review of International Studies, 14, pp. 195 – 211; Harold Nicolson. 
(1961). Diplomacy Then and Now. Foreign Affairs, 40 (1), pp. 39 – 49; T. G. Otte. (1998). Harold 
Nicolson and Diplomatic Theory: Between Old Diplomacy and New. Diplomatic Studies Program 
Discussion Papers, No. 44. Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy; Herbert Butterfield. (1966). The 
New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy, in Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield. (1966). Diplomatic 
Investigations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Henry Kissenger. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: 
Simon & Schuster, pp. 218 – 243. 
24 It is not this paper’s intention to enter into a debate concerning the shape of the IR system post World 
War II. For a mainstream interpretation, see Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. (2004). World 
Politics: Trend and Transformation, 9th Edition. California: Thomson Wadsworth. pp 106 – 113; William 
C. Wohlforth. (1999). The Stability of a Unipolar World. International Security, 24 (1), pp. 5 – 41; 
Randolph M. Siverson. (1980). War and Change in the International System, in K. J. Holsti, R. Siverson 
and A. George. (1980). Change in the International System. Colorado: Westview Press, pp. 211 – 232. For 
a specific account of the evolution of the IR system and the effect on diplomacy see Richard Langhorne. 
(1998a). History and Evolution of Diplomacy in Kurbaliga, Jovan (ed), Modern Diplomacy. Valetta: 
Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy Studies; Robert Dean. (2000). Tradition, Cause and Effect, and the 
History of International Relations. Diplomatic History, 24 (4), pp. 615 – 622;  
25 For a summary of events affecting the IR system since the end of the Cold War see Michael Cox. (2005). 
From the Cold War to the War on Terror, pp. 132 - 156 in John Bayliss and Steve Smith. (2005). The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; Kenneth N. Waltz. (1993). The Emerging Structure of International Politics. International Security, 
18 (2), 44 – 79; Joseph S. Nye (Jr.). (1999). Redefining the National Interest. Foreign Affairs, pp. 22 – 35. 
For a country specific discussion, see Bernard E. Brown. (2001). What is the New Diplomacy? American 
Foreign Policy Interests, 23, pp. 3 – 21; Mark Leonard. (2002). Diplomacy by Other Means. Foreign 
Policy, 9, pp. 48 – 55; Mark Grossman. (2004). Challenges for European and American Diplomacy in the 
21st Century, The DISAM Journal, fall, pp. 54 – 60; Geoff Miller. (2002). Current and emerging challenges 
to the practice of Australian diplomacy. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 56 (2), pp. 197 – 206. 
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a ‘tremendous increase in diplomacy as a direct result of the increasing number of 
international actors’, not only states but MNCs, NGOs and IGOs.26 Secondly, there has 
been an increase in bilateral and multilateral settings for diplomacy. Thirdly, the 
‘growing volume and expanding agenda of diplomatic business’ has ‘transformed the 
face of diplomacy’; a prominent example central to this new agenda is environmental 
issues, which are of a transnational and global nature.27 And finally, the notion of 
diplomacy being the sole conduit for intra-state relations no longer exists, since 
government departments other than the foreign ministry increasingly have contacts with 
their counterparts in other countries, which ‘circumvents the foreign ministry and the 
embassy’.28 To this last point can be added the growing relationships between states and 
firms, states and NGOs and states and IGOs, for example.    
 Each of the three periods described above had a profound affect on the IR system, 
but the principles to emerge after each war were not to the benefit of states. The 
principles espoused in the first instance by a statesman – Wilson - for a system of states 
were ultimately embraced by non-state actors. They adopted an agenda and ethos that 
was originally intended for the state system in 1919. States, due to their historical 
foundations and traditional focus of national interest and sovereignty, were reluctant to 
adopt the principles described in this section, which could ultimately undermine them.29 
                                                 
26 Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, p. xiv. 
27 ibid. 
28 ibid., p. xxii. 
29 The case of France’s obstinacy during the 1919 Paris Peace conference illustrates the stubbornness 
inherent to early 20th century, traditional power politics. The specters of individualism and national security 
were central to her objectives during the negotiations. Of the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau 
(nicknamed “the Tiger”) Kissinger notes that ‘no other nation either shared or grasped France’s objectives. 
The clock simply could not be turned back 150 years’ (Diplomacy, p. 231). For France, her demands were 
simple: to guarantee national security over the idealistic harmonisation of mankind. History had bestowed 
such caution and skepticism on France. France had been ‘the theatre of many a European War and itself a 
participant in many more, was not to be persuaded that there existed some nebulous, underlying harmony 
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Non-state actors, breaking through after 1989, consolidated a lower political agenda that 
was first announced in 1919.          
 The work of recent scholars supports this assumption. Hocking, for example, 
argues the breakthrough of nascent diplomacy (diplomacy not directed by traditional state 
actors) ‘reflects the expansion of the agenda to embrace human rights and environmental 
issues, the strengthening of civil society and the growing capacity of groups, particularly 
NGOs, to operate alongside governments in the international arena and to challenge their 
[states] authority’.30  The notions that were announced in 1919 remain awkward for 
traditional states. After the Cold War, emerging non-state actors, unconstrained and 
untainted by traditionalism, have been able to embrace and champion an alternative 
ethos, a lower political agenda to that of states.     
 
3.1 The central tenets of NDT  
Following the end of the Cold War, Nascent theorists agree that ‘the challenge 
[for diplomacy studies] now is to develop a way of conceptualising and analysing 
diplomacy that can identify, explain and understand these sorts of changes to diplomatic 
practice’.31 One change central to NDT is the emergence of non-state actors practicing 
                                                                                                                                                 
heretofore hidden from mankind. Two German occupations in the course of fifty years had made France 
obsessively fearful of another round of conquest. It would aspire to tangible guarantees of its security and 
leave the moral improvement of mankind to others.’ (Diplomacy, p. 233). For a discussion on the 
personalities involved in the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles, and the subsequent 
difficulties in reaching political agreement, see, Kissinger, Henry. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, pp. 218 – 246. 
30 Brian Hocking, ‘Catalytic Diplomacy: Beyond Newness and Decline’, in Jan Melissen (ed.). (1999). 
Innovation in Diplomatic Practice. New York: Macmillan, p. 32.  
31 Hocking, Privatizing Diplomacy?, p. 345. 
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‘unofficial’ diplomacy.32 This shift from a statist focus on diplomacy is positive, although 
embryonic, in terms of broadening the field of enquiry for diplomacy studies.  
Whereas TDT accounts for a singular actor (the state), NDT accounts for a 
diverse range of diplomatic actors including MNCs or NGOs, for example The key point 
to note is that these non-state actors lie out with the traditional domain of state-qua-state 
diplomatic interaction. Nascent theorists do not ignore the state altogether. Instead, their 
focus is largely on non-state diplomatic actors. NDT, therefore, postulates on non-state 
actors who practice alternate or unconventional diplomacy. In other words, Nascent 
theorists distance their theory from the traditional diplomatic institution.   
Nascent diplomacy can be distinguished from traditional diplomacy in simple 
fashion: if traditional diplomacy promotes the state as the unitary actor in IR, is therefore 
Realist and state-centric, then nascent diplomacy can be classified as an ideal, moral 
approach that promotes an international society, which does not endorse the state as the 
only significant actor engaged in international diplomacy. One central tenet of NDT, 
therefore, is the premise that the ‘the diplomatic expertise for dealing successfully with 
conflict and peacemaking does not reside solely within government personnel or 
procedures’.33 
Another central tenet of NDT is that it emerged to challenge the dominant 
Traditionalist theory on diplomacy.  Traditionalist statism, parochialism and dominance 
played a role in the emergence of this faction of theorists. The statist exclusivity of 
Traditionalism meant that ‘such a perspective plays into the hands of those forces which 
view diplomacy [traditional] as increasingly removed from the real problems – and 
                                                 
32 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 21. 
33 Louise Diamond and John W. MacDonald. (1996) Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to 
Peace. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press Books for a World That Works, p. 2. 
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solutions – facing the world in the post Cold War years.’34 Those ‘forces’ are what this 
thesis refers to as NDT. TDT parochialism encouraged the mustering of Nascent 
theorists, who have assembled to lead an academic cavalry charge against TDT. Nascent 
theorists are keen to alter the dominant theoretical perception that diplomacy must be 
viewed exclusively through a traditional and statist lens. Instead, they promote a view 
where non-state actors are central to modern diplomatic theory. 
Therefore, NDT has ‘a transformational aspect, advocating a change in 
understanding of a modern diplomatic environment dominated by states’ and the 
diplomatic theory that interprets the system as such.35 Centrally, NDT advocates an 
alternate worldview. This worldview can be described as one where: 
 
traditional power politics are bypassed; non-state actors unite if not replace states as the loci of 
power; humanity and a need to address the human condition supersedes typical strategic power 
concerns; partnership and inclusivity are preferred over rivalry, antagonism and exclusivity; 
emphasis is placed on the continuity of international relationships over sporadic or situational 
relationships between traditional power brokers; and the international community is deemed to 
address not only the political affairs of global interaction but also humane and environmental 
issues.36  
 
NDT emphasises the ‘human, humane, non-violent, relational, interactive, shared 
and mutually empowered aspects of resolving conflicts and building relationships’.37 
NDT is essentially reflective of the interdependent, multi-polar and transnational nature 
                                                 
34 Cooper, Beyond Representation, p. 173. 
35 Diamond and MacDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy, p. 37. 
36 ibid, p. 37. 
37 ibid., p. 39. 
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of the modern IR system. In addition, the Nascent theoretical approach to diplomacy is a 
departure from TDT. For Nascent theorists, the complexity of the IR system since 1989 
has induced a ‘diplomatic revolution’ where the incumbent state is ‘undermined and 
effectively destroyed by complex political, economic, military and ideological 
developments that have destroyed its homogeneity and effectiveness’.38 Therefore, it 
should come as little surprise when Nascent theorists claim that to focus on traditional 
diplomacy ‘is to examine the redundant or the irrelevant’.39 
 
3.2 The general characteristics of Nascent theorists 
There are certain assumptions that qualify diplomatic theorists as Nascent 
theorists. The purpose here is to identify these general assumptions. Firstly, Nascent 
theorists challenge the dominant assumption that diplomacy be interpreted in a rigid, 
precise or authoritative fashion, concentrating exclusively on the role of the state. They 
argue that to understand modern diplomacy, the theoretical focus on the state must be 
lessened. Lessening the state focus requires a reconceptualisation or reinvention of 
diplomatic theory. Hoffman, typifies this characteristic: he writes that ‘the concept of 
diplomacy can and must be reconstructed’, which is only possible ‘if theory on 
diplomacy is detached from the state’.40 This alternate approach (to Traditionalism) 
suggests that by exploring diplomacy out with the state rewarding insight awaits 
discovery. 
Nascent theorists, secondly, view the state as blocking change to a more pacific 
IR system. Nascent theorists can thus be described as ‘those who regard the state as an 
                                                 
38 Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, p. 287. 
39 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 25. 
40 Hoffman, Reconstructing Diplomacy, p. 541. 
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obstacle to world order’; to them, ‘the development of an alternative diplomacy, 
embracing NGOs and transnational movements, offers the prospect of an international 
order transcending the state system’.41 Thus, the traditional institution of diplomacy is 
‘perpetually under suspicion’ by Nascent theorists.42 Unless the diplomatic institution can 
reinvent itself as being receptive to change, Nascent theorists critically implicate it as one 
of the culprits held responsible for contemporary global problems, through its inability to 
act proactively rather that reactively.43 
Several Nascent theorists, thus, argue that the traditional diplomatic institution is 
in a period of crisis. This crisis rhetoric, aimed at the incumbent traditional diplomatic 
institution, is a third general assumption of NDTs. Der Derian, for example, writes of the 
‘crisis in which diplomacy finds itself today’44 and Riordan writes of the continuing 
‘fragmentation of traditional diplomacy’ where ‘no country, however powerful, will be 
immune’.45 Langhorne adds, ‘there has been a decline, since the first world war, in the 
role played in international politics by professional diplomacy’.46 Nascent theorists 
believe that traditional/professional diplomacy cannot cope with 21st century problems, 
and that this type of diplomacy both as a vocation and an area of theoretical focus is 
defunct.  
The crisis of the traditional diplomatic institution leads Nascent theorists to 
suggest, fourthly, that perhaps it is obsolete. They propose that the traditional diplomatic 
                                                 
41 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 24. 
42 Sharp, Who Needs Diplomats?, p. 619. 
43 For a counter to this argument see Kishan S. Rana. (2004). Foreign Ministries: Change and Reform. 
Paper presented at the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18th; Brian Hocking. (1999). 
Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation. London: Palgrave; Brian Hocking and David Spence (eds.). 
(2002). Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats. Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
44 Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 1. 
45 Riordan, The New Diplomacy, p. 10. 
46 Langhorne, Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State, p. 2. 
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institution is irrelevant, redundant and rapidly losing the ability to influence an 
increasingly complex IR system. Nascent theorists portray the traditional institution of 
diplomacy as unresponsive to change, archaic and capable only of providing out-dated 
solutions to out-dated problems. Eayrs, for example, describes traditional diplomacy’s 
‘deliquescence’ or ‘melting away into nothingness’.47 Nascent theoretical approaches 
have therefore ‘tended to ignore professional diplomacy or to question its significance’ in 
relation to modern diplomatic theory.48 According to Nascent theorists, the traditional 
diplomatic institution is obsolete, mired in a political and territorial world of a bygone 
era.  
The same criticism is leveled at state-centric diplomatic theories by Nascent 
theorists. They simply argue that these state-centric theories on diplomacy fail to account 
for the complexities of the modern diplomatic environment. State-centric/Traditional 
theories are therefore rejected for ‘not being sufficiently inclusive, the need [according to 
Nascent theorists] is for a more diffuse, multiperspectival approach’.49 Nascent theorists 
often employ TDT to illustrate its weakness and inapplicability to the modern diplomatic 
environment, while at the same time, to advance their arguments.  
The obsolescence accredited to traditional diplomacy theory has led Nascent 
theorists, fifthly, to focus on alternate diplomatic actors. More promising research, 
according to Nascent theorists, lies in theorising on non-state diplomatic actors. The 
modern diplomatic environment has provided ‘the opportunity for non-state actors to 
engage in diplomacy through channels, which replace those employed by governments’.50 
                                                 
47 Eayrs in Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 24.  
48 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 24. 
49 Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 362. 
50 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 24. 
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To construct sound diplomatic theory, claim Nascent theorists, means first to 
acknowledge the multi-actor nature of the IR system and, secondly, to theorise on the 
diplomacy that unconventional actors practice within that system.  
Sixthly and finally, Nascent theorists are unsure of the value of history to their 
brand of diplomatic theory. Their reluctance to embrace the distant as well as recent past 
is understandable as they focus on post Cold War developments in Diplomacy and IR, 
and are keen to distance their work from the historical obsession of the Traditionalists. 
Gaddis exemplifies the NDT’s attitude towards history. He writes of historians that ‘they 
devote themselves, figuratively at least, to collecting pebbles on the beach, and arranging 
them in patterns that may delight the eye but rarely stimulate the brain’.51 Hunt adds that 
Nascent theorists ‘have consigned diplomatic historians to the role of the hewers-of-the-
wood and the drawers-of-water in their world of theory’.52 For Nascent theorists, relying 
heavily on the distant past is superfluous when theorising on modern diplomacy.  
 
3.3 The range of NDT: moderate to orthodox 
Not all Nascent theorists fit the general characteristics described in the previous 
section. A closer examination of their body of work suggests that Nascent theory ranges 
from moderate (not entirely discounting the traditional diplomatic institution) to orthodox 
(entirely discounting). In the latter sense, Nascent theorists such as Modelski (1972), 
Hoffman (2003) or Jackson (2002), are hostile in their criticism of statist and 
traditionalist diplomacy. In other Nascent theoretical approaches, such as those 
                                                 
51 John L. Gaddis, John L. (1987). Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists and the 
Enrichment of Security Studies. International Security, 12 (1), p. 10. 
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demonstrated by Langhorne (1997, 1998, 2000), Diamond (1996) and Reychler (1996), 
the rhetoric against traditional diplomacy is more temperate. Both approaches, however, 
convey the same message: to understand modern diplomacy we first must distance the 
role of the state in diplomatic theory.  
An example of this message from a moderate perspective is the opinion of 
Diamond and Macdonald, who argue that: 
 
the whole worldview of the last several centuries, which saw the nation-state as the unit 
of power and the balance of power as the principle of order, is no longer satisfactory to 
explain all the new conditions and forces at work in the world community.53 
  
 The language that Diamond and Macdonald employ is observant rather than 
hostile. The worldview which is ‘no longer satisfactory’ to explain the complex and 
altered modern diplomatic environment is TDT. Diamond and Macdonald are not 
advocating the complete abandonment of TDT but a possible redirection of diplomatic 
theory, one that accounts for the emerging force of non-state diplomatic actors.  
Although moderate Nascent theorists champion the ascendancy of non-state 
diplomatic actors, they also believe that the state must not be entirely discounted. They 
believe that in order to theorise accurately on modern diplomacy, it is important not to 
discount or abandon statist reverence, and to view nascent diplomacy in relation to the 
state. Princen and Finger, for example, argue that a theory of modern diplomacy should 
incorporate both the Traditional and NDT focus:  
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although the work of the foreign ministries remains essential for conducting the affairs of state, 
a much more complex picture of diplomacy emerges when one considers the expansion of 
issues, global communications, and the involvement of non-state and intergovernmental 
organisations.54 
Princen and Finger’s advice, that a focus on both traditional and nascent 
diplomacy sheds light on the complexity of modern diplomacy, exemplifies the tone of 
moderate NDT. Sharp (1999) also argues for a temperate approach, where diplomatic 
theory must reflect:  
the transformed environment of actors, issues, and modes of communication within which 
diplomats function; and yet, demonstrate the continuing centrality of conventional diplomats to 
most of what happens in contemporary diplomacy.55 
Here, Sharp advocates a continuation of TDT but in relation to nascent diplomatic 
actors. However, within the NDT faction, the above temperate examples are the current 
exception, rather than the rule. In its more extreme form, NDT on traditional diplomacy 
has been hostile. Orthodox Nascent theorists argue that non-state diplomatic actors or 
forces, such as the information revolution, are eroding the legitimacy of the state and 
subsequently the traditional diplomatic institution. This line of argument produces 
extreme opinion, which: 
can lead to the conclusion that non-state actors have become more significant on the world 
stage than governments who are cast into a limbo of growing irrelevance. From this 
perspective, diplomacy [traditional] is not only of decreasing relevance, it may indeed be 
dangerous in that it holds back the more benign non-state actors underpinning world society 
                                                 
54 Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger. (1994). Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local 
and the Global. London: Routledge, p. 31. 
55 Sharp, For Diplomacy, p. 47.  
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from generating a more peaceful environment than that which has characterised the several 
centuries dominated by the Westphalian international system.56 
In this quote, several characteristics of Nascent theorists can be recognised: the 
notion of the traditional institution ‘blocking’ change is entrenched, alongside its 
irrelevance, and the abhorrence Nascent theorists have towards Traditionalism is clear. 
According to orthodox Nascent theorists, the incumbent state is locked in an awkward 
relationship with emerging diplomatic actors. In the modern era, we are witnessing a 
contest for supremacy between state and non-state actors. Orthodox Nascent theorists 
claim that traditional diplomacy is losing the battle, and that it is in a continuous state of 
decline. Rapid changes to diplomacy since the end of the Cold War have fuelled that 
decline as more effective new actors  ‘breakdown traditional diplomatic domains and 
activities’57.          
 The opinion of Modelski is characteristic of an orthodox NDT. The answer to his 
question - ‘are diplomats still filling a real need?’ - is candid: 
Contemporary diplomacy provides neither adequate communication nor faithful or reliable 
representation; it is (1) technologically redundant; (2) uneconomical and (3) politically harmful 
to world society….what is special about international diplomacy is the extraordinary length to 
which relations between organizations of the same type, level and purpose have been fixed, 
formalized and even fossilized in one particular manner, how inbred and self centred this 
system has become, and how impervious it is to the general environment.58 
Here, Modelski interprets traditional diplomacy as archaic, rigid and redundant. 
Consequently, traditional diplomacy is no longer relevant to the ‘general’ diplomatic 
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environment. According to Modelski, traditional diplomacy is the antithesis of increased 
communication and interaction, it is a ‘well-tried system for minimizing interaction, and 
for keeping people apart, instead of bringing them together’.59 For Modelski, those 
theorists supporting traditional diplomacy are guilty of endorsing a defunct system of 
international interaction, a form of diplomacy that is ‘tenaciously maintained and 
jealously protected’.60        
The language Modelski employs dictates his labelling as an orthodox NDT.  
Langhorne provides another example of this hostile language:  
 
All states have suffered a diminution of both internal and external authority in the face of the 
pressures of the global revolution, which has served to erode the spiritual and practical bases 
upon which the nation state was predicated. At the upper end of the scale, the result is nervous 
discomfort and uncertainty, at the lower end, it is disaster and collapse. State collapse renders 
the traditional way in which other states have responded irrelevant: bilateral diplomatic 
machinery becomes useless.’61  
 
Langhorne’s views on the state and the traditional diplomatic institution are clear: 
the state and its diplomatic institution have become obsolete in the modern diplomatic 
environment. Orthodox Nascent theorists portray the state and the traditional diplomatic 
institution as cynical institutions, self-serving, introspective, morally corrupt and 
stubbornly resisting change. They promote change to the IR system through the inclusion 
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of a moralistic, idealistic and utopian agenda, which pushes the system towards 
international civil society where the state is gradually replaced by non-state actors.  
These notions are evident in the work of Jackson, who views traditional 
diplomacy as ‘reflecting the values and prejudices of a conservative international order 
that leaves little or no room for change, particularly fundamental change, to the IR system 
itself’.62 According to Jackson, change is required if we are to ultimately rid the IR 
system of the conflict, war and morally corrupt practices that conservative state actors 
indiscriminately promote and realise through the means of traditional diplomacy. Jackson 
views traditional diplomacy as a ‘self serving barrier to progress’ and ‘standing in the 
way of an urgently needed international revolution’.63 Traditionalists, similarly, block or 
frustrate change because, according to Jackson, they tolerate and endorse that which 
ought to be condemned: ‘compromises that may be unfair or may entail equality, lack of 
a vision of a better world, failure or refusal to seek to institute such a world by 
international means’.64  
Jackson argues that the state system and the traditional diplomacy that greases it 
must be eradicated, as it is antagonistic to the moral doctrine that non-state diplomatic 
actors champion. Nascent diplomacy ‘must not be merely fitted into the state system. It 
must displace the politically pragmatic and morally compromised arrangements of 
conventional diplomacy’.65  
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Hoffman also typifies the ethos of an orthodox NDT. In a 2003 article, he aims 
for nothing less that to ‘rework radically the concept of diplomacy’.66 In blunt fashion, he 
claims that ‘the state is incoherent, and that this incoherence necessarily extends itself to 
statist diplomacy…traditional or conventional notions of diplomacy’ must be avoided if 
we are to understand the nature of modern diplomacy.67   
 Hoffman attempts to theorise on diplomacy with no relation to the state. Relying 
heavily on Sharp’s observations,68 Hoffman champions a ‘deconstructive/reconstructive 
approach’, which ‘denies the possibility of fixed meanings’ of diplomacy, that is, 
parochial TDT interpretations.69 Hoffman asks us to consider a fluid form of people-to-
people diplomacy, with no state foundations. In the modern sense, ‘this new diplomatic 
function is being exercised by wider and wider circles of people’.70 These citizen 
diplomats ‘subvert and transform existing political arrangements’ and form groups 
distinct from states, driven by ‘new social movements’ facilitated by information, 
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technological and communicative revolutions that bypass the state, rendering it 
irrelevant.71          
 Diplomacy, Hoffman concludes, functions ‘much more fully and consistently in a 
stateless context than in a state centered one’.72 Therefore, any interpretation or theory of 
diplomacy must be undertaken in the absence of the state. Although Hoffman is not 
specific, it can be assumed that he is referring to non-state diplomatic actors, practicing 
unconventional diplomacy. He consistently returns to NGOs as an example of ‘more 
effective’ non-state diplomatic actors, who take advantage of ‘expert, dynamic and 
innovative thrusts’ which direct the IR system at the expense of the incumbent state.73 
While Hoffman’s ‘incoherent diplomacy’ argument is problematic (the state and 
traditional diplomacy are unlikely to disappear) it is illustrative that novel theory on 
diplomacy is forthcoming if distanced from the dominant state perspective.  This 
alternate attitude to theorising on diplomacy, moderate or orthodox, is the hallmark of 
NDT. 
 
3.4 Diplomacy defined from a Nascent theorist’s perspective 
NDT is a broad collection of theories. Nascent diplomacy is therefore a difficult 
term to define succinctly. The difficulty in concisely identifying a neat range of nascent 
actors is evident, for the simple reason that any organisation outside the state can be 
considered a nascent diplomatic actor. As nascent diplomatic actors are an embryonic 
phenomenon (compared to states) with diffuse and varied networks, they have not yet 
developed either internal organisation and control or the means of representing 
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themselves, either to each other or to state actors.74 Therefore, to write of a concise form 
of nascent diplomacy in the fashion of traditional diplomacy is, for the time being, a 
difficult task. 
In this context, Nascent theorists do not believe the consolidation of a neat and 
concise definition of diplomacy is possible. They argue that today there are too many 
diplomatic actors for one simple definition to account for. For Nascent theorists, this 
admission is necessary if we are to exact a conceptual jailbreak from our ‘attempts to 
assert or capture a precise, fixed or authoritative meaning’ of diplomacy.75 Nascent 
theorists are critical of the parochial definitions of the ‘Nicolson genre’ and how their 
offerings are ‘striking in their attempt to defining authoritatively what true diplomacy is 
and what it is not’.76  
The idea of a ‘narrow conception of diplomacy’ is abhorrent to Nascent theorists, 
who challenge why it is important for the field to ‘capture authoritatively what diplomacy 
is?’ in a single sentence or two.77 Nicolson, for example, believed that the rigidity of 
traditional diplomacy permitted a definition capturing ‘the true identity or essence of 
diplomacy through linguistic precision’.78 Nascent theorists are less sure that an 
authoritative, concise definition of diplomacy exists.   
White, for example, notes that in the modern era, diplomacy is ‘one of those 
infuriatingly vague terms’ where precise definitions are no longer adequate ‘to cover the 
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range of actors’ practicing diplomacy.79 White questions ‘what is diplomacy?’ and sets 
forth a realisation that diplomacy is multi-faceted and cannot be defined in the traditional 
one-dimensional sense of Nicolson, Berridge or Satow.80 
The Nascent theorist’s reluctance or inability to define nascent diplomacy means 
that a concise definition is absent in their literature. However, this thesis attempts to 
introduce a definition, for the purpose of drawing distinction between the fundamental 
ethos’ of different factions of theorists. Nascent diplomacy can be defined as a response 
to states’ failure to embrace a distinctly unconventional or lower agenda that has emerged 
since the end of the Cold War. Nascent diplomacy is practiced by non-state actors who 
have risen up the IR hierarchy, as a result of the deficiencies of governments, acting 
alone or together, in terms of their rapidity or response to global issues. Nascent 
Diplomacy is characterised by the fostering of equitable, morally interdependent and 
stable relationships amongst non-state actors. These actors share common low political 
goals and exchange resources, expertise and knowledge (information) in pursuit of 
unconventional goals such as environmental, human rights or aid development issues. 
Nascent or non-state diplomatic actors have capitalised on state deficiencies, to promote 
their agenda, their position in the IR hierarchy and their alternate but effective techniques 
at tackling global problems, which states have been reluctant or unable to address. 
Simply, NDT embodies this alternate worldview. 
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3.5 Specific examples of NDT 
Nascent theorists are positive on the actors, forces and environments challenging 
the traditional diplomatic institution and employ them to validate much of their irrelevant 
state/diplomacy argument. Thus, Nascent theorists are dismissive of types of diplomacy 
associated with the archaic state. The following six themes are underwritten by a 
common Nascent theme: that the traditional diplomatic institution is no longer the only 
diplomatic actor of significance. 
 
3.5.1 Nascent theorists as advocates of the declining state argument 
Where NDT is concerned, the ‘case for euthanasia’, ‘obsolescence’ and 
‘irrelevance’ of the state and its traditional diplomatic institution is a foundation of their 
work.81 Nascent theorists advance several common assumptions in support of their 
portrayal of the traditional diplomatic institution as redundant. Firstly, they argue that 
advances in travel, technology and communications allow unconventional state actors 
(politicians and home-based ministry heads, for example) to bypass the conventional 
diplomatic channels.82 Secondly, the notion of the traditional diplomatic institution as the 
sole conduit for state-qua-state relations no longer exists. The growth of IGOs, regional 
organisations, summitry and the like suggests that there are now more effective channels 
for diplomacy.83 Thirdly, the once central purpose of the traditional diplomatic institution 
- information gathering and political reporting – is no longer required by the domestic 
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state. The ‘huge growth in international mass media’ has meant that alternate and faster 
sources of information are available to governments.84 Fourthly, the ‘democratisation’ of 
diplomacy has meant private individuals and organisations have detrimentally infringed 
upon the once hermetically sealed world of traditional diplomacy.85 For example, NGOs 
and private individuals are now incorporated into official delegations; ‘citizen activists’ 
now have ‘official representative status’.86 And finally, in certain hostile countries the 
traditional diplomatic mission is simply too dangerous to maintain. In the modern era, 
‘serious ideological tensions and deepening cultural division mean that the exchange of 
resident missions by hostile states provides – quite literally – dangerous hostages to 
fortune’.87  
These general assumptions lead Nascent theorists to argue that the state (and its 
diplomacy) is losing relevance. In the complex twenty-first century, the ‘once central and 
exclusive role of the state has become more vague’.88 For Nascent theorists, vagueness 
equates to irrelevancy. NDT obituaries for the nation state are common. Marie Guehenno, 
France’s former ambassador to the European Union, went so far as to predict ‘the end of 
the nation’ as the forces of globalisation and transnationalism grow to suffocate state 
autonomy.89 Nascent theorists such as Langhorne, Coolsaet, Biswas and Berger also 
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support declining state arguments.90 Indeed, there has been much written, particularly 
during the uncertain post Cold War period, questioning the legitimacy of the state as a 
‘viable and durable form of political community and collective identity’, so much so that 
the state and traditional diplomacy are perceived to be in ‘crisis’.91  
The crisis relates the increasing numbers of non-state actors having ‘some kind of 
diplomatic role to play’ within the IR system.92 The presence of these non-state actors, 
claim Nascent theorists, is detrimentally affecting state sovereignty. The state is 
conceding power to these new actors; its influence is being ‘undermined from above and 
below’.93 Nascent theorists argue that now sovereignty has to be shared both on a level 
above the state (international law, supranational and international organisations) and on a 
level below (regions with limited sovereignty, NGOs and multi-national businesses for 
example) which has led to a ‘reduced sense of the absolute sovereignty of the state’.94 In 
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the twenty-first century, ‘states have been scaled down’ and their ‘field of operation has 
narrowed’, now they are ‘performing reduced functions’.95  
The majority of NDT authors convey a similar message: that the state is 
unreflective of the contemporary IR system, is being challenged by non-state actors and 
is therefore irrelevant. Other Nascent theorists suggest that perhaps it is just time for the 
state to bow out from the IR system. Sharp, for example, ‘assumes that the state system is 
fading, and that is not necessarily a bad thing’.96 His argument is based upon a perception 
of an archaic, irrelevant and out of touch institution. Sharp observes that ‘we find 
ourselves inhabiting fading structures imposed by general principles and their particular 
political and territorial expressions, both of which were established to provide dubious 
solutions to long-forgotten or outdated problems’.97 The archaic state, then, belongs to an 
era where a traditional military-political agenda overshadowed the IR system. For 
Nascent theorists, the state is struggling to maintain legitimacy, as it neither has the 
responsive diplomatic tools, nor the compunction to operate in a radical environment. 
Not surprisingly, Nascent theorists consider the future bleak for the traditional 
diplomatic institution. Familiar and practical diplomatic rules and routines are becoming 
more and more difficult to uphold as ‘governance becomes complex and fragmented 
across various domains’.98 Decision making power is decentralised and dispersed 
amongst growing numbers of domestic and international agencies and groups. 
Organisations and structures of civil society are also becoming more prominent, cutting 
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across ‘conventional Westphalian images of diplomatic theory and practice’.99 According 
to Nascent theorists, the role of traditional diplomacy is less assured than in the past.   
The irrelevance of traditional diplomacy has a strong historical legacy, which 
suggests some form of continuity in NDT. For example, in 1950 Vansittart argued the 
professional diplomat is ‘technically obsolete, politically superseded, and placed in a 
position where [his] own trained judgements matter less and less’.100 In 1978, Wight and 
Bull pondered ‘whether traditional diplomatic practices have become obsolete, 
succumbing to the revolutionary practices, as bad money drives out good’.101 And a 
decade later Sofer described a worrying predicament for traditional diplomacy: 
 
With the increase in appointments of non-professionals, the foreign ministry has been reduced 
to the level of technical apparatus. Accordingly, statesmen and politicians accuse diplomats of 
lacking a comprehensive conception of foreign policy and espousing a parochial and unrealistic 
viewpoint.102 
 
These views suggest that even the traditional diplomats are under attack.  Sharp 
imagines a world without the professional diplomat, ‘replacing them with a new sort of 
profession defined in terms of the functional skills of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, 
and conciliation, contracted on a commercial basis’ lacking ‘both the symbolic and 
political significance of servants of the state’.103 Conceivably, then, traditional diplomacy 
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is losing its professional identity as we enter an era referred to as ‘diplomacy without the 
diplomats’.104 In this era: 
 
states are being emptied of their functions; globalisation is witnessing the end of the state and, 
therefore, of foreign policy. Diplomacy is replaced by global governance structures and 
authority is relocated from public to quasi-public and private [non-state] agencies. Diplomacy 
as an activity is emptied of special meaning and significance: everyone – or no one – is a 
diplomat now.105 
 
This statement is typical of the modern NDT mantra, citing the phenomenon of 
globalisation and the transfer of authority to structures of non-state governance. The 
concept that everyone is a diplomat relates to the notion that diplomacy existed before the 
state, and will continue to exist after the state. Der Derian in his genealogical history of 
Western diplomacy argued strongly on this point, highlighting that diplomacy has a 
history that transcends the development of the Westphalian state system.106 Sharp (1999) 
and Hocking (2001) similarly assure us that diplomacy is neither synonymous with the 
state nor is its importance to be judged by the prevalence of the state. After all, 
diplomacy, in its most rudimentary form, concerns the common problem ‘of living 
separately and wanting to do so, while having to conduct relations with others’.107 
Diplomacy can therefore exist in a stateless context amongst groups of people wanting to 
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amicably solve the common problem of living separately. For Nascent theorists, 
diplomacy needs neither the state nor the diplomatic institution; with or without the state, 
diplomacy will endure. 
 
3.5.2 The Nascent theoretical portrayal of IGOs as distinct diplomatic actors  
Nascent theorists view IGOs as distinct diplomatic actors where ‘the whole may 
be greater than the sum of the parts’.108 They argue that the Traditionalist perspective on 
IGOs (where IGOs are built by states, for states) is ‘relatively static’ and ‘bound to a 
single level of analysis’.109 Therefore, the NDT approach110 ‘has disaggregated the state, 
to the extent that it is no longer considered useful’ when theorising on IGOs.111 
Abandoning the state axiom, Nascent theorists suggest that IGOs are autonomous 
political actors, practicing a form of diplomacy distinct from the traditional practice. 
Nascent theorists propose several assumptions in support of this thesis. 
Firstly, Nascent theorists sponsor a view of IGOs as separate from states. Iriye, 
who proposes a ‘different world’ scenario, encapsulates this view.112 Iriye suggests that 
when thinking of IGOs it should be assumed:  
 
that there is yet another world, one that is produced by forces that cut across national frontiers. 
These forces create diplomatic networks of shared interests and concerns that go beyond 
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national interest and concerns. These transnational phenomena, addressed by intergovernmental 
organizations, may be said to be creating an alternative world, one that is not identical with the 
sum of sovereign states and nations.113 
 
Iriye proposes a similar theoretical journey if IGOs role in the modern diplomatic 
environment is to be truly understood. Of the absence of accurate theory on IGOs (in the 
Traditional canon), he notes that ‘this scholarly void must be filled. A focus on 
international organizations, rather than on nations and states, as individual units of 
analysis provides fresh perspective’.114 Developing this ‘fresh’ perspective requires a 
diplomatic theory devoid of the state, that is, to interpret IGOs as distinct political actors, 
with their own rules, regulations and type of diplomacy. 
Groom and Taylor also offer a convincing case for ‘analysing IGOs as distinct 
political systems’.115 For these theorists, IGOs can be distinguished from states as they 
have built a distinct system where behaviour is not guided by states. Subsequently, IGOs 
have developed their own organisational, cultural and diplomatic identity, which is 
dependent on four factors: ‘the ability to maintain effective channels of diplomatic 
communication internally and externally, the ability to integrate its sub-units, the 
engendering of loyalty, and the capacity to generate enough self-knowledge to enable it 
to steer in the sense of being able to set goals reflecting preferred values’.116 IGOs 
therefore are divergent from states in terms of structure, organisation, affiliation, 
expertise and agenda.  
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For Nascent theorists, the alternate agendas of IGOs and states are employed to 
highlight a further distinction between the two. Whereas states focus on high, traditional 
political-military concerns, IGOs typically focus on a lower political agenda. The 
traditional agenda is ill suited to the complex twenty-first century in that it has ‘left major 
potholes and broken bridges in the highways of global relationships’.117 Expanding on the 
notion of broken bridges in global state-qua-state relations, Langhorne portrays a 
dramatic image:  
 
when the consequences of state collapse produce tribal, gang, or economic warfare and/or 
brigandage, who will stop it? When these events produce utter disasters for human beings – no 
food, no water, no housing, the break up of families in refugee camps, the spread of disease, 
episodes of murder and rapine – who will relieve the suffering?118 
 
Not traditional diplomacy according to Langhorne, who argues this radical global 
agenda ‘renders the way in which other states respond irrelevant: a bilateral approach and 
the consequent use of bilateral diplomatic and other traditional machinery becomes 
irrelevant’.119  A new, demanding ‘world of diplomatic activity has thus been created’, 
one which ‘requires profoundly different authors of international exchanges from those of 
the past’.120 For Nascent theorists, those ‘authors’ will be independent IGOs, who are 
better equipped to tackle emerging global problems than states are.  
These unconventional, global problems will:  
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test as never before both the ability of governments to take on new kinds of foreign policy 
activity and the ability of traditional diplomats to negotiate agreements to meet these 
challenges. The existing nation-state diplomatic relationships will not suffice.121 
 
IGOs, according to Nascent theorists, will suffice. By focusing on a lower 
unconventional agenda, IGOs become empowered through the reluctance or inability of 
traditional state actors. After all: 
 
decision-making moves naturally to those who possess both the information and the expertise. 
Foreign ministries have traditionally been unenthusiastic and often ill prepared to take on new 
areas beyond the normal political aspects of international affairs.122  
 
In other words, IGOs succeed where states fail. The state’s inability or reluctance 
to embrace a different twenty-first century agenda is responsible for the success of IGOs. 
However, empowerment, increased decision-making capability, a distinct identity and a 
separate organisational culture is not enough to solve the global problems. The solution, 
Nascent theorists argue, is that IGOs have instigated a new type of diplomacy, one that is 
distinct from and more effective than traditional diplomacy at global problem solving.  
The advent of this ‘new’ diplomacy stems from a distrust of the unilateral state. 
Nascent theorists are suspicious of unilateral state action,123 preferring to champion the 
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‘beneficial effects of channeling perceptions of national interests through the process of 
collective evaluation’.124 Nascent theorists agree that ‘multilateral diplomacy can be 
complicated and messy’ but that this is preferable to unilateralism, which ‘can be 
dangerous and destructive’.125 Nascent theorists stress that their distrust in unilateralism 
and subsequent belief in multilateralism must not be interpreted as ‘wild-eyed idealism 
run amuck’ but rather as a disdain for an IR system governed by ‘unbridled state 
control’.126 
Central to this new type of multilateral diplomacy is the notion that IGOs have 
become arenas conducive to ‘innovative and non-hegemonic diplomacy’.127 The hallmark 
of this new diplomacy is: 
 
its form (with a heavy emphasis on coalition building), scope (its extension from the economic 
and the social into the security domain), and its intensity. A tilt has taken place for IGOs, from 
a “talking shop” to a constructive agent making a difference.128 
 
IGOs, then, are no longer ad hoc functional arrangements or tools of opportunism 
serving particularistic state interests.129 The ability to bypass traditional diplomatic 
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channels – the speed of the new diplomacy - is characterised by  ‘bottom up modes of 
leadership from the enhanced role of civil society in contemporary diplomacy’.130 In 
other words, IGOs may have been institutionalised by states and for states in the past, but, 
in the modern era it is independent IGOs that are driving a new form of responsive 
diplomacy, one which is increasingly important in the modern diplomatic environment. 
Nascent theorists do acknowledge the participation of official diplomatic 
representatives in IGO forums. However, they confer equal importance to the other IGOs 
and NGOs. Nascent theorists ‘do not imply that state actors and power politics are 
unimportant, but merely that they are not axiomatic’.131 By challenging the dominant 
state axiom to incorporate alternate actors, Nascent theorists view IGOs as practicing 
polylateral, as well as multilateral diplomacy. In the UN, for example, NGOs have been 
accorded observer status for some time now, and the power of their international 
secretariats is substantial.132 Nascent theorists suggest that within IGOs there are several 
polylateral layers of diplomacy, from state to IGO or state to NGO for example. 
Distinguishing these layers allows Nascent theorists to advance their notion that IGOs are 
not only facilitators of multilateral diplomacy but distinct diplomatic actors guiding the 
process of polylateral diplomacy.  
Nascent theorists portray IGOs as evolutionary, emerging or changing rapidly to 
embrace and tackle a global agenda. According to Nascent theorists, this flexibility – as 
well as their status as distinct diplomatic actors – means that IGOs will continue to grow 
in significance as prominent, independent and effective modern diplomatic actors.  
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3.5.2 Diplomacy as theatre: the Nascent theorist’s dismissal of summit diplomacy 
 
Nascent theorists argue that summitry confers little value to the modern 
diplomatic environment. They advance several arguments in support of this assumption. 
Firstly, Nascent theorists argue that the summit is ineffective in terms of meaningful 
political action. Instead the summit is merely a stage, a theatre133 for statesmen to 
demonstrate to their voters that they are personally involved in solving the world’s 
problems. Nascent theorists portray summits as nothing more than ‘dramatic theatre’, 
where ‘carefully orchestrated meetings’ are designed to attract media attention, and 
where statesmen constantly find themselves on public stage and so are obliged to assume 
‘prearranged roles in the official diplomatic play’.134     
 In this context, summits are little more than publicity stunts. According to 
Nascent theorists, summits endorse the trend of ‘politicians seeking publicity for 
domestic purposes’, where global media beams countless images of statesmen appearing 
to efficiently process issues that know no national boundaries.135 In the modern era, 
summits are conducted with the public in mind. Negotiation is often broadcast and 
televised,136 and ‘all rational discussion is abandoned in favour of interminable 
propaganda speeches’ addressed not to one’s political opponent but to the national 
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electorate at home and increasingly abroad.137 Add to the summit theatre ‘the power of 
television and sprinkle the surface with exotic locations of great symbolic significance, 
and it clear why summit diplomacy is an irresistible dish’ for statesmen.138 According to 
Nascent theorists, those political leaders involved in summitry ‘tend to talk as much to 
the press as they do to one another. The media presence at some summits is now so 
enormous that the meetings look like staged events’.139   
The inclusion of publicity into what should be a confidential diplomatic process, 
leads Nascent theorists to question the diplomatic value of summits. If anything, summits 
‘diminish the utility, guile and wisdom of statesmen as they entail much publicity, many 
rumours and wide speculation in that they tempt those involved to achieve quick, 
spectacular and often fictitious rules’, and enhance the uncertainty which it is the purpose 
of sound diplomatic interaction to prevent.140       
 In addition, statesmen outline their objectives before the summit has even started. 
The outcome of the summit is decided before it has even taken place. This means that to 
renege on very public statements can be viewed as leadership weakness by the public. 
Therefore compromise, a prerequisite of sound diplomacy, is virtually non-existent in 
diplomacy by summit. If adjustments need to be made by diplomatic ‘sherpas’141 during 
the summit then time is against all those involved.142 For Nascent theorists, all parties’ 
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predetermined and rigid positions means, more often than not, that to renegotiate during 
the summit is almost impossible; especially considering the time that went into 
prenegotiation and the short nature of the summit. After all, most summits are only two 
or three days long.          
 Membership of the exclusive summit club, ‘fireside chats’ amongst heads of 
states and the subsequent image of state amicability is, secondly, interpreted by Nascent 
theorists as a facade. The IR system is anything but a friendly place and is dominated by 
conflicting national interest, power struggles and inevitable conflict. Big egos mean that 
personalities can clash. According to Nascent theorists, ‘when leaders have disparate 
backgrounds, customs and languages and, in many cases, ethical attitudes and ideologies, 
summitry is more likely to produce mistaken and misleading impressions than a clear 
meeting of minds’.143 In addition, negotiating styles and expectations can differ greatly 
among statesmen from disparate cultures and language problems are ‘another source of 
potential misunderstanding’.144 For Nascent theorists, the image of personal contact at the 
summit is nothing more than an ‘illusion’.145      
 Thirdly and finally, Nascent theorists argue that summits are a waste of money. 
The venues for summits are often five star, usually located in such grand settings as 
Gstaad, Nice, Davos, Cancun or Gleneagles. According to Nascent theorists, the cost for 
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the taxpayer does not always equate with value for money. On top of the exorbitant cost 
of holding the summit, the host city/nation also needs to bear the burden of securing the 
location. With powerful leaders conveniently located in one place, ‘draconian security 
measures nowadays go hand and hand with multilateral summitry’.146 The July 2005 G8 
summit in Scotland was no different, costing at least ten million pounds and involving 
9,000 of Scotland’s 15,000 police officers.147 All three of these points confirm that NDT 
on summits is largely derogatory. The ambivalence Nascent theorists exhibit towards any 
form of traditional diplomacy, involving either the diplomat or the statesman, is also 
evident.  
 
3.5.3 The central Nascent actor: Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
As has been already stated, while states are central to TDT, NGOs are central to 
NDT. The promotion of NGOs as more effective diplomatic actors than states is a 
common argument of Nascent theorists. Their argument rests upon the assumption that 
NGOs have ‘become more significant on the world stage than governments’.148 Nascent 
theorists portray the state and the diplomacy it practices as cumbersome and overly 
bureaucratic. The state is depicted as a ‘villain, an intrusive monolith with a propensity to 
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lose sight of the real common good in pursuit of its own bureaucratic and diplomatic 
agenda’.149 The bloated and inefficient nature of traditional diplomatic bureaucracy 
serves only to confound social, developmental and economic progress.150 The ‘weakness 
of the state has stimulated a thriving voluntary sector and with it a strong and vocal 
global civil society’ represented diplomatically by NGOs.151 For Nascent theorists, states 
are either ‘inherently wicked or incompetent’.152 
Those succeeding at the expense of the wicked state are NGOs, which are 
portrayed in the NDT literature as increasingly powerful non-state actors. Since the end 
of the Cold War, NGOs have injected ‘unexpected voices into international discourse 
about numerous problems of global scope’.153  Their success has hinged upon their ability 
to ‘bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go beyond 
capacities of states to address individually’.154 According to Nascent theorists, NGOs are 
now an intrinsic part of the modern political landscape, and have become ‘active in 
political work once reserved for representatives of states’.155   
 Nascent theorists consider NGOs as an alternative to states and representative of 
‘a world unto itself, with its own philosophy and perspective, purpose, language, 
attitudes, activities, diversities, culture and membership’, and their own brand of 
diplomacy.156 NGOs have an independent ability to ‘breed new ideas; advocate; protest, 
and mobilise public support; and to undertake legal, scientific, technical and policy 
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analysis’.157 These fundamental qualities of NGOs are more suited to solving complex 
twenty-first century global problems. 
Nascent theorists envisage a twenty-first century where ‘NGOs will pioneer the 
formation of a new kind of transnational society in which individuals and their voluntary 
associations replace governments’.158 For Nascent theorists, NGOs are ‘increasingly 
playing a profound, even crucial, role in fostering and creating a world civil society, 
largely outside the purview of state control’.159 The rise of a global civil society, 
represented diplomatically by NGOs, therefore ‘challenges conventional understandings 
and analyses of world politics’.160 Central to this challenge is NDT that promotes the 
NGO at the expense of the irrelevant state.        
 There are several reasons Nascent theorists advance in support of this assumption. 
Firstly; NGOs are able to exploit opportunities governments are unwilling or unable to 
embrace.  In NDT, this exploitation is known as ‘gap-filling’, where ‘states, can no 
longer provide what the people perceive to be adequate services. NGOs are filling a gap 
left by the state’.161 These gaps occur where ‘a vacuum of responsibility has been 
created’.162 To fill this vacuum, ‘people, represented by NGOs, step forward when 
citizens feel governments fail to be effective, innovative, and imaginative in dealing with 
long-standing problems’.163 
According to Nascent theorists, these gaps are increasing and the emerging need 
for representation (of civil society groups) has given NGOs greater legitimacy than states. 
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NGOs have been able to fill these niches because, as Nascent theorists argue, they are 
more flexible, responsive and effective than the archaic state and its overly bureaucratic 
diplomatic system.164 In other words, NGOs have been able to fill unconventional niches 
that states have been unable or unwilling to address.  
A second reason behind the rise of NGOs is that for an increasingly informed 
global civil society, the lower political agenda is becoming more important than the 
traditional ‘high’ agenda. For Nascent theorists, civil society has grown tired of 
traditional military/security politics. In the complex, modern diplomatic environment: 
 
the classical and strategic matters are no longer the preponderant element of international 
relations… new political concerns have been added to the diplomatic menu. As a result of 
globalization, issues - formerly thought to be low politics – have now become increasingly key 
issues165 in relations between states. 166 
 
The cumbersome and bureaucratic state is confounded by this lower, 
unconventional agenda. NGOs have boldly stepped in, according to Nascent theorists, 
who imply that transnational/global concerns are today more important than the 
traditional high political agenda. In other words, international or global problems should 
supercede national, traditional concerns. 
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For Nascent theorists, the increasing ability of NGOs to proactively solve these 
global problems suggests they are gaining legitimacy as political actors, to the detriment 
of the incumbent state. Where NGOs are concerned, ‘the image that the state is in decline 
is connected with a depletion in its legitimacy’.167 NGOs, unconstrained by sovereignty, 
bureaucracy or national affiliation, are able to promote their own legitimacy at the 
expense of the declining states. In the modern era, ‘NGOs are more representative than 
national governments’.168  Nascent theorists argue that in such a context, there is little 
need for an expensive and inefficient traditional, national diplomatic institution.  
The increase in NGO legitimacy has been prompted by ‘growing doubts about the 
capacity of the state to cope on its own with the social welfare, developmental and 
environmental problems that face nations today’.169 In addition, NGOs are faster at global 
problem solving, have more expertise and more scope than traditional diplomatic 
institutions. Nascent theorists consistently argue that NGOs ‘unburdened by 
governmental bureaucracy and political considerations, move faster and more effectively 
than government agencies’.170 Former statesman, Sir David Steel, noted the inefficiency 
of traditional diplomatic actors: 
 
they [states] are responding to international problems very, very slowly and not very 
effectively. There seems to be a lack of willingness to adjust, a lack of response to greater 
internationalism.171 
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Consequently, Nascent theorists challenge ‘the extent to which the state and the 
diplomatic system remain, or indeed should remain, as the main vehicle for a global 
diplomacy’.172  
This NDT rhetoric is broad and insightful, but the question remains, how do 
NGOs actually surpass the traditional diplomatic institution? The answer lies within a 
distinct form of diplomacy, one that Nascent theorists claim is more effective than 
traditional diplomacy. 173 
According to Nascent theorists, the new diplomacy of NGOs outstrips and 
outperforms traditional diplomacy in several areas. Firstly, in terms of staff, NGOs have 
more expertise than traditional diplomatic institutions. NGOs make a point of recruiting 
highly trained and experienced personnel, many of whom have served in political 
organisations, including governmental and intergovernmental entities. Nascent theorists 
highlight that ‘many NGO staff members have capacities and expertise in policy making 
and supervision of transnational programmes that is more substantial to international civil 
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servants’.174 Unconstrained by the bureaucracy of traditional diplomacy, these former 
‘professionals’ revel in the speed, mission and efficacy of NGO diplomacy.  
 Secondly, in terms of organisational structures, NGOs are beginning to emulate 
traditional diplomatic actors. ‘NGOs have created their own rules and regulations’ as a 
result of the state’s irrelevance in the twenty-first century.175As NGOs become larger and 
more efficient, there comes a need to develop sturdy communicative, organisational and 
diplomatic structures. Today, many NGOs ‘all have at least rudimentary diplomatic 
machinery; they can communicate their interests and deploy their resources to influence 
the outcome of negotiations’.176 Indeed, many NGOs ‘have a greater ability to influence 
the diplomatic process at a global level than smaller states’.177  
 Thirdly, NGOs are able to respond rapidly to communication and information-
gathering developments, whereas governments – overburdened with bureaucratic 
diplomacy - are slower to respond. This ability gives NGOs yet another advantage. With 
regard to the information revolution, ‘the flexible and agile structure of NGOs allows 
them to adapt well to the use of new technologies’.178 In one Nascent theorist’s words: 
 
in drastically lowering the costs of communications, consultation and coordination, information 
technologies favor decentralised networks of NGOs…..Governments, on the other hand, are 
quintessential hierarchies, wedded to an organizational form incompatible with all that the new 
technologies make possible.179  
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This distinction, between a flexible and responsive form of NGO compared to a 
cumbersome and archaic state, is consistently reinforced in NDT.  
 Fourthly, NGOs are able to exist harmoniously with other nascent diplomatic 
actors, such as IGOs, whereas states have an awkward and often conflictual relationship. 
Indeed, NGOs owe much to IGOs for their ascendancy in the modern diplomatic 
environment. In 1948, the United Nations Charter granted Consultative Status with the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to certain NGOs. Specifically, article 71 states 
that: 
 
‘the Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such 
arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with 
national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned’. 180   
 
At the time of writing there are 2476 NGOs in consultative states with ECOSOC, 
and some 412 NGOs accredited to the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). 
181 NGOs are portrayed as ‘the favorite child of official agencies, something of a panacea 
for the many problems of development’.182 The multi-lateral IGO environment is a 
positive one for NGOs, the ‘official funding they are able to extract, the popularity they 
enjoy, and the increasing access they are offered to diplomatic centers of national and 
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international decision making’ represents a major coup for NGOs, at the expense of the 
state’s occasional disdain for IGOs.183 
 With a difference in agenda, diplomatic techniques and organisational foundations 
Nascent theorists portray the state-NGO relationship as awkward. This mutual discomfort 
can be traced to the criticism NGOs have of states and ‘the inherently controversial 
nature of their missions, which seek to oppose existing government policies and 
eventually change them’.184 NGOs subsequently provoke a defensive reaction from 
governments; they ‘spur visceral resistance and defensiveness from governments they 
criticise’.185 For Nascent theorists, however, the battle between states and NGOs will be 
only heighten as the 21st century agenda, and the solutions required to effectively tackle 
that agenda, becomes more complex.  
                                                 
183 ibid. 
184 Gordenker and Weiss, Devolving Responsibilities, p. 445. 
185 ibid. 
  Chapter three 
 136
3.6 Another nail in the traditional coffin: globalisation and multi-national 
corporations (MNCs) 
 
Nascent theorists argue that prominent MNCs question the role of the state and 
traditional diplomacy in the creation of wealth through trade. Nascent theorists believe 
that powerful MNCs frequently outstrip and outperform states in the creation of 
wealth.186 This observation suggests that the state is no longer relevant, as it has lost the 
principle – wealth creation based on territory and secured by force – that granted it 
exclusivity and purpose as a sovereign actor.   
Nascent theorists commonly cite three factors in support of these assumptions. 
They are: the impact of globalisation; the loss of state power to generate wealth through 
territory; and the evolving political and diplomatic nature of MNCs, superceding that of 
states. These three factors relate to the state and the traditional diplomatic institution’s 
inability to generate wealth, thus rendering both archaic institutions irrelevant.  
 Employment of the first factor, globalisation (specifically in the economic 
sphere)187, is abundant in NDT. For Nascent theorists, the irrelevancy of the state is 
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proven by comparing it to its traditional, historical role, where state success ‘hinged on 
military and economic resources – the ability to guarantee control of a new territory 
against other challengers as well as the capacity and challenges that new expanding 
markets offered’.188 States, in the past, demonstrated a form of ‘economic aristocracy’ or 
exclusivity, which justified their legitimacy and relevancy by creating wealth in this 
monopolistic fashion.189 This exclusive right to generate wealth is no longer the case, 
according to Nascent theorists. 
 In the modern era, Nascent theorists argue that globalisation has encouraged the 
rise of MNCs by removing barriers to international trade. While MNCs have become 
more powerful, states have been unable to control or benefit from globalisation. This 
transfer of wealth creating ability (from states to MNCs) has further questioned the 
modern role and relevancy of the state: if the state cannot generate wealth then what 
purpose does it truly serve? The list of factors responsible for the decline of the state’s 
ability to generate wealth is exhaustive.190 For example, there is a long list of: 
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fiscal termites gnawing at the foundations of state regimes: the increased mobility of skilled 
labour; the international flexibility of MNCs; technological change; increasing production; 
greater consumption; the growth of electronic commerce; the expansion of tax havens; and the 
development of new financial instruments and intermediaries.191 
  
All of these factors, according to Nascent theorists, have challenged the 
legitimacy of the state and subsequently the traditional diplomatic institution. The 
‘haunting specter of globalisation’ continues to make ‘governments weaker and less 
relevant than before: omnipotent markets mean impotent diplomats’.192 In the twenty-first 
century, the globalisation of the world economy ‘with its quest for international 
integration, arguably provides one of the tools for the chiseling away of sovereignty by 
decentralising national economies and wrestling control from the State’.193 Nascent 
theorists claim that so long as MNCs continue to benefit from globalisation at the 
expense of the state they are within their theoretical rights to confirm yet another crisis 
for the state system and the diplomacy that greases it.  
The second factor Nascent theorists commonly cite concerns the state’s irrelevant 
obsession with territory as a means of generating wealth. Nascent theorists argue that the 
creation of wealth is no longer a national issue to be realised through the domestic 
territoriality of the nation state. In the modern era, national territory has become ‘both 
inefficient and irrelevant for a major part of economic activity’.194  
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In the past, states competed with one another for the possession of territory and 
‘wealth creating resources within territories, whether natural or man-created’.195 
Presently, they compete for market share in the world economy where territory is no 
longer the most important basis for the creation of wealth. Important sources for the 
creation of wealth have become non-material, such as financial markets and information 
and communications technology, sources that know no territorial boundaries. These new 
sources of wealth have been exploited by MNCs, at the expense of the state. 
Such a development has led to an ‘important evolution’ in the sense that 
‘companies, rather than states, now possess the main keys for the creation of wealth’.196 
Furthermore, states have now become dependent (in terms of the creation of wealth) on 
sources out with their control in a way which has never occurred before.197 Under this 
view states are now reliant and dependent on MNCs, rather than controlling them as they 
did in the past. 
 According to Nascent theorists, the major source of financial power in the global 
21st century belongs to MNCs. This third oft-cited factor, they claim, determines that the 
state is no longer an important actor in IR, and has slipped down the hierarchy in terms of 
significance. Consequently, MNCs have become more significant than states in the global 
century. This NDT argument suggests that increasingly powerful MNCs owe no 
allegiance to their country of origin. Their desire for profits overrides any national 
affiliation or any sentimental attachment to the state and the traditional diplomatic 
institution. 
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Riordan (2003) is one NDT who argues that the rise and rise of MNCs is ending 
the state. He writes of MNCs that ‘their economic strength, combined with international 
networks frequently outstrip (and outperform) traditional diplomatic services, this makes 
them more influential than many states’.198 He ominously concludes that in the face of 
such growth ‘it is unlikely that the state and the traditional diplomatic service will 
survive’.199  
 To outperform states has required large MNCs to act like states, to even develop 
their own diplomatic corps. According to Nascent theorists, firms are beginning to act 
like states in certain respects: ‘large companies seek to develop their own task-defined 
diplomatic structures to serve their particular needs and develop local expertise that 
national diplomatic services find hard to rival.’200 MNCs, according to Nascent theorists, 
have been successful in developing a political and diplomatic aspect, harnessing the 
advantages offered by technology and the opportunities created by global trade, whereas 
states ‘have missed the boat’.201 There is empirical evidence in support of the prominence 
of MNCs: 
 
by the end of the 20th century, half of the top 100 economies in the world were not nation-states 
but corporations. By the 1980s a third of all world trade took place as transactions within 
transnational corporations.202 
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These brief statistics indicate that dynamic, political and diplomatic MNCs, 
operating in a radical global environment, have the capacity to overtake or bypass a state 
system mired in attempts to generate wealth through territory. All of the NDT arguments 
concerning trade, the state and diplomacy cite the state’s inability to generate wealth as a 
harbinger of its eventual downfall.  
 
3.5.6  Diplomacy and the information revolution 
Where the information revolution is concerned, Nascent theorists argue that 
control over information has escaped state control. They extend this argument to 
diplomacy, suggesting that if information gathering is one central purpose of the 
traditional diplomatic institution, and if it can no longer control or monitor information, 
then it serves little purpose in an era often referred to as the information age. This 
development has created a situation where unconventional diplomatic actors now 
‘trespass on areas of expertise once more or less the sole preserve of [traditional] 
diplomacy’.203  
Nascent theorists portray traditional diplomats as jealously guarding a sacrosanct 
domain, unwilling to alter traditional methods of information gathering and 
dissemination. Thus, diplomats are portrayed as ‘wedded to the idea that they are keepers 
of a diplomatic holy grail’.204 Traditionally, information gathering (political and 
economic reporting) was carried out by diplomats in the host country, combining 
‘assiduous reading of the local print media with a network of personal contacts’.205 In this 
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respect, the sources of information were limited, vague and open to much interpretation 
by the diplomat. In the modern era, this ‘previously sacred function’ of the diplomat is 
under threat from the information revolution because many alternative sources of 
information now exist.206 
Jeffrey R. Cooper paints a worrying scenario for these traditional diplomatic grail-
keepers: 
 
Diplomats and MFAs [Ministries of Foreign Affairs] have lost the monopoly on information. 
They do not control the flow of information to and from their government. With the loss of 
control and increasing limitations on sovereignty, governments no longer have the ability to 
control the communications, transactions and other interaction among entities in international 
affairs. These trends have made it impossible for foreign ministries to retain their previous role 
in controlling foreign relations.207 
 
Central to this scenario is the notion that governments have lost the ability to 
control information flows. Nascent theorists argue that changes in information gathering 
and dissemination in the past were controlled by the state, that is, within the state’s 
territorial boundaries and within its own bureaucratic systems. The current ‘revolution’ in 
information flows is stimulated by forces operating ‘outside boundaries dictated by the 
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logic of territoriality’.208 This change means that ‘the new information services and types 
of activity are increasingly slipping out of the control of governments’.209  
According to Nascent theorists, Governments will struggle to retain control over 
information flows in a radically different ‘information environment’.210 The new 
environment is one where: 
 
the world has changed fundamentally. Images and information respect neither time nor borders. 
Hierarchy is giving way to networking. Openness is crowding out secrecy and exclusivity. The 
quill pen world in which modern diplomacy was born no longer exists. Ideas and capital move 
swiftly and unimpeded across a global network of governments, corporations and NGOs. In this 
world of instantaneous information, contemporary diplomacy struggles to sustain its 
relevance.211 
 
According to Nascent theorists, such a drastic, radical and rapid environmental 
change has caught states lagging. The state’s tardiness has consequences.  Burt names 
three consequences for the ‘obsolete, cut off and frustrated state’s’ inability to adapt to 
the information evolution.212 The first is ‘inefficiency. Without access to state-of-the-art 
technology, it takes longer to get the job done. The second is a denial of information and 
information-processing capabilities needed for analysis, policy formulation and 
communication. The third is conceptual stagnation. The information revolution is 
changing the relations of nations through the evolving networked economy, the growth of 
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democracies, and increased connectivity among peoples – all of which will remain 
abstract to those whose channels are traditional and whose thinking remains linear’.213 
They conclude that without embracing the requisite technology, diplomacy ‘will surely 
become an anachronism’.214 
Such rhetoric highlights the inability, difficulty and reluctance of the state to 
adapt to a change not guided by its own hand. This reluctance to change is a common 
NDT claim to encounter. Under this NDT perception, states are viewed as archaic, 
unresponsive to change and stubbornly enforcing anachronistic values such as ‘adherence 
to tradition, secrecy and caution in information gathering’ where change is viewed as ‘the 
enemy of policy and bureaucratic coherence, continuity and consistency’.215 Notions of 
change, of embracing the revolution, run up hard against ‘profound institutional 
resistance’.216 
According to one NDT, Modelski, ‘diplomacy’s tradition-hallowed ways raise 
serious doubts about its compatibility with advancing technology…diplomacy has been 
consistently resistant to technological innovation’.217 
Two other Nascent theorists, Burt and Robison, agree, highlighting that: 
 
diplomacy is too centralised in fortress-like embassies, too light in commercial, information and 
media centers. Embassy infrastructure is characterised by imposing physical structures, 
autonomous agencies, and antiquated communication practices. New diplomacy, fuelled by the 
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information revolution, requires different skills, techniques and attitudes than those found in 
traditional diplomacy.218 
 
Nascent theorists argue that due to its rigid, bureaucratic structure, the traditional 
diplomatic institution is struggling to develop the different skills (proactive training of 
senior diplomats, for example), flexibility and attitudes required to benefit from the 
information revolution. The theme that the ‘narrow minded and technically myopic’ 
traditional diplomatic institution is confounded by the information revolution is well 
founded in NDT literature.219 Transition from the ‘hierarchical, closed, and classified 
nature of diplomacy to the openness, flexibility and speed of postmodern information 
flows’ is difficult because of institutional and bureaucratic constraints.220 Thus, ‘states 
find themselves scrambling to assume authoritative positions in this fluid international 
landscape.’221 Hemery concurs, claiming ‘current conventional wisdom suggests that 
information technology and the pace of communicative change combine to flatten the 
pyramid of effective state authority’.222 For Nascent theorists, the result for states and the 
traditional diplomatic institution is once more a question of legitimacy: if this state 
institution no longer controls or filters information then what purpose does it serve?  
A second set of common NDT assumptions concerns the ability of the 
information revolution to transcend the traditional political-military agenda. The 
information revolution is again responsible in that it has created a highly effective 
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channel for the promotion of transnational or global issues. The traditional high politics 
of military and security are being challenged by low politics, promoting an 
unconventional international political agenda driven by non-state actors.    
Traditional political-military concerns endure but are no longer the driving force 
of IR, according to Nascent theorists, who suggest that the source of power in IR is 
shifting from control over territory to control over information. Brown, for example, 
argues that the ‘political transition from territory-based power to information-based 
power, from sovereign borders to international publics and global constituencies’ has 
been detrimental to traditional diplomacy.223 ‘Because [information] networks are 
divested of territory’, Brown continues, ‘political mastery transfers from territory to 
network.’224 In other words, Nascent theorists suggest that he who controls information 
flows commands power in the IR system. The diplomatic institution does not control 
information, therefore does not command power. 
Furthermore, a conscious global public, fed by the information revolution, is more 
interested in championing a good cause rather than a traditional political-military 
campaign. After all, who can be against clean drinking water, inalienable human rights 
for all individuals or a campaign to save the whale? The information revolution has 
spread more attractive, lower agendas (to a disenfranchised public) and changed 
‘conventional ideas and approaches that used to be part and parcel of world politics and 
practices’.225 The information revolution has pushed the low political agenda to center 
stage in IR.  
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The most obvious factor promoting a lower agenda is the increased accessibility 
that civil society has to information and communications technology.226 Many homes 
have a computer, wired up to the Internet, putting them within a mouse-click of 
international interaction. In this respect, Krutskikh and Kramarenko consider the 
advantage of the information revolution as ‘its economic and technical affordability to the 
users and its mass employment on a mass scale which, for its part, influences the shaping 
of social and political processes and the making of political decisions’.227 More people 
are ‘wired up’ to the Internet, and more are informed through a global media. In short, 
global civil society is engaging a softer agenda that is radically different to the previous 
century where balances of power, territory and military alliances dictated the harder 
foreign policy agenda. 
Those benefiting, shaping and controlling softer information flows are non-state 
actors who ‘access, penetrate, and influence every level of officialdom and at the same 
time mobilise populations on a host of issues using every variety of communications 
technology from the radio to the internet’.228 By embracing the information revolution, 
non-state actors have been able to ‘challenge traditional hierarchies and control 
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structures, heightening the importance of actors other than central governments and their 
leaders to foreign affairs’.229  
Consequently, we are witnessing a ‘parallel diffusion’ of the practice of 
diplomacy amongst non-state actors who have access to new technologies and ‘a desire to 
reach and create global constituencies about specific issues that are based on perceived 
common values’.230 The prominence of new information technologies facilitates the 
realisation of a non-traditional agenda, ‘to increase understanding, foster tolerance and 
ultimately promote world wide peace.’231 This factor, alongside the inability of the 
traditional diplomatic institution to control information flows, leads Nascent theorists to 
conclude that, once more, the traditional vulgate of diplomacy is losing relevance. 
 
3. 6  The merits of NDT 
Broadly, Nascent theorists provide an equilibrium to the Traditionalist 
interpretation of diplomacy, whether in the orthodox sense of Hoffman (2003) or the 
more moderate fashion of Sharp (1999) or Cooper and Hocking (2000). This balance 
results in an evenhanded theory of modern diplomacy, for it is difficult to deny the 
existence and impact nascent diplomatic actors have on traditional diplomacy. 
NDT injects originality into the discipline of diplomacy studies. Cohen, for 
example, has argued that diplomacy studies ‘have generated a disappointing response 
from scholars in international relations’.232 He suggested that one solution to this problem 
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is to ‘open up the area to include, inter alia, the involvement of non-state actors’.233 This 
more inclusive and diffuse direction is a hallmark of NDT and a positive impact for 
diplomacy studies, as it is more reflective of modern diplomacy. 
The main strength of the Nascent theoretical approach is that it develops 
awareness of diplomatic actors and environments outside the Traditionalist interpretation 
of diplomacy. This may seem an obvious and incidental occurrence, but considering the 
dominance of TDT, such innovation prompts the field to acknowledge, explore and 
incorporate unconventional areas of research. For example, Nascent theorists challenge 
and dismiss the short-sighted notion that IGOs are convenient frameworks set up by 
states, for states. This may have been true of the inception of many IGOs following the 
Second World War, but in the modern era, alternate actors are seeking, and finding, a 
voice in the multilateral forum. These actors are not only NGOs but other IGOs as well, 
such as the representatives of the European Commission.234 Nascent theorists argue that 
we must devote attention to theorising on the types of diplomacy these organisations and 
actors practice. At the moment, this type of analysis is hardly prominent in the diplomacy 
studies field. 
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The growing presence of NDT opens up new areas of research. If we accept that 
nascent diplomatic actors are increasing in importance within the IR system then, using 
TDT as a benchmark, it is pertinent to establish what differentiates nascent diplomatic 
actors from the traditional diplomatic institution? Similarly, are there diplomatic rules 
nascent diplomatic actors agree upon, and if so can we identify them? Can we therefore 
cement certain characteristics of nascent diplomacy, and (again) what are they? These 
questions are but a few on a promising research agenda awaiting discovery within 
diplomacy studies and, as Lee commented, ‘the list could go on and on.’235 This non-
traditional research agenda is a promising one and in need of attention if diplomacy 
studies are to increase in scope and contribution to the broader IR discipline.  
The need for a more inclusive approach to the study of diplomacy allows the 
construction and introduction of a body of alternate (to the Traditional canon) diplomatic 
literature. The inclusion of this body of work renders the discipline more reflective of the 
modern diplomatic environment that we seek to theorise upon. This alternate body of 
literature (NDT) is not: 
 
the sole property of a narrow group of writers on diplomacy. On the contrary, the need for a 
more flexible approach to the study and practice of diplomacy has been a marked feature of the 
writings of a number of international relations scholars.236  
 
Alternate opinion on diplomacy does exist within the canon of diplomacy studies, 
however it has yet to be established as a separate and distinct body of scholarship. 
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Through the formulation of a body of alternate diplomatic studies literature, Traditionalist 
dominance of the diplomatic studies field could be mitigated, and a broader, more 
inclusive canon constructed. This new direction is not to suggest the abandonment of 
TDT; rather a body of work which incorporates both TDT and NDT is more reflective of 
the complex twenty-first century diplomatic environment. The emergence of NDT since 
the end of the Cold War is promising in this sense. NDT is ultimately beneficial for a 
diplomatic studies field that intends to truly reflect the multi-actor nature of the modern 
diplomatic environment.  
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3.7 The Limitations of NDT 
 
The limitations of NDT are similar to those of TDT. Like certain parochial 
Traditionalists, orthodox Nascent theorists such as Hoffman or Jackson endorse a 
singular or partial focus on diplomacy. This exclusive belief in non-state diplomatic 
actors is understandable, and is certainly a rebuttal to the similar state focus that has 
dominated diplomacy studies. However, choosing to ignore the state’s role in the modern 
diplomatic environment is to deny an actuality: the omnipotence of the state.   
Postulating on modern diplomacy should not be a case of further enforcing binary 
either/or positions. Just as the caveat against traditionalism warned against parochialism, 
this thesis cautions against a similar blinkered NDT focus on non-state diplomacy. This 
aggressive posturing, on both sides, can only distort diplomatic theory by cleaving it into 
two adversarial poles.  
Furthermore, criticism of traditional diplomacy is inherent to most of the NDT 
literature. Many NDT publications include, almost pro forma, a list of the actors or events 
detrimentally affecting traditional diplomacy.237 If the Nascent theorists are to be 
believed then each of these developments, in some way or another, is contributing to the 
end of traditional diplomacy.  A more productive direction would be to focus on the ‘ends 
of diplomacy’, including the means by which these are achieved, rather than an ‘injurious 
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fixation’ with the end of diplomacy.238 The NDT literature that aggressively and 
shortsightedly criticises traditional diplomacy as unresponsive, archaic and unreflective 
of the current international environment only serves to induce panic when theorising on 
diplomacy.  
This limitation is related to the notion that Nascent theorists are culpable of 
focusing on short- term developments affecting diplomacy and pay little heed to the rich 
historical legacy that has moulded contemporary diplomacy (both state and non-state). To 
prefer the recent past rather than the distant past is unreflective of diplomacy, which has 
had a strong historical legacy since ‘the dawn of history.’239  The works of Der Derian 
(1987), Constantinou (1996) and even Nicolson (1950, 1957) acknowledge the 
importance of history to any conception of diplomacy. To omit or avoid this historical 
evolution of diplomacy, a typical orthodox NDT position, is an unrealistic approach. 
Therefore, Nascent theorists can be accused of questioning traditional 
diplomacy’s modern relevance without a clear understanding of the recent and distant 
past, which ultimately weakens their theoretical argument. Melissen supports this point, 
when he notes that such ‘preoccupation with the present and too great an emphasis on the 
notion of change may impede a deeper understanding of diplomacy at the end of the 
twentieth century.’240 To understand diplomacy, nascent or traditional, requires a healthy 
respect for history. 
NDT does lack historical grounding. The distant past is invaluable to alternate 
theories on diplomacy, particularly the institutionalisation of unconventional actors and 
environments for diplomacy during the early stages of the twentieth century. This period, 
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can reveal phenomena that enrich the analysis of alternate theories on diplomacy, such as 
the advent of idealism, the emergence of public opinion on foreign policy or the first 
thoughts on notions of international civil society. As Gaddis comments, ‘many subjects 
that one might have thought to be finished and filed away are in reality waiting to be 
reawakened to new life by insight, imagination and a sense of relevance’.241  
A respect for distant diplomatic history would strengthen NDT considerably. 
Distant history demonstrates that non-state actors are not fleeting post-Cold War 
developments but have historical longevity, allowing us to confirm an alternate type of 
diplomacy, and thus strengthen arguments for its inclusion in the canon of diplomacy 
studies. A strong history accounting for the prevalence of unconventional actors promotes 
respect and recognition of the nascent form as a coherent typology, a separate paradigm 
and a significant force in historical and modern diplomacy. 
The evidence supporting a distinct faction of Nascent theorists in diplomacy 
studies is subtle rather than glaring (as was the case with the Traditionalists). However, 
this group of theorists is steadily increasing in size, scope and field of enquiry, and not 
before time as Nascent theorists are keen to remind us. There is some validity behind 
such rhetoric. After all, TDT only tells us part of the modern diplomatic story; it was only 
a matter of time before a group of theorists identified the lack of theory on non-state 
diplomatic actors and environments.  
In terms of diplomatic theory or theories, this thesis has now introduced and 
constructed two new categories of diplomatic theorists. Chapters two and three provided 
evidence which suggests that the Traditional and Nascent Theorists occupy opposite 
poles in the diplomatic studies field. The middle theoretical ground (a moderate state and 
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non-state focus) suddenly appears conspicuous by its absence. However, this thesis 
believes a third group of theorists occupy this middle ground and can be evidenced within 
the diplomatic studies literature.  
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Chapter Four – Innovative Diplomatic Theory (IDT) 
This chapter will present the third type of diplomatic theory: Innovative 
Diplomatic Theory (IDT).1 This chapter will introduce the general characteristics of 
Innovative diplomatic theory and theorists (Innovators) and present examples of their 
work. This chapter builds a comprehensive profile of this type of diplomatic theorist, 
with each of the following sections adding layers to the profile. Constructing this third 
diplomatic theory category allows this thesis to highlight IDT’s applicability to the 
modern diplomatic environment. 
 
4.0 The origins of IDT 
Unlike the other two types of diplomatic theory, the origins of IDT cannot be 
primarily correlated to a change in the diplomatic environment itself. Instead, IDT 
emerged (largely) as a result of different theoretical perceptions within the diplomatic 
studies field. Various types of diplomatic theorists interpreted the post-Cold War 
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diplomatic environment, in particular the relationship between the incumbent state and 
emerging non-state actors.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the state’s questionable relationship with non-state 
actors has been a contentious issue within the diplomatic studies field and, more broadly, 
within the IR discipline. As described in the previous chapters, the argument that the 
Westphalian state was under threat from the emergence of non-state diplomatic actors 
prompted a wealth of literature on the topic, mostly portraying a bleak future for the 
traditional institution.2 For example, Ohmae wrote of the ‘the end of the state’ (1995), 
Dunn of the ‘contemporary crisis of the state’ (1995) and Wolf asked if the ‘state would 
survive?’ (2001). If this literature was believed, the Westphalian polity was under threat 
as unconventional actors such as Inter Governmental Organisations (IGOs), Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), and multi-national corporations (MNCs) infringed 
upon its once exclusive authority, sovereignty and legitimacy. 
After the Cold War, diplomatic theory mirrored this state/non-state division. 
Chapters two and three evidenced the encroachment of Nascent diplomatic theory into a 
discipline dominated, to that point, by Traditionalist interpretations of diplomacy. The 
exclusive focus of TDT (state) and NDT (non-state) meant that both of these groups 
moved to occupy opposite poles in the diplomatic studies field.  
                                                 
2 These works were particularly dominant after the Cold War, as the international relations field vigorously 
debated the future of the nation state in light of the demise of the bi-polar order that had endured for almost 
forty years. Most works suggested a withering, hollowing out and decline in the legitimacy of the nation-
state. For examples of these types of work, see Robert Wesson. (1990). International Relations in 
Transition. Inglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall; Susan Strange. (1995). The Defective State. Daedalus, 124 (2), 
pp. 55 – 75; Susan Strange. (1997). The Erosion of the State. Current History, November, pp. 365 – 369; 
Shampa Biswas. (2002). W(h)ither the Nation-state? National and State Identity in the Face of 
Fragmentation and Globalisation. Global Society, 16 (2), pp. 175 – 198; Glenn P. Hastedt and Kay M. 
Knickrehm. (2003). International Politics in a Changing World. New York: Longman; Kanishka 
Jayasuriya. (2004). Breaking the ‘Westphalian’ Frame: Regulatory State, Fragmentation and Diplomacy. 
Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. No 90, pp. 
1 – 21; Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond. (2005). The Global Future. California: Thompson. 
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Both TDT and NDT are unlikely to become more moderate in their diplomatic 
theories; TDT is unlikely to become less statist while it is unforeseeable that NDT 
becomes more statist. The simple reason is that discounting or dismissing either the state 
or the non-state forms the bedrock of both theories. With TDT and NDT, ‘such 
approaches still yield cantilevered bridges at best since their builders do not significantly 
relax either of the two fundamental assumptions that distinguish the contending research 
traditions.’3 Through this exclusive focus, both TDT and NDT can be described as 
somewhat partial, parochial and one-dimensional. Both theories are likely to remain in 
this state of fundamental opposition. 
The result is that the field is left with two different theories on contemporary 
diplomacy. A middle ground, privileging both the state and the non-state, seems 
conspicuous by its absence. However, one group of theorists, the Innovators, has emerged 
as a result of this polarisation, and to occupy the middle ground. This split in the 
diplomatic studies field created a gap that the Innovators have sought to fill.  
   
 
 
                                                 
3 Rudra Sil. (2000) The Foundations of Eclecticism: The Epistemological Status of Agency, Culture, and 
Structure in Social Theory. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12 (3), p. 355. 
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4.1 The central tenets of IDT 
Melissen first introduced the label ‘Innovators’ in the 1999 book Innovation in 
Diplomatic Practice. In the introduction, he writes that the Innovator’s work is ‘intended 
to supplement the analysis of more familiar topics’ in the diplomatic studies literature; 
these familiar topics are traditional diplomacy (primarily) and unconventional 
diplomacy.4 However, the value of the Innovators is anything but supplementary, their 
contribution is valuable when theorising on modern diplomacy. When building the initial 
profile of the Innovators it is impossible to ignore the relationship between the state and 
the non-state. The acknowledgement and ultimate realignment of this relationship is 
central to the strength of IDT.  
The Innovators are the only group of diplomatic theorists who suggest that a 
theoretical division exists within the diplomatic studies field. They believe that 
diplomatic theory is polarised into statist and non-statist theories on diplomacy. This 
polarisation can be consistently evidenced within the diplomatic studies field, according 
to the Innovators. On the one hand, there exist Traditionalists who champion the 
continuity and familiarity of the state system, greased by official diplomacy. On the 
other, supporters of unofficial or nascent diplomacy, ‘pursuing a moral doctrine’, believe 
that their vision of a better world must not be subsumed under the state system, and that it 
‘must displace the politically pragmatic and morally compromised arrangement’ of 
conventional, traditional and statist diplomacy.5 
                                                 
4 Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, p. xx. 
5 Jackson, Martin Wight’s Thought on Diplomacy, p. 15. 
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For the innovators, this polarisation of diplomatic theory results in three 
scenarios: the state versus the non-state debate; the newness and decline debate; and, 
consequently, the either/or choice presented to the diplomatic scholar.  
Essentially, the state versus non-state debate is reflective of an incumbent versus 
challenger scenario, where one actor, method or theoretical interpretation succeeds at the 
expense of the other. Under this view, the modern diplomatic environment is governed by 
adversarial relationship with actors – ranging from traditional states to emerging actors - 
competing over how best to shape the ‘anarchical organising principle of the international 
system’.6 According to the Innovators, this competition fuels an ‘antagonistic 
relationship’ between different actors and diplomatic theorists.7 Often within diplomacy 
studies, state and non-state actors are portrayed as ‘inhabiting different environments, 
working to different rulebooks and occupying very different positions on the scale of 
importance in world politics. They exist, therefore, in two solitudes with little or no 
interaction between their worlds’.8 
For the Innovators, this perceived relationship between state and non-state 
diplomacy constitutes two central ‘debates about diplomacy: newness and decline’.9 The 
former notion, newness, relates to a world society view advocated by ever-growing 
numbers of non-state actors, which challenges a state-centric focus in diplomacy studies. 
The latter notion, decline, is characterised by the rise of the ‘unofficial’, at the expense of 
the ‘official’.10 The ‘well rehearsed proposition’ that traditional diplomacy is in decline 
                                                 
6 James A. Caporaso. (2000). Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority and 
Sovereignty. International Studies Association, p. 6. 
7 Jackson, Martin Wight’s Thought on Diplomacy, p. 15. 
8 Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 361. 
9 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p.21.  
10 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 21. 
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and under attack from more responsive non-state diplomacy is ‘a common and injurious 
claim to encounter in diplomacy studies’.11 Commonly cited in the NDT literature of 
Langhorne (1997, 1998, 2000) and Reychler (1996), for example, is the rise of non-state 
actors such as NGOs, MNCs and IGOs ‘infringing upon the once hermetically sealed 
world’ of the diplomat, and practicing more ‘representative’ diplomacy.12 Under this 
view, traditional diplomatic actors are often portrayed as disparate with non-traditional 
actors.  
According to the innovators, theory on modern diplomacy adheres to one view or 
the other: either statist or non-statist.  For the Innovators, acknowledging this either/or 
split is important because diplomatic theorists and students are forced into make a choice 
between which view is most applicable to the modern diplomatic environment. For 
example, one IDT, Sharp, argues that two schools of thought prevail in diplomacy 
studies; firstly, the ‘no change’ school, which assumes that only traditional diplomacy is 
significant, and secondly, the ‘all change’ school, which assumes state sovereignty and 
the traditional diplomatic institution are now irrelevant.13 The ‘all change’ school depicts 
the state system ‘as a town whose buildings have been burned down to shells’.14 Fuelling 
the fire are nascent diplomatic theorists who promote the role of non-state actors 
practicing more effective, faster and more representative diplomacy. 
Hocking and Cooper are two other IDTs who agree with Sharp. The study and 
theory of ‘diplomacy’, Hocking writes, ‘has become an icon for the advocates of two 
competing perspectives on international politics, the state-centric and world society 
                                                 
11 Hocking, The end(s) of diplomacy, p. 169. 
12 Biswas, W(h)ither the Nation-state?, p. 175. 
13 Sharp, Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats, p. 16. 
14 ibid. 
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views’.15 This ‘confused and unfocussed’ dialogue has resulted in ‘two lines of divergent 
argument’ (state versus non-state), which are in danger of widening and bogging the 
diplomatic studies field in ‘sterile and unproductive debate’.16 Similarly, Cooper draws 
attention to the ‘strong current in the contemporary diplomatic literature’, where the 
relationship between statist and non-statist theories and theorists ‘has been riddled with 
on-going and intractable tensions’.17 
Acknowledging this division in the first place is a unique and central tenet of IDT. 
Banishing or dismissing such rhetoric as nonsense is a second central tenet to IDT. For 
example, Sharp suggests that the presence of polarized thought on diplomacy is 
damaging the field, and that it is wrong to assume that either we accept a realist, statist 
view of diplomacy or we assume that the state was a significant actor in the past but is 
now irrelevant.18 According to the Innovators, the incumbent state versus nascent 
challenger notion is particularly unproductive for diplomacy studies and diplomatic 
theory, and in ‘either/or terms has caused us to labor needlessly’.19 Such fixation 
frustrates rather than promotes meaningful and robust diplomatic theory, according to the 
Innovators.  
Furthermore, if such needless debates continue we will fail to understand the 
complexity of the modern diplomatic environment. According to the Innovators, if we 
continue with these either/or arguments diplomacy studies will remain mired in 
misperception, confusion and misunderstanding in regard to the relationship between 
‘old’ Westphalian, traditional forms of diplomacy and unconventional, alternative and 
                                                 
15 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 22. 
16 ibid., p. 23. 
17 Cooper, Beyond Representation, p. 177. 
18 ibid. 
19 Casparo, Changes in the Westphalian Order, p. 4. 
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‘new’ forms of diplomacy that have emerged since 1918.20 In other words, if we continue 
to rely on either TDT or NDT, we will not be able to completely understand the diverse 
forces modern diplomatic environment.  
A continuous and objective (re)appraisal of the state/non-state relationship 
constitutes another tenet of IDT. The Innovators argue that the positive relationship 
between the state and non-state is a highly visible feature of the modern diplomatic 
environment. This environment is continually changing and it is important that we 
concentrate on the features and forces driving this change.  Of the Innovators, Melissen 
notes that they ‘try to provide insights into a transforming diplomatic landscape and the 
changing modalities and forms of diplomacy within’.21 Distancing but not abandoning a 
state focus, their central purpose is to ‘analyse the effects of drastic change in the 
international environment on tried and tested diplomatic practices, and to identify the 
potential for scope and innovation in those practices’.22 By analysing change, the 
Innovators do not make any rash judgements on the fate of the traditional diplomatic 
institution. At the same time, they aim to incorporate observations on non-state 
diplomatic actors into their theory on diplomacy. Within IDT, both the state and the non-
state are given equal weighting.  
Similarly, both Traditional and Nascent diplomatic theories are given impartial 
consideration by the Innovators. They believe that the modern diplomatic environment is 
best understood not in either/or terms but from an approach that values both statist and 
non-statist diplomatic theory. This is a third central tenet of IDT; to understand modern 
diplomacy an approach that values both statist and non-statist diplomatic theories is 
                                                 
20 Sofer, Old and New Diplomacy, p. 195. 
21 Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, p. xx. 
22 ibid. 
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preferable. This form of theoretical bi-polarity is the distinguishing hallmark of this 
group of theorists. 
 In this context, there does not appear to be anything particularly ‘innovative’ to 
IDT. After all, knowledge on the diplomacy of state and non-state actors is clearly visible 
in the diplomatic studies literature. However, it is not the knowledge that is innovative. 
Rather an approach that privileges both the state and the non-state is novel in terms of 
diplomatic theory.  For the Innovators, rewarding and original scholarship is to be found 
in theorising on diplomacy from a state and non-state approach. This theoretical 
orientation of the Innovators suggests a ‘strong demonstration of renewed theoretical 
innovation in the field, innovation that avoids old patterns and old labels’.23 
 
4.2 The general characteristics of the Innovators 
Sharp, Lee, Melissen, Hocking, Kurbaliga and Cooper are pristine examples of 
Innovative diplomatic theorists. There are certain assumptions that qualify these 
diplomatic theorists as Innovators. These are broad assumptions, yet most Innovators 
demonstrate each of these characteristics. This approach (privileging both the state and 
the non-state) to theorising on diplomacy is the first characteristic of the Innovators; there 
is no sliding scale or expansive range of views within this faction of theorists. All of the 
Innovators appear in agreement with their theoretical approach to diplomacy. 
A second characteristic is that Innovators are largely critical of the divergent 
nature of exclusive TDT and orthodox NDT. They argue that the need to defend these 
parochial theories on diplomacy can result in conflicting theories on modern diplomacy, 
which confuses an accurate evaluation of modern diplomacy. The Innovators believe that 
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the ambivalent views of exclusive Traditionalists and orthodox Nascent theorists are 
damaging for diplomatic theory, as they encourage competition of opinion at the expense 
of accuracy.24 Both these groups of theorists become consumed with defending their 
theories, and embellishing notions of diplomacy ‘which do not exist’.25 This competition, 
according to the Innovators, means that a body of diplomatic theory truly reflective of the 
modern diplomatic environment has yet to emerge. 
Innovators, thirdly, perform an arbitrary or mediating role within the diplomatic 
studies field.  They do so by utilising the merits of inclusive Traditionalists and the 
moderate Nascent theorists. Innovators recognise that the specialised focuses of both the 
inclusive Traditionalists and moderate Nascent theorists can be employed to construct a 
more balanced form of diplomatic theory. They consolidate the importance of the 
inclusive Traditionalist contribution, without entirely discounting the state in 
interpretations of diplomacy (as do orthodox Nascent theorists). Similarly, they raise the 
diplomatic studies field’s awareness of nascent forms of non-state diplomacy. Innovators 
recognise the importance of the contribution of moderate Nascent theorists and the 
current need to theorise on the impact of non-state actors on diplomacy.  
  Relating to the above point, the balance inherent to IDT stems, fourthly, from the 
notion of theoretical eclecticism that they practice. They feed off other theories, 
extracting the merits, dispelling the parochial limitations and sidestepping adversarial 
debates (between state and non-state legitimacy, for example) altogether. The end result 
is an impartial diplomatic theory, which stresses the mutually beneficial nature of state 
and non-state diplomatic relationships. Innovators can be said to critique other diplomatic 
                                                 
24 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 19.  
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theoretical observations, identifying the shortcomings and valuable observations of 
different factions of theorists. 
Innovators, fourthly, demonstrate a similar balance on postulations on the 
practical diplomatic environment. The Innovator’s propensity to moderate and 
incorporate balance into their theory is related, fifthly, to the symbiotic relationship they 
believe exists between different diplomatic actors in the modern diplomatic environment. 
They argue that state/non-state diplomatic relationships are distinctly non-adversarial, 
symbiotic and complementary. However, before recognition of this symbiotic 
relationship is confirmed, non-state diplomatic actors must be accepted as an integral part 
of the modern diplomatic environment, according to IDTs. Lee and Hudson offer a 
relevant warning for diplomacy studies if non-state actors are ignored, arguing that:  
 
most diplomatic theorists would have us believe that diplomacy is the stuff of high politics, yet 
we know this position obscures the practice of a diplomacy that is far more complex and 
multifaceted. Not only do we know this intuitively, diplomats and official government records 
tell us that this is so. This blindness produces nothing more than a partial disclosure of what 
constitutes diplomatic practice.26 
 
In order to validate this symbiotic and multi-actor assumption, the Innovators, 
sixthly, incorporate the opinion of practitioners, diplomats who are conventional and 
unconventional. This valuable empirical evidence is prominent in their work, as is 
reliance upon official sources such as government white papers and official data to 
validate their arguments. Thus, by relying on empirical data to validate theoretical claims, 
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the Innovators are working towards bridging the gap between diplomatic theory and 
diplomatic practice.  
Innovators, sixthly, focus exclusively on the shape of modern diplomacy. The end 
of the Cold War appears to have been the catalyst for their unique line of enquiry. This 
environmental change is significant to the Innovators. Melissen expresses the relief that 
the field has experienced since the ‘intellectual shackles of the cold war preoccupations 
and an excessive emphasis on things military’ have gradually disappeared, allowing the 
Innovators to focus on reappraising diplomacy’s role in the modern diplomatic 
environment.27 Generally, events before the Cold War attract only fleeting attention from 
the Innovators.  
 
4.3 A Literature Review of IDT: Definitions and Examples 
This section will provide examples of IDT, with the aim of substantiating the 
central tenets and characteristics described in the previous sections. Also, this section will 
evidence the Innovators ability to selectively borrow from statist and non-statist 
diplomatic theories in order to enrich their particular theory. Innovators are the eclectic 
amalgamators of polarised theory, both Traditional and Nascent, which results in a less 
partial and more balanced type of diplomatic theory.    
 IDT can be distinguished from other diplomatic theories by presenting their 
definitions of diplomacy. Critical of the ‘straightjacket approach’ of traditionalist and 
NDT definitions of diplomacy, Melissen writes that, ‘definitions of diplomacy abound, 
but not all of them prove helpful in analysing today’s varied manifestations of 
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diplomacy’.28 Wary of straying into either the Traditionalist or NDT camp and keen to 
demonstrate balance, Melissen defines diplomacy as ‘the mechanism of representation, 
communication and negotiation through which states and other international actors 
conduct their business’.29 In this loose definition, the Innovators give equal consideration 
to both states and nascent diplomatic actors.        
 The balanced interpretation of diplomacy, between state and non-state, is also 
evident in Sharp’s work (1997, 1999, 2001, 2003). Sharp commences in apologetic 
fashion for the dominant Traditionalist focus, noting that the parochialism it promotes ‘is 
unfortunate, for it constitutes a barrier to the conceptual coherence that the IR field now 
requires if it is to improve its understandings of diplomacy’.30 Maintaining this 
‘authoritative and exclusionary’ statist approach has hampered an effective response to 
the question ‘what is and is not diplomacy’, according to this Innovator.31  
 Like Melissen, Sharp first identifies the limitations of concisely defining 
diplomacy, labelling it as a ‘notoriously tricky term’ that can ‘convey many and different 
things’.32 He prefers to define diplomacy as a term ‘through a consideration of its usage, 
rather than attempt to capture a precise or fixed meaning’.33 One such usage is the 
application of diplomacy to official exchange between states. He notes that the ‘term 
diplomacy should be reserved for the way in which accredited representatives of 
sovereigns contribute to the making and implementation of foreign policy’.34 In addition, 
he alludes that if we want to understand diplomacy’s value to the IR system, we cannot 
                                                 
28 ibid., p. xvi. 
29 ibid., p. xvii. 
30 Sharp, For Diplomacy, p. 35. 
31 Ibid., p. 40. 
32 Sharp, Herbert Butterfield, p. 857. 
33 Sharp, For Diplomacy, p. 37. 
34 Sharp, Herbert Butterfield, p. 857. 
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ignore the historical experience of relations between sovereign states.35  
 However, it is Sharp’s second usage of the term diplomacy that avoids consigning 
his work to the Traditionalist faction. He also applies the term diplomacy to the ‘way in 
which relations between groups that regard themselves as separate ought to be conducted 
if the principle of living in groups is to be retained as good, and if unnecessary and 
unwanted conflict is to have a chance of being avoided’.36 Significantly, Sharp notes the 
term diplomacy is applicable to groups, not necessarily states but nascent actors such as 
NGOs or MNCs who have an equal interest in a stable IR system. He continues that 
diplomacy ‘is not a process of discovering and affirming what are mistakenly taken to be 
fixed and objective truths about the nature of diplomacy’.37 Thus, the Innovators suggest 
that when we attempt to define diplomacy, it must not be from a repetitive angle but from 
an innovative angle, which challenges the fixed and subjective notion that diplomatic 
theory can only be statist or anti-statist. What Sharp suggests is that traditional diplomacy 
must be considered in relation to ‘the transformed environment of actors, issues, and 
modes of communication within which diplomats function; and yet, demonstrate the 
continuing centrality of conventional diplomats to most of what happens in contemporary 
diplomacy’.38 This approach to theorising on diplomacy stresses the ongoing importance 
of the role of traditional diplomacy in relation to nascent diplomacy.     
 Cooper also adopts this dual focus. In 1997, he wrote on the need for a balanced 
approach to theorising on diplomacy, combining the merits of both statist and non-statist 
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observations. Without specifically identifying the Traditionalist and NDT approaches, he 
writes that: 
these tendencies [in the literature] point to a fundamental duality about the intensity of 
contemporary diplomacy. On the one hand a greater salience is accorded to an extant base of 
expertise and administrative capacity. On the other, there appears to be at least some room for a 
less emotionally detached form of diplomacy that cuts across traditional cleavages in the 
international system.39    
What Cooper is suggesting here is the presence of two possible areas of analysis 
relating to contemporary diplomacy: the extant base of the Traditionalists, juxtaposed 
with that distinct form of diplomacy espoused by the Nascent theorists. To understand 
diplomacy requires an examination of both areas.       
 Of the Traditionalist form of diplomacy Cooper writes that: 
the expanding scope, intensity and form of diplomacy in the globalised and interdependent 
context of the 1980s and 1990s has not meant that diplomacy and diplomats are any less 
important. On the contrary, diplomacy appears to have risen in importance precisely because of 
this added complexity.40  
For Cooper, a continuous appreciation of TDT is necessary, alongside an 
approach which centers ‘on the range of diplomatic activity, related to the widening set of 
actors and agenda of international politics’.41 In other words, IDT promotes 
understanding of both traditional and nascent diplomatic actors, their agendas, techniques 
and relationship.         
                                                 
39 Cooper, Beyond Representation, pp. 176 – 177. 
40 ibid., p. 175. 
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 Hocking would agree with Cooper.42 He has been the fiercest critic of the 
conflicting state versus non-state arguments, which cloud diplomacy studies. Diplomacy, 
he writes, ‘has become an icon for the advocates of two competing perspectives on 
international politics, the state-centric and world society views…and their preoccupation 
with newness and decline’.43 For Hocking, this ‘confused and unfocussed’ dialogue has 
resulted in the two lines of divergent argument.44 The first championing the role of the 
traditional diplomatic institution, the other focusing on the emergence and efficacy of 
non-state actors.        
 Hocking highlights the constraints this adversarial relationship has imposed upon 
‘understandings of diplomacy’.45 He argues that understanding modern diplomacy 
‘requires that it be extracted from this long standing dialogue of the deaf and the role of 
diplomats be evaluated outside the constraints which it has imposed’.46 Hocking is 
unforgiving, noting the theoretical ‘failure of diplomacy, unlike war, to stir the passions’ 
of the IR field.47 This apathy he blames on the ‘terminological confusion’ surrounding 
diplomacy and to the ‘deficiencies of the literature’ relating to diplomacy.48  
 Arguing for a ‘different perspective on the standard debates’, Hocking’s 
innovative evaluation concerns the introduction of the term ‘catalytic diplomacy’49. 
                                                 
42 The two authors wrote a combined piece which, at its inception, discusses explicitly the notion of 
adversity (between state and non-state perspectives) in diplomacy studies. See A. F. Cooper and Brian 
Hocking. (2000). Governments, Non-governmental Organisations and the Re-calibration of Diplomacy. 
Global Society, 14 (3), 361 – 376. 
43 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 22. 
44 ibid., p. 23. 
45 ibid., p. 21. 
46 ibid. 
47 ibid., p. 22. 
48 ibid. 
49 Hocking’s catalytic diplomacy is derived from Lind’s suggestion that the traditional, Westphalian state is 
being replaced by a new type of state (the catalytic state) as a result of the rapidly changing post-Cold War 
IR system. The catalytic state, according to Lind, is better able to cope with new twenty first century, 
global challenges. Ling defines the catalytic state as ‘one that seeks its goals les by relying on its own 
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‘Catalytic diplomacy’, he claims, transcends ‘the newness and decline’ arguments.50 
Catalytic diplomacy overcomes the adversarial theoretical relationship by focusing on the 
‘growing significance of points of linkage’ between traditional and nascent diplomatic 
actors, rather than ‘the distinctiveness between official and unofficial diplomacy’.51 He 
suggests that there is a ‘growing symbiosis between the activities of state and non-state 
representative, in which the foreign policy community engages in pursuit’ of common 
objectives.52          
 Rather than suggesting that we view diplomacy in a ‘binary either/or’ sense 
promoting the state over nascent diplomatic actors, or vice versa, Hocking instead 
stresses the need to ‘identify the adaptive processes which have characterised the 
evolution of diplomacy’.53 Hocking employs the relationship between traditional and 
nascent diplomatic actors as an example of adaptive diplomacy, noting that  ‘just as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) need access to governments and other agencies, so 
governments increasingly need the information and expertise (and often the legitimacy in 
the eyes of their citizens) that NGOs are able to afford them’.54     
 Such collaboration between traditional and nascent diplomatic actors does not 
reduce the role of the diplomat as the traditional vulgate of diplomacy. Nor does it, in 
Hocking’s opinion, suggest that the role of ‘the diplomat and that of representative of an 
NGO or other actor is substitutable. Just the opposite: it is the peculiar qualities that 
                                                                                                                                                 
resources than by acting as a dominant element in a coalition of other states, transnational institutions and 
private sector groups, while retaining its distinct identity and its own goals’ (1992:3) See M. Lind. (1992). 
The Catalytic State. The National Interest, 27, pp. 3 - 12 . The term is also used in a more normative sense 
in D. Osborne and T. Gaebler. (1993) Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is 
Transforming the Public Sector. New York: Plume. 
50 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 21. 
51 ibid., p. 31. 
52 ibid. 
53 Hocking, The ends(s) of diplomacy, p. 171. 
54 ibid. 
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define these roles’.55 For Hocking, state and non-state actors perform different but 
complementary roles in the modern diplomatic environment. Between these two types of 
actors there is no hostility, only symbiosis.      
 Like Sharp and Cooper, Hocking is suggesting a theoretical interpretation of 
diplomacy from both the traditional and nascent angle. Within such an equally weighted, 
bi-polar discussion an original, innovative and accurate diplomatic theory can be found, 
alongside meaningful and accurate scholarship. Hocking notes that the ‘meshing of what 
has been defined as official and unofficial diplomacy is of interest and significance’ to 
diplomacy studies.56 A suggestion that the relationship between traditional and nascent 
diplomacy will inform modern diplomatic theory is evident, rather than a focus on the 
virtues, features and characteristics of one type of theory over the other.   
Lee and Hudson develop the need for this theoretical ‘meshing’ further. They 
agreed that the categorisation of diplomatic theorists, or ‘pigeonholing’ as she preferred, 
was a positive direction for diplomacy studies.57 Lee and Hudson are more explicit than 
the other Innovators in that they identify the existence of the traditionalists in the field, 
whom they considers as perpetuating ‘rationalist thinking’58 and a ‘statist approach 
underpinning the conceptualisation’ of ‘orthodox diplomacy studies’.59 Although Lee and 
Hudson do not explicitly label different types of theorists, they are the closest Innovators 
to subscribe to the notion of conceptualising different types of theorists within the 
diplomacy studies field.         
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 Describing the presence of the traditionalists - whom they refer to as the ‘mentors 
of the theory of diplomacy’60- Lee and Hudson are less than complimentary: while 
‘orthodox diplomatic studies might usefully explain traditional interstate high politics in 
bilateral and multilateral settings, it fails to identify, explain and understand the many 
changes to diplomatic systems’.61 The two authors add that these ‘hegemonic 
interpretations serve to impose a contrived understanding of diplomacy’.62 
Traditionalists, Lee and Hudson imply, ‘sustain a particular picture of diplomacy – 
“where diplomatic theory is the constitutional theory of a state-system”63 – that renders 
much of what goes under the mantle of world affairs invisible and fails to provide a full 
account of diplomatic practices’.64        
 Lee and Hudson are concerned with the dominance of the TDT in the diplomatic 
studies field and the ‘analytical obstacles this perpetuity poses for understanding and 
explaining significant but neglected areas of study’.65 One neglected area of study that 
they identify is the ‘recognition of the widening content of diplomacy and also the 
emergence of non-state actors as diplomatic agents’.66 For Lee and Hudson, recognising 
the benefit of moderate NDT alongside moderate TDT is a positive direction for 
diplomacy studies. By adopting this approach ‘we can reveal that diplomacy is 
multifaceted and much more inclusive than the orthodox literature on diplomacy 
                                                 
60 Lee and Hudson cite de Callieres, Kissenger, Nicolson, Richelieu and Wicquefort as mentors (p. 355). 
61 Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 344. 
62 ibid., p. 345. 
63 Lee and Hudson acknowledge this quote is originally from M. A. Keens-Soper,, ‘Callieres’ in G. R. 
Berridge, M. A. Keens-Soper T. G. and Otte. (2001). Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissenger. 
London: Palgrave, p. 101. 
64 Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 
65 ibid., p . 354. 
66 ibid., p. 353. 
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suggests’.67 ‘These other sources’ – analysing the content of nascent diplomacy - ‘are 
also significant to the study of world affairs, rather than just one particularly narrow 
definition of diplomacy’.68 Despite the recognition that focus on nascent diplomatic 
actors would be rewarding, Lee and Hudson note that ‘the literature on these new areas of 
diplomacy has not found its way into the mainstream of diplomatic studies’.69 Lee and 
Hudson, like the other the Innovators, are suggesting diplomacy studies incorporate a 
dual focus, with diplomatic theory reflective of both traditional and nascent diplomacy.  
 The equilibrium the Innovators suggest, alongside their mitigating theoretical 
presence, is the central value of their contribution to the diplomatic studies field. In 
addition, they raise awareness of the importance of nascent forms of diplomacy, 
recognising the importance of the contribution of moderate Nascent theorists. They also 
confirm the importance of the moderate, dynamic traditionalist contribution to diplomatic 
theory, without abandoning the state, as do aggressive Nascent theorists. The value of the 
traditionalists, alongside that of the Nascent theorists, must be incorporated if we are to 
reconstruct diplomatic theory. The ability of the Innovators to transcend both factions of 
theorists and thus enrich diplomatic theory is evident in the following section. 
 
                                                 
67 ibid., p. 357. 
68 ibid., p. 351. 
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4.4 Specific examples of Innovative diplomatic theory  
In order to illustrate the differences between the three types of diplomatic theory, 
the respective opinions of the Innovators on six modern themes are now introduced. 
These themes all concern the impact of changes and challenges upon the traditional 
diplomatic institution, and are employed to highlight points of divergence among the 
three factions of theorists. As the Innovators’ opinion exists in relation to TDT and NDT, 
both these theories are consistently encountered in the following six sections.  
 
4.4.1 The ambiguity of declining state arguments  
 Innovators do not have a general opinion on whether or not the state and the 
traditional diplomatic institution are in ‘crisis’ or ‘decline’. Instead, they argue that the 
debate over state crisis or relevancy is dangerous for the diplomatic studies field as it 
encourages competition between theorists, which equates to inaccuracy. Therefore, the 
Innovators avoid entering the debate over state (ir)relevancy, except to highlight its 
futility. 
The Innovators refer to this debate as an ‘injurious fixation’ that exclusive 
Traditionalists or orthodox Nascent theorists have; one that damages the theoretical 
productivity of the diplomacy studies field.70 The presence of the state/non-state debate in 
diplomacy studies has only served to ‘generate a largely sterile discussion rooted in two 
competing perspectives on international relations and diplomacy’: newness and decline 
(of the traditional diplomatic institution and its diplomatic method).71 If we are to 
                                                 
70 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 21. 
71 ibid. 
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understand modern diplomacy, the Innovators claim, we must first distance ourselves 
from such state versus non-state rhetoric. 
Where diplomacy studies are concerned, the debate is between exclusive 
Traditionalists and orthodox Nascent theorists, who both have very different opinions on 
the future of the state and its traditional diplomatic institution. The Innovators argue that 
the polarisation (state-centrism versus non-statism; newness or decline; either/or 
postulations) is conducive to an adversarial or ‘antagonistic relationship’ between 
diplomatic theorists, which is in danger of cleaving the field in two.72 The Innovators 
agree that both factions of theorist do present convincing argument. However, they 
continually remind us of a limitation: each faction is determined to impose their opinion 
at the expense of the other. Consequently, the Innovators highlight that both arguments 
miss the point: other than a theoretical disagreement there is no practical reason to 
suggest the relationship between state and non-state is adversarial.  
The Innovators advise a redirection of focus for the diplomatic studies field, one 
that is founded on the premise that there is a symbiotic relationship between state and 
non-state actors and environments.73 The Innovators argue that the rise of non-traditional 
actors can be analysed as an environmental change that states and diplomacy, which 
evolve very slowly, are reluctant to embrace but are being forced to do so. The 
Innovators stress that the relationship between traditional and nascent forms of diplomacy 
is not adversarial but complementary. The physical/practical relationship between state 
and non-state may have been adversarial in the past but in the contemporary sense is 
                                                 
72 Jackson, Martin Wight’s Thought on diplomacy, p. 22 
73 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, pp. 21 – 22. 
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certainly not. IDT presented in the following more specific sections demonstrates their 
belief in a symbiosis between state and non-state actors and environments. 
 
4.4.2 The impact of IGOs on traditional diplomacy 
Innovators stress a symbiosis between traditional state actors and IGOs. Where 
IGOs are concerned, the Innovators dismiss both TDT and NDT. The opinion of the 
Innovators on both these lines of divergent argument is presented here, which illustrates 
the typical IDT perspective on the impact of IGOs on the modern diplomatic 
environment. 
According to the Innovators, IGOs cannot be considered as independent 
diplomatic actors. The Innovators acknowledge that IGOs74 have designs on diplomacy 
but by conventional standards are not fully-fledged diplomatic actors, because they are 
not recognised as such by states (the most dominant diplomatic actor). This undiplomatic 
nature of IGOs is further compounded by their lack of ultimate participation in the 
decision-making process. Although IGOs can influence prenegotiation and voting, they 
cannot vote. The Innovators remind us that ‘they [IGOs] cannot make binding 
commitments that involve national resources, or require national legislation, or take 
treaty form, without the authorisation of sovereign states’.75 Until they achieve this status, 
IGOs cannot be considered as independent diplomatic actors.  
                                                 
74 The United Nations does maintain external offices in selected places. Compared to other IGOs the UN 
has the largest network, but they are dissimilar to embassies or traditional diplomatic institutions. In sixty-
eight cities worldwide the UN maintains ‘information centres’ and ‘offices’, but by conventional/traditional 
standards cannot be described as diplomatic. For a discussion on the differences (between IGO networks 
and traditional diplomatic networks) see, Michael Bruter. (1999). Diplomacy without a state: the external 
delegations of the European Commission. Journal of European Public Policy, 6 (2), p. 185. or visit the 
European Commission’s home page at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/delegations, accessed 
8th August, 2005. 
75 Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns, p. 209. 
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 According to the Innovators, a second more obvious disqualifying factor is that 
IGOs are, after all, inter-governmental organisations. As Kaufmann writes of the UN, ‘it 
can almost certainly be concluded that the UN must still be treated as an organisation of 
states’.76 The Innovators are not endorsing the Traditionalist assumption that IGOs are 
built by states for states, but do acknowledge their heavy state membership.  
Where the new diplomacy of IGOs is concerned, the Innovators stress that new 
diplomacy is a process, not an institutionalised form of diplomacy. For the Innovators, 
this distinction is important. In years to come, IGOs may develop a coherent and self-
determined foreign policy, a separate institution, be independently funded, and so on, but 
until then it is unrealistic to assume that IGOs are independent diplomatic actors. 
Furthermore, the Innovators highlight that states and traditional diplomats are not 
ambivalent to this alternate process; if the means suits their ends then they will embrace 
quicker, more effective avenues of multi-lateral diplomacy. IGOs allow state 
representatives ‘to handle far more complex issues in less time than the rather fruitless 
debates took up in past meetings’.77 For the Innovators, this form of new diplomacy is not 
locked in competition for relevance and efficacy over traditional diplomacy. The 
Innovators suggest that traditional and new forms of diplomacy are complementary.  
 The Innovators offer a similar caveat for the more extreme ‘alternate world’ 
scenario suggested by some Nascent theorists. If anything, they claim this type of NDT 
increases TDT opposition, who will interpret such rhetoric as ‘wild-eyed idealism run 
amuck’.78 For the Innovators, there are no alternate worlds (figuratively or physically) 
only one world where states and IGOs cooperate and coexist in an amicable fashion. 
                                                 
76 Kaufmann, The Diplomacy of International Relations, p. 145. 
77 Cooper, English and Thakur, Enhancing Global Governance, p. 12. 
78 Weiss, Forsythe and Coate, The United Nations, p. xxvii. 
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IGOs and their Nascent theoretical supporters often fall foul of promoting their agenda, 
and revolutionary multilateral structure and ethos as a panacea to the globe’s ills. 
According to the Innovators, such NDT opinion is a statement of how IGOs ought to be, 
rather than a practical appraisal of how they are. Indeed, NDT often overlooks the 
ineffectiveness of IGOs, preferring to endorse the positive features of their presence. The 
Innovators remind us that IGOs can be ineffective, under funded and corrupt.79  
For the Innovators, this sort of Nascent rhetoric confirms that the desire to defend 
respective theoretical opinion equates to an inaccurate understanding of diplomacy and 
IGOs. Furthermore, NDT also demonstrates how the theory on diplomacy is distanced 
from the practice of diplomacy. Such idealistic opinion is fodder for the Traditionalists, 
according to the Innovators.  
 However, the Innovators warn that no matter how accurate the Traditionalist 
interpretation of IGOs is, this triumph must not be used to dismiss IGOs as mere 
frameworks or forums for states to engage. While the idealistic notions of the Nascent 
theorists are problematic, so to is the parochialism of the Traditionalists view of IGOs, in 
particular their reluctance to acknowledge that alternate actors may influence the 
multilateral forum. The Innovators claim that it is unrealistic for Traditionalists to 
maintain that states are the only significant actors at IGOs; TDT would be more accurate 
if unconventional actors such as NGOs, and the obvious lobbying and prenegotiation role 
they play, were acknowledged as significant influences to traditional diplomacy’s place 
within the IGO environment. 
                                                 
79 For a UN case-specific discussion see, Jacques Fomerand. (2000). The United Nations and Its Limits. 
Seton Hall Journal of International Relations. Summer/Fall, 51 – 59; Frank Vogl. (2004) The UN 
Convention Against Corruption. UN Chronicle, (3), 15 – 18; ‘Corruption Charges Threaten Valuable UN 
Role in Iraq. USA Today, 4/5/2004.  
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The Innovators argue that the fallibility of both the Traditionalists and the Nascent 
theorists (moreso) is evident in the diplomatic literature, which results in skewed or 
polarised diplomatic theory in IGOs. The need for a balanced interpretation between 
Traditionalists and Nascent theorists is required if an accurate theory on the relationship 
between states, IGOs and diplomacy is to be advanced. TDT and NDT literature ignores 
this obvious practical confluence.  
For the Innovators, recognising the respective focus of states and IGOs in turn 
suggests a symbiotic relationship between the two. For example, in the contemporary IR 
system it is evident that global problems, such as environmentalism, mass migration and 
poverty, cannot be dealt with as effectively through traditional bilateral diplomacy. Three 
Innovators, Cooper, English and Thakur, note of the global agenda, ‘the general issue 
here is that individual countries, however big and powerful, can no longer handle such 
problems themselves or in small groups but that these have to be tackled by the 
international community as a whole’.80 Therefore states, conscious of this 
unconventional, lower agenda, encourage the growth of IGOs, who, when consensus 
exists, can be more effective at solving global problems. The Innovators claim that 
despite the problems inherent to IGOs, such as complexity, universal membership and 
public transparency, states do value multilateral fora over the inherent difficulty of 
reaching consensus bi-laterally. 
At the same time, the Innovators note that IGOs do not have the ability to resolve 
traditional problems. The UN, for example, is ill equipped to deal with the tensions that 
were released with the end of the Cold War. The UN is unable to cope with nationalist 
rivalries, movements of religious fanaticism, unsolved territorial disputes, ancient 
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prejudices and rancours, and the sense of exclusion and discrimination affecting 
underdeveloped countries.81 The ineptitude of the IGO in traditional political-military 
matters, or a high political agenda, could thus be interpreted as a failure.  
For the Innovators, the relationship between states and IGOs becomes productive 
when there is a confluence of interests. In the modern era, this mutual reciprocity occurs 
commonly where the lower, global agenda is concerned. However, in terms of traditional 
politics, IGOs will continue to have little impact. Schuller and Grant frame this 
dichotomy explicitly, noting two scenarios ‘1) unilateralism in seeking the success of 
goals defined primarily with the domestic political system; and 2) multilateralism in 
seeking mutual understanding among the broader international political system’.82 
However, the Innovators suggest that an acknowledgement of the respective 
specialisation of both states and IGOs (the former able to address the high agenda and the 
latter, through multilateralism, able to address the lower agenda) is viable. 
 The opinion of one IDT illustrates how viable they consider the relationship 
between traditional diplomacy and multilateral IGO diplomacy. Melissen stresses that 
both the state and the IGO are the ultimate beneficiary of multilateral diplomacy. He 
argues that:  
 
Much diplomacy is of an experimental nature and innovations in diplomatic practices are so by 
definition. Many of the now accepted diplomatic methods first emerged as ad hoc devices. 
They only became more widespread or institutionalised when they appeared to fill a void or 
meet the demands of changing circumstances better than existing methods. Summitry and 
                                                 
81 Abba Eban. (1998). Diplomacy for The Next Century. US: Yale University Press, p. 121. 
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multilateral diplomacy are probably among the best examples of the insitutionalisation of 
modes of international dialogue that were preciously ad hoc.83  
 
 According to the Innovators then, the ad-hoc IGO became a permanent feature of 
the modern diplomatic environment because it filled a niche that states believed needed 
addressing. The state/IGO relationship is thus a symbiotic one, and of benefit to both. 
Diplomatic theory, according to the Innovators, should acknowledge this obvious 
confluence of interests, diplomatic techniques and symbiosis between state and IGO.  
 
4.4.3 Research wanted: diplomacy by summit  
Where the efficacy of summit diplomacy is concerned, the Innovators again adopt 
a balanced, moderate opinion. For the Innovators, it is important to consolidate the 
benefits of summitry whilst acknowledging its limitations. They also seek to reconcile 
divergent views on summitry. The Innovators are critical of these divergent opinions 
Traditionalists and Nascent theorists have of diplomacy by summit. For the Innovators, 
the conflicting views of both the Traditionalists and Nascent theorists means the value of 
summitry remains undecided: ‘as always, one can see the summit cup as half full or half 
empty’.84   
For the Innovators, that we still cannot theoretically agree on the value of 
summitry to diplomacy is indicative of several ailments with diplomatic theory. The 
culprits, according to the innovators, are parochial theorists, in particular Nascent 
theorists and Traditionalists. Maintaining a non-state focus, Nascent theorists interpret the 
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summit as serving no purpose. They propose that non-state actors could achieve a better 
result, at less cost and in less time. Nascent theorists portray an exclusive ‘club’ image of 
summits, with non-state actors begging for scraps from the summit table. This is untrue, 
according to the Innovators,85 and illustrative of the inaccuracy one skewed opinion can 
bestow upon an accurate theoretical interpretation of diplomacy at the summit.  
 On the other hand, Traditionalists advocate several benefits to the summit 
process, particularly the positive or negative impact summits can have in stalled 
negotiations. However, Traditionalists are critical of ‘amateurs’ infringing upon carefully 
crafted diplomatic relationships. The Innovators argue that such criticism confirms the 
parochial focus of the Traditionalists, who are keen to interpret diplomacy in purely 
traditional terms, that is, the diplomat and the diplomatic institution as the only 
diplomatic actors of importance. For the Innovators, Traditional opinion fails to recognise 
that summits involve much more asymmetric diplomacy, between not only heads of state 
or diplomats, but also significant non-state actors, and individuals from academia, 
business and industry.      
For the Innovators, these shallow observations on diplomacy by summit polarises 
opinion and leaves the diplomatic studies field confused as to the relationship between 
summitry and diplomacy. With both Traditionalists and Nascent theorists endorsing their 
divergent interpretations of summitry, they inhabit opposite poles in the diplomatic 
studies field, which ultimately leads to a split diplomatic theory. For the Innovators, both 
the Traditionalists and the Nascent theorists present an overly simplistic portrayal of 
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summitry, where two or more heads of state meet for a casual and expensive ‘fireside 
chat’. The Innovators remind us that summitry (in the practical sense) is anything but 
simple, an exclusive state exercise or a meaningless gathering.86     
 The example of the Copenhagen Social Summit of 1995 illustrates the diffuse 
nature of contemporary summits, where many actors – state and non-state - staked a 
claim to the process. At the Summit: 
187 governments sent a total of 5,741 accredited delegates. Their activities were monitored, 
lobbied and criticized by 2,315 accredited representatives of non-governmental organizations, 
2,863 media personnel, 405 United Nations Staff and a parallel private NGO forum of about 
10,000 representing 2,000 activists groups.87  
Not only do these figures demonstrate the non-state interest and influence at 
summit conferences but they also illustrate how the 5,741 official representatives were 
overshadowed by almost 16,000 non-state representatives. Although these non-state 
representatives did not directly participate in official meetings and negotiations (reserved 
for accredited state representatives) their presence was noticeable.  
As the quote indicates a non-state forum was held three days before the official 
summit. The major recommendations to emerge were presented to the official, state 
representatives. These recommendations were welcomed by state representatives as the 
Copenhagen Summit’s purpose was to tackle ‘social development and human well being 
                                                 
86 This is not to argue all summits are a raging success, as the WTO summit in Cancun demonstrated. 
However, the success of a summit should not be judged on measurable outcomes, on fixed results. The 
exercise of getting negotiating parties round the table should be judged a success. The opportunity for all 
parties to state publicly their position on an agenda, although increasing complexity of negotiations, allows 
all actors a say. Communication, negotiation and representation are, after all the foundations of any form of 
diplomacy. 
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for all and to give these goals the highest priority both now and into the 21st century.’88 
With such a non-traditional and unfamiliar agenda the NGO expertise and opinion was 
tolerated, accepted and incorporated into the final Programme of Action of the World 
Summit for Social Development.89 An indication of ‘official’ appreciation towards NGOs 
was the recommendation that their ‘accreditation and participation be increased should 
another such meeting be convened’.90 Five years later a second meeting was convened, in 
Geneva. The number of accredited NGO representatives increased from 2,315 in 
Copenhagen to 3,497 in Geneva.91 Some of those NGO representatives without official 
accreditation were invited to form part of the specialised state delegations. These 
delegations were directly involved in much of the Geneva Social Summit, whose mission 
statement gives an idea of the enhanced respect for non-state participation:  
To realise the Summit’s goals it is imperative to open the debate to a much wider range of 
actors. The Forum will be a unique opportunity for NGOs, parliaments, trade unions, business 
and industry, professional associations, academics, governmental and intergovernmental 
representatives, civil society groups and the media, to join in the debate on social 
development. In a dynamic meeting with roundtable discussions, debates, lectures, 
exhibitions and multimedia presentations, all the participants in Geneva 2000 will come 
                                                 
88 http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/wssd/agreements/index.html, retrieved  9th July, 2006. 
89 Central to the Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development were five elements: 
An Enabling Environment for Social Development, Eradication of Poverty, Expansion of Productive 
Employment and Reduction of Unemployment, Social Integration and measurable Implementation and 
Follow-up. For an expansion of these themes visit   
90 See, Note by Secretariat. (1995). Accreditation of non-governmental organizations in accordance with 
the rules for their participation set out on Preparatory Committee decision 2. Available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/037/33/IMG/N9503733.pdf?OpenElement, retrieved 9th 
July, 2006.  
91 http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/geneva2000/ retrieved 9th July, 2006. 
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together to share experiences, identify examples of good practice, discuss obstacles and how 
to overcome them.92 
From the above quote it is evident that the relationship between states and non-
state actors has become more diffuse. Indeed the 1995 Copenhagen summit paved the 
way for more NGO participation and accreditation in ‘official summits’.93 As of 2006, it 
is clear that NGOs participate vitally in the international system. They contribute 
valuable information and ideas, advocate effectively for positive change, provide 
essential operational capacity in emergencies and development efforts, and generally 
increase the accountability and legitimacy of the global governance process, of which 
states are a part.  
Although these are but two gatherings, an extrapolation is applicable to most large 
summits. The Innovators use such practical evidence to confirm that the relationship 
between state and non-state actors is not conflictual but complementary, with the summit 
environment ensuring an amicable atmosphere prevails. By relying on such empirical 
evidence, which confirms the symbiotic relationship between state and non-state, the 
Innovators find it difficult to understand why both the Traditionalists and Nascent 
theorists continue to endorse theories that are distanced from summit reality.  
 For the Innovators, rather than enforce divergent opinion, balance is needed 
alongside an admission that ‘summits do work, but not with predictable efficiency’.94 
During the twentieth century, summitry has changed from sporadic to regular meetings, 
although theoretical perceptions have not changed, according to the Innovators. Melissen 
                                                 
92 ibid.  
93 For several examples of growing NGO state partnership and increasing [NGO] accreditation see 
Appendix A., State/NGO Symbiosis.  
94 Group of Thirty. (1991). The Summit Process and Collective Security: Future Responsibility Sharing. 
Washington: Group of Thirty, p. 8. 
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describes this summit evolution adroitly, suggesting ‘the world in which summitry takes 
place is no longer bilateral or multilateral, but is increasingly polylateral,’ suggesting a 
move towards international society involving a great variety of governmental and 
nongovernmental actors.95 For the Innovators, research geared towards a more accurate 
theoretical understanding of summit diplomacy is needed.  
 
4.4.4 The symbiotic relationship between states and NGOs 
Where NGOs and the traditional diplomatic institution are concerned, the 
Innovators are particularly keen to stress the symbiotic relationship. The Innovators 
achieve this by firstly tackling common theoretical misperceptions of NGOs, and 
secondly, by relying heavily on practical evidence to validate their state/NGO symbiosis 
claims.96  
Firstly, the Innovators challenge the notion that the rise of NGOs has taken the 
state completely by surprise. The end of the Cold War (1989) is often cited as the year 
signaling the massive proliferation of NGOs. The Innovators argue that while it is 
undeniable this period has seen an unprecedented growth in NGOs, it is not unique in the 
history of the IR system.97 To accurately understand the modern relationship between 
                                                 
95 Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, p. 8. 
96 For a balanced, innovative approach to theorising on the relationship between the state and NGOs, see 
Thomas G. Gordenker and Leon Weiss. ‘Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and 
Dimensions’, in Thomas G. Gordenker and Leon Weiss (eds). (1996). NGOs, the UN & Global 
Governance. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, pp. 17 –51; Bosire Maragia. (2002) Almost There: 
Another Way of Conceptualizing and Explaining NGOs quest for Legitimacy in Global Politics. Non-State 
Actors and International Law, 2, 301 – 332. 
97 NGOs have been part of the IR system for over one hundred and fifty years. The founding of two major 
NGOs can be traced to the nineteenth century: the International Red Cross (in 1863) and the International 
Olympic Committee (in 1896). In 1874, there were thirty-two registered international NGOs; by 1914, this 
number had increased to 1083. These early NGOs are small in comparison to today’s tens of thousands of 
NGOs, however a rise in quantity does not suggest a revolution. For a historical perspective on the 
emergence of NGOs, see Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldar (eds.). (2001). Global Civil 
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state and NGO, an evolutionary approach is more appropriate than the dramatic 
revolutionary one.  
Secondly, the Innovators argue that the general sanctimonious portrayal of NGOs 
must be abandoned. For them, it is misguided to broadly herald all NGOs as a panacea to 
all international problems; ‘in focusing on NGOs as if they had a common role and 
common characteristic, we may conceal the failure of many to measure up to the ideal’.98 
The Innovators remind us that some NGOs are ineffective, corrupt or utterly useless, but 
they do not cease to be NGOs. A portrayal of NGOs as saviors or messianic challengers 
to the morally corrupt state is not one the Innovators are keen to endorse. To them, the 
presence of some NGOs can do more harm than good. The anti-governmental NGOs, for 
example, only entrench our theoretical perception of an adversarial relationship. A 
practical comment helps validate this notion; Marcie Friedman of the American Red 
Cross (ARC) commented: 
 
wing-nut crazy NGOs that stir up trouble are more of a help than a hindrance to promoting civil 
society, and a common state/NGO agenda. Wise NGOs help the government, whilst helping 
themselves.99 
 
 For the Innovators, a further misrepresentation in the diplomatic studies literature 
is the notion that NGOs are more efficient than the state in achieving a low political 
agenda, which erodes state legitimacy and purpose. For the Innovators, this type of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Iriye, Akira. (1999). A Century of NGOs. Diplomatic History, 
23 (3), 421 – 435; David Reiff. (1999). Civil Society and the Future of the Nation State: The False Dawn of 
Civil Society. Nation, 268 (7), 11 – 16. 
98 Pearce in Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 367. 
99 Marcie Friedman, interview, March 10th, 2005. 
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rhetoric is nonsense. They remind us that, practically, NGOs are more effective in aid 
distribution or humanitarian relief for example. The Innovators stress that NGO 
specialisation is not contested but welcomed by the incumbent state. One IDT, Cooper, 
refers to this function as a ‘sub-contracting/facilitative role that supports the work of 
government’.100 If anything, the state welcomes the opportunity to outsource 
unconventional problems to organisations geared entirely towards a single issue. 
Governments are utilising such specialisation and have found it ‘useful to include NGOs 
in their delegations as advisors’ in order to harbour their vast practical expertise, which 
for the Innovators is further evidence of an ‘ever thickening texture in international 
diplomacy’.101  
The Innovators contend that NGOs are more specialised than governments in 
individual areas, which does not necessarily suggest a legitimacy crisis for the state. 
Instead, NGO participation allows states to concentrate on the high traditional agenda 
they evolved to represent. The Innovators stress that NGOs also have a useful function as 
a ‘kick-starter’; that is, they often have a catalytic function where ‘proactive behaviour on 
the part of the NGOs helps frame the agenda for action by the government’.102 Therefore, 
the presence of NGOs illustrates the useful purpose they provide to the modern 
diplomatic environment where low political issues are just as important as high political 
issues. The Innovators agree that NGOs are able to act on the former, states on the latter.   
  For the Innovators, this specialisation of focus has led to a symbiotic relationship 
between the incumbent state and NGO in the diplomatic arena. NGOs are a welcome 
addition to state apparatus, as they differ markedly in terms of their agenda, methods 
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employed and guiding principles. However, the Innovators argue that because the 
methods, standards and norms of NGOs and states differ does not mean their relationship 
has to be conflictual. In areas where there is a ‘clear mutuality of interest’, there exists 
strong cooperation between governments and NGOs.103 The Innovators reel out several 
practical examples to validate the symbiotic relationship.104  A few of the more common 
examples within the IDT literature, used to illustrate cooperation between states and 
NGOs, are the Ottawa Process,105 the class action suits of the Swiss Nazi Gold106 and the 
Kimberley Process.107  
                                                 
103 ibid., p. 367. 
104 For a broad overview of state/NGO symbiosis see David Hulme and Michael Edwards. (1997). NGOs, 
States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort. New York: St Martins Press. This book establishes an 
analytical framework and presents overviews of key issues in the relationships between NGOs, states and 
donors. For a specific example of NGOs, States and military working together see Bronwyn Evans-Kent 
and Roland Bleiker. (2003). Peace Beyond the State? NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. International 
Peacekeeping, 10 (1), 103 – 126; Oliver P. Richmond. (2003). Introduction: NGOs, Peace and Human 
Security. International Peacekeeping, 10 (1), 1 – 11. 
105 In December 1997, 122 countries assembled in Ottawa to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of the Abti-Personnel mines and their Destructyion. The 
Convention can be considered a major achievement. It is far stronger that previous attempts to address the 
egregious human consequences of anti-personnel mines. Beyond the Convention’s direct 
accomplishements, the process that brought about the treaty itself has been heralded as a model for 
cooperation between governments and NGOS. For more on the history, process and outcomes of the 
Ottawa meetings, see Nicola Short. (1999). The Role of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines. 
International Negotiation, Vol. 4 Issue 3, pp. 483 - 502; John English. (1998). The Ottawa Process: Paths 
followed, paths ahead. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52 (2), pp. 121 – 133. 
106 NGOs exerted significant influence in almost every mediation undertaken on behalf of class action suits 
concerning the whereabouts of dormant accounts once held by Holocaust victims. Initial negotiations 
focussed on stolen assets that had been deposited in Swiss banks during World War II. Later negotiations 
were focussed on reparations for slave and forced labour, insurance, looted art, and other confiscated Nazi 
property. Although the official parties in these negotiation were traditional state actors – Germany, Austria, 
France, the United States and the lawyers on both sides of the issues – all parties knew that no final 
agreement was possible without first obtaining the consent of key NGOs, such as the World Jewish 
Council, The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, and several German-Eastern 
European reconciliation commissions that had been established in Belarus, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Russia and Ukraine. These NGOs, in effect, ‘were the ultimate arbiters as to whether an agreement between 
governments and the lawyers would be acceptable’ to those initially affected (Eizenstat, Nongovernmental 
Organizations, pp. 17-18).  Their blessing was ‘essential for political and diplomatic negotiations. Even 
though they were not parties to the lawsuits, they had a formal role at the negotiating table’ (Eizenstat, 
Nongovernmental Organizations, p. 18). For a concise description of the process, see, John Authers, and 
Richard Wolffe. (2002). The Victim’s Fortune: Inside the Epic Battle over the Debts of the Holocaust. New 
York: HarperCollins. 
107 The Kimberley Process was designed to tackle the sale of illegal ‘conflict’ or ‘blood’ diamonds. The 
Kimberley Process is a sound example of where an NGO, Global Witness, acted as a catalyst to a process 
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  For the Innovators, the development of NGOs within the modern diplomatic 
environment, alongside an amicable bondage with the state, has enhanced ‘the 
relationship between state and societal actors’.108 The Innovators claim that the modern 
state is more representative of its constituent parts as a result, but is instilled with a sense 
of historical pragmatism. The presence of NGOs in the modern diplomatic environment 
‘has provided another example of how existing parts of the diplomatic system can 
provide the means of responding to the needs of the current situation and to some degree 
actually shape them’.109 Consequently, the Innovators suggest that NGOs are now of a 
permanent feature of the complex twenty-first century. Their prevalence, in turn, 
confirms a desire by both states and NGOs to address low as well as high political issues, 
and to work together in pursuit of common objectives. 
For the Innovators, theoretically understanding the relationship between state and 
NGO is ‘not well served by assumptions that the representatives of state and non-state 
actors inhabit different worlds any more than an appreciation of the significance of NGOs 
                                                                                                                                                 
in which officially accredited diplomats (the British, American and the European Union Commission in 
particular) worked alongside journalists and De Beers, the Global Diamond firm. The purpose of this multi-
stakeholder collaboration was to establish a humanitarian diamond regime instead of the brutal and cruel 
system that had existed previously. The Kimberley Process is designed to eliminate conflict diamonds by 
keeping countries with inadequate rough import and export controls from importing diamonds into the 
legitimate stream of commerce. When the Process went ‘live’, fifty-two countries had signed up. The 
Republic of Congo was the first country to experience the wrath of the Kimberley Process, when in 
October, 2004, it was suspended from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). The decision 
was reached after a KPCS delegation visited the country and discovered that Congo was exporting far more 
diamonds than it produced or legally imported. Victoria Gomelsky, a spokeswoman for Global Witness, 
noted ‘removing the Republic of Congo is a major step to ensuring the Kimberley Process is working 
effectively and has teeth. This decision sets an important precedent for how to deal with countries and 
diamond traders that are not complying with the Kimberly Process’ (Kimberley Endorsed, p. 2). Virginia 
Haufler also notes that the Kimberley Process was a beneficial example of ‘a trend in which international 
institutions, NGOs and governments pressure foreign investors to engage in conflict-prevention initiatives’ 
(International diplomacy, p. 158). For more on the development and impact of the Kimberley Process, see 
Victoria Gomelsky. (2002). Kimberley Endorsed; NGOs Welcome Certification Scheme. National 
Jeweller, 96 (23), 1 - 3; Victoria Gomelsky. (2003). Noncompliant Countries Will No Longer Be Able to 
Trade Diamonds Internationally. National Jeweller, 97 (12), 30 - 34; E. Ablorh-Odjidja. (2003). Conflict 
Diamonds: The Kimberley Process for Corruption. New African, August/September, 40 – 43.  
108 Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 363. 
109 Langhorne, Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State, p. 8. 
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is best understood by assuming that their activities herald the imminent demise of the 
state’.110 The Innovators demonstrate balance combined with a stronger link to practical 
diplomacy, which, they argue, ultimately renders a more accurate theoretical portrayal of 
the amicable and symbiotic state/NGO relationship. 
 
4.4.5 Open for business: The traditional diplomatic institution and commerce 
The Innovators argue that commerce is central to diplomacy; that it always has 
been and always will be. Where traditional diplomacy is concerned, there should be no 
separation of the political and the commercial, as both are central to modern diplomacy. 
Dispelling this myth allows the Innovators to demonstrate, once more, the symbiosis 
between the traditional diplomatic institution and their trading partners, typically MNCs. 
The Innovators employ practical evidence in support of this assumption, which allows 
them to dispel another myth: that MNCs are challenging the legitimacy of the state in its 
central role of the creation of wealth.  
The Innovators remind us that governments, for example, have restructured their 
diplomatic institutions to integrate (horizontally) commerce departments. Some states, for 
example Canada, Australia and Belgium, have merged their commerce and foreign 
ministries into one department.111  Other states, such as the Britain and the Czech 
                                                 
110 Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 376. 
111 Other countries with combined trade and foreign ministries include Albania (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade), Austria (The Austrian Foreign Ministry), Fiji (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade), 
Republic of Korea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Mauritius (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
International Trade and Cooperation) and New Zealand (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade).  
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Republic, have created joint bodies of commerce and diplomatic ministries to coordinate 
and exploit commercial opportunities. 112  
In all of these instances, the Innovators argue that there are clear and formal 
government/business partnerships, incorporated in essentially diplomatic structures. In 
states that have not gone so far as to institutionalise commerce and diplomatic 
partnership, formal government/business partnerships are equally evident. The US, South 
Africa, Germany, Norway, Brazil, Sweden and Tunisia, for example, have introduced 
organisational reform, which renders them more commercial. This practical confluence – 
between commerce and diplomacy - is used by the Innovators to demonstrate that 
governments the world over are prioritising commercial diplomacy as an intrinsic part of 
their foreign policy objectives, equal in importance to the high political agenda. Some 
theorists go a step further, arguing ‘economic management and industrial policies may 
often be even more important for governments than conventional foreign policies as 
typically conceived’.113 It is clear then, that foreign and commercial policy enjoy a 
symbiotic existence, where one is just as important as the other. For the Innovators, an 
insistence on a distinct separation of commerce from diplomacy can, at best, be described 
as a sentimental interpretation of diplomacy. 
IDT clarifies that diplomacy ‘has always been concerned with commerce. 
Ambassadors have traditionally been their countries’ chief commerce promotion 
                                                 
112 Britain’s joint body is called the United Kingdom Trade and Investment (UKTI) department. The 
creation of UKTI forms part of the contemporary institutional reform of the FCO, with a particular 
emphasis on commercial diplomacy: the development of firm to government partnerships in current 
diplomatic practice. For more information on UKTI, visit https://www.uktradeinvest.gov.uk/ukti. For a 
theoretical slant on the origins and constitution of UKTI see Donna Lee. The Embedded Business-
Diplomat: How Institutional Reform Upholds the Role of Business in UK Diplomatic Practice. Paper 
prepared for the Panel ‘Diplomacy & Business: Beyond the Hegemony of the State, 45th Annual ISA 
Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17 – 20, 2004.  
113 Strange, Susan. (1992). States, firms and diplomacy. International Affairs, 68 (1), p. 2  
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officers’.114 The Innovators have difficulty understanding why other diplomatic theorists 
continue with the parochial separation of political and commercial diplomacy, for this 
argument only serves to highlight the distance their theory has from actual, real 
developments in diplomacy. IDT suggests we know intuitively of the historical and 
contemporary linkage between commerce and diplomacy. We know that commerce has 
always been ‘embedded in diplomatic practice; diplomats have always undertaken 
commercial activities’.115 For the Innovators, not only do official government statements 
tell us that this is a so, but diplomats, practitioners and ambassadors also testify to the 
inextricable bondage between diplomacy and commerce.  
The Innovators employ practical opinion to validate this testament. For example, 
retired Indian Ambassador Kishan Rana, states that during his career ‘over fifty percent 
of my time was devoted to economic work’.116 British Ambassador to Iran Anthony 
Parsons also argues that much of his embassy’s time was dominated by commercial 
work:  
 
By the end of 1975 I had, with the approval of the Foreign Office, reorganized the Embassy 
staff to meet our priorities. First came export promotion in all its aspects – dealing with the 
flood of business visitors and commercial enquiries, helping to organize commerce promotions 
and commerce delegations, seeking new commercial opportunities and feeding them back into 
the export promotion machine back home.117  
 
                                                 
114 Lee and Hudson, the old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 345. 
115 For a plethora of historical examples of this occurrence see, Donna Lee and David Hudson. (2004). The 
old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy. Review of International Studies, 30, pp. 349 – 
350. 
116 Kishan Rana. (2000). Inside Diplomacy. Manas: New Delhi, p. 117. 
117 A. Parsons. (1984). The Pride and the Fall: Iran, 1969 – 1982. London: Cape, p. 37. 
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British Ambassador Christopher Meyer also hinted at the increasingly close 
relationship between the commercial and the diplomatic worlds. He wrote that: 
 
it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between what is political in diplomacy and what is 
economic, and indeed, whether there is dividing line between the two which has any validity at 
all.118  
  
 By employing practical opinion, the Innovators question the relevance of the any 
approach that enforces a gulf between the political and the commercial. For the 
Innovators, TDT is affected by a historical stereotype of diplomacy and reflects how they 
think diplomacy ought to be conducted, rather than how it really is. This provincial 
attitude is hardly productive for diplomacy studies, according to the Innovators. As long 
as theories of diplomacy continue to divorce the political from the commercial, an 
accurate theory of this visible aspect of modern diplomacy will remain elusive. 
 The Innovators level the same tirade against arguments which suggest that 
revolutionary globalisation, the failure of the state to create wealth, and the growing 
power of MNCs question the need for the state and the traditional diplomatic 
institution.119 
 For the Innovators, the revolutionary globalisation argument illustrates, firstly, 
that theorists (whom this thesis has labeled Nascent theorists) have no sense of history.120 
                                                 
118 Meyer in Lee and Hudson, the old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 346 
119 For a critique of the types of works that introduce and advance these phenomenon, see Mark Beeson. 
(2004). Governance goes global: power, authority and order in the twenty-first century. Australian Journal 
of International Affairs, 58 (4), pp. 511 – 521.  
120 For an example of the fallacy of authors who suggest that globalisation is a radical departure from the 
past, see,  Thomas W. Zeiler. (2001). Just Do It! Globalisation for Diplomatic Historians. Diplomatic 
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The Innovators remind us that ‘today’s growing integration of the world economy is not 
unprecedented’, as similar trends ‘occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.’ 121 Indeed, empirical evidence122 suggests that the current wave of 
globalisation is not that remarkable or drastic. An examination of the historical IR system 
illustrates that states have experienced similar global phenomena in the past, emerging 
stronger, more streamlined and more commercially potent than before. Therefore, 
arguing that the current phase of globalisation is a radical departure from the past and 
predicating the end of the state is ill founded. Despite the many economic changes that 
have occurred during the twentieth century, ‘neither the markets for goods and services 
nor those for factors of production appear much more integrated that they were a century 
                                                                                                                                                 
History, 25 (4), pp. 529 – 551; Danielle S. Petito. (2001). Sovereignty and Globalisation; Fallacies, Truth 
and Perception. New York Law School Journal of Human Rights, XVII, pp. 1139 – 1172. 
121 Wolf, Will the Nation-State survive Globalisation?, p.179.  
122 For example, see, Martin Wolf. (2001). Will the Nation-State survive Globalisation? Foreign Affairs, 80 
(1), 178 – 190. Wolf provides statistics which suggest that ‘the proportion of world production (that is 
traded on global markets) is not that much higher today than it was in the years leading up to World War 
One. Commerce was comparably significant in 1910, when ratios of trade (merchandise exports plus 
imports) to GDP hit record highs in several of the advanced economies. Global commerce then collapsed 
during the Great Depression and World War II, but since then world trade has grown more rapidly than 
output. The share of global production traded worldwide grew from about 7% in 1950 to more than 20% by 
the mid 1990s; in consequence, trade ratios have risen in almost all of the advanced economies. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, exports and imports added up to 57% of GDP in 1995 compared to 44% in 
1910; for France the 1995 proportion was 43% against 35% in 1910; and for Germany it was 46% against 
38% in the same years. But Japan’s trade ration was actually lower in 1995 than it had been in 1910. In 
fact, among today’s five biggest economies, the only one in which trade has remarkably greater weight in 
output than it had a century ago is the United States, where the ratio has jumped from 11% in 1910 to 24% 
in 1995. Wolf also highlights a second informative comparison between different global epochs: ‘by the 
late nineteenth century many countries has already opened their capital markets to international 
investments, before investments, too, collapsed during the interwar period. As a share of GDP, British 
capital investments abroad – averaging 4.6% of GDP between 1870 and 1913 – hit levels of unparalleled in 
contemporary major economies. More revealing is the correlation between domestic investment and 
savings (a measure of the extent to which savings remain within one country) was lower between 1880 and 
1910 than in any subsequent period. (pp. 179 – 180). For a similar example of historical global eras 
rivalling the current wave of globalisation see Andrew Coleman and Jackson Maogoto. (2003). After the 
Party, is there a Cure for the Hangover? The Challenges of the Global Economy to Westphalian 
Sovereignty. Legal Issue of Economic Integration, 30 (1), pp. 35 – 60. In this article the two authors trace 
similar ‘global’ eras from the Roman Empire to the modern ‘global’ IR system.  
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ago’.123 For the Innovators, globalisation should be interpreted as an evolution, rather 
than a revolution. 
In relation to the second oft-cited argument, the inability of the state to generate 
wealth, an equally simple IDT rebuttal illustrates the weakness of this argument. The 
Innovators highlight that domestic territory, including the basic factors of production 
(land, labour and capital), remain an important sources of wealth for a state and its 
inhabitants. 
The argument that the global and borderless nature of financial and information 
markets, which escape the Spartan pockets of government treasuries, is problematic for 
the Innovators. They claim that states are harnessing the global market to generate 
wealth. A democratic government that ignored the massive pecuniary rewards of 
financial deregulation and economic integration would soon feel the wrath of its 
capitalistic public. Globalisation actually ‘enhances a nation’s economic well-being – 
indeed, experience suggests that the opening of commerce and most capital flows 
enriches most citizens in the short run and virtually all citizens in the long run’.124 For the 
Innovators, Globalisation is of financial benefit to all concerned: states, firms, diplomacy 
and individuals. 
The Innovators remind us that after the Second World War in order to monitor 
and control traditional and unconventional sources of wealth states began implementing 
global financial, economic and commercial systems with a view to governing and 
regulating the emerging global market. 125 These systems are concerned with developing 
                                                 
123 Wolf, Will the Nation-State survive Globalisation?, p. 181. 
124 ibid., p. 183. 
125 As the earlier footnote by Wolf suggests, unconventional forces, factors and sources of wealth are 
(mis)associated with the current wave of globalisation. Capital and trade flows, for example, have always 
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standards and ‘general regulatory principles’ that allow institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF),126 the World Commerce Organisation (WTO)127 or 
the United Nations Conference on Commerce and Development (UNCTAD)128 to 
essentially manage and guide the global economy.129  For the Innovators, it must be 
emphasised that these regulatory institutions are composed of networks of state agencies 
acting on behalf of states, not the independent multi-lateral institutions chipping away at 
state sovereignty and legitimacy that some theorists imagine (Nascent theorists in 
particular).   
In short, these global regulatory institutions may be heavily influenced by state as 
well as MNC representatives.130 Their introduction was a response to the decline of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
been a source of wealth for the international state. Whereas territorial acquisition was a major source of 
wealth during the colonial phase of the IR system, capital, trade, financial and information sources of 
wealth are the de jure source of state wealth.  
126 The IMF was established in 1945 with headquarters in Washington D.C. Membership in 2004 amounted 
to 184 states. Essentially the IMF monitors short-term cross-border payments and foreign exchange 
positions. When a country develops chronic imbalances in its external accounts, the IMF supports 
corrective policy reforms, often called ‘structural adjustment programmes’. Since 1978, the IMF has 
undertaken comprehensive surveillance both of the world-economy as a whole. The IMF also provides 
extensive technical assistance. In recent years the Fund has pursued various initiatives to promote 
efficiency and stability in global financial market. For more see www.imf.org 
127 The WTO was established in 1995 with its operation based in Geneva, Switzerland. In 2004, its 
membership consisted of 146 states. The WTO is a permanent institution designed to replace the 
provisional General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, which was established in 1947). It has a 
wider agenda than GATT, covering services, intellectual property, and investment issues as well as 
merchandise trade. The WTO also has greater powers of enforcement through its dispute-settlement 
mechanism. The organisations Trade Policy Review Body conducts surveillance of members commercial 
measure. For more information see, www.wto.org 
128 UNCTAD was established in 1964, with its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. In 2004 146 states 
were members. UNCTAD monitors the effects of world trade and investment on economic development, 
especially in the South. It provided a key forum in the 1970s for discussions on the emerging International 
Economic Order. For more information see, www.unctad.org 
129 Coleman and Maogoto, After the Party, p. 45. 
130 Perhaps the most obvious and infamous example of the omnipotence of regulatory institutions is the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis. If anything the Crisis revealed the need for more, not less, global financial 
market regulation. What began as a recession in Thailand turned into one of the worst global economic 
disasters in history. The Asian ‘tiger’ states – Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, Republic of Korea and 
Malaysia – watched helplessly as a number of factors caused widespread panic and economic chaos. The 
contagion was caused by a number of investors and banks withdrawing their capital from the ‘tiger’ 
nations. Weak banks in one country called in loans from other countries, leaving economic disaster in their 
wake. For example, Brazil, for a time, lost reserves at a rate of USD 1 billion per day. Like a row of 
dominoes, one by one, nations succumbed to the contagion. By the time the worldwide crisis concluded, 
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territorial aspect of generating wealth and an attempt to control and/or exploit emerging 
forms of wealth generation, such as financial or information markets. For the Innovators, 
the influence of these multi-lateral state institutions in the global arena is clear. 
Revolutionary postulations on the nature of globalisation fail to appreciate that states 
control the global economy, and not vice versa. For the Innovators, states, the dominant 
political and economic entity of the past three hundred and fifty years, are hardly likely to 
engineer their own economic downfall. IDT runs contrary to the argument that states are 
calling ‘for freer markets without noticing this threatens their own lifeblood, that they are 
becoming their own gravediggers’.131 States, exposed historically to similar 
globalisations, are demonstrating the ability not only to generate wealth through a 
number of markets but also the desire to control, govern and regulate such markets 
through international institutions.  
Finally, the non-statist theorist’s third obsession, that firms are becoming more 
like states and developing political and diplomatic tools, is a broad argument that is 
problematic for the Innovators. This development would suggest that ultimately, firms 
become so similar to states that they negate the need for states and traditional diplomacy.  
For the Innovators, this is unlikely to happen. According to the Innovators, a clear 
distinction can be drawn between the fundamental purpose of a firm and that of a state: 
firms serve their shareholders, whereas governments serve their domestic populations, 
                                                                                                                                                 
the currencies of such disparate nations as Canada, Chile and Australia had plummeted. For a brief and 
concise account of how the crisis unfolded, see Robert Gilpin. (2003). A Postscript to the Asian Financial 
Crisis: The Fragile International Economic Order. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16 (1), 79 – 
89; Sharon L. Bush. (2005). The Asian Financial Crisis: Regional Capitulation or Re-direction?  Journal of 
Third World Studies, 22 (1), 253 – 260; Stephan Haggard. (2001). Politics, Institutions and Globalization: 
The Aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. American Asian Review, 19 (2), 71 – 99;  Ming-Yu Cheng and  
Sayed Hossain. (2000). The Asian financial crisis. New Economy, 7 (4), 224 – 229; Stephan Haggard. 
(2000). The politics of the Asian financial crisis.  Journal of Democracy, 11 (2), 130 – 145. 
131 Ulrich Beck. (1999). Beyond the Nation State. The New Statesman, p. 25. 
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with functions ranging from tax revenue to health or education provision. In short, states 
and firms occupy different niches in the modern diplomatic environment. Beck agrees, 
noting that ‘nation-states are responsible for all their citizens, corporations are concerned 
for their shareholders only’.132  
For the Innovators, this distinction is proof enough that firms are unlikely to 
become state-like. Firms are motivated by profit, whereas the collective good of the 
domestic population motivates states. The Innovators remind us that these two 
motivations are not interchangeable; both actors exist to serve very different functions in 
the modern diplomatic environment.  
For the Innovators, states remain able to affect the profitability of an MNC and 
vice versa, so both are mutually dependable. The relationship is one of symbiotic and 
reciprocal partnership. In the early 20th century: 
 
nation-states realising that corporations and the market economy would assist them in the 
struggle for survival in the international community created an environment conducive for 
corporations to develop.133  
 
According to the Innovators, an intrinsic link between government cooperation 
and business corporations exists. While firm/government structures – political and/or 
diplomatic – may eventually mirror one another, the end products of both firms and 
states, irrespective of their size, will always justify the independent demand/need for the 
two. The Innovators consistently highlight that firms and states are very different entities, 
                                                 
132 ibid., p 25. 
133 Coleman and Maogoto, After the Party, p. 39. 
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providing different functions for, and occupying different niches within, the IR system. 
The relationship between firms and states is not adversarial or competitive; for either to 
flourish they need one another, as they have always done.  
 
4.4 6 Diplomacy and the information evolution 
The Innovators stress an information evolution rather than a revolution. As a 
result, the Innovators are able to dispel the image of an archaic diplomatic institution 
unwilling or unable to embrace the revolution. They argue that the traditional diplomatic 
institution’s willingness, necessity and drive to embrace radical new information 
technologies.          
 The Innovators argue that the information revolution is not driving a wedge 
between states (ambivalent to the revolution) and non-state actors (embracing the 
revolution); it is bringing them closer together. Diplomacy in the information age must be 
reflective of both hard and soft politics that drive state and non-state actors. For the 
Innovators, modern diplomacy ‘must integrate a broad range of economic, sociocultural, 
environmental, scientific, and legal considerations, as well as the traditional political and 
military factors’.134 Effectively achieving such a broad and unconventional range of 
interests will confound the state and the foreign ministry. A complex foreign policy 
agenda (low and high) means state and non-state actors need to work together in 
collusion rather than competition, utilising developments in information technology as a 
mechanism to pool resources, expertise and knowledge in dealing with a more complex 
IR system. For the Innovators, this collusion is indicative of ‘the growing symbiosis 
                                                 
134 Jeffrey R. Cooper, Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries’, 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, 
<www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html> 
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between state and non-state actors’ where the information revolution fuels ‘significant 
processes whereby the state, while remaining a key player in world politics, is joined in 
the management of complex policy issues by a network of nongovernmental actors.’135 
 In this context, the innovators dismiss arguments which suggest the traditional 
diplomatic institution is suffering as a result of the information revolution. These 
arguments tend to overlook the central premise of the information and communication 
revolution: that more communication and information is better than less. Increased 
communications means that political entities, be they states, NGOs or IGOs, are more 
aware of one another’s ethos, skills and agenda. Common interests can be realised and 
exchanges of expertise are therefore becoming widespread in the modern diplomatic 
environment.136          
 The Innovators stress that the advent of communicative technology, such as the 
Internet, can be viewed as ‘improving’ communication, a ‘high-tech add-on to traditional 
communication systems’ or another layer added to a traditional process.137 New 
technology provides broadened information opportunities, a greater range of information 
                                                 
135 ibid. 
136 In December 2001, the UN General Assembly demonstrated such collusion in relation to the information 
revolution. The UN General Assembly approved by consensus Resolution 56/183, which essentially called 
for a world summit on ‘information society’. The Summit’s objective was to draw the attention of political 
leaders in as many countries as possible to global problems and the opening up of opportunities offered by 
shaping the global information society, to define the main principles and directions of international 
cooperation in the process of creating such a society, as well as the roles of various participants in this 
process (states, business circles and civil society represented by NGOs). The result of the world summit 
was consensus across three objectives: 1. Access to Information Technology (IT) for all 2. IT should 
become an engine of economic and social development and reaching the goal of the millennium 
development goals written into the UN millennium declaration 3. Confidence and security in using IT. The 
latter goal sought to assuage fears that IT could be used for purposes incompatible with the protection of 
international stability and security and the need to prevent the use of information resources and technology 
for criminal and terrorism purposes. Point three championed the development of countermeasures and the 
setting up of UN organisations for rapid reactions to violations of information related security matters. The 
Summit was a success, and demonstrated the ability, necessity and desire of a collusion between state and 
non-state actors. The entire process was facilitated by an IGO. For a similar discussion, see G. Kramarenko 
and A. Krutskikh. (2003) Diplomacy and the Information Revolution. International Affairs, 115 – 123.  
137 Riordan, The New Diplomacy, p. 63.  
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is forthcoming and much time is saved with figures and instant reporting available at the 
touch of a button. Both state and non-state actors experience this similar benefit. 
According to the Innovators, there is no crisis for the traditional diplomatic institution as 
a result of an ill conceived revolution; the day is still far off when ‘diplomats are replaced 
by computers’.138         
 For the Innovators, the notion that we must caution on the replacement of the 
human element in diplomacy with machines demonstrates how unrealistic the 
information revolution debate has become. Rather than inducing panic or conjuring 
images of diplomats and diplomatic institutions in terminal decline, a more moderate, 
balanced understanding of the revolution is required, according to the Innovators. The 
Innovators are the first to acknowledge that: 
 
information technology is changing our lives, our society, our institutions, our culture. Yet 
there remain many constants, including time and human relations. Traditionalists who insist 
diplomacy need not change are wrong. So, too, are those who insist that it must change 
completely. Finding the intersection which honors the past and respects the future is the 
challenge.139  
 
In other words, to understand the modern relationship between diplomacy and 
information means diplomatic theory must be distanced from the ‘crisis effect’ the 
revolution is having/not having on the traditional diplomatic institution. 
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For the Innovators, there is no doubt that the information evolution is having a 
transforming effect on spheres of ‘economics, politics, security, social affairs, science, 
culture and education’.140 The Innovators agree that the evolution is improving 
communications, providing a broader agenda which incorporates high as well as low 
politics and facilitating a more representative IR system. When considering the impact of 
the current information evolution an historical analogy serves a purpose. The telephone 
had a similar revolutionary effect on diplomacy but after a hundred years has been 
accepted as a communicative necessity of the diplomatic system, rather than a force 
tearing it down. More people are connected to telephone networks which have also 
escaped the central control of the foreign ministry, and yet the diplomatic institution 
endures.  
The central premise of IDT is that an information revolution must not be confused 
with a diplomatic evolution. Diplomacy has always been characterised by patterns of 
communication based on information; for the Innovators, there is an inseparable link 
between communication, information and the technologies which grease the basic 
functions of diplomacy. The information evolution, and subsequent diplomatic evolution, 
helps further regulate interaction between separated communities, be they states, NGO, 
IGOs, MNCs or individuals. After all, more communication, more information is better 
than less.  
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4.5 The merits of IDT 
The central benefit of the Innovators’ work to this thesis, and the diplomatic 
studies field more broadly, is that by challenging both Traditional and Nascent diplomatic 
theory they have laid the groundwork for the categorisations of diplomatic theorists. 
Although they do not explicitly identify, label or categorise diplomatic theorists in the 
field, as this thesis does, it is within their discussions between ‘world society and state 
centric’ views, for example, that supporting theoretical evidence could be subtly 
discerned.141 The Innovators often discuss the relationship between competing views on 
diplomacy but stop short of assigning labels to the associated theorists.  
In terms of its contribution to the diplomatic studies field, IDT is valuable for 
several reasons. Firstly, as their moniker suggests their theoretical approach is innovative, 
a different method to theorising on diplomacy. These theorists consistently demonstrate 
that an original and novel approach to postulating on modern diplomacy can yield fresh 
insight for the diplomatic studies field. The prominence of theorists such as Melissen, 
Hocking and Sharp within the canon suggests an acceptance of innovative theorising by 
the diplomatic studies field. Furthermore, the emphasis on a different approach to 
postulating on diplomacy suggests that more rewarding insight on diplomatic theory 
awaits discovery. Innovators suggest a promising research agenda exists by ‘thinking 
outside the traditional square’ or adopting an unconventional approach to standard 
diplomatic theory.142 The scope for this possible redirection of theoretical exploration is 
immense. A devoted account of the diplomacy of NGOs, MNCs, IGOs and even 
individuals offers at least four immediate areas in need of rigorous attention. These gaps 
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ought to be filled, if we are to build a complete body of theory on the modern diplomatic 
environment.  
By adopting a different approach, Innovators also, secondly, avoid or dispel 
debate that is becoming unproductive in relation to the modern diplomatic environment. 
One such ‘sterile and injurious’ debate concerns the future relevancy of the state (and its 
diplomacy) in the face of the proliferation of non-state diplomatic actors.143 Innovators 
believe that any debate that claims the state and its diplomatic institution is in decline ‘is 
a distortion of reality’.144 By sidestepping the state versus non-state debate, IDT is 
therefore more closely related to the practical diplomatic environment, where symbiotic 
relationships between the state and the non-state can be evidenced. This practical 
symbiosis is central to IDT, which adds further legitimacy to their approach to theorising 
on the modern diplomatic environment.   
Thirdly, Innovators acknowledge that while they are engaged in the enterprise of 
diplomatic theory, they also believe that empirical evidence can be employed to enrich 
theory. The Innovators believe that ‘data linked to theory is more powerful than data 
alone’.145 Not only do Innovators ensure that diplomatic theory and diplomatic practice 
remain close but also that empirical evidence is a sound testing ground for diplomatic 
theory.  
 
                                                 
143 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 21. 
144 Brian Hocking. (1999). Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation. London: Macmillan, p. 3. 
145 Bates in Rudra Sil. 2000) The Foundations of Eclecticism: The Epistemological Status of Agency, 
Culture, and Structure in Social Theory. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12 (3), p. 375. 
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4.6 The limitations of IDT 
The limitations of IDT are a consequence of the different theoretical categories 
this thesis has identified as inherent to the diplomatic studies field. The bulk of the 
limitations of IDT are therefore forwarded by other groups of different theorists. An 
exception to this rule, however, concerns their engagement with diplomatic theory sui 
generis. The Innovators fail to engage with diplomatic theory as an independent topic. 
This is expected, as their discussions largely concern the practical interaction of 
diplomatic actors where theory is often encountered in perfunctory fashion. In short, like 
the majority of diplomatic theorists, they do not identify, explore or postulate on the 
central tenets of diplomatic theory.         
 Secondly, Innovators have a tendency to side-step dominant debates within the 
diplomatic studies field. For example, when Hocking proposes his robust ‘catalytic 
diplomacy’ hypothesis, he stresses the need to move diplomatic theory beyond the sterile 
debates, the divergent lines of argument and the competing perspectives of other 
diplomatic theorists (Traditionalist and NDT).146 While his approach is understandable, 
this thesis argues that in order to truly dispel the state versus non-state debate, the 
motivations (the reasons why the two other groups continue with such debate), the 
theoretical orientation and the constitution of each faction of theorists must be addressed 
before suggesting a solution. Innovators can, at times, be too innovative, abandoning the 
valuable, albeit parochial, work of their theoretical predecessors. Over-innovation means 
that they can be accused of abandoning the field, rather than building on it.  
 Related to the above point, Innovators naturally shy away from the value of 
history to diplomacy. Although they flirt with history, it is hardly central to their work. 
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For example, Melissen states at the outset of Innovation that ‘this book examines some of 
the ways in which diplomatic practice since 1945 has adapted to fundamental changes in 
international relations’,147 later he also states that ‘the divide of 1989 as a watershed in 
international relations should not be neglected by students of diplomacy’.148 Diplomacy is 
a historical activity and greater understanding of its modern shape is conferred by an 
examination of the distant as well as recent past. The Innovators have jumped ahead of 
the game, arguing for a balanced relationship without understanding how each traditional 
or nascent diplomatic actor came into being; no attempt to promote each of these actor’s 
founding principles, respective ethos’, tools, objectives or methods is evident in IDT. 
 Fourthly, theorists who belong to the TDT and NDT categories are naturally 
critical of the symbiosis that Innovator’s believe exists between state and non-state 
diplomatic actors. Both TDT and NDT focus exclusively on the state and the non-state, 
respectively, and therefore are dismissive of Innovative theory, which gives equal 
weighting to all diplomatic actors.         
 Fifthly, Innovators, like the two other factions, are attempting to cement a 
singular definition, theory or form of diplomacy. In their work they portray diplomacy as 
one form, a composite of traditional and non-state diplomacy, rather than the separation 
or tripartiality that this thesis proposes. Hocking, for examples, argues for catalytic 
diplomacy (singular) rather than for catalytic diplomacies. Lee also writes of a singular 
form of commercial diplomacy, associated exclusively with the traditional diplomatic 
institution. This thesis argues that, alongside IDT, there are two other distinct theories of 
diplomacy, a clearly identifiable traditional form and a less concrete nascent form.  
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 Innovative diplomatic theory is the third and final category this thesis introduces. 
Alongside Traditional and Nascent diplomatic theory, Innovative diplomatic theory 
completes a broad spectrum of different theoretical views on modern diplomacy. If 
Traditional and Nascent diplomatic theories occupy different poles in the diplomatic 
studies field, then IDT inhabits the middle ground, privileging both the state and non-
state diplomatic actors and highlighting the symbiotic and productive relationship that 
these two types of actors share. Occupying three different theoretical positions, however, 
presents a problem: through disparity it may prove difficult to reconcile these divergent 
and opposed diplomatic theories as central to the strength of modern diplomacy studies. 
Reconciliation of these divergent theoretical views becomes the task of the following 
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Chapter Five – Reconciling divergence amongst TDT, NDT and IDT 
5.0 Introducing Reconciliation 
The aim of this chapter is twofold: firstly, to describe the existing relationship 
between the three groups of theories and theorists. The purpose of this appraisal is to 
determine if the relationship is antagonistic and competitive. If this is the case, a solution 
will be offered to mitigate isolation and competition between the three disparate theories. 
The ultimate aim of the chapter therefore (secondly) becomes the reconciliation of the 
three divergent diplomatic theories.  
Currently, the relationship between TDT, NDT and IDT is characterised by 
isolation between the groups, disagreement over the best theory (with which to interpret 
the modern diplomatic environment) and parsimony. This thesis contends that 
reconciliation of the three diplomatic theories is fundamental to better understanding the 
modern diplomatic environment. This argument is built on the rationale that no single 
diplomatic theory is able to account for the complexity of the modern diplomatic 
environment.  
In essence, our understanding of modern diplomacy will remain ‘impoverished if 
our thinking is confined to only one of them’, to TDT, NDT or IDT.1  This chapter 
identifies a novel methodology aimed at accommodating all three diplomatic theories 
within diplomacy studies. Central to this proposed methodology is the notion of learning 
from an academic discipline that has encountered and overcome the need to reconcile 
                                                 
1 Stephen M. Walt. (1998). One World, Many Theories. Foreign Policy, 110, p. 29. This is a citation from 
an IR theorist, speculating on the divergence that exists between disparate IR theories, such as Realism, 
Liberalism and Pluralism. However, this idea resonates with the three types of diplomatic theory this thesis 
has introduced.   
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divergent theories. In this instance, the discipline to be learned from is International 
Relations (IR).   
5.0.1 The current relationship between the three diplomatic theories 
Having three different theories should be valuable for diplomacy studies. 
Disagreement amongst alternate theories is normally a healthy sign for any theoretical 
field, but this is not the case with diplomatic theory. Hitherto, there is no consensus that 
all three diplomatic theories have validity. Instead, we are led to believe that there is only 
room for one dominant form of diplomatic theory: TDT, NDT or IDT. This situation is 
problematic as it encourages isolation and theoretical disintegration. This has certainly 
been the case with other academic disciplines with divergent theories, where ‘the 
objective is not to encourage theoretical integration but to ward off the standard 
criticisms each approach typically faces from proponents of competing approaches.’2 
Diplomacy studies is no different, the three diplomatic theories are currently competing 
for dominance within the discipline. This competition is natural for such a young 
theoretical field. Granted, TDT has had a long historical legacy of scholarship, but 
alternate diplomatic theories have only truly emerged since the end of the Cold War. 
The relationship between the three groups of theories can be described as 
antagonistic. The relationship is clouded by disciplinary disagreement over the optimal 
theory, with different groups of diplomatic theorists arguing that their theory is better 
grounded and more rigorous than other types of theory. The central problem with the 
disagreement over one diplomatic theory is that it leads to confusion over which 
theoretical interpretation is most applicable to the modern diplomatic environment. We 
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are asked to make a choice between the three theories: which one is most useful when 
interpreting modern diplomacy?  
This unfortunate situation has the propensity to ‘encourage scholars to emphasize 
their differences rather than their similarities and thus to go their separate ways in 
isolation’.3 Isolation and divergence of opinion has led to fragmented and partial 
diplomatic theories. Despite the fact that diplomatic theorists are all engaged in the 
enterprise of diplomatic theory, they ‘stand on the same island, albeit on different 
promontories’.4  Pre-ordained to defend the state or the non-state, or both: 
 
neither camp finds it easy to take the other seriously. They prefer to leave each other alone, for 
contacts usually take the form of the occasional shell lobbed across the cease-fire line.5 
 
 This isolation amongst the diplomatic theorists is expected; all three groups have 
contrasting opinions on the nature and shape of the modern diplomatic environment. 
Each offers a different lens with which to interpret the modern diplomatic environment. 
The central problem, however, is that we are asked to see modern diplomacy through 
only one lens, which makes the task of understanding modern diplomacy quite difficult. 
Modern diplomacy is complex, involves many actors and historical influences, and 
cannot be understood by adhering exclusively to TDT, NDT or IDT.  
 
                                                 
3 P. G. Lauren. (1976). Diplomats and Bureaucrats. California: Stanford, p. 4. 
4 Stephen H. Haber. (1997). Brothers under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations. 
International Security, 22 (1), p. 43. 
5 Sharp, For Diplomacy, p. 43. 
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5.0.2 Confirming the existence of fundamental theoretical disagreement 
The disagreement that exists between the three groups of theorists is best 
illustrated by revisiting the six themes prevalent in the modern diplomatic literature. 
When the three respective diplomatic theories on each of these themes are presented 
alongside one another, it becomes clear there are few points of convergence, and many 
points of divergence.  
Consider the debate over the future of the state and the traditional diplomatic 
institution. Where NDT is concerned, the obsolescence and irrelevance of the traditional 
diplomatic institution are central foundations of their work. There is little point in 
theorising on traditional diplomacy, they claim, because ‘diplomacy becomes redundant 
in a world in which the state suddenly disappears’.6  According to Nascent theorists, the 
archaic state system and the traditional diplomacy that lubricates it belong to a by-gone 
era. For Nascent theorists, conventional, statist and traditional diplomacy is today 
incoherent, irrelevant and obsolete.7 This is one reason why Nascent theorists focus on 
emerging, non-state diplomatic actors. 
In stark contrast, Traditionalists counter that the traditional diplomatic institution 
is anything but irrelevant. Traditionalists are convinced that the institution plays a 
fundamental, invaluable and central role in modern international relations. Traditionalists 
are unconvinced by obsolete, irrelevant and declining diplomacy arguments. They 
                                                 
6 Hoffman, Reconstructing Diplomacy, p. 535. 
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counter, simply, that if the traditional diplomatic institution is obsolete then why does it 
continue to exist?8  
According to Traditionalists, the traditional diplomatic institution has ridden out 
similar criticism before. It has consistently evolved since the 17th century, reacting 
positively to changes in the IR system.9 For Traditionalists, this consistent adaptability 
confirms that the traditional diplomatic system ‘remains at the core’ of the modern IR 
system.10 The 21st century is no different. For Traditionalists, to deny the diplomatic 
institution is to deny an actuality, the omnipotence of official diplomacy as the traditional 
and enduring conduit for inter-state relations.  
The third group of theorists, the Innovators, fall somewhere in between these two 
contrasting views. They first acknowledge that the ‘well rehearsed proposition’ on 
whether or not the traditional diplomatic institution is in decline depends on respective 
theoretical foundations.11 Traditionalists champion the traditional diplomatic institution, 
whereas Nascent theorists promote the role of nascent diplomatic actors. This 
fundamental difference means, according to Innovators, that ‘the debate about the decline 
of diplomacy turns on contending images of how the world works – or should work’.12 
Traditionalists are therefore concerned with the reality of diplomacy, whereas Nascent 
theorists have a future vision of how the IR system and diplomacy should work. In other 
                                                 
8 For examples of this approach, see Berridge, G. R. (2002). Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. London: 
Macmillian, pp. 116 – 128; Holsti, K J. (2004). Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in 
International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 198 – 210. 
9 Several diplomatic theorists propose and evidence the argument that the traditional diplomatic is 
evolutionary. See, Hocking, Brian. (1999). Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation. London: 
Macmillan; Hocking, Brian and Spence, David (eds.). (2002). Foreign Ministries in the European Union: 
Integrating Diplomats. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Robertson, Justin (ed.). (1998). Foreign 
Ministries in Developing Countries and Emerging Market Economies. Dalhousie Journal of International 
Affairs, 14; Rana, Kishan S. (2004). Foreign Ministries: Change and Reform. Paper presented at the 
International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18th. 
10 Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, p.112.  
11 Hocking, The end(s) of Diplomacy, p. 169. 
12 ibid. 
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words, TDT explains the reality of how the IR system is, whereas NDT postulates on 
how the IR system ought to be. None of these disparate views provide us with a 
conclusive answer on the (ir)relevance of the state and the traditional diplomatic 
institution. All theories are convincing, all approaches have their merits. 
The same pattern of disagreement exists over the impact of IGOs on modern 
diplomacy. Traditionalists argue that IGOs are constructed by states, for states. For 
Traditionalists, IGOs are only as great as the sum of their state parts. The IGO is a 
supplement to traditional diplomacy; after all ‘states use international institutions to 
further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly’.13 Traditionalists are 
therefore dismissive of the notion that IGOs are distinctive diplomatic actors; they warn 
that ‘it is misleading to think of international institutions as outside forces or exogenous 
actors, they are the self-conscious creation of states’.14  
 These views are in direct opposition to those espoused by Nascent theorists, who 
argue that IGOs are distinct diplomatic actors where ‘the whole may be greater than the 
sum of the parts’.15 Nascent theorists argue that the universal effectiveness of IGOs and 
multilateral diplomacy questions the need for the traditional diplomatic institution. For 
them, the IGO is more effective at global problem solving than the incumbent traditional 
diplomatic institution. For Nascent theorists, IGOs: 
 
have become more significant on the world stage than governments who are cast into a limbo of 
growing irrelevance. [Traditional] diplomacy is not only of decreasing relevance, it may be 
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dangerous in that it holds back the more benign non-state forces underpinning world society 
from generating a more peaceful environment.16  
 
 Nascent theorists suggest that the traditional organs of state interaction are 
villainous, blocking or frustrating change heralded by the more pacific IGO. This view is 
in contrast to Traditionalists, who portray IGOs as too complex, too complicated and 
simply anti-diplomatic.17  
If the IDT lens is adopted, we remain unclear on the role and relevancy of IGOs 
to modern diplomacy. For the Innovators, IGOs are neither built by states for states nor 
are they independent diplomatic actors. Innovators highlight that IGOs, ‘while remaining 
instruments of national policies, can also rise above the fray of politics and act as an 
indispensable mechanism for the collective legitimisation of new norms, standards and 
principles of universal application’.18 Innovators stress a symbiosis between traditional 
state actors and IGOs. The state/IGO relationship is thus a complementary one, and of 
benefit to both.  
Once more we are presented with three very different answers to the question ‘do 
IGOs really matter?’ In terms of the three diplomatic theories, the indecisiveness of the 
Innovators combined with the parochialism of the Traditionalists and the ‘different 
world’ scenario of the Nascent theorists means we are unable to conclusively determine if 
IGOs really do matter.19 In this instance, confusion reigns over the modern diplomatic 
worth of IGOs. 
                                                 
16 Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 362. 
17 Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, p. 159. 
18 Jacques Fomerand. (2000). The United Nations and Its Limits. Seton Hall Journal of International 
Relations. Summer/Fall, p. 57. 
19 Iriye, Global Community, p. 6. 
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Opinion on diplomacy by summit is equally confusing. For once though, 
Traditionalists and Nascent theorists are in agreement. Both groups of theorists concur 
that summitry is of questionable value to modern diplomacy and the IR system. However, 
this similar judgement is influenced by two very different theoretical journeys.   
For Traditionalists, summitry is ‘the target of biting criticism’ over its efficacy as 
a viable diplomatic tool.20 Comparing summitry to the ‘art’, ‘specialised vocation’ and 
subtle nuances inherent to traditional diplomacy supports this argument.21 For 
Traditionalists, statesmen make poor diplomats, as is evidenced by the repeated failure of 
meetings of the upper echelons of power.22 Within the TDT literature, there exist four 
common assumptions, which constitute the typical TDT case against statesmen-
diplomats. Firstly, statesmen are largely ignorant of the intricacies of policy.23 Secondly, 
they are vain, ignorant and egotistical.24 Thirdly, they are oversensitive to the whims of 
their fellow heads of state, whom they regard as members of the same ‘trade union’.25 
And finally, aware of the massive media presence, statesmen perform like minor 
celebrities, keen to exploit the global publicity machine to their political and personal 
advantage.26  All of these qualities, according to Traditionalists, are anti-diplomatic and 
many ‘disadvantages for diplomacy flow’ from the infringement of statesman on 
intricately fostered diplomatic relationships.27 In essence, Traditionalists conclude that 
the summit devalues diplomacy. They are more likely to remind us of the failings of 
summits rather than interpret them as a valuable supplement to traditional diplomacy.  
                                                 
20 Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, p. 169. 
21 Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 2. 
22 See chapter two, section 2.5.3: The questionable efficacy of summit diplomacy 
23 Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, p. 169. 
24 ibid. 
25 Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World, p. 27, 
26 Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, p. 170. 
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 Similarly, Nascent theorists share little affinity for the summit process, but 
advance different reasons. For Nascent theorists, the argument that summits are 
ineffective is employed as evidence of another nail in traditional diplomacy’s figurative 
coffin. That statesmen have to meet face-to-face, claim Nascent theorists, suggests a 
deficiency in the conventional channels of state-qua-state diplomacy. In addition, Nascent 
theorists suggest that summits are nothing more than dramatic theatre; summits are mere 
publicity stunts; summits portraying statesmen as close allies is a consequent façade; and 
summits are a waste of time and money, as they rarely produce any meaningful results.28  
 Innovators also appear confused as to how to interpret summit diplomacy. Their 
indecisiveness leaves the field in doubt concerning the continuing practice of summitry. 
Once more, they take a middle-ground stance on the value of summitry. For Innovators, 
the value of summitry remains undecided; ‘as always, one can see the summit cup as half 
full or half empty’.29 Innovators agree that ‘summits do work, but not with predictable 
efficiency’.30 
 Interpreting summitry through any of the three lenses does not provide an 
explanation of either the omnipotence or the occasional ineffectiveness of diplomacy by 
summit. The confusion that reigns over the relevance of summitry to modern diplomacy 
suggests the current theoretical frameworks for analysis are inadequate to fully 
explore/explain the function and purpose of diplomacy by summit. 
Similarly, the massive proliferation of NGOs since the end of the Cold War has 
apparently confounded the diplomatic studies field. This changing dynamic ‘has been 
                                                 
28 These themes are expanded upon in chapter three, section 3.5.3: Diplomacy as theatre, the NDT 
dismissal of summit diplomacy. 
29 Kaufmann, The Diplomacy of International Relations, p. 62. 
30 Group of Thirty, The Summit Process, p. 8. 
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viewed through a variety of lenses and is the subject of differing interpretations’.31 The 
result is ‘interpretive tensions’ between the three groups of theorists, who judge the 
impact, value and efficacy of NGOs to modern diplomacy quite differently.32  
For Traditionalists, the impact of NGOs upon the hallowed profession of 
traditional diplomacy is often described as secondary, peripheral or inconsequential.33 
Whatever their activities, NGOs ‘hardly relate to the world of diplomacy’.34 Some 
Traditionalists ‘choose to ignore the phenomenon: others continue to relegate NGOs – or 
indeed any challenger to state-centered assumptions – to the margins of the discussion’.35 
They are dismissive of ‘the challenge posed to inter-state diplomacy by the growth of 
nongovernmental organisations’36 and assume that NGOs have ‘virtually no independent 
impact on international relations and diplomacy.’37 
On the other hand, Nascent theorists counter strongly that NGOs are a far more 
significant diplomatic actor than Traditionalists would have us believe. The dismissive 
nature of TDT is perhaps responsible for the fierceness of the NDT rebuttal. In this 
respect, Nascent theorists claim that NGOs have ‘become more significant on the world 
stage than governments’.38 The ‘weakness of the state’ is responsible and ‘has stimulated 
a thriving voluntary sector’ represented diplomatically by NGOs.39  
                                                 
31 Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 361. 
32 ibid. 
33 For example, Berridge in Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (2002) only mentions NGOs three times, on 
pages 18, 147 and 164 respectively. 
34 Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 361. 
35 ibid. 
36 White, Diplomacy, p. 401.  
37 Peter Gubser. (2002). The Impact of NGOs on State and Non-State Relations in the Middle East. Middle 
East Policy, IX (1), p.142.  
38 Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 362. 
39 Alan Whaites. (1998). NGOs, civil society and the state: avoiding theoretical extremes in real world 
issues. Development in Practice, 8 (3), p. 344 . 
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For Nascent theorists, NGOs are benefiting at the expense of the state: they are 
now an effective and intrinsic part of the political landscape, and have become ‘active in 
political work once reserved for representatives of states’.40 ‘NGOs have created their 
own rules and regulations’ as a result of the state’s increasing irrelevancy in the twenty-
first century.41 Subsequently, ‘NGOs, increasingly alienated by a lack of government 
leadership’ are pursuing ‘their international obligations independently’, effectively and 
diplomatically.42 Nascent theorists argue that NGOs are flourishing on unconventional 
and unfamiliar ground for traditional state actors. In other words, NGOs are flourishing 
while the state is floundering. 
 Innovators do not favour the state over the NGO, or vice versa. Rather, they focus 
on the modern symbiotic relationship between traditional state actors and emerging 
NGOs. Seen through the IDT lens, NGOs and states are working closely together. For 
example, Hocking informs us that: 
 
NGOs need access to governments and other agencies, so governments increasingly need the 
information and expertise (and often the legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens) that NGOs are 
able to afford them. This is not to deny or down grade the role of the diplomat as a 
representative of government. It is most certainly not to suggest that the role of the diplomat 
and that of representative of an NGO or other actor is substitutable. Just the opposite: it is the 
peculiar qualities that define these roles.43 
                                                 
40 Gordenker and Weiss, NGOs, the UN & Global Governance, p. 17. 
41 Lobe, US Conservatives Take Aim at NGOs, p. 6. 
42 Burt and Robison, Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age, p. 32. 
43 Hocking, The end(s) of diplomacy, p. 172. 
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Hocking respects the distinction between traditionalism and modernity in 
diplomacy, while acknowledging the positive changing nature of the modern state/NGO 
relationship. Interpreted through the IDT lens, states and NGOs do ‘inhabit different 
environments’, but their relationship is positive, symbiotic and complementary.44 
Therefore, both states and NGOs have important but different roles to play in the modern 
IR system. Neither one is more important than the other. In sum, these three very 
different diplomatic theories on NGOs and modern diplomacy suggest further 
disagreement in the diplomatic studies field.  
The fifth theme, diplomacy and commerce, is no different. The relationship 
between commerce and diplomacy is a source of contention amongst the three types of 
theorists. With each group disagreeing with the other on the relevancy of commerce to 
diplomacy, we become perplexed as to the modern relationship, if it exists at all.  
Nascent theorists view the traditional diplomatic institution and firms as two 
separate and conflicting entities, which have created a rivalry between the state organ and 
mercantile firms. Nascent theorists argue that powerful MNCs frequently outstrip and 
outperform states in the creation of wealth.45 Consequently, the state is no longer as 
relevant in this globalised century as it has virtually surrendered the principle – wealth 
creation based on territory and secured by force – that granted it exclusivity and 
                                                 
44 Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 361. 
45 See, for example, Coolsaet, Rik. (1998). The Transformation of Diplomacy at the threshold of the new 
Millennium. Diplomatic Studies Program, Leicester University, No. 48, pp. 1 – 25; Coleman, Andrew and 
Maogoto, Jackson. (2003). After the Party, is there a Cure for the Hangover? The challenges of the Global 
Economy to Westphalian Sovereignty. Legal Issue of Economic Integration, 30 (1), pp. 35 – 60; Strange, 
Susan. (1992). States, firms and diplomacy. International Affairs, 68 (1), pp. 1 – 15; Beck, Ulrich. (1999). 
Beyond the Nation State. The New Statesman, pp 25 – 28; Wolf, Martin. (2001). Will the Nation-State 
survive Globalisation? Foreign Affairs, 80 (1), pp. 178 – 190; Mann, Michael. (1997). Has Globalization 
ended the rise and rise of the nation-state? Review of International Political Economy, 4 (3), pp. 472 – 496.  
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legitimacy as a sovereign actor.  Nascent theorists commonly cite three economic factors 
as responsible for this situation, which ‘spells the end of the nation-state’ and traditional 
diplomacy.46 They are: the impact of globalisation; the loss of state power to generate 
wealth through territory; and the evolving political and diplomatic nature of MNCs, 
superseding that of states in terms of efficacy.47 These three factors relate to the state’s 
inability to generate wealth, thus rendering the archaic institution, and its diplomacy, 
obsolete and irrelevant. The basis of their argument (that state and firm must be 
considered as separate) is an unusual one in that it has resonance with TDT. 
Several Traditionalists continue to make a similar distinction between the political 
and the commercial, associating diplomacy with the former and discounting the latter as 
inconsequential in their theory of diplomacy.48 These theorists view diplomacy as an 
activity concerned with high political matters, of which commerce bears little 
importance. Thus, the traditional approach ‘to diplomacy privileges political transactions 
and neglects economic transactions’.49 This portrayal of diplomacy suggests that 
commercial work is a departure from the more serious concerns of diplomacy: military, 
security or political negotiation, for example.  
Conversely, other Traditionalists see commerce as central to modern diplomacy, 
although these theorists are in the minority. For example, Rana observes that, since the 
1960s, ‘commercial work has generally been regarded as a top priority within a unified 
                                                 
46 Wolf, Will the Nation-State survive Globalisation?, p. 179. 
47 For an expansion on these points see chapter three, section 3.5.5: Diplomacy and commerce. 
48 See for instance R. P. Barston. (1998). Modern Diplomacy. London: Longman; G. R. Berridge. (2002). 
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diplomatic service’.50 Similarly, Berridge comments on the necessity of a solid 
relationship between commerce and diplomacy.51 He informs us that one purpose of the 
modern diplomatic institution is the ‘use of the resident mission’s resources to promote 
not only exports but also inward investment’.52 
For these Traditionalists, one of the central purposes of the modern diplomatic 
institution is to facilitate commerce between the host and home nation. However, this 
opinion is largely the exception rather than the rule. Within the majority of TDT, ‘there is 
no attempt to present commerce as a significant and integral part of diplomatic 
practice’.53 And even those theorists who acknowledge the relationship are hardly 
extensive in their comment.54 
Differing once more are the Innovators, who argue that modern diplomacy and 
commerce are inherent to one another. In a series of articles,55 two IDTs note that: 
 
countries diplomatic systems are being overhauled so that the commercial activities of 
diplomatic services have been centralised, the commercial activities of diplomats have been 
extended, and business interests have been formally integrated within diplomatic systems…new 
diplomatic practices based upon the ascendancy of business interest within diplomatic systems 
have begun to emerge.56  
                                                 
50 Rana, Inside Diplomacy, pp. 96 – 97. 
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52 ibid. 
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Business in UK Diplomatic Practice. Paper prepared for the Panel ‘Diplomacy & Business: Beyond the 
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For the Innovators, extensive commerce/diplomacy relationships exist within 
diplomatic systems as well as diplomatic institutions, which are commonly an 
amalgamation of international trade and foreign affairs departments. Innovators are keen 
to realign diplomatic theory to acknowledge the growing relationship between diplomacy 
and commerce, to remind us that ‘diplomatic practice is and always has been much more 
than the traditional interstate high politics that it has largely been portrayed 
as…commercial diplomacy has always been an integral part of diplomatic practices’.57  
This type of IDT rhetoric is valuable, yet the relative neglect of the commercial 
aspects of diplomacy within diplomacy studies is quite exceptional.  The recognition of 
commercial and diplomatic relationships is ‘uncommon in the canon of diplomacy 
studies, rendering them invisible in most accounts of the theory of diplomacy and 
practice’.58 The difference of opinions between the three theories on commerce and 
diplomacy are significant, a common occurrence with most of these forces and factors 
affecting the modern diplomatic environment. 
Where the information revolution is concerned, a similar amount of disagreement 
and confusion exists. Describing the modern relationship between information and 
diplomacy as a revolution, as a drastic change detrimentally affecting the state and its 
diplomacy, is a view that Nascent theorists are keen to stress. Nascent theorists such as 
Modelski (1973), Burt (1998) and Brown (2001) reinforce the notion of a competitive 
zero-sum game where state and non-state actors share different perceptions on the 
applicability of new methods of gathering, disseminating and utilising information. The 
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NDT literature relating to diplomacy and the information revolution suggests that states 
have lost control of information flows whereas nascent diplomatic actors have seized on 
the opportunities offered by the revolution to creep up the IR hierarchy.  
For Nascent theorists, the current information revolution confirms ‘the 
diminishing importance of the state and increasing importance of new social and political 
entities, such as NGOs’.59 Responsive non-state actors are clearly winning the 
information game, whereas traditional actors are confounded by their loss of control over 
information flows. 
In response, Traditionalists hardly mention the information revolution; it does not 
occupy much print space in the canon of diplomacy studies. Traditionalists, keen to stress 
the art, the importance of history or the classical nature of diplomacy, are reluctant to 
relate De Callieres or Satow to the triviality of the information revolution debate. 
Furthermore, Traditionalists argue that the traditional diplomatic institution has coped 
with and survived similar revolutions before, in each instance emerging stronger and 
more efficient.  
In the previous century, diplomacy witnessed several notable changes in 
information and communications capabilities.60 Traditionalists remind us that these 
developments complemented the role of the diplomat. In the past, diplomacy responded 
well to changes in information gathering, harnessing new technology, transportation and 
communication to its advantage. More effective modes and methods of communication 
combined with greater access to information were of great benefit to traditional 
                                                 
59 Jovan Kurbaliga. (1999). Modern Diplomacy. Valetta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy Studies, p. 
187. 
60 Some examples are ‘the widespread availability of convenient long-distance air travel, direct dial 
intercontinental voice telephone circuits and worldwide real-time media, among myriad technological 
developments’ (Cooper, J., www.usip.org). 
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diplomacy. Traditionalists argue that the current revolution will have a similar, beneficial 
affect on traditional diplomacy. 
The central function of the traditional diplomatic institution, appropriately 
‘gathering information on political, military and economic developments’, remains 
important and it is ‘difficult to see this function ever being adequately performed in any 
other way’.61 For Traditionalists, the term revolution should not be mistaken for 
evolution, which stresses state continuity and incremental change in information 
gathering and dispersal techniques, albeit slower than the lightning quick pace that the 
‘new world of cyber diplomacy’ promotes.62 
The final groups of theorists, Innovators, highlight that arguments suggesting the 
traditional diplomatic institution is suffering tend to overlook the central premise of the 
information and communication revolution: that more communication and information is 
better than less. Increased communication means that political entities, be they states, 
NGOs or IGOs, are more aware of one another’s ethos, skills and agenda. Common 
interests can be realised and exchanges of expertise therefore become widespread in the 
modern diplomatic environment.  
Innovators suggest that rather than inducing panic or conjuring images of the 
diplomatic institution in peril,63 a more moderate, balanced understanding of the 
revolution is required. Innovators acknowledge that ‘Traditionalists who insist diplomacy 
need not change are wrong. So, too, are those who insist that it must change completely. 
Finding the intersection which honors the past and respects the future is the challenge.’64 
                                                 
61 Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, p. 122. 
62 Burt and Robison, Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age, p. 3. 
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In other words, to understand modern diplomacy means diplomatic theory must be 
extracted from the ‘crisis effect’ the information (r)evolution is having/not having on the 
traditional diplomatic institution.       
 When the three different theories on factors and forces influencing the modern 
diplomatic environment are presented together, the split between the three theoretical 
camps becomes apparent. Each theory favours or dismisses factors and/or forces affecting 
the traditional diplomatic institution in the modern diplomatic environment. 
Consequently, each theoretical group remains in isolation and in competition over the 
‘right’ theoretical interpretation, which has the propensity to confound the field’s 
understanding the complex modern diplomatic environment. This ambivalence begs the 
question ‘why do the three groups of theorists feel it necessary to offer such different 
theoretical observations?’  
  Chapter five 
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5.0.3 The motivations driving the theoretical disagreement 
There are several reasons contributing to the disagreement between the three 
groups of theorists. Primarily, the source of theoretical disagreement can be traced to the 
difference in each group’s theoretical foundations. TDT, for example, focuses exclusively 
on traditional diplomacy; non-state diplomatic actors are of secondary importance and are 
often discounted. Conversely, NDT is distinctly anti-statist and advocates a theory on 
diplomacy that discounts the irrelevant traditional diplomatic institution. IDT stresses a 
symbiosis between state and non-state and is thus dismissive of the parochialism inherent 
to the first two theories. By competing over the respective actor(s) central to diplomatic 
theory the groups are destined to disagree.  
Thus, isolation amongst these groups is not surprising. It is particularly evident in 
TDT and NDT, where both groups champion two very different actors as central to their 
theories. Both claim that the state and the non-state do not collaborate in the practical 
realm, so why propose collaboration in the theoretical realm. State and non-state 
diplomatic actors are portrayed by Traditionalists and Nascent theorists as: 
 
inhabiting different environments, working to different rulebooks and occupying very different 
positions on the scale of importance in world politics. They exist, therefore, in two solitudes 
with little or no interaction between their worlds.65 
 
Furthermore, Traditionalists and Nascent theorists argue that there is only room in 
the international relations environment for one dominant form of diplomacy: statist or 
alternate (non-state). Thus, the portrayal of the traditional diplomatic institution 
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competing with nascent diplomatic actors over the exclusive right to manage the 
international relations system is well endorsed. This notion leads to the assumption that 
the relationship between state and non-state diplomacy is seen (by theorists) as 
competitive where one diplomatic form can only succeed at the expense of the other.  
This state versus non-state rhetoric suggests a deficiency in diplomatic theory. All 
three groups of theorists tend to avoid diplomatic theory. Traditionalists, due to their 
supremacy, appear to practice a form of theoretical aristocracy, mentioning diplomatic 
theory in passing. They are dismissive of any challenge to their dominance and continue 
to theorise on the practice of traditional diplomacy, rather than ‘theory on the theory’.66 
Nascent theorists, in response, become aggressive and at times emotive. They appear to 
practice a form of extremity of argument, discounting sentimental affiliation for the 
traditional diplomatic institution and ignoring TDT. And Innovators appear to be engaged 
in creating a symbiotic form of diplomatic theory, untainted by statist or non-statist 
theoretical precursors but certainly not sufficiently developed to sustain life alone. 
Few of the works reviewed for this thesis tackled diplomatic theory effectively; 
many of the works rarely mentioned diplomatic theory.67 The ambivalence towards 
diplomatic theory is strange, leading one to wonder why the field is devoid of critical 
analysis on diplomatic theory? It is possible that either we assume that TDT is diplomatic 
theory and De Callieres will continue ‘to tell us all we need to know’ or, as this thesis 
suggests, that diplomatic theory is a topic in need of frank appraisal and deeper 
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exploration. Perhaps, the three groups of theorists avoid diplomatic theory because it 
‘doesn’t, at first glance, exist’.68  
Diplomatic theory, as chapter two, three and four demonstrated, does exist. 
Hitherto, the three alternate theories on modern diplomacy had not been identified and 
firmly categorised. Therefore, many of these problems relating to diplomatic theory had 
remained unexplored as we assumed there to be one big block of theory on diplomacy. 
Now that the three diplomatic theories have been identified, these problems and their 
impact on diplomatic theory are more visible. Should these problems endure, several 
consequences for the diplomatic studies field will emerge.  
 
5.0.4 Consequences of theoretical disagreement for diplomatic theory  
 Should the disagreement, isolation and competition continue amongst the three 
groups of theorists then several consequences will also endure. Chief among these 
consequences is the notion that a sound understanding of the modern diplomatic 
environment will remain elusive. If theorists continue to compete over one dominant and 
all-encompassing theory on diplomacy then it is unlikely that we will understand the 
complexity of modern diplomacy where state and non-state actors are clearly engaged in 
diplomacy. No single diplomatic theory capably accounts for the complexity of the 
modern diplomatic environment. In other words, our understanding of modern diplomacy 
will remain insolvent if our thinking is confined to TDT, NDT or IDT.  
Currently, diplomatic theory can be likened to IR theory, which resembles ‘a 
disassesembled jigsaw puzzle scattered on a table before us’ where ‘each piece shows a 
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fragment of a broad picture’.69 Presently, the pieces (TDT, NDT and IDT) remain in 
isolation, which obscures a complete picture of modern diplomacy. If the pieces remain 
scattered then so too will theory on diplomacy. Furthermore, some of the pieces are more 
prominent than others, which creates further problems including preferencing. 
For example, TDT is the most prevalent ‘piece’ of the diplomatic studies jigsaw. 
Its dominance results in an imbalanced form of diplomatic theory. TDT is applicable to 
only the state part of the modern diplomatic environment. Until balance between the state 
and the non-state is introduced to diplomatic theory, TDT will continue to tell us only 
part of the rich and varied modern diplomatic story; it will only reveal part of the 
metaphorical jigsaw puzzle.  
A body of theory that accounts for both the state and the non-state as central to 
modern diplomacy is absent from the canon of diplomacy studies. Although Innovators 
forward symbiosis theories, their particular theory has only recently emerged, and will 
take some time to develop robustness. So far, IDT has failed to alter the conventional 
assumption that diplomacy is only practiced by official state-representatives. The work of 
Innovators, alongside that of Nascent theorists, remains peripheral to diplomacy studies, 
which are still largely concerned with what Marshall refers to as ‘the political 
foreground’.70  
Both IDT and NDT struggle to maintain a foothold in a field dominated by TDT. 
This is problematic; knowledge on nascent diplomatic actors is scarce in diplomacy 
studies. The diplomatic studies field has yet to explicitly conceptualise the type of new 
diplomacy practiced by unconventional actors, if it exists at all. The impact of significant 
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IGOs, NGOs or MNCs on the diplomatic system cannot be ignored for much longer. In 
the modern era, one may ‘wonder what sense it makes to exclude or leave aside the 
public diplomacy of NGOs, the discreet diplomatic maneuvering of international firms, 
or even the efforts of private diplomats, when such actors are recognised by states?’71 In 
response, it makes little sense to exclude non-state actors in diplomatic theory. The 
diplomacy of nascent, alternative actors remains a vastly under researched area, one that 
is in need of attention if the complexity of modern diplomacy is to be understood.  
 TDT dominance means that the diplomatic studies field ‘is perpetually under 
suspicion by other academics’.72 The ‘troubled state of diplomatic studies’ is a 
consequence of the TDT domination and their desire to regard diplomacy and diplomatic 
theory in singular, partial and statist terms.73 Several theorists agree.74 Strange is one who 
attributes the imbalanced shape of the diplomatic studies field to the ‘intellectual 
apartheid’ that the Traditionalists practice, and warns that ‘the study must move with the 
times, or be marginalized’.75  
 Cohen also observes that diplomacy studies ‘have generated a disappointing 
response from scholars in international relations’.76 He suggested that one solution to this 
problem is to ‘open up the area to include, inter alia, the involvement of non-state 
                                                 
71 Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, p. xvii. 
72 Sharp, For Diplomacy, p. 43. 
73 Sharp, Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats, p. 1. 
74The ‘unrealistic narrative’ of contemporary diplomacy led Craig to complain that diplomacy, as a field of 
theoretical study, has ‘failed to engage the attention of the International Relations profession’ (1983: 2). 
Puchala also wrote of his ‘frustration with the intellectual sterility of many present-day renderings’ 
concerning diplomacy (1995: 2) and Sharp complained that ‘the study of diplomacy remains marginal to 
and almost disconnected from the rest of the field’ (1999: 34).  For a discussion on reinvigorating 
diplomacy studies see Sharp, Paul. (1999). For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International 
Relations. International Studies Review, 1 (1), pp. 33 – 37. Within Sharp ‘makes an argument for why more 
international relations scholars should be studying diplomacy’ (1999: 33). 
75 Strange, States, firms and diplomacy, p. 11. 
76 Cohen, Putting Diplomatic Studies on the Map, p. 1. 
  Chapter five 
 234
actors’.77 Although the Innovators have begun this process, it is important to consolidate 
this more inclusive and diffuse approach, as it is more reflective (than TDT or NDT) of 
modern diplomacy. A focus on both the state and the non-state may mitigate the 
dominance of the Traditionalists, and create a more balanced form of diplomatic theory. 
This direction would be positive for diplomatic theory: a continued focus on traditional 
diplomacy but alongside nascent diplomacy, practiced by non-state actors.  
 However, avoiding further marginalisation and ‘moving with the times’ would 
mean abandoning certain fixed assumptions. The first assumption to go would be the 
state versus non-state debate. For diplomacy studies, this incumbent state versus nascent 
challenger notion is particularly unproductive, and in ‘either/or78 terms has caused us to 
labor needlessly’.79 By continuing the binary either/or argument diplomatic theory will 
remain mired in misperception, confusion and misunderstanding of the relationship 
between ‘old’ Westphalian, traditional forms of diplomacy and unconventional, 
alternative and ‘new’ forms of diplomacy that have emerged since the end of the Cold 
War.80  
 This either/or debate has now become an unnecessarily ‘long standing theme’ in 
diplomacy studies, and has ‘generated a largely sterile discussion rooted in two 
competing perspectives on and diplomacy’; the state versus non-state.81 This awkward, 
antagonistic relationship between state and non-state does not dominate in the practical 
world, so why persist with the debate in the theoretical realm? Diplomats, conventional 
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and unconventional, value state/non-state linkages, indeed practical opinion suggest that 
they are part of the rich tapestry of the modern IR system.82 The reluctance or inability to 
abandon this debate is one consequence of the disagreement inherent to each group of 
theorists.  
This obsession with a sterile debate (one that is unlikely to be resolved) has meant 
that diplomatic theory is becoming increasingly removed from diplomatic practice. By 
avoiding the growing state/non-state linkages, theory on diplomacy is becoming more 
distant from the reality of diplomacy. Within diplomacy studies, the gap between theory 
and practice is widening. Gyngell and Wesley frame this divide eloquently and 
accurately: 
 
the gap between academics and practitioners is large. They speak different languages. 
Empirical to their bootstraps, practitioners tend to regard theory as an artificial template 
imposed on an uncertain world. For their part, theorists consider practitioners dangerously 
limited by their failure to understand, or to have regard for the broader patterns shaping 
international events.83  
 
Most practitioners would agree with the division Gyngell and Wesley discuss. 
Interviews with several diplomats have revealed doubts of the value of diplomatic theory 
to practical diplomacy. For example, Ambassador Laverdure of Canada’s DFAIT took a 
healthy swipe at diplomatic theorists:  
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I get into so many arguments with Canadian Professors, and I keep threatening them that one 
day I’ll take the stage and exact my revenge. In international affairs we need academics, 
professors and PhDs, but can’t we get closer to one another? Because they [academics] write 
big books stating how the world should be run, it doesn’t mean they understand the practice.84   
Similarly, Ian Kemish of Australia’s DFAT alluded to the growing distance of 
diplomatic theory from practice: 
we [DFAT] consider theory part of the foreign policy process, it is invaluable and important 
that we engage with the academic community but on a productive basis, not this one of distance 
that seems to endure at the moment….if theoreticians really want to accurately understand 
diplomacy then I suggest they step into my shoes for a few days.85  
This cynicism from practitioners was evident during several interviews; the value 
of academia to diplomacy was not as clear. However, when asked if she respected 
academic opinion on diplomacy, Lydia Morton, also from DFAT, replied:  
 
absolutely, it’s another opinion that we must consider and in many cases employ. Academics 
are an interest group and we must represent that opinion, otherwise we’re not doing our jobs.86 
 
Morton’s answer however was the exception, rather than the rule. Most diplomats 
are, naturally, very diplomatic in their answers. The majority were subtly disdainful of 
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diplomatic theory, or had little idea even what diplomatic theory was. Ambassador Les 
Luck noted that ‘in reality diplomacy is very different from theory’, so what does that tell 
us about diplomatic theory?87 The theoretical reality of diplomatic studies is that theory, 
consumed by competitive either/or debates, is somewhat distant to ‘real’ diplomacy:  
 
not only do we know this intuitively, diplomats tell us that this is so. This [theoretical] 
blindness produces nothing more than a partial disclosure of what constitutes diplomatic 
practice.88 
 
It is unfair to level all the blame for the widening gap on the theoreticians. Several 
of the diplomats interviewed took unnecessary swipes at the academics, Ambassador 
Laverdure claimed: ‘I enjoy teasing professors, because I know that they’re probably the 
guys that failed the exam for the foreign services…How does the expression go? “if you 
can’t do, teach”’.89 While such comment is hardly conducive to lessening the gap, it 
illustrates how divorced diplomatic theory has become from practice. Bridging the gap is 
no easy task. Both sides – academic and practitioner – ‘express alarm at the inability of 
the other to step out of a limited perspective’.90 For the practitioners of diplomacy, the 
term ‘academic has a pejorative ring, and is used to mean irrelevant’.91 However, the 
simple acceptance that there should be a division between theory and practice is an 
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example of accepting a fixed assumption where diplomacy is concerned.   
 To banish the gap altogether would be impossible, but we can lessen it by 
distancing diplomacy studies from narrow, competitive and partial theories on diplomacy 
and by engaging with state and non-state diplomats. This author believes that to solidify 
and strengthen diplomatic theory the diplomatic community can be engaged. 92 The onus 
to reorient theory to practice is the responsibility of the diplomatic theorists. The 
practitioner need not worry on whether or not the gap is widening: he will continue to be 
a diplomat. The academics, however, should worry. Diplomatic theory, more than other 
IR subjects, is heavily reliant on a practical, clearly defined and visible profession. It is 
therefore important that theory should be closely related to practice. 
The widening gap between theory and practice is but one consequence of the 
disagreement between different types of theorists. The three groups of theorists are so 
busy defending their respective theories that the problems described here are becoming 
unavoidable: the marginalisation of diplomacy studies; the isolation and competition 
leading to more disagreement between theorists; and the ongoing frailty of diplomatic 
theory.   
 Ultimately, a sound understanding of modern diplomacy will remain elusive if the 
notion of a one-piece jigsaw persists. The notion of one piece or one ‘lens’ through which 
to postulate on modern diplomacy is insufficient if modern diplomacy is to be truly 
understood. The reason this ‘theoretical myopia’ persists is related to the disagreement 
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and competition amongst the three groups of theorists, which encourages isolation.93 
Subsequently, if the three theories are not reconciled the above problems are likely to 
worsen. The isolation within diplomacy studies and from other IR disciplines is likely to 
increase. Reconciliation (finding room for all three theories) banishes these inherent 
problems, which allows a better understanding of the complex tapestry of modern 
diplomacy.  
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5.1 Redirection of the relationship between the three diplomatic theories  
The first half of this chapter identified several problems with the current 
relationship between the three groups of theorists and theories; the second half proposes a 
solution to those problems. The first step to understanding modern diplomacy, this thesis 
proposes, was the recognition, categorisation and construction of the three different types 
of diplomatic theory, acknowledging the pieces of the ‘disassesembled jigsaw puzzle’.94 
Now that the pieces have been identified, we can begin the next step, asking how do these 
pieces fit together and what picture do they exhibit when they are appropriately fitted?  
Fitting the ‘pieces’ together has not been attempted with the three diplomatic 
theories in mind, for the simple reason that previously they had not been identified, 
constructed and distinguished. Now, a suitable method of fitting the ‘pieces’ together is 
proposed in the remainder of this chapter advanced. This section proposes that all three 
diplomatic theories have validity in relation to understanding the complexity of the 
modern diplomatic environment. The aim here is to grant the three diplomatic theories 
equal weighting within diplomacy studies.  
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5.1.1 Learning from IR theory: Making room for the three diplomatic theories 
An appropriate method for reconciling the three diplomatic theories is to learn 
from another academic discipline that has encountered and overcome similar problems. 
In order to be useful this discipline has to meet certain criteria: firstly, the presence of 
three or more divergent theories; secondly, a consensus amongst its academics of the 
necessity of alternate theories as important and central to modern scholarship; and, 
thirdly, the discipline had to consider the accommodation of divergent theories and 
theorists as paramount to modern understandings of its subject. Meeting all three criteria 
is the International Relations discipline.  
In International Relations, there are many different types of theories95 that explain 
world politics, however among the most widely accepted theories are Realism, 
Liberalism and Constructivism. All three theories are vastly different. Their foundational 
differences and central tenets can be seen in the table below.96 
Table 1. Comparative IR theories 
Feature Realism Liberalism Constructivism 
Philosophical Outlook Pessimistic Optimistic Neither optimistic or 
pessimistic 
Human Nature Competitive Cooperative Believes in the potential 
for humanity to engineer 
changes that either 
improve or harm future 
global conditions 




Core Concern Increase military power, 





shared meanings and 
images of contemporary 
international life; the 
theoretical implications 
of these visions 
                                                 
95 For works discussing all IR theories see, Cynthia Weber. (2001). International Relations Theory: a 
Critical Introduction. London: Routledge; J. Friedrichs. (2004) European Approaches to International 
Relations Theory. New York: Routledge; Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater. (2005). Theories of 
International Relations. London: Palgrave.  
96 This table is primarily from Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, p. 136. For the purpose of lucidity, this 
author has revised and condensed the original table.  
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Structure of global 
system 




Ideas; identities; ideals; 
images – all as socially 
constructed by various 
groups 
Approach to Peace Balance of Power Collective security Tracing assumptions 
within various theoretical 
traditions 
Future vision Continuity: great-power 
competition for power 
Change: cooperation as 
democratic regimes, 
open markets, and 
international institutions 
spread 
Advocacy of normative 
innovation through 
construction of new 
images 
 
This table highlights that there are several foundational differences between each 
International Relations theory. Each theory contains ‘a set of mutually exclusive 
assumptions’.97 This exclusivity could suggest that all three theories are ‘competing for 
dominance’ within the International Relations discipline.98 This is not the case, since the 
‘three perspectives complement each other’.99 By fitting the ‘pieces’ of Realism, 
Liberalism and Constructivism together a complete theoretical picture of the modern IR 
system emerges. This tripartite form of theorising is invaluable in relation to accurately 
understanding the modern IR system.  
One theory is unable to account for the complexity of the modern IR system. The 
IR system ‘has become so complex and differentiated today that single or universal 
answers on how to approach a problem are becoming increasingly unsatisfactory’.100 
There are simply too many actors – state and non-state – for one theory to fit all. The 
presence of different International Relations theories is therefore useful in that they 
‘provide a map, or frame of reference, that makes the complex, puzzling world around us 
                                                 
97 John Bayliss and Steve Smith. (2005). The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 291. 
98 Hastedt and Knickrehm, International Politics in a Changing World, p.28.  
99 Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse. (2006). International Relations. London: Pearson Longman, 
p. 4. 
100 Hastedt and Knickrehm, International Politics in a Changing World, p.29. 
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intelligible’.101 As a result ‘IR scholars do not agree on a single theory to explain IR…no 
single theoretical framework has the support of all IR scholars’.102 Instead they ‘benefit 
from the existence of several theories of world politics from which they can draw 
guidance’.103 
Each of the International Relations theories is fundamentally distinctive; ‘each is 
a lens through which the world looks different and different things seem important’.104 
The presence of these three theories offers the International Relations scholar a choice, 
where he can choose a particular ‘theory to heed’ dependent on the shape of the IR 
system.105 IR scholars draw guidance from particular theories that resonate with certain 
occurrences in the IR system. For example, during the inter war period of 1919-39 
Liberalism was the dominant paradigm, whereas during periods of international tension 
(such as the Cold War) Realism returned to the fore. These theoretical swings were 
followed by the introduction of Constructivist theories, alongside Liberalism and 
Realism. Furthermore, IR theorists do not co-exist in an amicable fashion; however they 
do respect the necessity of one another’s presence. International Relations scholars agree 
that ‘they need more than one catholic theory’ in order to understand the modern IR 
system.106 
The theoretical conundrum a tripartite theoretical approach resolved in 
International Relations has resonance with the field of diplomatic theory. Diplomatic 
theory would equally benefit by practicing a similar form of theoretical tripartiality. 
                                                 
101 Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond. (2005). The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World 
Politics. California: Thomson Wadsworth, p. 24. 
102 Goldstein and Pevehouse, International Relations, p. 4. 
103 Kegley and Raymond, The Global Future, p. 24. 
104 Goldstein and Pevehouse, International Relations, p. 4. 
105 Kegley and Raymond, The Global Future, p. 24. 
106 Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, p. 12. 
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Should diplomacy studies accept that in order to comprehensively understand the modern 
diplomatic environment it is necessary to have several distinct yet complementary types 
of diplomatic theory, then a broad base of theory could be constructed. This direction is 
not only important in terms of understanding the modern diplomatic environment but also 
in terms of reconciling divergent theories. Traditionalists are unlikely to become less 
statist, just as it is improbable that Nascent theorists will become more statist in their 
theoretical orientation. If we insist diplomatic theory must be singular then of course 
Traditionalists, Nascent theorists and Innovators will continue to compete over the right-
to-theory. If, however, we respect the need for tripartite diplomatic theory then there is no 
singular form over which to compete.  
Instead of disagreement, competition and isolation between the three diplomatic 
theories, it would be beneficial for diplomacy studies if these diffuse theories on 
diplomacy could be accommodated. With diplomacy now being practiced by state and 
non-state actors, perhaps diplomacy studies, like IR, needs more than one lens in order to 
effectively navigate the terrain of modern diplomacy.  
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5.1.2 Reconciling the three diplomatic theories through an interdisciplinary 
confluence with IR theory 
 
 It is now necessary and possible to identify the valuable relationship to be teased 
out between IR and diplomatic studies. 107 This final section offers a method for 
reconciliation:  an interdisciplinary confluence between diplomatic theory and IR 
theory.108 To reconcile the three diplomatic theories is to relate TDT, NDT and IDT to 
Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism (respectively) and to draw parallels and 
differences between the theories in the two fields. If points of theoretical convergence can 
be established between the two fields, this thesis can then propose that just as IR theory 
needs Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism to understand the modern IR system, then 
so too does diplomatic theory need TDT, NDT and IDT in order to understand the 
modern diplomatic environment.  
 Establishing similarities also consolidates, strengthens and further enriches the 
three diplomatic theories. Borrowing from the three IR theories adds layers to each 
diplomatic theory, which is especially important for NDT and IDT, two of the newer 
diplomatic theories. Bridges linking these research agendas are helpful if we are to 
strengthen and enhance the overall body of diplomatic theory. The challenge is to 
strengthen the bridges and provide for more interaction and collaboration between 
diplomatic theory and IR theory.  
 
                                                 
107 For an example of an interdisciplinary approach between IR and diplomacy studies see, Lee, D. and 
Hudson, D. (2004). The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy. Review of 
International Studies, 30, 343 – 360. They two authors link diplomacy studies with the Internal Political 
Economy (IPE) approach in order to enrich their analysis of the relationship between diplomacy and 
commerce.  
108 For another example of interdisciplinarity, this time between IR and diplomatic history, see, Elman, 
Colin & Elman, Miriam F. (1997). Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory. International 
Security, 22 (1), pp. 5 – 21; Haber, Stephen H. (1997). Brothers under the Skin: Diplomatic History and 
International Relations. International Security, 22 (1), pp. 34 - 43. 
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5.1.3 TDT and Realism  
Realism and TDT share certain similarities and can be clearly distinguished by the 
primary actor on which each focuses: the former on the state, the latter on the traditional 
diplomatic institution. TDT is not Realism, however, just as Realism endures at the center 
of IR, so too does TDT hold centre stage in diplomacy studies. 
 Realism and TDT share certain similarities. The observation that the traditional 
diplomatic institution is a servant of the Realist state enforces this conclusion. After all, 
the emergence of diplomacy in its institutionalised form coincides with the emergence of 
the nation state. In the 17th century, the diplomatic institution and the Westphalian state 
system evolved as mutually reinforcing concepts. The Traditionalist belief in diplomacy 
as an institution of the state has similarities with the Realist belief in the state as the 
unitary actor in IR. 
This actor belief is the first similarity between TDT and Realism. For Realists, the 
state is the main actor in IR. The state is sovereign: it has supreme power over its 
domestic territory and populace, a condition guaranteed by the legitimate use of force 
within that territory.109 Similarly, Traditionalists endorse, advocate and relate the 
historical omnipotence of the traditional diplomatic institution to diplomatic theory. They 
contend that the diplomatic institution remains the most important diplomatic actor in the 
modern diplomatic environment. After all, TDT explains ‘diplomacy by reference to the 
business of a multiplicity of states, and [the theorists] who are persuaded of its 
indispensable usefulness – amounting to necessity – to the diplomatic-system’.110  
                                                 
109 For an interesting discussion on the historical origins of this state principle see, Diamond, J. (1999) 
Guns, Germs and Steel. New York:  W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 265 – 291. 
110 Berridge, Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, p. 3. 
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A second similarity between TDT and Realism concerns the reliance of both 
theories on history. History forms the bedrock of Realism. Using history as a guide, 
Realists stress continuity, stability, and familiarity, based on tried and tested methods of 
state interaction. Realists argue that ‘the same basic patterns that have shaped 
international politics in the past remain just as relevant today’.111 Thus, Realists endorse a 
‘conservative world view’, which ‘generally values the maintenance of the status quo and 
discounts the element of change in IR’.112 Similarly, the ‘propensity to treat the future as 
an extension of the past’ is a central feature of TDT. TDT focuses on ‘explaining not 
change, but rather enduring regularities’ in diplomacy.113 In other words, TDT, like 
Realism, is concerned with promoting continuity and tradition in diplomacy, and a 
gradual diplomatic evolution of its techniques over drastic revolution.  
Thirdly, Liberal views which stress the increasing importance of non-state actors 
in IR and diplomacy, are treated with disdain by both groups of theorists. Realists 
complain that theories promoting non-state actors are unreflective of the omnipotence of 
the state. Realists believe that non-state actors ‘cannot stop states from behaving 
according to balance-of-power logic’.114 Thus, the impact of non-state actors, and those 
Liberal theories championing their role in the modern IR system, are peripheral to IR 
theory. For Realists, academics that endorse Liberal and non-state approaches to IR are 
‘blind to the requirements of power politics’.115 They promote a sense of ‘feckless 
                                                 
111 Bayliss and Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, p. 161. 
112 Goldstein and Pevehouse, International Relations, p.4. 
113 Kahler, Inventing International Relations, p. 42. 
114 John J. Mearsheimer. (1994/95) The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security, 
19 (3), p. 7. 
115 Kahler, Inventing International Relations, p. 21. 
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utopianism’ that had ‘cast a shadow of academic disrepute over the field’ through their 
‘excesses of sentimentalism’.116 
 Similarly, Traditionalists are sceptical of alternate theories that discount the role 
of the traditional diplomatic institution in the modern diplomatic environment. For 
Traditionalists, official diplomacy does not seem to suffer from real decline despite the 
appearance on the international scene of new actors and new working methods. The role 
of non-traditional actors in the modern diplomatic environment is therefore of secondary 
importance to traditional diplomacy. Theorists endorsing an anti-statist view are engaged 
in ‘the foolish searching for something beyond current international realities’.117 Their 
theories have ‘proved sterile…and have been shattered time and time again by actual 
political developments’.118 
 While the two theories share similarities they also have their differences. Perhaps 
the most obvious difference is that Realism focuses on a state’s foreign policy objectives, 
whereas Traditionalism focuses on diplomacy, or on the methods used to achieve a state’s 
foreign policy objectives. Realists focus on the ends of foreign policy, while 
Traditionalists concentrate on the means employed to realise foreign policy objectives.  
A second point of divergence between both Realism and TDT is their 
interpretation of the relationship between war, anarchy, power and diplomacy. For 
example, Realists argue that between states anarchy persists. Consequently, they ‘tend to 
see war as the natural order of things, a necessary evil for which one should always be 
                                                 
116 Grayson Kirk. (1947). The Study of International Relations. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 
p.p. 4 – 5. 
117 David Long. (1991). J.A Hobson and idealism in international relations. Review of International Studies, 
17, p. 286. 
118 John H. Herz. (1951). Political Realism and Political Idealism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 
36. 
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prepared’.119 For Realists, war is not actively sought; it is an unfortunate occurrence of 
the anarchical nature of the state system. International state posturing is thus a perpetual 
bargaining game, which ultimately concerns the power a state is able to exert over 
another. Central to Realism is the notion of power: the factors that enable one state to 
manipulate another’s behaviour against its preferences.120 Power contests thus create 
anarchy, which in turn can lead to war. Realists do not grant much currency to diplomacy 
when it is related to the omnipotent specters of war, power and anarchy.  
 Traditionalists, on the other hand, promote diplomacy as the antithesis to anarchy, 
war and power. For Traditionalists, the purpose of diplomacy is to allay the anarchical 
nature of the IR system and facilitate peaceful relationships amongst sovereign states. 
Traditionalists see diplomacy as a continuous and valuable activity aimed at mitigating 
the uncertainty and turbulence of the system through familiar, historical channels of state 
diplomacy. 
 Batora’s Traditionalist opinion on diplomacy illustrates the purpose of the 
traditional diplomatic institution operating within the anarchical IR system:  
 
Diplomacy is something they [states] have in common that enables them to communicate in a 
predictable and organised manner. Diplomats are the primary guardians and promoters of 
national interests of the states they represent but are at the same time members of a 
transnational group of professionals with a shared corporate culture, professional language, 
behavioural codes, entry procedures, socialisation patterns, norms and standards.121   
 
                                                 
119 Goldstein and Pevehouse, International Relations, p. 5. 
120 Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, p. 37. 
121 Batora, Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?, p. 1. 
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Traditionalists agree that the purpose of diplomacy is to avoid or mitigate 
confrontation, to lessen the unpredictability and disorganisation inherent to an anarchical 
IR system composed of individualistic states. Through common diplomatic 
understanding, the turbulence, anarchy and unpredictability of the international relations 
system is lessened by the acceptance of a common set of rules, standards and norms 
governing state behaviour. Where Realists see war as a consequence of the anarchic IR 
system, Traditionalists would argue that war breaks out as a failure of the traditional 
diplomatic system; ‘diplomacy fails because no one [including leaders motivated by 
realists concerns] wants it to succeed’.122  
Traditionalists clearly place much more value on diplomacy then Realists. They 
portray it as an unsung activity preserving the fragile stability of the IR system. In the 
words of one diplomatic theorist, ‘no one cares that diplomacy works, so long as it 
works.’123 One could replace the ‘no one cares’ with ‘Realists do not care’ in this quote. 
What concerns Realists are breakdowns in the diplomatic system, why they occur, what 
results from them and if a pattern – in relation to past breakdowns - can be discerned. 
Traditionalists, on the other hand, consistently theorise on the continuities of diplomacy 
and how the modern diplomatic system works, not breaks down.  
 These points of theoretical divergence and convergence between TDT and 
Realism are compelling. They suggest that realism and Traditionalism can be 
distinguished, but share certain similarities. In the context of this thesis these similarities 
suggest that just as Realism is central to IR so to must TDT remain central to diplomatic 
theory/diplomatic studies.  
                                                 
122 Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, p. 8. 
123 Paul Sharp, Correspondence, July 15th, 2005.  
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5.1.4 NDT and Liberalism 
 Perhaps the most obvious similarity between NDT and Liberalism is the 
uncomplimentary opinion both theories have of the incumbent state. For Liberalists, the 
state is an ‘evil institution that encourages people to act selfishly and to harm others’.124 
Similarly, in the NDT literature the state is depicted as a ‘villain, an intrusive monolith 
with a propensity to lose sight of the real common good in pursuit of its own bureaucratic 
and diplomatic agenda’.125   
Both groups of theorists see the state and the state system as a hindrance to 
international harmony. Nascent theorists view the state as blocking change to a more 
peaceful IR system. Nascent theorists are ‘those who regard the state as an obstacle to 
world order’; for them ‘the development of an alternative diplomacy’ which ‘offers the 
prospect of an international order transcending the state system’ is paramount to 
international stability.126 Similarly, Liberalists see the state and the state system as a 
hindrance. They believe ‘the condition of anarchy, the uncertainty and insecurity 
involved with it, poses an obstacle to progress in international affairs’.127 For Liberalists, 
the state is a significant obstacle to achieving a harmonious IR system, so much ‘that we 
have made of national sovereignty a god; and of nationalism a religion, so that even when 
the most solid advantages for international cooperation are offered they are rejected 
impulsively’.128  
                                                 
124 Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, p. 34. 
125 Whaites, NGOs, civil society and the state, p. 344. 
126 Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, p. 24. 
127 Jackson, Martin Wight’s Thought on Diplomacy, p. 6. 
128 Angell, Norman. (1933). ‘The International Anarchy’, in L. Woolf (ed.) The Intelligent Man’s Way to 
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 Both groups of theorists hold the incumbent state responsible for this constant 
rejection. For Liberalists, the state ‘no longer serves the needs of the people in an age 
when nothing short of the governance of all mankind offers promise of protecting men 
from the evils of anarchy’.129 Nascent theorists differ slightly here in that their opinion is 
confined to the traditional diplomatic institution, but the message is the same: in the 21st 
century, the traditional diplomatic institution is irrelevant and rapidly losing the ability to 
control the increasingly complex IR system. Nascent theorists portray the traditional 
diplomatic institution as ‘unresponsive to change, archaic and capable only of providing 
solutions to out-dated problems’.130 Consequently, both groups of theorists suggest that 
the existing international order – dominated by states and greased by traditional 
diplomacy – must be incorporated into a more effective, institutional system.  
For both Liberalists and Nascent theorists, thirdly, a more effective institutional 
system would be to invest faith in the principle of international organisation, which could 
overcome the endemic ills of the state system. The former believe in the principle of 
‘collective security’ enshrined in the form of an ‘international organisation to facilitate 
peaceful system change, disarmament and arbitration’.131 Liberalists, thus, place great 
faith in universal ‘international institutions, new actors (transnational corporations, 
nongovernmental organisations) and new patterns of interaction’ such as economic 
interdependence and integration.132 Similarly, Nascent theorists focus on the role of non-
state diplomatic actors (NGOs, IGOs and MNCs) when theorising on diplomacy. 
Fundamentally, Nascent theorists believe that the modern IR system has provided ‘the 
                                                 
129 F. L. Schuman. (1952). The Commonwealth of Man. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 481. 
130 Hoffman, Reconstructing Diplomacy, p. 537. 
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opportunity for non-state actors to engage in diplomacy through channels which replace 
those employed by governments’.133  
 Liberalists claim that by allowing these non-state actors and institutions to 
flourish, the frequency of conflict and international anarchy can be reduced and 
ultimately banished from the IR system.134 Similarly, Nascent theorists promote the more 
peaceful ethos of non-state actors over the incumbent traditional diplomatic institution. 
 Consequently, both groups of theorists question the value of employing history as 
a guide to the future; NDTs more so than Liberalists. This focus on ‘looking backwards 
instead of forwards’ is only conducive to repetition, rather than progress.135 Liberalists 
are therefore seeking ‘change in an unchangingly repetitive realm’.136 The ‘Liberal world 
view values reform of the status quo through an evolutionary process of incremental 
change’.137 For some Liberal theorists, to change the IR system means discounting a 
retrospective view, to abandon history. Where history is concerned, Nascent theorists 
tend to avoid the distant past altogether. This is natural for Nascent theorists whose 
theory is concerned with post cold-War developments in the IR system and the 
emergence of non-state actors challenging the incumbent state and the traditional 
diplomatic institution.  By focusing on events since the end of the Cold War, Nascent 
theorists demonstrate uncertainty on the value of history to diplomatic theory. 
 The fourth and final similarity between the two groups of theorists is their opinion 
of theorists who endorse the centrality of the state and the traditional diplomatic in 
theoretical postulations. Both groups of theorists see state-centric theories as archaic and 
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unreflective of the modern IR system. For Liberalists, the disparity of views is enshrined 
in an ‘ongoing debate’138 where Liberalists continue to lock theoretical horns with 
Realists.139 Consistently, Liberalists maintain that:  
 
In a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power 
politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to the new era.140  
 
 Those endorsing this ‘cynical calculus’ are state-centric theorists who: 
 
alienate themselves from the complex reality of international relations. This theory is an 
instrument used to endorse a certain world order, while rejecting others as threatening their 
preferred order.141 
 
    Nascent theorists also argue that the state-centric theories on diplomacy fail to 
account for the complexities of the modern IR system. These theories are thus rejected 
for ‘not being sufficiently inclusive, the need [according to Nascent theorists] is for a 
more diffuse, multiperspectival approach’.142 Nascent theorists also portray the dominant 
Traditionalists as jealously and unfairly protecting a sacrosanct theoretical domain, one 
that is fast losing relevance.  
 Despite these similarities the two theories can be distinguished from one another. 
These differences emerge when the similarities are revisited. While this observation may 
                                                 
138 See appendix 6, the Myth of the Great Debate. 
139 Kegley and Raymond, The Global Future, p. 27. 
140 Clinton in Kegley and Raymond, The Global Future, p. 32. 
141 Reychler, Beyond Traditional Diplomacy, p. 6. 
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seem paradoxical, at a deeper level of analysis (a closer cross examination) real 
differences begin to emerge. The following are subtle differences but confirm that the 
two types of theory can exist as independent sets of individual, interconnected 
assumptions.  
Returning to both theories’ opinion on the value of history it is clear that 
Liberalism has a richer, deeper view of history, and how that history is employed to shore 
up its theoretical foundations. Much of Liberalism was conceived in the false calm of the 
Inter-war period (1918 – 1939), and looking further back was influenced by the work of 
early liberal thinkers. NDT on the other hand see no relevancy in the distant past, and 
states quite clearly its focus is on ‘seismic shifts in the political landscape since 1989’.143 
This is a distinct difference. Liberalism can trace its roots to the distant as well as recent 
past, whereas NDT cannot.  
 The difference in the depth of history employed highlights a second distinction 
between the two theories. Liberalism has a deep, philosophical grounding, whereas NDT 
does not. Liberalism, for example, stems from the core belief of certain early 
philosophical writers that ‘the equality, dignity and liberty of the individual are greater 
than the glory of the state.144’ Indeed, philosophers such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant, 
Jean Jacques Roussaeu, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Jefferson, John Locke, and even 
further back, Thomas More are often seen as the catalysts for the introduction of thoughts 
postulating the existence of a ‘better world’ outside the political machinery of the day.145 
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There are even some liberal writers who credit the Magna Carta as the beginnings of ‘an 
ideal, a moralistic movement challenging the egregious nature of the ruling state.’146 In 
the face of such a rich, philosophical and historical tradition, NDT with its exclusive 
insistence on post Cold War events appears somewhat paltry by comparison. NDT is a 
newer and narrower theory, relating primarily to non-state diplomacy while Liberalism is 
a far older and broader body of theory, first grounded in philosophy but evolving to 
emphasis global cooperation (in the face of introspective and individual state motives) 
through international institutions, law and disarmament.  
 A third and final point of distinction between the two groups of theorists is their 
regard for the incumbent state. Orthodox Nascent theorists, such as Hoffman and 
Modelski, are scathing in their criticism of the state and its traditional diplomatic 
institution. From a diplomatic point of view their central premise is that diplomacy can be 
performed far more effectively by non-state actors. Liberalists, after the disaster of the 
Second World War, changed their base theoretical assumption of international society 
superseding the incumbent state to arguments that acknowledged ‘the state will endure. If 
positive change is to occur, it must begin with the state.’147 It took a disaster on the scale 
of the Second World War to convince these post War Liberalists that change must begin 
in the ‘real’ world of the nation-state. It is foreseeable that NDTs may realise, in time, the 
futility of ignoring the incumbent and dominant international political actor.  
 These base differences between the two theories confirm that two different but 
similar theories can be evidenced in the IR discipline and the diplomacy studies field.  
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The four similarities between Liberalists and Nascent theorists suggest that just as 
Liberalism is central to IR so to must NDT become central to diplomatic 
theory/diplomatic studies.  
5.1.5 IDT and Constructivism 
Both Innovators and Constructivists interpret state/non-state linkages in different 
ways, but both advocate the same message: growing state and nonstate linkages are 
central to the stability and harmony of the modern IR system. The most obvious 
similarity between IDT and Constructivism is that they are both relatively new theories, 
having only truly emerged since the end of the Cold War. A second obvious commonality 
between IDT and Constructivism is that both theories offer ‘alternative ways of thinking’ 
about modern diplomacy and IR.148 That is, ways of thinking which are different from 
Realism and/or TDT and Liberalism and/or NDT. Thus, both IDT and Constructivism 
offer alternate lenses with which to interpret the current shape of the IR system. This lens 
does not restrict thinking in binary either (state) or (non-state) terms, but both.  
While both IDT and Constructivism postulate on continuities within the modern 
IR system, such as state omnipotence, they advocate an equal focus on emerging factors 
and forces transforming that system. At its core, Constructivism ‘looks into why the 
world is organized in the way it is, considers the different factors that shape the durable 
forms of world politics, and seeks alternative worlds’.149 Similarly, Innovators ‘try to 
provide insights into a transforming diplomatic landscape and the changing modalities 
and forms of diplomacy’.150 Distancing but not abandoning the state focus, their purpose 
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is to ‘analyse the effects of drastic change in the international environment on tried and 
tested diplomatic practices’.151 Both Innovators and Constructivists focus on ‘how state 
and non-state actors reproduce the structure’ of the IR system and ‘at times transform 
it’.152 In other words, both groups of theorists are interested in enduring regularities in the 
system, alongside emerging phenomenon. 
Both theories perform a valuable mediating role between dominant, disparate and 
conflicting theories within their respective disciplines. Strictly speaking, Constructivism 
is ‘not a theory of international politics’ but rather helps ‘clarify the differences and 
relative virtues’ of alternate IR theories.153 Constructivism therefore ‘attempts to bridge 
the gap’ between the disparate theories of Realism and Liberalism by ‘accepting many 
key assumptions shared by both approaches’.154 Innovators too practice a balanced 
approach to diplomatic theory. They perform a mediating role within the field, utilising 
the merits of both the statist and non-statist diplomatic theories. They recognise that there 
is a need to theorise on both state and non-state actors if the modern diplomatic 
environment is to be understood. Innovators draw on both statist and non-statist theories 
to enrich their theory; they do not believe one single diplomatic theory is able to fully 
explain the modern diplomatic environment. Similarly, at the heart of Constructivism is 
the contention that:  
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because there are a great number of alternative, and sometimes incomplete, ways of organising 
theoretical inquiry about world politics, the challenge of interpreting the world’s political 
problems cannot be reduced to any one simple yet compelling account (such as Realism or 
Liberalism).155  
 
Equally, Innovators propose enhanced cooperation, dialogue and balance in place 
of the theoretical hostility and parochialism inherent to either state-centric or anti-statist 
theories on diplomacy. The notion of existing ‘somewhere in between’ dominant 
theoretical perspectives on IR and diplomacy is thus central to both IDT and 
Constructivism.156  
 Therefore, it can be argued that both theorists do not favour any one theoretical 
opinion over the other. But this indecisiveness does not suggest Innovators or 
Constructivists exist in a state of theoretical purgatory. Their impartiality is a 
consequence of their belief in both state and non-state actors as having an equal influence 
in world politics. For example, Innovators believe a symbiotic relationship exists between 
modern diplomatic actors (state and non-state). In the modern diplomatic environment, 
they argue that state/nonstate diplomatic relationships are distinctly non-adversarial, 
symbiotic and complementary.  
Similarly, Constructivism advocates consideration of both the state and the non-
state if we are to understand the modern IR system. Whereas the Innovators advocate the 
growing physical and practical relationships between state and non-state actors,157 
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Constructivism sees an ontological connection between ‘socially accepted ideas, norms 
and values held by powerful state and non-state actors’.158 Not only do ‘ideational 
structures shape how the very actors define themselves – who they are, their goals, and 
the roles they believe they should play’– but also they shape the ‘prevailing ideas in each 
age about the global condition and the prospects for humanity to escape the problems 
posed by states in an anarchic arena’.159  
 According to both groups of theorists, social linkages between modern peoples 
occur in many different guises in the modern IR system, not just state-qua-state relations 
(political linkages) as the sole conduit for international exchange. For Constructivists, 
seeing the modern IR system through one statist lens is today insufficient. They argue, for 
example, that Realist approaches which focus exclusively on ‘power politics, anarchy, 
and military force cannot explain’ the modern IR system.160 Instead, these factors must be 
considered in tandem with the impact ‘institutions, norms and changes in identity’ have 
on modern IR.161  
Similarly, Innovators argue that to understand the modern diplomatic environment 
state and non-state actors must be considered in tandem. Innovators stress that modern 
diplomacy must be considered in relation to ‘the transformed environment of actors, 
issues, and modes of communication within which diplomats function; and yet, 
demonstrate the continuing centrality of conventional diplomats to most of what happens 
in contemporary diplomacy’.162 This approach to theorising on diplomacy is valuable, 
stressing the role of traditional diplomatic actors in relation to nascent diplomatic actors.  
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In the case of both theories, it is the shared ‘ideas and norms’ between state and non-
state, ‘rather than power and self-interest’ of disparate actors, which shapes the modern 
IR system. 163 Fundamentally, both Constructivism and IDT claim that ‘in our theoretical 
exploration of world politics, we must avoid the temptation to embrace one worldview 
and abandon another without any assurance that their relative worth is permanently 
fixed’.164  
As both theories are relatively new they have not yet achieved the breadth and 
depth of more well established theories such as Realism or Traditionalism. The youth of 
both theories means that differences between Constructivism and IDT are not as obvious 
as the other two diplomatic and IR theories. For example, Constructivism is not 
sufficiently broad enough to have explored fully certain fleeting postulations. Where 
diplomacy is concerned, Constructivism simply mentions that ‘diplomacy is an agent for 
change’ in international relations.165 However, this valuable observation is not expanded 
upon. An extrapolation could suggest the centrality of socialisation, dialogue and the 
diffusion of norms to Constructivism makes diplomacy an essential element of world 
politics, as well as an agent of change. IDT differs here because through its inherent 
balance between state-centric and non-statist theory it encourages ‘both change and 
continuity’ in international relations.166  
A second related difference lies in the very notion of theory according to both 
groups of theorists. Constructivism, like Realism and Liberalism, claims to be individual 
and distinct body of theory. They can be distinguished from one another because each 
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contains different sets of assumptions, each of which attempts to make sense of the 
complex international relations system.  For Constructivists, different theoretical 
‘perceptions about world politics must be organized for inquiry to be conducted’.167 IDT, 
on the other hand, prefers disorganisation and diffusion. IDT consistently highlights the 
futility of adhering to one theory of the other as it confines diplomatic theorists to 
parochial factions (in the context of this thesis, to Traditionalism or NDT). IDT, 
therefore, champions an eclectic approach to theory, borrowing from all types of theory. 
For IDTs, ‘any interpretation [of diplomacy] is as valid as any other, and there is no point 
in attempting to develop a shared conception of the world’.168 This line of enquiry is 
confusing; after all how can an eclectic body of theory stand as an independent category 
of theory? This question will become easier to answer as both Constructivism and IDT 
broaden further. For the moment, this difference between Constructivism (as striving to 
stake a claim to independence, in relation to other independent theories) and IDT (as 
embracing the value of eclecticism, of diverse and disparate views) serves to highlight 
that the theories share both differences and similarities. Once more, the similarities 
between the two theories suggest that just as Constructivism is emerging as central to IR 
so too is IDT central to diplomatic theory/diplomatic studies.  
  
5.2 Implications for diplomatic theory: benefits of reconciliation 
 This thesis contends that there are several benefits for diplomacy studies of 
reconciling TDT, NDT and IDT. The majority of these benefits mitigate the problems of 
theoretical diversity identified in section 5.0.3, which characterise the current relationship 
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between the three groups of diplomatic theories and theorists as one of isolation and 
competition (over the optimal diplomatic theory). Reconciliation provides a method to 
sidestep these problems and breathe new life into the diplomatic studies field. There are 
many other associated benefits. 
  Firstly, reconciliation encourages the banishment of disagreement and 
competition between theorists over one, all-encompassing form of diplomatic theory. If 
the notion of one comprehensive type of diplomatic theory endures then diplomatic 
theorists will continue to compete. If, however, there is no singular theory to compete 
over and diplomatic theory is viewed as tripartite then we have three lenses (instead of 
one) with which to view the modern diplomatic environment. Reconciliation allows the 
three theories to become specialised instead of viewed as extreme, irrelevant and 
parochial by other competing groups of theory. The key to durable reconciliation is to no 
longer view each group as parochial, exclusive and parsimonious but specialised, where 
each theory has a unique contribution to understanding modern diplomacy. ‘Recognizing 
the different kinds of insights each approach has to offer’ is important to the future 
strength of a broadening diplomatic studies field.169 (354) 
For example, Traditionalists could become specialists of the state and the 
traditional diplomatic institution. Their exclusive focus, historical knowledge and 
insistence on the state as the only diplomatic actor is thus appreciated, rather than 
dismissed as an archaic, sentimental theory by other ‘competing’ groups. At the same 
time, in order to understand the complex multi-actor nature of modern diplomacy it is 
necessary to develop a body of theory on non-state diplomatic actors. Thus, the 
specialisation of Nascent theorists is accepted as crucial to this area of modern diplomatic 
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theory. Nascent theorists become specialised in alternate and non-state diplomacy. The 
relationship between state and non-state diplomatic actors becomes the domain of the 
Innovators, who stress a symbiosis between the two. In addition, the Innovator’s 
insistence on validating theory with practical opinion becomes valuable to modern 
diplomatic theory in that it lessens the divide between theoretical and practical 
diplomacy. Bridges are thus built between the theoretical and practical diplomatic 
domains. 
Under the suggested tripartite form of theoretical organisation, the diplomatic 
studies field becomes more orderly, with each group of theorists aware of the borders of 
their respective domains. Their purpose then is not to defend their theory but to enhance 
knowledge within their own specialised sub-field. 
A third benefit suggests that by reconciling the three divergent theories on 
diplomacy, the sterile and unproductive state versus non-state type debates can be 
sidestepped, or even expelled from the diplomatic studies field. Perhaps the field has 
become subconsciously distracted by the competition between different actors central to 
their respective theories. Now that this thesis has suggested a way to reconcile the three 
views, a complete picture of the modern diplomatic environment can be conceived.170   
A fourth benefit is that reconciliation through interdisciplinarity mitigates the 
marginalisation of the diplomatic studies field. This gesture must come from the 
diplomatic studies field; there are few murmurs of marginalisation directed towards the 
IR field. For the marginalised diplomatic studies field, the danger of continuing to avoid 
interdisciplinarity perhaps highlights the need for it. Elman and Elman broadly agree, 
noting that: 
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as long as disciplines provide inward looking socialisation and training for their prospective 
members, scholars will emerge…grounded in their own field, but virtually ignorant of 
developments and applications beyond the boundaries of their own discipline.171  
 
Writing specifically with the diplomatic studies field in mind Gaddis stresses the 
need for the discipline to engage with other disciplines, otherwise scholarship in 
diplomacy is likely to stagnate. He writes of the diplomatic studies field that:  
 
without occasional bumps against those that lie nearby there is a tendency for fields – and the 
minds that inhabit them – simply to replicate themselves without evolutionary progress. It 
might be a good thing for disciplines to consider whether they are in fact bumping up against 
their neighbors with sufficient regularity to move beyond the monotony of self replication.172  
 
As of 2006, it is difficult to argue that diplomatic studies ‘bumps’ into any other 
disciplines, even IR. The discipline’s isolation is problematic. Considering that the field 
of diplomacy studies is dominated by TDT, scholars are prone to theoretical myopia, 
replication instead of innovation and distance from real, multi-actor postulations on 
modern diplomacy. In this context, building theoretical linkages between diplomacy and 
IR is productive for diplomatic theories and theorists because ‘if we cannot understand 
one another, if we cannot bring together, in a mutually comprehensible way, the various 
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perspectives that our discipline has to offer then we will remain cut off’.173 A confluence 
between IR and diplomacy studies would lessen the latter discipline’s marginalisation 
and help push ‘the study of diplomacy to the center stage of international studies where it 
rightly belongs’.174 Building bridges between IR and diplomacy studies ‘could well result 
in a more general understanding that it [diplomacy] is not a peripheral and even 
somewhat esoteric subject, but by its fundamental nature and role should be at the heart 
of any instruction in the elements of international relations’.175 
 The positive benefits described above are all consequences of reconciliation, the 
main beneficiary being diplomatic theory and the diplomatic studies field. Reconciliation 
is important where diplomacy studies are concerned because Traditionalists are not going 
to become less statist, Nascent theorists less anti-statist and Innovators less symbiotic. All 
three groups of theorists have obvious strengths, but when these are employed to defend 
their respective diplomatic theory the propensity to entrench adversarial debate is 
inevitable. 
The fourth, final and most important benefit of reconciling and strengthening the 
three diplomatic theories is that it helps us understand the modern diplomatic 
environment better. If diplomatic theory can be considered as tripartite, ‘we will be in a 
better position to analyse the contemporary changes in diplomacy’.176 By using the three 
lenses of TDT, NDT and IDT, we can ‘begin to address crucial issues which as yet have 
largely been ignored, remain paradoxical or unanswerable in the current diplomatic 
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studies schema’.177          
 Those issues that have been ignored relate to the diplomacy of non-state actors. 
Those issues that remain paradoxical concern the coexistence of state and non-state 
diplomatic actors. And those issues that remain unanswerable relate to the confusion 
surrounding debates postulating on the nature and constitution of the modern diplomatic 
environment. The following chapter will attempt to mitigate the ignored, the paradoxical 
and the unanswerable from the current diplomatic schema by validating the worth of 
interpreting modern diplomacy through the three lenses of TDT, NDT and IDT.  
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Chapter Six – Using TDT, NDT and IDT to better understand the modern 
diplomatic environment 
 
Now that the three diplomatic theories have been reconciled, we can begin the 
next step, asking how do these three theories fit together and what picture do they 
produce when they are appropriately fitted? The aim of this chapter is to paint an accurate 
theoretical picture of the modern diplomatic environment, by using the three diplomatic 
theories together. Where points of convergence (amongst the theories) are evident, 
several theoretical assumptions are advanced. Each of these assumptions relates to the six 
themes, factors and forces present throughout this thesis. Ultimately, the picture that 
emerges (by using the three lenses) is not a fragmented diplomatic environment 
composed of disparate actors and diplomatic environments but a multi-layered system of 
diplomatic networks.   
 
6.0 Methodology:  using the three diplomatic theories work together 
With a view to better understanding the modern diplomatic environment, a 
formula is proposed and tested in this chapter. Central to the proposed formula are three 
ingredients: firstly, the diplomatic theories of TDT, NDT and IDT; secondly, this thesis’ 
consequent theoretical observations; and thirdly, empirical diplomatic evidence. Blending 
these three ingredients together – in relation to each of the six themes – results in a more 
lucid interpretation of the modern diplomatic environment.  
Firstly, it is argued that using the three diplomatic theories together – in relation 
to a particular theme – is more beneficial than considering them in isolation. Currently, 
one theory is unable to account for the complexity of the modern diplomatic 
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environment. There are simply too many actors – state and non-state – for one theory to 
fit all. The presence of different diplomatic theories is therefore useful in that they 
‘provide a map, or frame of reference, that makes the complex, puzzling world around us 
[more] intelligible’.1 Each of the three diplomatic theories is fundamentally distinctive, 
since each is a lens through which the modern diplomatic environment looks different 
and different things seem important. Each of the three theories has something different to 
say on each particular theme.  
By using the three theories together – in relation to each particular theme - the 
necessity of the second ingredient is confirmed. By considering the individual theoretical 
observations of each group of diplomatic theorists alongside one another, this thesis is 
able to propose a number of meta-theoretical assumptions. These assumptions are this 
thesis’ theoretical propositions on the modern diplomatic environment. Some of these 
assumptions exist already but are in need of consolidation, whereas others are novel, 
emerging as a result of the interplay of the three theories. 
Only by using the three theories together do these assumptions emerge. If points 
of convergence amongst the three theories can be established the subsequent theoretical 
assumption can be confirmed as accurate, as consensus exists amongst two or more of the 
diplomatic theories. This occurrence is rare, however. More common, are points of 
contention and theoretical divergence amongst the three theories, which leads to the third 
ingredient necessary to enhance understanding of the modern diplomatic environment.  
Thirdly and finally, empirical evidence can be employed in an arbitrary capacity. 
If contention and divergence amongst the three theories is apparent (and in most of the 
six themes, factors and forces this is the case) then empirical evidence can be used to 
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settle the conflicting and individual theoretical differences. By using the three theories 
together (firstly) a set of theoretical assumptions (secondly) emerges. If these 
assumptions can be confirmed with empirical evidence (thirdly) then this thesis can 
propose a more accurate and composite body of theory on each of the six themes, forces 
and factors prevalent in the modern diplomatic environment. By using empirical evidence 
each of the theoretical observations proposed in this chapter is enriched and 
substantiated. 
The empirical evidence used in this chapter comes from ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ 
diplomatic sources. In the following six sections, evidence from three diplomatic 
institutions is employed to validate this thesis’ theoretical assumptions: the British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) and Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(DFAIT). Several NGOs and IGOs are also employed, such as the International Red 
Cross, the American Red Cross and the United Nations. Considering evidence from both 
traditional (state) and unconventional (nascent) diplomatic actors reveals a cross section 
of the modern diplomatic environment. 
In addition, using empirical evidence is a tentative step towards bridging the gap 
between theory and practice. Diplomatic studies and theory are closely related to the 
practical, real world of diplomacy. The theory of the field must therefore take into 
consideration the official, professional and real activity of diplomacy. By relating theory 
to practice, diplomatic theory becomes more robust, relevant and informative. After all, 
and borrowing from an International Relations adage, ‘theory linked to data is more 
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powerful than either data or theory alone’.2 These three ‘ingredients’ and their subsequent 
employment constitute this thesis’ final postulations with a view to better understanding 
the modern diplomatic environment. 
This approach has faint resonance with the broader IR field, in particular the 
notion of theoretical eclecticism proposed by Katzenstein and Okawara.3 It must be 
noted, however, that their novel approach is focused more on the practical application of 
a loose idea of theoretical eclecticism, rather than on a thorough explanation of the 
methodology behind the idea.4 However, certain central notions of Katzenstein and 
Okawara’s methodology can be extracted.  
Firstly, the two authors approach ‘stresses the need to build bridges between 
multiple analytical perspectives’, advice which could easily be applied to diplomatic 
theory.5 This thesis agrees by similarly arguing that ‘bridges’ need to be built between the 
three diplomatic theories of TDT, NDT and IDT. The antagonistic debates and 
competitive opinions (amongst the three diplomatic theories) on diplomacy are 
sidestepped in order to construct a more diffuse and multiperspectival form of diplomatic 
theory. The ‘bitter, repetitive and inherently inconclusive’ nature of the battle over one, 
all encompassing diplomatic theory is thus written off.6 Released from the constraints of 
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defending or promoting respective and individual diplomatic theories, a more complete 
picture of the modern diplomatic environment can be realised.  
A second tenet of eclectic theorising that the two authors suggest is the need for 
more ‘innovation and originality’ within the IR field.7 Diplomatic studies also could 
benefit from a similar fresh approach. The dominance of the Traditionalists has stymied 
innovation and detracted ‘scholars from the primary task at hand: recognizing interesting 
questions and testing alternative explanations’ in relation to modern diplomacy.8 Two 
such ‘interesting’ questions this thesis addresses in this chapter are: is the modern 
diplomatic environment better understood as a dual enterprise involving state and non-
actors practicing distinct but complementary forms of diplomacy? and if so, is an eclectic 
approach (using the three lenses/theories selectively) better able to interpret the multi-
actor nature of modern diplomacy? 
This approach offers much to theorising on diplomacy, since originality, 
deconstruction and reconstruction – from an innovative angle – is important if diplomatic 
theory is to be modernised. As the first half of this thesis demonstrated, the diplomatic 
studies field continues to broaden. There is a subsequent correlation with increased 
possibilities for innovation. As the field broadens there is both the need and possibility 
for new approaches to theorising on modern diplomacy. In addition, considering the 
multi-actor complexity of modern diplomacy, perhaps it is time to move away from, but 
not abandon, the heavy TDT (statist) focus. To better understand modern diplomacy, we 
need to ‘think outside the traditional square’.9 By using an innovative approach, this 
direction becomes inevitable.         
                                                 
7 ibid., p. 182 
8 ibid., p. 183. 
9 Sofer, Old and New Diplomacy, p. 207. 
  Chapter six 
 272
 A third feature of theoretical eclecticism that Katzenstein and Okawara suggest is 
its ability (and necessity) to challenge hegemonic or dominant IR theories, which 
constrain understanding of the modern IR system.10 The reliance on one theoretical 
perspective, they argue, results in a limited understanding of the complexity of the 
modern IR system.11 For the two authors, relying solely on Realism or Liberalism, as one 
example, is problematic because:  
 
these parsimonious theoretical explanations conceal different layers and connections. 
Eclecticism protects us from taking as natural partial assumptions about the political world. It 
regards with discomfort the certainties that derive from relying solely on a single paradigm. 
Adequate understanding requires analytical eclecticism, not parsimony.12 
 
Again, diplomatic theory could benefit from applying a similar, multi-
paradigmatic approach to theorising on modern diplomacy. More theoretical attention 
needs to be devoted to the ‘layer’ of nascent diplomatic actors in the modern diplomatic 
environment. Within the diplomatic studies field, there is a distinct lack of traditionalist-
type depth of knowledge on nascent diplomatic actors, the diplomatic techniques they 
employ, their common practitioners, their institutional make-up and organisational 
structures, to name the more obvious elements. Currently, the individualistic, parochial 
and parsimonious posturing of Traditionalists, Nascent theorists and Innovators conceals 
the many different layers and connections at work in modern diplomacy. These 
connections can be, for example, traditional (state to state) or unconventional (state to 
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NGO, NGO to IGO or even IGO to the individual). These many different layers will 
remain concealed should the reliance on one theory or one lens persist.  
By adopting an eclectic approach (using the three diplomatic theories together), 
knowledge and theory of nascent diplomacy is promoted alongside the established 
knowledge of traditional diplomacy. The robust body of TDT can be used as a strong 
foundation on which to build, compare and evaluate alternate forms of diplomatic theory. 
This mutual respect for all theories therefore promotes not an either/or approach but a 
multiperspectival theory of diplomacy. In other words, eclectic diplomatic theory 
recognises and advances knowledge of both state and non-state diplomatic actors and 
their respective forms of diplomacy. No one theory is held to be better than the other. All 
have equal weight; all have a valuable and specialised contribution to enhance 
understanding of the 21st century diplomatic environment. 
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6.1 Seeing the modern diplomatic environment through the three lenses: TDT, NDT 
and IDT 
 
The following six themes all relate to the future of the traditional diplomatic 
institution. The notion that we are in the midst of a period of transformation from tried 
and tested methods of diplomatic interaction to a new form of polylateral diplomatic 
interaction is prevalent in the diplomatic studies literature. The purpose of the following 
six sections is to rigorously test this claim, which is possible by considering the three 
diplomatic theories together and in an eclectic fashion. 
 
6.1.1. The ongoing evolution of the state and its traditional diplomatic institution 
The present and future relevance of the traditional diplomatic institution is central 
to understanding the modern diplomatic environment. Theorising eclectically confirms 
that the institution is not in decline, irrelevant or obsolete. Rather, the institution remains 
central to the modern IR system. 
To arrive at and consolidate this hypothesis, the interplay between alternate 
diplomatic theories is invaluable. Using the three theories eclectically recognises 
‘interesting questions’ and tests ‘alternative explanations’ in relation to the fate of the 
traditional diplomatic institution.13 Eclecticism therefore encourages the diplomatic 
theorist to ask: does the traditional diplomatic institution remain relevant and, if so, how 
can this be proven? In response, three observations emerge.  
The first observation, from considering the three theories together, is the value of 
the vibrant debate between the three theories. The future of the traditional diplomatic 
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institution has generated much debate within the diplomatic studies field. At the moment, 
this debate is polarised: either the institution is or is not relevant.  
For example, where NDT is concerned, the case for euthanasia, obsolescence and 
irrelevance of the traditional diplomatic institution is a foundation of their work. 
According to Nascent theorists, on the one hand, the archaic state system and the 
traditional diplomacy that lubricates it belong to a by-gone era. Furthermore, the recent 
proliferation of non-state actors questions the relevance of the traditional diplomatic 
institution, as Nascent theorists claim them to be more effective diplomatic actors. On the 
other hand, Traditionalists argue that the traditional diplomatic institution is anything but 
irrelevant, as it continues to play a fundamental, invaluable and central role in modern 
international relations. For Traditionalists, the traditional diplomatic institution maintains 
the monopoly on foreign policy. Non-state actors are thus of peripheral or secondary 
importance.  
These polarised views are useful in that they encourage diplomatic theorists to 
settle the issue: how can we prove if the institution is or is not relevant?  In response, the 
IDT lens becomes useful. Innovators build on both NDT and TDT. They first 
acknowledge that the proposition on whether the traditional diplomatic institution is 
irrelevant depends on respective theoretical foundations. Foundationally, Traditionalists 
champion the traditional diplomatic institution, whereas Nascent theorists promote the 
role of non-state entities as more effective diplomatic actors. This fundamental difference 
means, according to Innovators, that the debate about the decline of diplomacy turns on 
opposing images of how the diplomatic world works – or should work. Traditionalists are 
concerned with the reality of diplomacy, whereas Nascent theorists with a future vision of 
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how the IR system and diplomacy should work. In other words, TDT explains the reality 
of how the IR system is, whereas NDT postulates on how the IR system ought to be. 
Consideration of these three theoretical views leads to a second observation: that 
the relevance of the traditional diplomatic institution can be settled by considering the 
reality of the modern diplomatic environment. In other words, empirical evidence may 
help settle the debate. If the evidence – the reality, the is – of the modern diplomatic 
environment confirms the omnipotence and growth of the traditional diplomatic 
institution then its ongoing relevancy can be agreed upon. On the other hand, if the 
evidence confirms the mass proliferation of non-state actors at the expense of the 
institution, then its irrelevancy can be confirmed. 
Both of these observations are valid. As of 2005 the UN recognised that there 
were 191 states in the IR system, an increase from 45 in 1945 and 26 in 1919.14 In order 
to operate in the international environment, all of these states must practice some form of 
‘official’ diplomacy, which adheres to traditional vulgates of diplomatic interaction such 
as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rights. On this evidence, the growth of the 
traditional diplomatic institution and its diplomatic methods suggest it continues to be 
relevant: more states mean more traditional diplomacy. After all, as Traditionalists argue, 
if traditional diplomatic institutions were obsolete then why do they continue to exist and 
expand? 
However, the empirical evidence also supports the NDT argument that non-state 
actors are increasing in number. The 2005/6 statistics confirm there are 20,928 NGOs, an 
increase from the 997 in 1954, and 4,518 in 1988. In 2005/6 there are 1,963 IGOs, an 
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increase from the 118 in 1950, and 309 in 1988.15 However, this evidence does not 
suggest that the rise of these non-state actors is correlated to a decline in traditional state 
actors. If diplomacy is the activity of representation then an increase in diplomatic actors 
– state and non-state – only suggests that there are more groups in need of international 
representation. There are more non-state actors emerging and they are practicing a form 
of unofficial diplomacy. Despite this increase in diplomatic actors, this evidence still does 
not conclusively confirm if the traditional diplomatic institution is relevant. Eclecticism 
may provide a new way of settling the issue.  
A return to the three diplomatic theories suggests a third observation: that the fate 
of the traditional diplomatic institution concerns its willingness to change in accordance 
with a radical modern diplomatic environment. The future of the traditional diplomatic 
institution can thus be conclusively determined by assessing its ability to change. 
According to Traditionalists, the traditional diplomatic institution (since its 
inception in the 17th century) has consistently evolved and reacted to changes in the IR 
system. For Traditionalists, this continual environmental adaptability confirms that the 
traditional diplomatic institution remains at the core of the modern IR system. The 21st 
century is no different: the traditional diplomatic institution is adapting, albeit slowly, to 
changes in the modern diplomatic environment.  
As one Traditionalist, Rana, notes:  
 
The world over, foreign ministries (MFAs) are undergoing transformation, adapting to the 
changing environment of world politics and their countries’ needs. The simultaneous 
                                                 
15 From Part A: Statistical Data Graphics, Figure 1.1.1. (a): Overview of number of international 
organisations by type [types A-G,] of the Yearbook of International Organisations, Edition 42, 2005/2006, 
edited by the Union of International Associations, Lausanne, Switzerland. 
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congruence of a number of factors (such as the greater participation of varied departments of 
the government and the domestic publics in foreign affairs, changes in communications and 
information technology, and transformation in the task that professional diplomats are required 
to handle) has virtually forced MFAs to reengineer their diplomatic structures and processes.16   
 
Again, empirical evidence proves useful in ascertaining the extent to which 
traditional diplomatic institutions have reengineered core structures and processes. If 
empirical evidence – the reality, the is – of the modern diplomatic environment confirms 
the evolutionary nature of the traditional diplomatic institution then its future role is 
assured. On the other hand, if the practical evidence suggests that the institution remains 
static, inflexible and unresponsive to change then its irrelevancy can be confirmed.  
Empirical evidence and practical opinion leans towards the evolutionary nature of 
the traditional diplomatic institution and its ongoing relevance. For example, former 
Australian Ambassador to France John Spender argued that: 
 
The [traditional] diplomatic institution will remain the most important influence in the 
international relations system. It will change, as it has always done. To speak of its decline and 
irrelevancy is problematic. The reason state diplomacy endures and will continue to endure at 
the heart of the foreign affairs is that no other entity has been able to challenge its supremacy. It 
endures, because it works.17 
 
For Ambassador Spender, continuity and a continual evolution and refinement of 
the tools and techniques of traditional diplomacy confirms the modern relevancy of the 
                                                 
16 Rana, Inside Diplomacy, p. 1. 
17 John Spender, Interview, Gold Coast, Australia. February 25th, 2004. 
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state diplomatic institution. The rhetoric that the state is in decline, Ambassador Spender 
concludes, is nothing more than ‘a flight of the imagination’ of diplomatic theorists.18 
Theoretical imagination of an institution in peril is a notion that Ambassador Robert 
Gordon also highlights. For him: 
 
diplomacy has a certain mystique which in a sense is very attractive. As a result, many scholars 
fill the vacuum or the void of knowledge with all sorts of imagined notions of how they think 
diplomacy should be. Some of them are true but most of them are less true.19  
 
The notion that the institution is in decline and in a state of irrelevance or 
obsolescence does appear to be one of the ‘less true’ pieces of knowledge. Further 
opinion suggests that the institution is evolving. The traditional diplomatic institution 
continues to react to changes in the modern diplomatic environment. Justifying its 
modern relevance and purpose (and changing accordingly) can be clearly evidenced. 
Ambassador Gordon noted of this point: 
 
In Britain, we had quite a profound rethink in the last two years of the purpose and execution of 
foreign policy and its relevance to our citizens. This has now spawned a new FCO (Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office) ten-year strategy, which is aimed at ensuring the ongoing relevance, 
accountability and efficiency of the FCO and its diplomatic capacity.20 
 
                                                 
18 ibid. 
19 Ambassador Robert Gordon, Interview, Hanoi, Vietnam. March 9th, 2005. As of January 2006, Robert 
Gordon is the British Ambassador to Vietnam. 
20 ibid. 
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 The strategy Ambassador Gordon refers to is part of a major reform process to 
streamline, modernise and justify the relevance of the FCO in ‘this complex 
interdependent21 world’.22 A radically different twenty-first century agenda has 
‘challenged the traditional methods of conducting relations between states’.23 In other 
words, the ‘complex’ modern diplomatic environment has demanded that the FCO must 
change and evolve if it intends to remain relevant.  
A shift in the FCO’s agenda is one factor driving its organisational change. This 
new global agenda is ‘like no other before it’ and is dominated by a ‘volatile security 
setting, ideology and religion, economics, population growth, environmental change, 
decreasing energy resources, technological innovation and wider participation of non-
state actors in world politics’.24 If the FCO is to adapt and remain relevant it: 
 
will need to be focused on new priorities,25 more flexible in responding to change,26 more 
open27 and better equipped to serve the public.28 This will require a program for internal change 
in the FCO, changes to our structures and working practices and far-sighted management.29   
                                                 
21 For the origins of Interdependence theory, see Keohane, R. and Nye, J. S. (1972). Transnational 
Relations and World Politics. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; Kehoane, R. and Nye, J. S. 
(1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little Brown; Roseneau, J. N. 
(1980). The Study of Global Interdependence. London: Francis Pinter. 
22 The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Annual Report 2004. UK: Public Records Office, p. 3.  
23 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Strategy. (2004). UK: Public Records Office, p. 12. 
24 ibid. 
25 Specifically, the FCO wants to focus their resources on new priorities more efficiently. In order to 
achieve this they are ‘introducing new resource management systems which will improve our ability to 
assess the costs and activities of our Posts. This should help us to match financial resources to changing 
priorities in a more dynamic way. As a guiding principle we should be capable of shifting at least five per-
cent of staff and budget from lower to higher priorities in any three-year spending period’ (FCO Strategy, 
p. 16). These changes have been successful, according to the FCO, who claim they have moved ‘ten per-
cent of resources from administration function in London to front line policy and service functions over the 
last three years (as of 2004)’ (FCO Annual Report, p. 161) 
26 These changes refer to the FCO’s desire and ability to ‘respond fast to changing circumstances’ (FCO 
Strategy, p. 17). Specifically, ‘to achieve greater financial flexibility we have decided to retain a 
Departmental Reserve of equivalent to two per cent of our budget resources from the start of each year. We 
will extend the concept of rapid reaction teams for consular work to crisis management in other areas of 
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Despite these changes, the FCO will retain much of its traditional make-up. As 
Ambassador Gordon pointed out, ‘it is important not to throw the baby out with the 
bathwater’.30 The FCO ‘must preserve the diplomatic expertise, knowledge and 
professionalism that are its core strengths, rightly admired across the world’.31 In essence, 
Gordon claims that the FCO’s evolutionary experience suggests both continuity and 
change. Continuity in terms of preserving core diplomatic functions, such as 
diplomatically representing their host nation abroad, and change in terms of how they 
perform and execute these core functions.  
The above is strong evidence of one traditional diplomatic institution changing its 
structure, ethos and organisational culture in response to a radically different international 
                                                                                                                                                 
FCO work. And we are considering a new, centrally-managed cadre of reserve staff who can be switched 
quickly to new priority work. We will also exploit opportunities that technological advances provide, for 
example in video conferencing, our intranet and mobile telephony, especially in confidential remote 
working. Using this new technology our working practices can become more flexible and less 
compartmentalised.’ (FCO Strategy, p. 17).  
27 The FCO aims, by 2007, to employ and come to rely on a ‘wider range of people, skills and experience’ 
(FCO Strategy, p. 19). This diversity is necessary if the FCO is to achieve its ambitious agenda of change: 
‘to undertake such a varied range of activities we shall need to continue to recruit high calibre staff, with a 
wide variety of skills, and offer them motivating and rewarding opportunities. It will be essential to ensure 
that our internal appointment process and reward system give fair recognition to the diverse skills of all our 
staff, including experience gained outside the FCO. Our efforts, in this respect, are aimed at developing 
more interchange with the public, private and voluntary sectors.’ (FCO Strategy, p. 20). This type of 
evidence lays to rest the stereotypical claim that diplomacy is a hermitically sealed world, best left to the 
professionals.  
28 In a signal of its intention to ‘engage’ with the British public more, the FCO states: ‘across the whole 
range of our activity – including our core policy work – we will focus on delivering targeted and specific 
outcomes. This must involve making our policy processes more open. We are also giving greater priority, 
including through regular, published stakeholder surveys, to ensuring that we have public feedback on our 
performance.’ (FCO Strategy, p. 21) 
29 FCO Strategy, p. 14. This type of rhetoric is aimed at increasing the FCO accountability to a demanding 
British public. To appease their (the publics) concern that there is real action behind the words, the FCO 
employed (in 2000 and 2005) an independent auditing firm, Collison Grant Limited, to assess their 
progress.  The report from Collison Grant Limited was positive; it stated that the FCO realised ‘overall 
saving of 48 million pounds, achieved as a running rate, in 2004, with the full benefit to be obtained during 
the financial year of 2005/2006’. The 2005 Report by Collison Grant Limited, entitled ‘Efficiency, 
Effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’, is available at 
www.fco.gov.uk/publications. 
30 Ambassador Robert Gordon, Interview, March 9th, 2005. 
31 FCO Strategy, p. 2. 
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environment. The FCO is not alone in this respect. Canada’s DFAIT too acknowledges 
that: 
 
international policy execution is more complex today than it has ever been in the past. The 
traditional staples of diplomacy – war and peace, trade and commerce – have been joined by a 
wide and growing range of issues – the environment, health, global poverty and migration. In 
this complex environment, it is important that DFAIT be able to critically assess and address 
the world around us, identify the trends and issues that matter most and respond creatively and 
effectively. The Strategic Policy branch [of DFAIT] is constantly seeking new methods that 
allow us to fulfill our valuable role better, faster and cheaper.32  
 
Like the FCO, DFAIT realises that the ‘complex’ environment in which it 
operates requires new techniques, structures and responses. To deal with the new 
challenges in the international environment, DFAIT intends to: 
 
implement a plan for renewal and transformation consisting of a renewed mandate; a rebuilt 
policy capacity and ability to ensure government-wide foreign policy coherence; a strengthened 
global presence; structural changes and an enhanced departmental toolkit; and better service to 
Canadians, especially timely consular support.33  
 
To realise these changes, DFAIT will ‘renew its capacity through re-allocation of 
existing resources and through the development of new strategies and instruments’, 
                                                 
32 Canada’s International Policy Statement is available in pdf format from < http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-en.asp>, retrieved 18th December 2005, p. 3 
33 Canadian International Policy Statement, (2005), p. 30. 
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which constitutes ‘complete internal restructuring and consolidation of Foreign Affairs’.34 
All of these proposed changes to DFAIT operations are aimed at ‘streamlining and 
modernising’ their diplomacy ‘for greater effectiveness’.35 
A second factor driving organisation change to traditional diplomatic institutions 
the world over is the public demand for greater accountability. Publics are demanding 
that traditional diplomatic institutions make the optimum use of Foreign Ministry 
budgets. This demand creates pressure for traditional diplomatic institutions in the face 
(often) of shrinking financial resources. These challenges necessitate the creation of more 
modern and streamlined working practices, with the result being: 
 
that Foreign Ministries are having to work to an overarching strategy, to restructure, to 
prioritise, actively seek new business, to promote awareness of their skills and services within 
government and the outside, and to sell their countries’ image abroad while also expanding the 
relevance of foreign policy [formulation and execution] to domestic audiences.36   
 
                                                 
34 Specifically, DFAIT aims to restructure the department by 2007. The list of proposed reforms is large. 
DFAIT aims to  ‘include a more focussed North America branch, a global issues branch concentrating on 
multilateral reform, more strategic management of bilateral relations and international security, and a 
stronger emphasis on strategic foreign policy development and public diplomacy. Secondly, it aims to 
increase policy capacity, to better anticipate emerging issues and provide leadership in forging a 
government-wide response. Thirdly, to establish a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START) to 
ensure that there is longer term-planning for early responses to international crises and that the required 
government skills and expertise are at the ready. Fourthly, to develop new program capacity, including a 
$100-million Global Peace and Security Fund, to provide security assistance, as well as resources for post 
stabilization and recovery. Fifthly, to strengthen its field presence, particularly in regions of growing 
interest to Canada (such as Asia), and to improve capacity in key third languages such as Mandarin and 
Arabic. Finally, to pursue a more robust and aggressive public diplomacy strategy, to ensure that Canada’s 
voice and ideas and clearly heard and understood, enabling us to build the coalitions we need to achieve our 
goals’ (International Policy Statement, pp. 2-3) 
35 Canadian International Policy Statement, (2005), p. 15. 
36 Ann Lane. (2005). Diplomacy Today: Delivering Results in a World of Changing Priorities. Report on 
Wilton Park Conference, March 3rd to 6th. 
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This ‘radical transformation’ is unprecedented, overdue and welcomed (by 
publics) as a necessity in the complex modern diplomatic environment.37 Given the self-
motivated need for evolutionary change, it can be confirmed that the traditional 
diplomatic institution is not in decline, obsolete or irrelevant. Traditional diplomacy 
‘remains a major and ubiquitous activity of governments in our time, and therefore of 
importance to us all’.38 Diplomacy, after all, is the ‘story of how nations deal with each 
other, their actions in specific cases and the modalities they employ’ to ensure 
international political stability.39 Traditional diplomacy’s ongoing relevance is closely 
related to its evolutionary capacity. Granted, the traditional vulgate of diplomacy is slow 
to change, to react to environmental developments, however it does change and evolve to 
suit its immediate environment.  
These observations are more accurate than the splintered and fragmented form of 
theory on the fate of the traditional diplomatic institution that currently exists. Thus, by 
theorising eclectically, it can be confirmed that the institution has demonstrated, once 
more, its adaptability and keen sense of awareness of the ever-changing environment 
within which it operates. These theoretical observations, when supported with empirical 
evidence, confirm the central, enduring and valuable role of the traditional diplomatic 
institution in the modern diplomatic environment.  
 Reaching this assumption would have been impossible had the three diplomatic 
theories remained in isolation and competition. However, used together, and in eclectic 
fashion, the debate between the three theories will remain a valuable enterprise when 
                                                 
37 ibid., p. 1. For a breakdown of the motivations and responses of Britain’s FCO to the modern complex 
modern diplomatic environment see, Ann Lane. (2005). Diplomacy Today: Delivering Results in a World 
of Changing Priorities. Report on Wilton Park Conference, March 3rd to 6th. 
38 Watson, Diplomacy, p. 13. 
39 ibid. 
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theorising on the role and fate of the traditional diplomatic institution. NDT, and IDT to a 
certain extent, are useful in that they continually encourage the field to prove in some 
fashion (in this section the method employed was empirical evidence) that the traditional 
diplomatic institution is not irrelevant or obsolete. For Traditionalists, it is no longer 
adequate to argue that the institution is not irrelevant or obsolete simply because it 
continues to exist. Instead, we are encouraged to demonstrate how and why the institution 
is adapting to yet another radical diplomatic environment. Thus, novel, valuable and 
deeper knowledge is continually added to the diplomatic studies field.40 The debate 
between various statist and non-statist theorists, if their divergent theoretical approaches 
are respected, is productive in that the specialised work of the Traditionalists ultimately 
becomes more robust.  
 
6.1.2  Do IGOs really matter?  
By using the three diplomatic theories together, the important role, purpose and 
function of IGOs in the modern diplomatic environment can be confirmed. Each theory 
has a valuable contribution in reaching this understanding. By using the three diplomatic 
theories in an eclectic manner five observations emerge, all of which are validated by 
practical evidence.  
Firstly, IGOs are not distinct diplomatic actors. This observation runs contrary to 
NDT, which claims that IGOs are distinct diplomatic actors where the whole is greater 
                                                 
40 Since 1999, this new knowledge has come to light in the diplomatic studies field, and only adds to the 
scope of diplomacy studies. For three approaches demonstrating the value of such additional knowledge, 
see Brian Hocking. (1999). Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation. London: Macmillan; Brian 
Hocking and David Spence (eds.). (2002). Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating 
Diplomats. London: Macmillan; Rana, Kishan S. (2004). Foreign Ministries: Change and Reform. Paper 
presented at the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18th. 
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than the sum of their state parts. For Nascent theorists, the IGO is more effective at global 
problem solving than the incumbent traditional diplomatic institution, which means IGOs 
have become more significant on the world stage than governments who are cast into 
growing irrelevance.  
This rhetoric is useful, as it challenges statist theorists to prove otherwise. 
According to Traditionalists, this distinct-diplomatic-actor thesis is difficult to prove, 
since IGOs are inter-governmental organisations after all. States and statesmen initially 
instigated the concept; therefore Traditionalists argue that IGOs are built by states, for 
states. Consequently, Traditionalists caution that it is misleading to think of IGOs as 
outside forces or exogenous actors. IGOs are the conscious creation of states and their 
success depends on the will of their state members. IDT does not subscribe to either of 
these arguments but suggests that an appraisal of practical evidence will help settle the 
debate.  
Susan Spencer of UNICEF (Vietnam) admitted that although her IGO confers 
massive advantage on development issues it struggles to make an impact politically:  
 
We’re not politicians or diplomats, we’re aid workers. UNICEF does like to push the line that it 
is a political organisation…. we are aware of political issues, however our priority remains 
making sure children survive and thrive and get a good start in life. There is a difference 
[between individual states] in terms of agenda, and in essence this renders us apolitical. We 
may not be as strong as the state, but we have a lot of knowledge and a lot of expertise. You 
can’t put a price on that; its worthwhile listening to us.41 
 
                                                 
41 Susan Spencer (UNICEF), interview, Hanoi, Vietnam. March 10th, 2005. 
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In other words, IGOs are not independent political actors but facilitators of 
expertise available to states if required. The different focus and approach of IGOs means 
they occupy a specialised niche in the modern diplomatic environment; they perform a 
different role and function to traditional a state actor, which perhaps alludes to why NDT 
continue to endorse the distinct-diplomatic-actor thesis. However, despite their different 
purpose, function, and focus, IGOs remain controlled by states. This is a point evident in 
much of the official rhetoric espoused by traditional, state actors.  
Britain, for example, acknowledges that ‘the UN is nothing more than the 
aggregate of its member states’ and ‘can only be as strong as its members states allow it 
to be’.42 Similarly, Australia’s DFAT highlighted that the UN is ‘anachronistic…it is up 
to the member states to encourage the organisation to becomes a relevant and effective 
21st century actor.’43 DFAT is suggesting that the success, and future relevance, of the 
UN is dependent on its member states. Consequently, IGOs are viewed only as great as 
the sum of their state parts and prone to state manipulation. States use IGOs to further 
their own goals, and will continue to design international institutions accordingly. 
This conclusion suggests a second theoretical observation: IGOs are a supplement 
to traditional state-qua-state diplomacy. Once more, this observation runs contrary to 
NDT. Nascent theorists highlight that IGOs are not only fora for states but also for non-
state actors, such as NGOs and other IGOs. They claim that non-state actors are finding a 
voice within IGOs and are being accepted as part of a process once reserved for states. 
How then can IGOs be a supplement to traditional diplomacy? While these observations 
are correct, Traditionalists remind us that the success of any IGO largely depends on the 
                                                 
42 FCO Annual Report, p. 143. 
43 DFAT’s Annual Report is available in pdf format from < http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual_reports/>, 
retrieved, 18th December 2005, p. 18. 
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whims of its dominant state members. Non-state actors influence the process of 
multilateralism but it is states that take the decisions. Until IGOs dispel the member-state-
servant image, they will continue to supplement traditional diplomacy. Traditionalists 
reluctantly acknowledge the emergence of non-state actors in IGOs but seem unperturbed 
by this occurrence. States form the bulk of the IGO membership; they are the only actors 
of real consequence. 
This observation is supported with empirical evidence. DFAT’s Bob Davis noted 
of IGOs and multi-lateral diplomacy that: 
 
they are useful for the bilateral opportunities they present….we do need multi-lateral forums 
but their efficacy has yet to be really proven, particularly in conflict situations. The business 
end of diplomacy will remain for some time in the bilateral relations between nation states.44  
 
Acknowledging that IGOs and multilateralism are useful add-ons to the traditional 
bilateral machinery, Davis reveals his statist preference in his interpretation of the worth 
of IGO forums. This is not uncommon for diplomats. Ambassador Les Luck, also of 
DFAT, jovially agreed that: 
 
Where IGOs are concerned, the multilateral process is tedious, long and often nothing more 
than a token gesture. Where we [DFAT] achieve real progress is in the unofficial meetings, in 
the corridor, the car parks and the hotel lobbies. Often we achieve far more with our 
counterparts over a quick one-on-one chat than at a full day’s meeting.45 
                                                 
44 Bob Davis, interview, Canberra, Australia. July 15th, 2004. As of January 2006, Bob Davis is the 
Assistant Secretary, Open Source Collection Branch, DFAT.  
45 Ambassador Les Luck, interview, Canberra, Australia. July 15th, 2004. 
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Thus, IGOs are a forum, a meeting place where many traditional actors are 
gathered at the same time; multi-lateral IGOs constitute another level of diplomacy, 
which exists alongside the traditional bi-lateral form of diplomacy. Therefore, the real 
benefit of the multilateral IGOs is the bilateral opportunities that emerge. This type of 
argument further impinges upon the Nascent theoretical notion of IGOs as distinct 
diplomatic actors.  
If IGOs are not distinct diplomatic but supplementary actors then what 
relationship do they share with the state? NDT informs us that the relationship is 
adversarial, with both IGOs and states competing over a right to manage and solve 21st 
century global problems. However, theorising eclectically provides confirmation that the 
state/IGO relationship is symbiotic. IDT confirms this third point unequivocally. For 
Innovators, IGOs are neither built by states for states nor are they independent diplomatic 
actors. Innovators prefer to focus on a symbiosis between traditional state actors and 
IGOs. The state/IGO relationship is thus a complementary one, and of benefit to both.  
The practical evidence suggests that states, largely, value IGOs. Ambassador 
Laverdure of DFAIT was positive on the value of multilateralism to Canada. He 
acknowledged:  
 
we would never be an important power if multilateralism did not exist, we’re a small country, 
that’s why we believe the only way to make a difference to the world is to work through the 
UN and the Commonwealth, and we’ve achieved great success with that.46  
                                                 
46 Ambassador Claude Laverdure, interview, Paris, France. May 9th, 2005. As of January 2006, 
Ambassador Laverdure is the Canadian Ambassador to France.  
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Ambassador Laverdure’s Minister Plenipotentiary Laurette Glasgow was equally 
positive, stating that: 
 
the modern international system is evolving to the point where states cannot coexist without 
international institutions. In our [Canada’s] case, multilateralism has been valuable. We can 
create partnerships, reach common agenda and increase the well-being of Canadians in ways 
previously unimaginable. Multilateralism allows us to bypass the tried and tested methods of 
traditional bilateral interaction. I can’t imagine how the system would function as effectively 
without international institutions.47  
 
Traditional diplomatic institutions further validate these comments. Most 
diplomatic institutions see the UN as a necessary part of the modern IR system. For 
example, Britain’s FCO writes of the ‘indispensable’ UN that it plays a vital role for a 
‘strong and secure international community’.48 Because of its ‘universal membership and 
comprehensive mandate, the UN is the only institution capable of giving legitimacy to 
decisions taken by and on behalf of the international community’.49  
Similarly, Canada’s DFAIT notes that: 
 
                                                 
47 Laurette Glasgow, Interview, Paris, France. May 9th, 2005. As of January 2006 Laurette Glasgow is the 
Canadian Ministre Plenipotentiaire to France.  
48 FCO Annual Report, p. 146. 
49 ibid., p. 141. 
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today, UN multilateral cooperation is more important than ever. It is the only option open to us 
if we are to usefully tackle emerging global issues, to protect people around the world against 
violence, and to give them the opportunity to build prosperous fulfilling lives.50 
 
For states such as Canada and Australia, the IGO is a valuable addition to 
traditional diplomatic methods in the 21st century. The favorable rhetoric that such states 
confer on IGOs such as the UN leads into the fourth theoretical observation: that any 
positive relationship between states and IGOs is dependent on commonality of agenda. In 
the modern diplomatic environment, the common agenda is often global, rather than 
national. Thus, Nascent theorists remind us that traditional bilateral diplomacy is not as 
efficient or effective at global problem solving as multilateralism.  Similarly, Innovators 
also stress that IGOs are more effective than states at global problem solving by 
highlighting the inadequacy of traditional diplomatic techniques to tackle global 
problems. IGOs are more useful as they provide an international forum, multilateral 
mechanisms and quicker solutions to international problems. Although Traditionalists 
have little to say on this matter (the notion of a successful IGO detracts from their loyal 
affiliation to the traditional diplomatic institution), they do agree that states will use IGOs 
if it suits their own agenda. With the global agenda affecting more and more states, their 
reliance on IGO and multi-lateral diplomacy is only likely to increase.  
This situation is certainly the prevailing impression in the official publications. 
The emerging global issues and the need to address them through multilateralism are 
mentioned in many Foreign Affairs documents. DFAIT provides one example by 
highlighting that ‘issues that were not high on the international agenda decades ago are 
                                                 
50 Canada’s International Policy Statement, (2005), p. 15. 
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now critical, such as climate change, fragile states, terrorism and internally displaced 
persons’.51 To tackle these issues, DFAIT, and many other diplomatic institutions, invest 
great faith in the ‘more focused multilateral cooperation.’52 
Ambassador Robert Gordon mentioned a similar preference for multilateralism 
when tackling global problems. He noted that: 
 
As the agenda shifts and evolves so too must the method change. This change in diplomatic 
method, or the means if you prefer, is especially important when tackling emerging global 
problems such as terrorism or environmental degradation. If traditional methods are not as 
effective as multilateral methods then the FCO will naturally use the most effective channel in 
the hope of achieving the most effective result.53  
 
In other words, traditional diplomatic actors will engage with alternate diplomatic 
methods, depending on the problem/issue at hand. With the diplomatic agenda becoming 
increasingly global states will persevere with IGOs and multilateralism, particularly when 
it suits their interests. The theory and evidence suggests that IGOs will continue to be 
utilised for global problem solving.  
When the counter-side of this notion is considered, a fifth theoretical observation 
emerges. If agreement or commonality (of agenda) is absent then the IGO becomes little 
more than a state talking shop, plagued by complexity, distrust and inefficiency. 
Individual states will not endorse a decision that runs contrary to their own national 
interest for the sake of the IGO’s legitimacy, credibility and well-being. This is a claim 
                                                 
51 Canada’s International Policy Statement, (2005), p. 19 
52 ibid. 
53 Ambassador Robert Gordon, Interview, Hanoi, Vietnam. March 9th, 2005. 
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both Traditionalists and Innovators advance, although the notion has deeper resonance 
with the former diplomatic theory. Traditionalists portray IGOs as too complex, too 
complicated and simply anti-diplomatic. IGOs are anti-diplomatic due to their large 
membership where each state has a different, and often conflicting, individual interest.  
Nascent theorists avoid this obvious drawback of IGOs and the difficulty of 
reaching agreement multilaterally. Instead, they (incorrectly) assume the mere presence 
of an IGO is a panacea to all international ills. This type of rhetoric is uncomfortable for 
diplomatic practitioners. For example, Paul Wilson, of DFAT, complained that:  
 
the sanctity with which some people treat the UN is difficult to take. French Foreign Minister 
De Villepin is indicative of this attitude, and I quote, “in this temple of the UN we are the 
guardians of a conscience”…..let’s be pragmatic about what they set out to do and what they 
actually can do. I’m sceptical of the view that getting together is a good thing, especially if you 
get together and don’t do anything.54  
 
Jane Madden, DFAT’s Permanent Delegate to UNESCO, mentioned the 
difficulties the complexity of IGO forums bestow upon traditional diplomacy. IGOs, in 
her opinion, are: 
 
                                                 
54 Paul Wilson, interview, Paris, France. May 10th, 2005. As of January 2006, Paul Wilson is DFAT’s 
Deuxieme Secretaire to France.  
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not entirely effective, decision making in multilateral institutions – due to the size and scale of 
their task, and their membership numbers – is often slow, cumbersome and awkward. Reaching 
consensus in large organisations, where everyone has different perspectives, is not easy.55 
 
 Madden provides firm, practical evidence of the diplomatic practitioner’s lament 
of complexity through universal membership. Thus, the theory and the empirical 
evidence suggest that IGOs are complex diplomatic environments where disagreement is 
just as common as agreement.  
Despite the drawbacks of multilateral diplomacy, IGOs will continue to play a 
vital and valuable role in the modern diplomatic environment. IGOs are becoming an 
increasingly positive environment for non-state actors, with NGOs and other IGOs 
finding a voice and gaining entry into processes once reserved exclusively for states. The 
traditional members – states –will continue to endorse diplomacy by multilateralism if it 
suits them (for global problem solving), for bilateral opportunities or even to symbolise a 
mythical unity of mankind. IGOs will remain important diplomatic environments for state 
and non-state actors. 
Nascent theorists are valuable in this respect as they will continue to encourage 
awareness of the notable proliferation of IGOs during the 20th century56 and the 
multilateral diplomacy they practice, no matter how effective or ineffective. This NDT 
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focus suggests that IGOs are unlikely to disappear and we must therefore continue to 
theorise on how these actors fit in to the modern diplomatic environment.  
 The words of one statesman adroitly sums up the role of IGOs in the modern 
diplomatic environment. British Prime Minister Tony Blair noted that: 
 
The UN, for all its imperfections, is a force for good and our desire is that it does more, not 
less. If the UN did not exist we would be forced to invent it. It may be imperfect but it was not 
designed to take us to Heaven, it was conceived to save us from another hell….The United 
Nations provides the opportunity to find solutions, it is up to the nations to will the means for 
us all to succeed.57 
 
From the above, it is clear that IGOs do matter. But matter for reasons other than 
those believed by the three diplomatic theories and theorists independently. By using the 
three theories in an eclectic fashion a block of theoretical observations, some novel and 
others existing, can be proposed: multilateralism is a supplement to traditional 
diplomacy; it can be a complex process and thus ineffective or difficult to reach 
consensus; and, in DFAIT’s case certainly, multilateral fora can be of some benefit to the 
traditional state, if they suit the state’s interests; IGOs are only as great as the sum of their 
state parts, yet are now a valuable and intrinsic part of the modern diplomatic 
environment; IGOs are only likely to succeed when points of agenda convergence 
amongst states are startlingly obvious. When these observations are supported by 
empirical evidence, a more complete picture of IGOs, and their place in the modern 
diplomatic environment, can be confirmed.  
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6.1.3 Diplomacy by Summit 
Where summitry is concerned, the opinion of the three groups of theorists is 
similar. This is unusual and is the only one of the six themes where such agreement 
occurs. All three groups of theorists employ different arguments but all agree that 
summitry is of questionable value to modern diplomacy. Thus, diplomatic theory is 
apathetic towards diplomacy by summit. This rare consensus amongst theorists is 
valuable, particularly in terms of identifying where future research and theory should be 
directed.  
For Traditionalists, summitry is the target of criticism over its efficacy as a viable 
diplomatic tool. Comparing summitry to the art, specialised vocation and subtle nuance 
inherent to traditional diplomacy supports this argument. In essence, Traditionalists 
conclude that the summit devalues diplomacy. There is little affinity for a glamorous 
summit process that detracts from traditional diplomacy. Traditionalists are more likely to 
remind us of the failing of summits rather than interpret them as a valuable supplement to 
traditional diplomacy.  
 Similarly, Nascent theorists share little affinity for the summit process, although 
for different reasons. That statesmen have to meet face to face, claim Nascent theorists, 
suggests a deficiency in the conventional channels of state-qua-state diplomacy. In 
addition, Nascent theorists suggest that summits are nothing more than dramatic theatre; 
summits are mere publicity stunts; summits portraying statesmen as close allies is a 
subsequent façade; and finally that summits are a waste of time and money, as they rarely 
produce any meaningful political results.58  
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 Innovators, too, appear reluctant to endorse diplomacy by summit. Predictably, 
they take a middle-ground stance on the value of summitry. For Innovators, the value of 
summitry remains undecided, ‘as always, one can see the summit cup as half full or half 
empty’.59 Innovators agree that summits are loosely significant for modern diplomacy, 
but not essential to international political stability. Their indecisiveness leaves us in doubt 
concerning the continuing practice and efficacy of diplomacy by summit. 
 Interpreting summitry through any of the three lenses does not provide us with an 
explanation for the prevalence of summit diplomacy. Seeking commonality amongst the 
three theories, however, is valuable in ascertaining why theorists are generally dismissive 
about summitry.  
 There is a different reason behind each group’s motives in dismissing the value of 
summitry. The Traditionalists’ dismissal of summitry can be traced to their loyal and 
sentimental devotion to the traditional diplomatic institution. Any process that detracts 
from or hinders the work of the institution is unlikely to be viewed in a favorable light. 
Conversely, for the Nascent theorists, any process that questions the value and worth of 
the traditional diplomatic institution is dwelt upon. For Nascent theorists, the argument 
that summits are ineffective is employed as evidence of another nail in traditional 
diplomacy’s figurative coffin. Where IDT is concerned, they are willing to reserve 
judgement on the summit process; ‘research pending’ as one theorist expresses.60 
 These different motives suggest reluctance by the majority of diplomatic theorists 
to include summitry under the heading of diplomacy. For diplomatic theorists, the 
summit itself essentially involves statesmen and therefore should fall under the study of 
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statecraft and not diplomacy. Granted the pre and post negotiation work is pure 
diplomacy but the summit itself is not. All summits involve diplomacy to a certain point 
but the summit itself has hardly any resonance with any of the diplomatic theories. This 
diplomacy/statecraft division appears to be the source of the theorists’ disdain for 
summitry, as well as the reason opinion and theory on diplomacy by summit is largely 
avoided in the diplomatic studies field. 
 Similarly, many of the diplomats, Ambassadors and practitioners interviewed 
were uncomplimentary about the summit process. Their attitude somewhat vindicates the 
ambivalence diplomatic theorists also have towards diplomacy by summit. If the 
practitioners are uncomplimentary on summitry then the theorists will also mirror this 
apathy.  
 For example, DFAIT’s Laurette Glasgow questions: 
 
at what point does the meeting of statesmen become statecraft and not diplomacy? Statesmen 
are not diplomats; they have a much wider and less specialised role in modern international 
relations. Yes, the statesman is in essence the diplomat-in-chief, but he is not a classical 
diplomat by any stretch of the imagination.61  
   
 However, Glasgow is also quick to point out that ‘summitry is part and parcel of 
the modern diplomatic system, we just haven’t figured out which part, as yet’.62 Most 
diplomats share a similar, vague attitude on diplomacy by summit. All those interviewed 
had some derogatory comment on the summit but all agreed it was a necessary and, at 
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times, valuable manifestation of the evolution of inter-state relations. For example, Ian 
Kemish of DFAT notes that: 
 
the only time we see action [at the summit] is when the television cameras appear. Most of the 
diplomacy, that is the negotiation and subsequent agreement, has already taken place before the 
summit. However, getting the rubber stamp on prenegotiation work from the “bosses” adds 
something to any international agreement. It shows solidarity, progress and commonality 
amongst sovereign states. This can only be positive for international relations and diplomacy.63 
 
 Summitry is an omnipotent occurrence in the modern diplomatic environment, the 
summit itself may not be relevant to diplomacy but the process and the outcome most 
certainly is.  
But is this too shallow a view of diplomacy by summit? Ambassador Claude 
Laverdure, the former Canadian ‘sherpa’ to the G8, claims there is more diplomacy going 
on at the summit than the above statements would have us believe. He reminds us that: 
 
the importance of summitry must not be devalued. We often overlook the fact that it is not only 
statesmen who meet at summits but also diplomats of every rank and status. There is far more 
diplomacy goes on at any summit than you may think.64 
 
 In this context, it could be argued that the summit is a valuable forum for 
diplomacy, as well as statecraft, and will continue to be so. Ambassador Laverdure’s 
statement mirrors the official organisational ethos prevalent in modern diplomatic 
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institutions. In the Annual Reports, White Papers and official statements, few mentions 
were made of the negative impact of the summit process itself. These publications 
stressed the invaluable role of diplomacy pre and post summit. For example, Australia’s 
DFAT, writing on the 2003 WTO summit in Cancun, mentions that: 
 
Despite our best endeavors, progress was disappointingly slow, highlighted by the failure of 
WTO members to reach agreement at Cancun. However we will continue to look for ways 
forward. The culmination of complex and intense negotiations on the part of the department is 
responsible for the progress before Cancun and future success is dependent on a similar level of 
hard work and commitment.65  
 
The fundamental role of DFAT in pre and post summit negotiations is clear from 
the above statement. Similarly Britain’s FCO sees itself as an intrinsic part in any 
summit. For example, during the July 2005 G8 Summit the FCO was:  
 
heavily involved in negotiating many of the summit outcomes. Several other [British] 
government departments have a strong interest in the policy, and lead in some cases, but the 
FCO ensures the policy is coherent and consistent by, for example, acting as a channel for 
policy papers and briefings and regular co-ordination meetings. The FCO is responsible for 
organising the summit as well as a number of preparatory events.66 
 
This practical rhetoric confirms that diplomacy and the summit are closely 
related; in the above case the very success of the summit depended on the role of the 
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FCO before, during and after the G8 summit. The reluctance, therefore, of the majority of 
diplomatic theorists to positively address summit diplomacy is perplexing.  
Currently, diplomatic theory fails to recognise that summits involve much more 
multi and polylateral diplomacy, between not only heads of state or diplomats but also 
significant non-state actors. Some diplomatic theorists present an overly simplistic 
portrayal of summitry, where two or more heads of state meet for a casual fireside chat. 
Summitry, in the practical sense, is anything but simple, an exclusive state exercise or a 
‘meaningless gathering of theatre actors’.67  
At the moment, diplomatic theory is restrictive in that we have only scratched the 
surface of diplomacy by summit. The common dismissal (of diplomacy by summit) 
inherent to each of the three diplomatic theories is therefore valuable in the sense that a 
gap in the research can be confirmed, and a means of filling that gap suggested. The 
prevailing dismissive mood surrounding summitry suggests two possible directions for 
diplomatic theory on summitry: either it is wholeheartedly included under the banner of 
diplomacy studies or it continues to be treated with disdain and largely avoided. The 
former direction would be more beneficial for diplomatic theory as the summit does 
involve a considerable amount of diplomacy.  
More research is needed to enhance our understanding of summitry’s place within 
the modern diplomatic environment. Central to this exploration could be a frank appraisal 
over the relevancy of summitry to diplomacy and where, if at all, the study and research 
of summitry fits in the diplomatic studies field. Indeed, the three groups of diplomatic 
theorists could build on the practitioner’s various opinions on diplomacy by summit. The 
practitioners, and the official statements, are subtly complimentary on this form of 
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diplomacy, although not overwhelmingly so. In other words, they are uninterested in 
relegating this form of diplomacy to the margins of the professional activity.  
This being said, the responsibility for exploring the role of diplomacy by summit 
should fall under the ambit of the diplomatic theorist. In the practical sense, summitry is 
no longer an ad hoc and sporadic means of conducting inter-state relations; it is a 
permanent feature of the modern diplomatic environment. Practitioners – statesmen or 
diplomats – have accepted its existence, no matter however expedient a means of 
diplomacy summitry is. Therefore, diplomatic theory, if it intends to accurately mirror the 
practical realm of diplomacy, needs to tackle the topic of diplomacy by summit in a less 
parsimonious and more positive fashion. Such a contribution is unlikely to come from the 
Traditionalists or the Nascent theorists, as their respective state and non-state focus 
precludes them from tackling diplomacy by summit in an objective manner. The 
Innovators, with their impartial and balanced form of theory, may be the most appropriate 
group of theorists for a revised account of diplomacy by summit’s place in the modern 
diplomatic environment and in the diplomatic studies field.68  
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6.1.4 The niche diplomacy of NGOs 
In 1909, the Yearbook of International Relations informs us there were 176 
NGOs.69 This number had increased to 997 by 1954 and to a staggering 20,928 in 
2005/6.70 Opinion on the impact of the now swelling ranks of NGOs is divided within the 
diplomatic studies field. On the one hand, some theorists portray NGOs as a nuisance to 
professional diplomacy, and of secondary or peripheral importance.71 On the other, 
champions of NGOs view their impact as a watershed moment for diplomacy and 
international relations, heralding the rise of a pacific actor more effective than the 
incumbent state and its traditional diplomatic institution.72 By theorising eclectically, the 
role and impact of NGOs in the modern diplomatic environment can be better 
understood. There are five subsequent theoretical observations this thesis proposes, each 
of them supported by practical opinion and evidence.  
Firstly, it is postulated that NGOs are important diplomatic actors. NGOs 
emerged in response to changes in the diplomatic environment after the Cold War, and 
appear likely to increase in number, professionalism (of approach) and technique (of 
diplomatic method). The presence of NGOs in the diplomatic system ‘has provided 
another example of how existing parts of the diplomatic system can provide the means of 
responding to the needs of the current situation and to some degree actually shape 
them’.73 In other words, NGOs have filled a niche in the modern diplomatic environment 
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that traditional diplomatic actors were unwilling or unable to address. Subsequently, 
traditional actors have welcomed this evolutionary development.  
For example, Britain’s FCO has clearly responded to a change in the modern 
diplomatic environment and enhanced their state/NGO partnership. They note that 
‘international relations are no longer channeled solely between governments….we now 
work as openly as we can with representatives of NGOs and the public’.74 
Both Anne Plunkett and Bob Davis of DFAT also agreed that ‘there is no more 
state exclusivity’ in terms of formulating and delivering foreign policy.75 Lydia Morton, 
also of DFAT, adopted a similar tack, stating: 
 
NGOs have an important role in foreign policy, they always will. They have their own identity, 
their own mentality but their opinion matters, their expertise matters. They [NGOs] are part of 
the national interest, part of the foreign policy formulation process.76 
 
With this endorsement from the dominant diplomatic actor, it can be suggested 
that NGOs are now an integral ‘part’ of the modern diplomatic environment.  
This assumption leads to a second observation: NGOs have been accepted in a 
diplomatic environment dominated by states as they provide a valuable diplomatic role. 
There are now at least three significant forms of state/NGO interface; firstly that of a 
kick-starter, where proactive behaviour on the part of NGOs helps frame the agenda for 
action by the government; secondly, NGOs can take on a subcontracting/facilitative role, 
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such as active mediation or aid distribution, that supports the work of government; 
finally, as a joint manager, where the activity of NGOs lends itself to certain types of 
institution building with governments.77 Some examples illustrate these three forms; The 
Kimberley Diamond Process and Nazi Gold are among the better-known cases on states 
and NGOs working together diplomatically to achieve a common agenda. 
Britain’s FCO acknowledges that NGOs ‘have acquired great power to drive the 
international agenda by forming public attitudes and generating pressures on 
governments’.78 The role of NGOs is only going to become ‘more important’ in the 
future; they ‘will contribute to stronger popular demands for accountability, and to 
pressure for governments to focus on the environment, poverty and other aspects of the 
global agenda’.79 For the FCO, it is ‘essential to foster, cement and encourage a close 
partnership with NGOs’.80 Practically, traditional diplomatic institutions have 
acknowledged the emergence of NGOs, an occurrence that must be incorporated into the 
mainstream of diplomatic theory. 
From this conclusion a third observation can be advanced: that the state/NGO 
relationship is not adversarial or competitive but symbiotic and complementary. This 
observation was reached by examining the interplay between the three theories. In the 
diplomatic studies literature, the treatment of NGOs by two of the three groups of 
theorists suggests that the relationship is adversarial. Traditionalists, for example, 
consider NGOs as peripheral or of secondary importance to traditional diplomacy. Some 
Traditionalists ‘choose to ignore the phenomenon: others continue to relegate NGOs – or 
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indeed any challenger to state-centered assumptions – to the margins of the discussion’.81 
The Traditionalists dismissive treatment of NGOs is understandable. Their focus on the 
traditional diplomatic institution reminds us of its ongoing importance as a central 
diplomatic actor. TDT suggests that we must not become carried away with the modern 
phenomenon of NGOs. 
The lens of TDT is thus somewhat restrictive, as it does not provide 
understanding of the significant proliferation of NGOs since the end of the Cold War. 
Their parochialism led to the mustering of an alternate faction of theorists who argued 
that NGOs were no longer peripheral or of secondary importance in the modern 
diplomatic environment. The TDT rejection of NGOs as emerging diplomatic actors laid 
down a challenge to theorists to prove that NGOs were effective diplomatic actors. 
Traditionalist opinion (or lack thereof) on NGOs bred an opposing faction of theorists 
who argued that NGOs are important diplomatic actors. This group, Nascent diplomatic 
theorists, thus develops awareness, draws attention to NGOs and conceptualises on how 
they are impacting the modern diplomatic environment. It is unlikely this aggressive 
response would have occurred if TDT had been less dismissive of NGOs. 
The NDT contribution to understanding the state/NGO relationship is therefore 
equally valuable for diplomatic studies. Firstly, through developing awareness of NGOs 
in the modern diplomatic environment they promote research supporting their 
observations. Thus, their opinion serves as a valuable counterweight to dismissive TDT. 
Secondly, Nascent theorists highlight that if adherence to TDT continued an 
understanding of NGOs in the 21st century will remain elusive. In other words, they 
identified an existing gap in the knowledge and sought to address it. In this capacity, 
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NDT adds to the field, to our diplomatic knowledge. And thirdly, their scholarship 
generates interesting debate and questions, such as ‘due to their increasing numbers and 
increasing efficacy, are NGOs more important diplomatic actors than states and their 
traditional diplomatic institutions?’ Many Nascent theorists would have us believe that 
NGOs have ‘become more significant on the world stage than governments’.82 This 
different attitude promises a vibrant debate between alternate groups of diplomatic 
theorists, which breathes life into a diplomatic studies field dominated by TDT.  
However, this is where NDT, like TDT, becomes restrictive. NGOs are not more 
significant on the world stage than traditional diplomatic actors. Confirmation of this 
assumption is left to the third group of theorists.83 Using both TDT and NDT, Innovators 
take the knowledge a step further. They argue that NGOs are important diplomatic actors, 
but not as important as states and their traditional diplomatic institutions. Interpreted 
through the IDT lens, states and NGOs do ‘inhabit different environments’, but their 
relationship is positive, symbiotic and complementary.84 For Innovators, both states and 
NGOs have important but different roles to play in the modern diplomatic environment. 
Again, it is unlikely that IDT would have emerged if TDT and NDT were less parochial. 
This conclusion is supported by empirical evidence. Ambassador Laverdure first 
discussed the notion of adversarial relationships, before confirming the growing synergy 
between state and NGO:  
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I’d say they [adversarial relationships] might have been the case ten or fifteen years ago, when 
we realised there were other international players. We had suspected them but were inclined to 
close our eyes and say “they don’t know what they’re talking about, we know the business and 
we don’t need new partners”. The relationship was initially adversarial because many NGOs 
had a tendency to be themselves adversarial, because they were always negative about what we 
were doing and it got into the streets, for example the Seattle WTO negotiations and the G8 
protests. All these people [NGOs] were suggesting that we in our traditional diplomacy never 
address the real questions, that we don’t talk about global employment, human rights or poverty 
in the world. It took us quite a while to realise that these people were not going to disappear, to 
realise that if we’re to work together it might be in the interest of our own country and world 
society. Nowadays, we deal with these people on a daily basis. They are not necessarily taking 
over our responsibility; we’re all interested partners. Now it’s more of a team effort, we don’t 
see them as a threat and they’ve discovered we don’t live on another planet.85 
 
A modern diplomat, then, identifies the reason behind the division in the 
diplomatic studies literature and the changing nature of the state/NGO relationship. Both 
state and NGO, it would appear, are valuable actors in the modern diplomatic 
environment. Each has a different, specialised and complementary role to play. This was 
a notion Marcie Friedman of the American Red Cross was keen to stress. Of the state and 
the NGO, she highlighted that:  
 
we’re like different animals, sometimes we fight but most of the time we get along. We respect 
each other’s territory. The value of NGOs to diplomacy and international relations is that we 
reflect different approaches, different ways of doing things, different ideas. We’re there to 
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balancing things off, to test out ideas. Our great ability is the freedom to make statements 
because we don’t have any political affiliation….we’re a useful addition. But to argue we’re out 
to get the state, to steal its legitimacy? C’mon.86  
 
From the above opinion then it can be deduced that the state/NGO relationship is 
not adversarial, with states suppressing recalcitrant NGOs, or aggressive NGOs 
challenging the state and questioning its legitimacy.  
The symbiotic relationship between state/NGO and the acknowledgment of their 
diplomatic actor status leads to a fourth observation: states clearly value the participation 
and role of NGOs in the modern diplomatic environment. For example, Canada’s DFAIT 
clearly values the contribution of NGOs to its foreign policy execution. One government 
initiative concerns leveraging: 
 
the impact of these groups internationally, to promote sharing of knowledge and expertise, to 
build synergies amongst them, and to better publicise their work to Canadians. DFAIT will 
continue to promote greater outreach and dialogue with non-governmental organisations.87  
 
For DFAIT, ‘achieving our international objectives requires the active 
participation of civil society, as NGOs are international actors in their own right’.88 
Consequently, NGOs are often included in Canadian delegations to meetings of 
international organisations where ‘practice permits’ and ‘when the discussion concerns a 
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shared subject matter’.89 The state/NGO partnership is one that DFAIT values; they are 
‘committed to working more closely with NGOs to strengthen information sharing, 
consultative and participatory mechanisms’.90   
DFAIT clearly believes that NGOs are a useful tool in achieving its foreign policy 
objectives.  Canada’s Deputy Foreign Minister, V. Peter Harder, expressed a similar 
sentiment, noting that: 
 
we couldn’t have achieved our agenda without the involvement of NGOs. Maybe fifteen years 
ago the relationship was adversarial but back then they [NGOs] weren’t global, and they didn’t 
know what we were up to. Now we discuss issues that are of real concern to them [NGOs]. 
Now, we work together.91 
 
This type of rhetoric is more than a token acknowledgement of NGO’s worth to 
Canadian Foreign Policy execution. In other words, the NGO/DFAIT relationship is 
deeper than lip service paid by the Canadian Foreign Office. Perhaps the best-known 
example of DFAIT/NGO cooperation is the Ottawa Process, where the Canadian 
government worked in close partnership with several NGOs on the successful campaign 
to ban landmines.92 
Similarly, Britain’s FCO highlights that a close relationship with NGOs is central 
to their future success. The FCO will ultimately benefit from increased collaboration with 
NGOs. The FCO is ‘seeking to tap into the expertise and experience of a range of groups 
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and communities throughout this country [Britain]…the aim is to set up strategic 
partnerships and networks in the UK to work towards common goals’.93  
This empirical evidence clearly confirms the symbiotic state/NGO relationship, 
with partnership becoming a hallmark of the modern diplomatic environment. However, 
a final observation must be advanced: states largely guide the role of NGOs in the 
modern diplomatic environment. This observation is consummate with TDT. These 
theorists remind us that the state and the traditional diplomatic institution remain the 
primary diplomatic actors in the modern IR system. The NGO/state relationship is a 
subservient one with NGOs reliant on the state for legitimacy, funding in many cases, and 
for access into the official and dominant channels of diplomacy. 
Consequently, the state/NGO relationship is not always a positive one, from both 
sides of the practical fence. Paul Wilson, speaking of recalcitrant NGOs, warned of the 
danger of incoherence and lack of government oversight on NGOs, stating that: 
 
NGOs are good for Australian diplomacy, if they are doing certain things. If they are doing 
other things, that’s not necessarily good. Its not the existence of these alternate actors which 
creates problems, it’s the lack of coherence.94 
 
State/NGO cooperation is only likely to occur where both share a common goal. 
States are unlikely to support, endorse and build partnerships with NGOs that are 
ambivalent to their foreign policy goals. One NGO representative agreed, stating that: 
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wing-nut crazy NGOs that stir up trouble are more of help than a hindrance to promoting civil 
society, and a common state/NGO agenda. Wise NGOs help the government, whilst helping 
themselves.95 
 
Richard Kohler, also of DFAIT, confirms the hierarchical relationship between 
the state and NGOs. He noted ‘NGOs will continue to rely on state to create the 
frameworks within which they operate – they will always have an influence on nation 
states but never control’.96 The inference here is that states largely control the modern 
diplomatic environment and NGOs place within it.  
Despite this tentative negativity, the empirical evidence combined with the 
eclectic contributions from each of the three diplomatic theories is compelling. It 
suggests that states and NGOs are ‘attracted towards each other’ in search of international 
stability and Foreign Policy realisation.97 The immediate problem that arises is that 
NGOs, like the dilemmas they address, are unpredictable and do not manifest themselves 
in consistent patterns. Instead, there is a considerable ad-hoc element built into the 
state/NGO relationship where short-term focus is promoted alongside a flexible issue-by-
issue approach. Contacts, coalitions and relationships are built on an improvised 
foundation and importance is given to the bargaining and flexibility of both actors.  
This lack of practical consistency in the state/NGO relationship may be 
responsible for the confusion in the diplomatic studies field. Without firm, consistent and 
recognisable patterns of state/NGO collusion the relationship can become confusing. 
However, it is time to agree that NGOs are important, and are emerging diplomatic actors 
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97 Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 370. 
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working (largely) in tandem with dominant state actors. A view advanced by one IDT is 
perhaps the most applicable to the modern relationship between states and NGOs:  
 
Foreign policy is no longer primarily about the conduct of state-to-state relations, even while 
this remains a major activity. Rather, it in involves an array of government and non-government 
actors and networks which require new ways of managing international politics. Effective 
networking with non-governmental bodies is critical to the success of diplomacy today.98 
 
Robust, historical and productive networks of state/non-state linkages are 
prevalent, and can be consistently evidenced, in the practical modern diplomatic 
environment. However, the acceptance of these relationships has yet to filter through to 
the theoretical diplomacy field. This is a situation that will eventually change. 
Theoretically understanding the relationship between state and NGO is ‘not well served 
by assumptions that the representatives of state and non-state actors inhabit different 
worlds any more than an appreciation of the significance of NGOs is best understood by 
assuming that their activities herald the imminent demise of the state’.99 Using the three 
diplomatic theories together allows complete endorsement of this sage advice. To alter 
existing and parochial perceptions on the state/NGO relationship is to first acknowledge 
that divergent and categorical views on diplomacy exist. Only then can we test each of 
these views against empirical evidence from the practical, modern diplomatic 
environment. This section has hopefully demonstrated the merit behind such an approach.  
                                                 
98 Lane, Diplomacy Today, pp. 1 – 4.  
99 Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 376. 
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6.1.5 The mutual relationship between commerce and diplomacy 
The close relationship between trade and diplomacy is often overlooked in the 
canon of diplomacy studies. One reason for this occurrence is the fragmented and 
disagreeable nature of various theorists’ opinion. Currently, there is no clear consensus 
on the relationship between commerce and diplomacy. Only the Innovators consider 
commerce central to diplomacy, while TDT and NDT are dismissive of any link between 
the two. However, using the three theories eclectically, a clearer picture of the amicable, 
productive and growing bond between commerce and diplomacy can be seen. Three 
theoretical observations are relevant here.  
Firstly, the notion that trade is central to diplomacy must be confirmed. This view 
runs contrary to the dominant Traditionalist group of theorists. Several Traditionalists 
continue to endorse a distinction between the political and the commercial, the classical 
view of diplomacy and the modern.100 For Traditionalists, commercial work is a 
departure from the more serious concerns of diplomacy: military, security or political 
negotiation for example. The Traditionalists create no illusion that their focus is on the 
high, political aspect of diplomacy. Traditionalists are not ignoring the link between trade 
and diplomacy; they simply believe it does not merit their theoretical attention. 
Commercial diplomacy does not fall under their specialist focus. 
Similarly, Nascent theorists argue that commerce and diplomacy are also separate, 
however for different reasons. They suggest that states, and their diplomatic institutions, 
are unable to control increasingly powerful multinational corporations (MNCs). Due to 
their size and their ability to generate independent wealth, these MNCs are becoming 
                                                 
100 See for instance Barston, Modern Diplomacy; Berridge, Diplomatic Theory and Practice; Eban, 
Diplomacy for the Next Century; Hamilton and Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy; Plishcke, Modern 
Diplomacy; Marshall, Positive Diplomacy; Steigman, The Foreign Service of the United States. 
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diplomatic actors in their own right. According to Nascent theorists, the growth of MNCs 
in this respect has been to the detriment of states and their traditional diplomatic 
institutions. This type of rhetoric, as shall become apparent, is problematic.  
 The Innovators are the only group of theorists who correctly argue that commerce 
is central to diplomacy. Innovators are keen to realign diplomatic theory to acknowledge 
the growing relationship between diplomacy and commerce, to remind us that: 
 
diplomatic practice is and always has been much more than the traditional interstate high 
politics that it has largely been portrayed as…commercial diplomacy has always been an 
integral part of diplomatic practices.101 
 
Thus, extensive commerce/diplomacy relationships exist within diplomatic 
systems, as well as diplomatic institutions, which are commonly an amalgamation of 
international trade and foreign affairs departments.  
All of the diplomats interviewed were perplexed when I mentioned the theoretical 
separation of trade and diplomacy. For example, Ambassador Claude Laverdure observed 
that: 
 
I initially signed up [for DFAIT] because of my interest in foreign affairs. I might have chosen 
a different vocation if I’d known how much business is involved! 65% of my work is concerned 
with trade, economics and commerce. Furthering the interests of the Canadian economy 
occupies most of my time.102 
 
                                                 
101 Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of diplomacy, p. 345. 
102 Ambassador Claude Laverdure, interview, May 9th, 2005. 
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British Ambassador to Vietnam Robert Gordon similarly highlights that much of 
his embassy’s time is dominated by commercial work:  
 
Part of my job is realising our priorities, one of which is the well being of British commerce. 
Export promotion is paramount to my work – dealing with business visitors and commercial 
enquiries, helping to organise trade negotiations, promotions and delegations, seeking new 
commercial opportunities and feeding them back into the export promotion machine back 
home. We work very closely with business. It’s not an “us versus them” mentality. We’re all on 
the same page.103 
 
 This opinion further suggests that commerce is central to diplomacy. The latter 
part of Ambassador Gordon’s statement leads to a second observation. States and firms 
are not locked in an adversarial relationship; they share a growing and symbiotic 
relationship.  
This observation runs contrary to Nascent theorists, who view traditional 
diplomatic institutions and firms as two separate and conflicting entities. This separation 
has created a rivalry between the state organs and mercantile firms. Nascent theorists 
argue that powerful MNCs frequently outstrip and outperform states in the creation of 
wealth.104 For Nascent theorists, this development has rendered the archaic state, and its 
diplomacy, obsolete and irrelevant. These views are understandable and perhaps an 
                                                 
103 Ambassador Robert Gordon, interview, March 9th, 2005. 
104 See, for example, Coolsaet, Rik. (1998). The Transformation of Diplomacy at the threshold of the new 
Millennium. Diplomatic Studies Program, Leicester University, No. 48, pp. 1 – 25; Coleman, Andrew and 
Maogoto, Jackson. (2003). After the Party, is there a Cure for the Hangover? The challenges of the Global 
Economy to Westphalian Sovereignty. Legal Issue of Economic Integration, 30 (1), pp. 35 – 60; Strange, 
Susan. (1992). States, firms and diplomacy. International Affairs, 68 (1), pp. 1 – 15; Beck, Ulrich. (1999). 
Beyond the Nation State. The New Statesman, pp 25 – 28; Wolf, Martin. (2001). Will the Nation-State 
survive Globalisation? Foreign Affairs, 80 (1), pp. 178 – 190; Mann, Michael. (1997). Has Globalization 
ended the rise and rise of the nation-state? Review of International Political Economy, 4 (3), pp. 472 – 496.  
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expression of NDT’s exasperation over the ignorance towards commerce in the 
diplomatic studies field.  
 This type of parochial nascent opinion is, however, useful. It ‘opens up the subject 
[of trade and diplomacy] to wider debate’, which leads to a more accurate theory on trade 
and diplomacy.105 Nascent theorists thus encourage the field to prove otherwise: that 
states and firms are not locked in competition over an exclusive right-to generate wealth. 
Innovators take offence with this type of NDT rhetoric. They argue that the state and 
firms share a symbiotic relationship. If anything, the relationship between the traditional 
diplomatic institution (the state’s international actor) and globally minded firms is 
growing ever-closer.   
  Practical evidence supports this observation. For example, it is undeniable that 
governments have restructured their diplomatic institutions to horizontally integrate trade 
departments. Some states, for example Canada,106 Australia107 and Belgium,108 have 
                                                 
105 Kishan S. Rana. (2004). Foreign Ministries: Change and Reform. Paper presented at the International 
Studies Association, Montreal, March 18th, p. 10. 
106 In Canada’s International Policy statement of 2004 the Prime Minister, Paul Martin, illustrated the 
importance and centrality of DFAIT to promoting international commerce. Prime Minister Martin writes 
that, ‘Canada will step up its engagement with other mature nations, as well as with those that today are 
emerging as the global titans of tomorrow. That’s why we signed a science and technology agreement with 
India and launched discussions on new economic frameworks with Japan and Korea. That’s why we will 
undertake market access negotiations with Mercosur in the context of the Free Trade Area of the 
America’s. And that’s why we are pursuing major opportunities with China in tourism, technology and 
resources, where our expertise and other value added capabilities make us a formidable global player. 
These are crucial opportunities and we will not let them pass us by. DFAIT is central to these desires’. 
Further comments from Prime Minister Martin on this issue are available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca, 
accessed 9th July, 2005. For a theoretical portrayal of trade and diplomacy see Potter, Evan H. (2004). 
Branding Canada: The Renaissance of Canada’s Commercial Diplomacy. International Studies 
Perspectives, 5, 55 – 60; Clark, Joe. (1997). The First International Country. International Journal, 52 (4), 
539 – 545.   
107 In DFAT’s Annual Report (2004), the head of operations, Dr. Ashton Calvert, reaffirmed Australia’s 
desire to pursue ‘an ambitious trade agenda for improved access to overseas markets for Australian 
business’ (5). The Trade Policy ‘is geared towards increasing economic activity, creating jobs and getting a 
fair deal for Australia in the international marketplace’, essentially ensuring ‘better trade conditions for 
Australian products’ (5). DFAT pursues these goals at three levels: 1) Multilaterally through the WTO by 
negotiating trade agreements which provide the legal ground rules for international trade; 2) Regionally, 
through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) by strengthening regional trade links and pursuing 
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merged their Trade and Foreign Ministries into one department.109  Other states, such as 
the Britain and the Czech Republic, have created joint bodies of Trade and diplomatic 
Ministries to coordinate and exploit commercial opportunities.  
For example, Britain has recently created a joint body called the United Kingdom 
Trade and Investment (UKTI) department. The creation of UKTI forms part of the wider 
institutional reform of the FCO, with a particular emphasis on commercial diplomacy: the 
development of firm to government partnerships in future diplomatic practice. UKTI is 
made up of staff from the FCO and the Department of Trade. In the FCO’s 2005 Annual 
Report, the strategic priority of UKTI is stated as the ‘promotion of UK economic 
interests in an open and expanding global economy’.110 Working closely with the FCO 
the objective of UKTI is to further develop economic flows in and out of Britain. 
Through UKTI, the FCO and Department of Trade aim to work closely together for 
‘enhanced competitiveness of companies in the UK through overseas trade and 
                                                                                                                                                 
common trade and economic goals; 3) Bilaterally, through the negotiation of free trade agreements that 
deliver substantial gains to Australia, we also work to expand markets and address market barriers’ (7). The 
government, through DFAT, places a high priority on consultation with domestic business to ensure ‘trade 
policy objectives developed by the government sufficiently reflect the views, concerns and ambitions of the 
Australian public’ (5). DFAT, alongside Austrade,  plays an integral part in this process, offering service to 
Australian business to access overseas markets. They aim to ‘make trade easier, by making Australia’s 
network of diplomatic missions work for your business’ (6). DFAT provides business with up to date 
information on ‘export grants and financial assistance, customs and export clearance procedures’ (6). And 
they consult ‘extensively with the business community, State and Territory Governments and community 
groups in coordinating, developing and advancing Australia’s trade objectives’. Finally, DFAT plays an 
integral role in attracting investment to Australia, ‘providing support for investors and information on 
establishing a business in Australia’ (8). It is clear then that DFAT has a major contribution to developing 
and encouraging commerce that benefits Australia. See also, Harris. S. (1989), The Amalgamation of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Occasional Paper. Melbourne: Australian Institute of 
International Affairs.   
108 For discussion on the Belgian case, see Coolsaet, Rik. (2004). Trade and Diplomacy: The Belgian Case. 
International Studies Perspectives, 5, 61 – 65.  
109 Other countries with combined trade and foreign ministries include Albania (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade), Austria (The Austrian Foreign Ministry), Fiji (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade), 
Republic of Korea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Mauritius (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
International Trade and Cooperation) and New Zealand (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade).  
110 FCO Annual Report, p. 92. 
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investments; and to ensure a continuing high level of quality foreign direct investments 
through UKTI’.111 112  
Similarly, The Canadian government has combined the Foreign Affairs 
Department and the International Trade Department. This combination is aimed at 
identifying points of convergence between the two. One purpose of Foreign Affairs, for 
example, is ‘to ensure that we get the both the domestic business climate and our 
international economic relations right while providing the services that Canadian and 
Foreign businesses need.’113 Similarly the International Trade Department notes that: 
 
Canada’s international commercial performance must meet the challenges of the 21st century 
global economy. To ensure our ongoing success we will continue to work in close partnership 
with the Foreign Affairs Department. We both share the common goal of enhancing Canada’s 
trading prowess in the global economy.114 
 
Australia’s DFAT describes a similar close relationship between their Foreign 
Affairs Department and their Trade Department, noting that the benefits of the global 
market are ‘not automatic. They come from the effective policies and institutions put in 
                                                 
111 ibid. 
112 The impact has been rewarding. In 2004 UKTI helped UK based companies ‘develop business 
opportunities around the world. More than 813 inward-investment projects – 60% of them knowledge-
driven – created 59,614 associated jobs – of which 25, 614 were new - in the UK, and protected a further 
34,000’ (96). UKTI, through its diplomatic network, encourages domestic firms to benefit from their 
expertise and extensive foreign, physical locations, for examples they provide ‘UK based companies with 
local knowledge  and contacts in 115 countries. A further 330 international trade advisers, experts in doing 
business overseas, are based throughout the English regions’ (93). UKTI has been of major benefit to UK 
domestic firms in reaching foreign markets, hitherto difficult to penetrate. The presence of UKTI clearly 
demonstrates a symbiotic partnership between commerce and diplomacy. See also, 
https://www.uktradeinvest.gov.uk/ukti. For a theoretical slant on the origins and constitution of UKTI see 
Lee, Donna. The Embedded Business-Diplomat: How Institutional Reform Upholds the Role of Business in 
UK Diplomatic Practice. Paper prepared for the Panel ‘Diplomacy & Business: Beyond the Hegemony of 
the State’, 45th Annual ISA Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17 – 20, 2004.  
113 Canada’s International Policy Statement (2005), p. 32. 
114 ibid., p. 23. 
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place by government and executed by DFAT and its commercial partners [firms].’115 
Interestingly, DFAT is one of the few institutions to acknowledge the declining state 
argument in relation to globalisation. DFAT is keen to stress the dominant and ongoing 
role of the state and its diplomacy in the creation of wealth. They argue that:  
 
the nation state has not been superseded by economic integration. Countries or groups of them 
still provide the legal and political frameworks within which companies operate.116 
 
DFAT reminds us of the central role of the state and traditional diplomacy to 
international trade, either in bilateral relationships, or in multilateral institutions such as 
the IMF or WTO. Ultimately, DFAT is responsible for advancing ‘the interests of 
Australia and Australians internationally by supporting Australian business through 
market access and export advice and assistance and promoting trade and investment in 
and out of Australia’, alongside the more traditional/political aspects of diplomacy.117  
If anything, the relationship between commerce and diplomacy will be further 
enhanced in the years ahead. DFAT intends to ‘intensify our consultation with Australian 
and Foreign business and trade advocacy with the Australian public more generally’ 
which will ‘ensure industry groups and other interested parties are sufficiently well 
informed of market developments, and to contribute their views with respect to key trade 
developments’.118 The current and future close partnership between DFAT and Australian 
business is unmistakable.  
                                                 
115 DFAT Annual Report (2004), p. 12. 
116 ibid.. 
117 ibid., p. 16. 
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An extrapolation can be extended to most modern diplomatic institutions: 
commerce and diplomacy are moving ever closer. While firms ‘are becoming more 
diplomatic’, traditional diplomatic institutions are also becoming more businesslike.119 
For example, many traditional diplomatic institutions are borrowing techniques from 
corporate practice such as ‘introducing incentive and competition-based program 
techniques, human resource management and performance optimization.120 This mutual 
exchange of expertise, knowledge and working practices is often overlooked in the 
diplomatic studies literature. Non-statist theorists are keen to invent and endorse yet 
another factor damaging the legitimacy of the traditional diplomatic institution. These 
theorists are engaging in falsehood however, commerce and trade are now inseparable in 
the modern diplomatic environment.  
For all of the above objectives to succeed, there has to exist clear and formal 
Foreign Office/business partnerships incorporated in diplomatic structures. In states that 
have not gone so far as to institutionalise trade and diplomatic partnership, formal 
government/business partnerships are evident. The US, South Africa, Germany, Norway, 
Brazil, Sweden and Tunisia, for example, have introduced organisational reform in this 
fashion.121 Governments the world over are prioritising commercial diplomacy as an 
intrinsic part of their foreign policy objectives, equal in importance to the traditional high 
political agenda. 
                                                 
119 Hocking, Privatizing Diplomacy?, p. 149. 
120 For an expansion, evidence and debate relating to this notion (that diplomatic institutions are becoming 
more businesslike) see, Rana, Kishan S. (2004). Foreign Ministries: Change and Reform. Paper presented 
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The changing nature of the state/firm relationship suggests a third and final 
observation: that states, through diplomatic negotiation and international agreement, 
largely control the global commercial environment. This, in turn, suggests that firms are 
subservient to and heavily dependent on states and traditional diplomatic institutions. 
This is a view that Laurette Glasgow from Canada’s DFAIT is keen to stress. She 
argued that:  
 
The international relations system, including the international market place, is governed and 
shaped by states. Through diplomatic interaction, we [DFAIT] negotiate free trade agreements, 
which positively affect the prosperity of multi-national corporations.  In these negotiations, we 
often have representatives of the business community as advisors, but it is DFAIT – working as 
the official representative of the Canadian government – that takes the final decision.122  
 
Similarly, Australia’s DFAT is keen to stress its ability to shape the international 
market place. In their 2004 Annual Report, they claim that DFAT led ‘intensive 
negotiations with the United States for a free trade agreement’, ‘successfully led 
negotiations with Thailand on a comprehensive Thailand-Australian Free Trade 
Agreement (TAFTA)’ and ‘furthered prospects for trade opportunities by establishing a 
‘FTA between ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand’.123 None of these agreements, which 
will ultimately benefit Australian firms, ‘would have been possible without the expertise 
and contribution of DFAT’.124 
                                                 
122 Laurette Glasgow, interview, May 9th, 2005. 
123 DFAT Annual Report (2004), p. 70. 
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This evidence suggests that states, their diplomacy, and firms have an inseparable 
partnership in the modern diplomatic environment. Globalisation actually ‘enhances a 
nation’s economic well-being – indeed, experience suggests that the opening of trade and 
most capital flows enriches most citizens in the short run and virtually all citizens in the 
long run’.125 Globalisation, thus, has been of significant benefit to all concerned: states, 
firms, diplomacy and individuals. 
Far from being a departure from traditional diplomacy, commerce is, and has 
always been, central to diplomacy. Diplomacy has always been ‘concerned with trade 
with diplomats acting as their countries chief trade promotion officers’.126 Not only do we 
‘know this intuitively, diplomats and official government records tell us that this is so’.127 
Only by piecing the three theories together can we unequivocally confirm the close 
relationship between diplomacy and trade.  
 One then wonders what sense it makes to continue to relegate commercial 
diplomacy to the margins of the diplomatic studies field? The former Australian 
Ambassador to France, John Spender, suggested a reason why. He highlighted that:  
 
traditionally, politics and economics have been treated as two exclusive topics and activities. In 
the practical sense, it is only recently that trade and diplomacy have visibly grown closer. In 
academic circles, this division remains, since theory always takes a while to catch up with 
practice. Add to this the tedium of economics when compared to political drama and intrigue 
                                                 
125 Wolf, Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?, p. 182. 
126 Nicholas Bayne. (2004). New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-making and Negotiation in International 
Economic Relations. Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate Publishing Company.  
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and it may be the case that statistics, pie charts and graphs don’t stimulate the diplomatic 
scholar’s gray-matter!128 
 
 This is a valuable observation; we seem to have a stereotypical view of diplomacy 
as an activity based on political negotiation, bargaining and communication. To challenge 
this view is to reconstruct our basic theoretical understanding of diplomacy. The above 
empirical evidence suggests that this reconceptualisation of diplomacy is inevitable. 
Most, if not all, traditional diplomatic institutions are restructuring their internal 
organisation to incorporate commerce as an essential and visible function of diplomacy. 
Thus, the separation of commerce from diplomacy is no longer a viable theoretical 
exercise.  
The interplay between the three diplomatic theories is central to proposing such 
an observation. The central tenets of the three different types of theorists on commerce 
and diplomacy are useful in that they present the diplomatic scholar with three choices. 
Both TDT and NDT inform us – for different reasons – that the amicable relationship 
between states and firms is difficult to substantiate, whereas IDT argues the contrary: that 
states and firms share a symbiotic relationship that manifests in readily identifiable 
diplomatic-to-firm structures. All three theories present compelling argument, which 
encourages a deeper appraisal of the state/firm relationship. Before the end of the Cold 
War, the Traditional view would have gone unchallenged, however with the field and the 
modern diplomatic environment broadening this view begins to look increasingly frail. 
Similarly, NDT would have appeared the most appropriate theory during the 
globalization period in the decade following the Cold War.  
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The recent emergence of IDT suggests an evolution in the way in which 
diplomatic theorists view the modern diplomatic environment, and commerce’s place 
within it. When TDT failed to suffice, NDT emerged, followed by IDT. This is an 
encouraging sign for the diplomatic studies field, and suggests a consistent growth in the 
field knowledge. All three theoretical views on commerce and diplomacy still endure, 
which hints at further promise: that the debate on the relevancy of commerce to 
diplomacy will only encourage diplomatic theorists to prove that their theoretical view is 
most appropriate.129 Again, the field benefits as we will see the texture of the knowledge 
on commercial diplomacy thicken as the theory catches up with the practice.  
 
6.1.6 What revolution? The information evolution 
The interplay between the three groups of theorists is valuable in ascertaining the 
impact of the so-called information revolution on modern diplomacy. If considered in 
isolation, the three theories – and their divergent views – present three fragmented views. 
Used together in eclectic fashion, a more accurate picture of modern diplomacy and 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) emerges.  
Nascent theorists portray a dismal situation for the traditional diplomatic 
institution. They describe the modern relationship between information and diplomacy as 
a revolution, as a drastic change detrimentally affecting the state and its diplomacy. For 
Nascent theorists, states have lost control of information flows whereas nascent 
                                                 
129 For an example of how knowledge on diplomacy and commerce evolves and produce a more 
appropriate body of theory, see Donna Lee. The Embedded Business-Diplomat: How Institutional Reform 
Upholds the Role of Business in UK Diplomatic Practice. Paper prepared for the Panel ‘Diplomacy & 
Business: Beyond the Hegemony of the State, International Studies Association annual conference, 
Montreal, Canada, March 17 – 20, 2004; D. Lee and D. Hudson. (2004). The old and new significance of 
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diplomatic actors have seized on the opportunities offered by the revolution to creep up 
the IR hierarchy, at the expense of states. Thus, the current information revolution 
confirms ‘the diminishing importance of the state and increasing importance of new 
social and political entities, such as NGOs’.130 
The notion of yet another factor asking questions of the traditional diplomatic 
institution is natural for this group of non-statist theorists. However, if this fundamental 
assumption is temporarily sidestepped, the valuable contribution of NDT can be realised. 
NDT develops awareness that there are other diplomatic actors besides the traditional 
diplomatic institution. These non-state actors execute a form of information gathering and 
dissemination outside the traditional state-qua-state diplomatic interface. These new 
information flows are difficult for all governments to monitor all of the time. NDT thus 
challenges other theorists to prove otherwise, that the information revolution is not 
diminishing the importance of the state.   
TDT challenge this assumption in a rather unusual fashion. Largely, they ignore 
the debate altogether. Traditionalists hardly mention the information revolution; it does 
not occupy much print space in the canon of diplomacy studies. Their silence speaks 
volumes on this matter: if they’re not worried then why are they not worried? Simply, 
they argue that the traditional diplomatic institution has coped with and survived similar 
revolutions before, in each instance emerging stronger and more efficient. Traditionalists 
maintain that the traditional diplomatic institution remains the most important diplomatic 
actor. Their currency is the gathering and dissemination of a particular type of 
information that alternate sources cannot provide to governments. For Traditionalists, it is 
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not the method of gathering information that is important; it is the content, quality and 
nature of the information that counts.  
Initially, this dismissive treatment of the information revolution appears to be a 
redundant contribution to understanding information and modern diplomacy. However, 
this is not the case. TDT reminds us that there is nothing ‘revolutionary’ about the 
information revolution. The traditional diplomatic institution has coped with and survived 
similar revolutions before. Perhaps developments in ICT are revolutionary for nascent 
diplomatic actors but not for the centuries old traditional diplomatic institution. For 
Traditionalists, the current information revolution is another benefit or add-on to the 
toolkit of diplomacy. Their attitude reminds us that it is not the mode of information 
gathering and dissemination but the message that is important to sound diplomacy.  
IDT endorses, enhances and builds on the observation of both TDT and NDT. 
Innovators contribute to our knowledge by agreeing that rather than inducing panic or 
conjuring images of the diplomatic institution in peril, a more moderate, balanced 
understanding of the revolution is required. Innovators acknowledge that: 
 
Traditionalists who insist diplomacy need not change are wrong. So, too, are those who insist 
that it must change completely. Finding the intersection which honors the past and respects the 
future is the challenge.131  
 
In other words, to understand the information revolution and modern diplomacy 
means theory must avoid the ‘crisis effect rhetoric’ (the effect the information 
(r)evolution is having/not having on the traditional diplomatic institution).132 
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From the above three contributions, a theoretical jigsaw puzzle of modern 
diplomacy and the information revolution can be pieced together. Firstly, it can be agreed 
that control over all information has escaped state control, but control of the official 
diplomatic information channels has not. Governments continue to demand a particular 
type of information that only the traditional diplomatic institution can provide. Other 
non-state actors do not have free access to this information unless the traditional 
diplomatic institution deems it necessary. For traditional diplomatic actors, nothing has 
changed save for a more efficient manner of exchanging information through official 
diplomatic channels. If anything the so-called revolution has made the task of traditional 
diplomacy easier, cheaper and faster. Traditional diplomatic institutions thus embrace 
changes in ICT.  
A second theoretical notion that can be extracted from the interplay of the three 
theories is that state-qua-state information flows (through diplomacy) are no longer the 
sole conduit for the exchange of international information. Non-state actors – akin to the 
traditional diplomatic institution – also exchange specialised forms of information. There 
are now several different levels and conduits of information exchange. These different 
and specialised levels of information flows create specialised networks where entities, be 
they states, NGOs or IGOs, are more aware of one another’s ethos, skills and agenda. 
Common interests can be realised and exchanges of expertise become more widespread 
in the modern era. All actors in the IR system benefit, as more communication across 
more levels is better than less.  
The practical evidence now considered validates much of the theory presented so 
far. If it can be established that the traditional diplomatic institution is embracing 
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sweeping ICT changes (albeit slower than the lightning quick pace the revolution 
demands) then the above theoretical observations can be unequivocally confirmed.  
Canada’s DFAIT is one example of a diplomatic institution embracing the 
information revolution. General Consulate to Australia, and former Chief Information 
Officer for DFAIT, Richard Kohler made this very clear.133 The basic currency of 
diplomats, according to Kohler, was that of good faith based on reliable, accurate and 
timely information flows. Canadian diplomats, and many other nations too, seek out the 
most cost effective means of transmitting and storing that information. Thus, any 
developments on further improving ICT within DFAIT are aggressively championed as it 
makes the diplomats job easier, but more importantly it makes their job more cost 
effective.134 Kohler argued that the information revolution changes, for the better, the 
fundamental methods of gathering and disseminating information. 
Kohler identified three specific benefits to DFAIT’s embracement of 
improvements in ICT. Firstly, these improvements have supported Canadian foreign 
policy in a general sense, offering ‘smoother capabilities that have never existed 
before’135. Secondly, their new information systems allow for a ‘virtual or instant 
                                                 
133 The following information comes from an interview with General Consulate Kohler, which took place 
September 4th, 2004. 
134 Kohler quantified this matter, after noting that the ‘information revolution allows us to transmit and 
store information more cheaply. With all of our local networks linked telex has disappeared, we have fewer 
secretaries and communications technicians are rare. While the new network is expensive, the savings from 
shutting down the old telecommunications system have paid for a significant investment in new 
technology. DFAIT now handles 24 million email messages per year, something the old system could never 
have supported. The [new] network leases cost about $25 million Canadian per year to handle all voice and 
data communications; if we were to rely on private carriers instead, the cost would exceed $75 million per 
year for the same traffic load, a boon for taxpayers’.  
135 Kohler specifically stated that ‘technology supports but does not drive the department’. He noted that in 
the era of ‘virtual’ diplomacy, ‘every post can be staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week. During non-
business hours, the telephones of more than 50 posts are forwarded to Ottawa for response to consular 
enquiries. Should the situation be an emergency that warrants the head of mission becoming involved, staff 
in Ottawa know how to reach him or her, or mission staff. A Canadian traveller is simply a phone call away 
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mission’ to be established with a ‘plane ticket, a portable computer, and a dial tone’ 
anywhere in the world.136 And thirdly, the new technology allows a ‘virtual team to be 
assembled to tackle any policy operations issue without having to physically move 
people’. Significantly, these teams are composed of not only DFAIT representatives but 
of representatives from the non-state sector too.137 The main benefit to DFAIT that 
Kohler consistently returned to, however, was that ‘information facilitated by electronics 
allows for much better unity of focus, of message, across our foreign service; it underpins 
collective clarity; and it allows mandarins to focus on pure foreign policy’.  
Kohler’s personal rhetoric naturally stems from the wider organisation mantra of 
the Canadian Foreign Ministry, which states that ‘achieving our international objectives 
depends largely on seizing and capitalising on developments in information 
technology’.138 DFAIT’s activities in relation to the information revolution are replicated 
within other diplomatic institutions. 
Australia’s DFAT also promotes the benefits of the information revolution, 
acknowledging that the ‘rapid development of information technology has vastly 
                                                                                                                                                 
from consular services anywhere in the world.’ The information revolution, has allowed DFAIT to develop 
enhanced responsiveness to a range of unconventional 21st century issues.  
136 Regarding the ‘virtual’ mission Kohler proudly noted that ‘the department can respond to a crisis 
anywhere, anytime. The head of mission can put up a brass plate outside a hotel room door and be 
operational almost immediately after arriving in a trouble spot, which has huge implications for the 
mobility of DFAIT operations. This approach was used to establish a new embassy in Zagreb, Croatia, at 
the height of the Bosnian Conflict’. This virtual mission, according to Kohler, faced many difficulties 
operating out of a hotel room, but it was operational within hours of staff landing in Croatia. He concluded 
that DFAIT can now establish a small diplomatic mission in hours, a task that took previously weeks or 
even months. This flexibility both enhances DFAIT’s foreign policy and is cost effective, especially in 
cases when DFAIT does not need to establish a ‘physical’, permanent mission.  
137 Kohler stated that the ‘team members can be drawn entirely from within the department, anywhere in 
the world, but the team can also include officers of other departments in Canada, even other governments, 
as well as academics and civil society organisations’. Associated benefits were a reduction in the cost of 
hosting meetings and travelling costs, as members of the virtual team do not need to meet face to face. 
Interestingly Kohler posited that ‘perhaps in the future we will see hybrid, just-in-time virtual teams, drawn 
throughout the diplomatic and NGO communities, as the operational norm, rather than the novelty that such 
teams are today’.  
138 Canada’s International Policy Statement (2005), p. 29. 
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expanded the amount and nature of information that can be transmitted quickly and 
widely’.139 More efficient means of gathering and disseminating relevant information has 
been of benefit to DFAT, these developments ‘have conferred greater efficiency on the 
department’.140 Furthermore, developments in ICT are being ‘embraced’ by DFAT, in the 
hope of making their ‘mission, purpose and expertise available to wider spheres of people 
with a direct interest in foreign affairs’.141   
This type of rhetoric is equally visible in Britain’s FCO, who went so far as to 
produce an ICT Strategy document.142 This document confirms their desire to remain a 
viable and effective international actor by embracing the revolution. The goal of 
reforming their ICT capabilities is ‘to get the right information to the right place at the 
right time so that the right decisions can be taken and the right actions put in hand’.143 
This statement confirms the FCO’s desire to enhance their ICT capabilities. The focus of 
the 2004 ICT strategy is to ‘provide the FCO with the ICT it needed to operate as a single 
global online organisation,144 to make those structures as flexible as possible, particularly 
by enabling remote and mobile working at classified levels, to streamline and simplify 
our processes so that people can work faster, more efficiently and more flexibly and to 
improve the ICT connection between the FCO and the rest of Whitehall’.145 Throughout 
                                                 
139 DFAT Annual Report (2004), p. 72. 
140 ibid., p. 189. 
141 ibid., p. 173. 
142 E-Diplomacy: the FCO Information and Communication Technology Strategy. UK: Public Records 
Office.  
143 ibid., p. 3. 
144 The early results of the FCO’s new global system, Firecrest, indicate the volume of information flowing 
between Post and the FCO. As of 2004 Firecrest had over ’11,000 users, using over 1000 servers, spread 
across 153 countries. It connects 192 posts and handles up to 1 million e-mails per day and 7.5 million uses 
of web-browsing per day’ (E-Diplomacy, p. 10).  
145 E-Diplomacy, p. 3. 
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the Strategy document, the benefits of updating their ICT capabilities outweigh the costs 
of not doing so. 
This new FCO strategy will provide several benefits for the realisation of 
diplomatic objectives, including ‘new and flexible types of diplomatic representation, 
swifter responses to emergencies, more flexible team-working including the rapid 
creation of specialised teams and video conferencing, and the ability for staff to work 
from home’.146 The strategy projects that, in 2005, savings of over one-hundred million 
pounds will be realised through savings in telephone, fax and communications staff costs, 
for example.147 The improved quality of the FCO’s ICT capabilities has been beneficial. 
It: 
 
has made the FCO considerably more effective. The relationship between Post and FCO 
London has improved markedly, with staff overseas feeling they are consulted more often, and 
able to contribute to policy making. The future benefits will continue to reap similar 
dividends.148  
 
For traditional diplomatic institutions, the purpose of introducing new strategies 
for enhanced and secure information gathering and dissemination is to make the modern 
diplomatic institutions work faster, smarter, cheaper and with greater flexibility. To 
realise this direction has taken some time, because traditional diplomatic institutions just 
do not have the luxury of being able to implement sweeping and rapid organisational 
change. State actors have to be particularly sure that information networks remain secure. 
                                                 
146 ibid., p. 6. 
147 ibid., p. 9. 
148 ibid., p. 16. This information was corroborated by an independent auditing firm, Collison Grant Limited. 
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Perhaps this prudence has been misconstrued in the more non-statist diplomatic literature 
as a reluctance or inability of traditional diplomatic institutions to embrace the 
information revolution too quickly.  
What the three theories suggest, alongside the practical evidence, is that enhanced 
ICT capabilities are positively affecting all diplomatic actors. After all, the information 
revolution is about facilitating better information flows and removing obstacles to 
communications between entities, be they state or non-state. Admittedly, the pace of 
communication and information gathering, delivery and reaction has increased 
exponentially. However, this does not lead to more complexity; rather, more 
accountability, greater speed, necessity of pro-action and reaction and more 
communication between all diplomatic actors. In other words, developments in ICT have 
enhanced the effectiveness of modern diplomacy.  
The information revolution is unlikely to change the basic function of diplomacy: 
building relationships with foreign peoples. Richard Kohler of DFAIT stressed this point, 
noting that: 
 
The art of diplomacy is thriving, as much today as in the time of ancient Greece. Yes, time 
passes and technology advances, but human nature and human communications are constant. A 
computer and a globalized network will never be able to replace body language and tone of 
voice; one doesn’t develop “trust” in a CPU.149 
 
Developments in ICT are tools to facilitate the business of diplomacy, not 
instruments to replace human interaction or judgement, which are central qualities of any 
                                                 
149 Richard Kohler, Interview, September 4th, 2004. 
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form of sound diplomacy. Thus, it can be argued that while the tools of diplomacy are 
changing its central foundations, purpose and functions are not. 
Information is at the heart of diplomacy; it always has been and always will be. A 
typical foreign ministry is comprised of people who collect information, who analyse and 
interpret information, who compile reports and policy advice based on information, and 
people who feed that information back to their home governments. The centrality of 
information to diplomacy – getting it, interpreting it, passing it on to other governments – 
is fundamental to traditional diplomacy. Diplomacy, based largely on fluid information 
flows, facilitates the smooth interaction and regulation of affairs between states and non-
state actors, when relevant.  
The interplay of the three theories alongside the practical evidence conveys a 
simple message: the information revolution must not be confused with a diplomatic 
evolution. Diplomacy has always been characterised by patterns of communication based 
on information; there is an inseparable link between communication, information and the 
technologies which facilitate the basic functions of diplomacy. The information 
revolution improves interaction between separated communities, be they states, NGOs, 
IGOs, MNCs or individuals.  
This observation was reached only by considering the three diplomatic theories in 
eclectic fashion. TDT is useful in the respect that the crisis rhetoric is mitigated in the 
debate between theorists over the impact of the information evolution on the incumbent 
traditional diplomatic institution. Traditionalists remind us, appropriately, that diplomacy 
has survived many similar ‘revolutions’. NDT is equally valuable because awareness of 
other diplomatic actors (outside the state) is further developed and debate encouraged. 
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And IDT is appropriate not only due to its emphasis on symbiosis and balance but also 
because this theory pushes us to seek out practical and empirical evidence, which will 
help settle the debate whilst adding to the field’s knowledge. These three specialised 
focuses, if recognized as such, will create a far broader and inclusive body of theory on 
diplomacy and the information (r)evolution than that which currently exists.  
 
6.2 The lucidity of tripartite diplomatic theory 
 The aim of this study has been to deconstruct, modernise (reconstruct) and 
strengthen diplomatic theory. The views of two well-known authors, Wight and Der 
Derian, were employed as an initial departure point for this overdue task. By returning to 
their central points, the success of this study’s intention to deconstruct, modernise and 
strengthen diplomatic theory can be gauged.  
 Wight’s ideas on international theory were found to resonate with diplomatic 
theory. Essentially, Wight was concerned with addressing and alleviating the ‘theoretical 
impoverishment’ of international theory.150 Central to his observations was the claim that 
‘international theory does not, at first sight, exist’ due to its ‘recalcitrance to being 
theorised about’.151 For Wight, international theory was an ‘impression’ or an assumption 
that international relations scholars had taken for granted; consistently they failed to 
question the origins, rigor or depth of the ‘notion of international theory’.152  
 Adopting a different topic but a similar ethos to Wight, Der Derian sought to 
tackle the ‘intellectual poverty’ of diplomatic theory head on. However, Der Derian’s 
book, combining over 3,000 years of history alongside the philosophical alienation 
                                                 
150 Wight, Why is there no international theory?, p. 20. 
151 ibid., pp. 17 – 33. 
152 ibid., p. 26. 
  Chapter six 
 336
theory, was perhaps too ambitious. In other words, he took diplomatic theory too far, too 
quickly. Many of his observations on diplomacy and theory were compelling and useful 
in terms of germinating the approach behind this thesis. However, many of his 
observations were also ‘largely repellant and intractable in form’.153 
 This thesis sought to address these claims. Diplomatic theory does appear to be an 
impression or an assumption that the diplomatic studies field has taken for granted. In 
addition, the subject of diplomacy, with an emphasis on its practical nature, does appear 
to be resistant to theory. However, these claims are a ‘first’ impression.154 This thesis 
believed that there was much potential behind the idea of extracting and postulating on 
the topic of diplomatic theory sui generis. By exploring diplomatic theory as an 
independent topic, and as a much deeper topic than the initial ‘impression’ or assumption 
suggests, the claims of Der Derian and Wight began to look increasingly frail.   
 Indeed, the thesis has shown that three different types of diplomatic theory exist 
and can be found within the field of diplomacy studies. In addition, the presence of three 
diplomatic theories demonstrates that diplomacy is not, as Der Derian and Wight 
lamented, ‘resistant to theory’155 or showed a ‘recalcitrance to being theorised upon’.156 
Theoretical observations on diplomacy are rife within the diplomatic studies literature; an 
attempt to extract these observations, however, is not as common. This thesis sought to 
address and fill this gap.   
In addition, to ultimately banish the notion of diplomatic theory as weak, non-
existent and impoverished, and to ensure such claims would appear themselves frail in 
                                                 
153 Wight, Why is there no international theory?, p. 20. 
154 ibid., p. 17. 
155 Der Derian, Mediating Estrangement, p. 92. 
156 Wight, Why is there no international theory?, p. 33. 
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the future, this thesis sought to reconstruct diplomatic theory in a simple and concise 
fashion. In the future, there should be no doubt when answering the question ‘what is 
diplomatic theory?’ The central tenets of the most dominant type of diplomatic theory, 
TDT, can now be presented alongside two alternate and individual types of diplomatic 
theory, NDT and IDT, in a simple and concise fashion. Table 1 presents the central tenets 
of each of the three theories. When the three theories are presented in this lucid and 
simple fashion, we can clearly see how they complement one another. Indeed, they seem 
to cover most aspects of, and influences on, the complex modern diplomatic 
environment.  
 
  Chapter six 
 338
Table 1. - The Three Diplomatic Theories 
 
 TDT NDT IDT 
Primary actor(s) State Non-state: NGOs, 
IGOs, MNCs (for 
example) 











neither optimistic nor 
pessimistic 











networks of state and 
non-state actors  
Origins/ 
Emergence 
Post 1648 Post 1918 Post 1989 
Agenda High – military, 
individual security, 
defence, trade and 
national interest 
Low – humanitarian, 
aid, environment, 
collective security 
High and Low; and to 
clarify the limitations 
of rival theoretical 
interpretations on 
diplomacy. 



































of power, zero-sum 
competition (among 


















how and why they 
colour mental maps of 
diplomacy 
Influences Strong historical 
legacy, tendency to 
rely on history 
No historical legacy, 
views contemporary 
IR system as a radical 
departure from the 
past 




the basic drives of 
diplomatic actors 
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This thesis sought to present the ‘basic assumptions’ of various theorists’ opinions 
on diplomacy and to ‘re-evaluate’ the usefulness of ‘the mental maps they have relied on 
to make sense of its complexity’.157 The dominant mental map within diplomacy studies 
remains Traditionalist diplomatic theory; however adhering to this one perspective, it was 
argued, was insufficient when attempting to understand the complexity of the modern 
diplomatic environment. The introduction and development of the two other diplomatic 
theories, NDT and IDT, was intended to offer the diplomatic scholar two alternate but 
equally useful theoretical lenses with which to interpret the modern diplomatic 
environment.  
By mirroring the IR discipline and the divergent theories inherent to their 
theoretical field, this thesis argued the case for the inclusion, by way of reconciliation, of 
the three diverse, and often divergent, diplomatic theories. With reconciliation of these 
divergent theories, a consequent formality is that the diplomatic scholar now has a choice 
of three ‘lenses’ which ‘provide a map, or frame of reference, that makes the complex, 
puzzling world around us [more] intelligible’.158 Similar to the way an optometrist uses a 
phoropter to incrementally overlay lenses of different strength to produce a clearer image, 
by combining the three diplomatic theories/lenses, and subsequently reinterpreting the six 
themes inherent to the modern diplomatic environment, our image of the modern 
diplomatic environment becomes sharper.  
                                                 
157 Hastedt and Knickrehm, International Politics in a Changing World, p. 29. 
158 Kegley and Raymond, The Global Future, p. 24. 
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6.3 The necessity of Tripartite Diplomatic Theory 
The introduction, construction and realisation of the three diplomatic theories is 
the first step to ensuring diplomacy studies has a strong and visible theoretical grounding. 
As hypothesised, the presence, identity and ongoing refinement of the three diplomatic 
theories is central to the overall rigour of the diplomatic studies field. Elman and Elman 
are two theorists who believes that the strength of ‘any discipline can be measured by a 
cursory glance at the inherent body of theory’.159 While a discipline’s inherent body of 
theory is but one measure of its strength, it is an important measure. For diplomacy 
studies, a strong body of theory is important in terms of ensuring a promising and less 
marginalised future.  
 Furthermore, disparate theoretical views are useful for diplomacy studies. One 
reason behind introducing and constructing the three divergent diplomatic theories was 
the need to generate theoretical debate within the discipline. Waltz believes that divergent 
‘theory is at the heart of any mature [academic] discipline’.160 A necessity for the 
majority of academic disciplines is the presence of a coherent and vibrant theoretical 
debate at its core, as IR has shown for example. Through debate theories are contested, 
which in turn ensures strength in conflicting theories. After all, diplomatic scholars would 
be unlikely to introduce a theory that is weak and completely untested. With the three 
theories now constructed and evidenced, vibrant debate – as to the applicability, shape 
and robustness of each theory - can begin in earnest. By introducing the three diplomatic 
theories, it is hoped that this thesis has taken the first step to encouraging debate within 
                                                 
159 Elman and Elman, Progress in International Relations Theory, p. 2. 
160 Waltz, Foreword in Elman Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman, Progress in International Relations 
Theory. Massachusetts, MIT Press, p. ix. 
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the theoretical field. Theoretical debate can only add to the strength and depth of the 
diplomatic studies field.  
That this thesis was able to evidence three different, and often divergent, theories 
on diplomacy suggests that the diplomatic studies field is broadening. The emergence and 
rise of NDT and IDT can be correlated to the inability of TDT to fully account for the 
complexities of the modern diplomatic environment. Quite simply, Nascent theorists and 
Innovators are seeking to fill a gap in the field: diplomatic theory on non-state actors. 
Alternate theoretical perspectives (to TDT) can be clearly evidenced within the 
diplomatic studies field, as this thesis demonstrated in chapters three and four. Growth in 
unconventional diplomatic theory is only recent, yet highly significant considering the 
field was dominated by TDT for almost three centuries (1716 – 1989). The presence and 
growth of alternate diplomatic theory, alongside the incumbent body of TDT, confirms 
that the diplomatic studies field is growing.  
The source of the growth of diplomatic studies can be traced to an increase in 
complexity of the modern diplomatic environment. One feature of the practical 
diplomatic environment is its diversity, with both state and non-state actors, such as 
MNCs and NGOs, fully engaged in processes of diplomatic exchange. Langhorne refers 
to this increasing complexity and diversity as ‘an ever-thickening texture of international 
relations and diplomacy’.161 The complexity of the modern diplomatic environment has 
meant an increase in the number of theorists postulating on the shape and nature of 
modern diplomacy. 
If diplomatic theory is to relate to the practical realm of diplomacy it has to 
broaden, just as the environment has broadened. For too long now we have assumed that 
                                                 
161 Langhorne, Current Developments in Diplomacy, p. 13. 
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‘traditional or statist diplomacy’ means ‘diplomacy per se.’162 Since the end of the Cold 
War, non-state actors and unconventional environments for diplomacy, such as IGOs and 
summitry, are looking less ad-hoc and more permanent. Therefore, it is important that 
theory mirror this growth and development in ‘unofficial diplomacy’.163 Diplomatic 
theory, if it is to remain relevant to the modern diplomatic environment, must be geared 
towards both state and non-state diplomacy. Permeating the diplomatic studies field with 
a more modern attitude to theorising on diplomacy are approaches which have objectivity 
and innovation at their core. This emergence is a positive for the scope of the diplomatic 
studies field. 
Increasing our familiarity and knowledge of unconventional actors and fora for 
diplomacy was a central intention throughout this thesis. The six themes inherent to the 
current diplomatic environment, the diplomatic studies field and this thesis in particular 
were employed for this reason: to highlight the lack of, and need for, knowledge on non-
state diplomatic actors and environments. In addition, the six themes were employed to 
test the applicability and modernity of various diplomatic theories; to illustrate the 
difference, strengths and weaknesses in these theories; to argue the need for more than 
one ‘lens’ with which to interpret modern diplomacy; and to ensure that diplomatic 
theory remains relevant to modern diplomatic practice. With the three categories of 
Traditional, Nascent and Innovative Diplomatic Theory now substantiated we can begin 
to thicken the texture of diplomatic theory, and enhance its appropriateness for 
interpreting the modern diplomatic environment.  
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In light of the broadening of the field, and this thesis’ contribution to diplomatic 
theory, the future looks promising for diplomatic studies. So much so that one theorist 
claims we are living in a ‘time when diplomacy is in renaissance’.164 However, this claim 
is perhaps too positive. Sharp counsels that it is first important to ask: ‘does diplomacy 
matter, and can the study of it yield anything of importance for our understanding of what 
happens and what ought to happen in international relations?’165 The response to this 
question is unequivocal. Diplomacy ‘is a major and ubiquitous activity of our time, and 
therefore of importance to us all’.166 The study of diplomacy, of how actors (state and 
non-state) interact, is central to any notion of international political stability and therefore 
merits ongoing, innovative and vigorous academic attention. Ensuring this occurs is the 
sole responsibility of the diplomatic studies field. There is much to learn of diplomacy. 





                                                 
164 Rana, Foreign Ministries: Change and Reform, p. 9. 
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UN accreditation, USAID and NGOs, The Ottawa Process, The Kimberley 
Diamonds, NOREPS, Nazi Gold and Venezuelan Elections 
 
The Ottawa Process 
 
In 1997 Jody Williams, the coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines, won the 1997 Nobel Prize for Peace. In a subsequent interview she noted that 
not only had ‘we won the Nobel Prize but we changed the way diplomacy is done’.1 The 
most tangible achievement for the global ban on anti-personnel land-mines was to have 
122 countries sign up to a conference that was held in Ottawa in 1997. The work of a 
group of like-minded countries received much credit and remains a firm example of the 
beneficial relationship the state has with NGOs. 
In terms of the kick-starting role of NGOs the anti the Ottawa Process provides a 
sound example of the triggering effect NGOs can have on states and policy. Although the 
process itself was unique,2  its effect on diplomacy and multilateral negotiation is 
remarkable. The lead actors pressing governments for effective action were not states but 
NGOs. The newly formed International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), along with 
the International Committee of the Red Cross stepped beyond the traditional NGO role of 
direct humanitarian aid and advocacy. The ICBL acted as a sort of ‘master NGO, 
ultimately attracting over 1,000 NGOs from more than 60 countries’, they were, in turn, 
supported by the collaboration of sympathetic small and middle power states such as 
Canada, South Africa and Norway.3  
The Ottawa Process was unique in that it encouraged the unprecedented 
participation of NGOs in the negotiations themselves. Rarely have non-state actors been 
invited to disarmament conferences before. If they have, their participation was usually 
limited to providing expert advice. However, in this case, government ministers and 
                                                 
1 Williams in Cooper, Governments, NGOs and the recalibration of diplomacy, p. 365. 
2 In May 1996, state diplomats attended the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva to discuss practical 
steps to address the problem of landmines. The states involved were particularly distrustful of a multi-
lateral approach that would have allowed the will of the majority to prevail over matter which directly 
affected their own national security. Nations intent on using landmines, particularly the United States, were 
able to use their veto to weaken resolve, water down the treaty text and reach the lowest common 
denominator. The conference, involving solely state representative, was largely a dismal failure. Jody 
Williams, the Coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines stated that ‘it was a useless 
treaty, with loopholes so big that you could drive a tank through them’ (Williams in Davis, 2004: 2). In 
October 1996 the Ottawa Conference opened with renewed hopes. The summit involved fifty states, 
hundreds of NGOs and dozens of United Nations agencies. The conference and the need for quick and 
effective action was endorsed further when Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian Foreign Minister, set an 
ambitious timetable for all interested states to sign a comprehensive treaty ban by December 1997. This 
was an ambitious schedule. Over the next thirteen months, the Ottawa summit was followed by a series of 
meetings and conferences held throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe to build a global 
consensus and draft a workable treaty. By December 1997 this fast-track process lead to the signing of the 
Ottawa Convention by 123 nations. The Ottawa Conference was a resounding success.  
3 David Davenport. (2003). The New Diplomacy. Policy Review, 116, p. 20. 
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officials shared plenary session with mine victims and NGO representatives.4 This was 
unconventional diplomacy in action, with state and non-state actors pooling resources in 
search of effective action. Traditionally this would have been the realm of the state 
diplomat, supported by international arms and disarmament experts. The process would 
have been exhaustive with accredited specialists engaged in lengthy and highly technical 
negotiations, with the time consumed by setting the agenda, negotiating the rules of 
procedure, identifying relevant issues, reviewing technical reports and debating various 
proposals about arms limitations. All of this would have occurred outside of public view 
and well in advance of heavily publicised meetings among senior government officials 
and heads of state.  
The Ottawa Process was to introduce an alternative path: the power of mobilising 
public opinion to change government policy. Several of the NGO unconventional 
techniques were targeted directly at the public, for example they engaged in a ‘massive 
letter-to-the-editor campaign to the majority of the world’s most prominent newspapers’.5 
However the coup de grace was their employment of television imagery, the ICBL 
sponsored documentaries and invited prominent individuals to offer their opinion. The 
most notable, Princess Dianna, sparked tremendous media interest while visiting 
landmine victims in Bosnia and Mozambique. As public momentum galvanised it became 
increasingly difficult for decision makers to ignore the swell of public support. In 1995, 
for example, the ICBL campaign sparked a public debate in the United Kingdom which 
culminated in a series of hearings in the British House of Commons. By 1997, landmines 
had become an election issue in Britain and France and eventually, under increasing 
public scrutiny, the newly elected governments in both countries pledged to support the 
Ottawa Process.  
In the Ottawa Process both states and NGOs shared the same goal, the central 
difference being the urgency NGOs injected into the process. The words of Kofi Anan, 
the UN secretary General, illustrate the power of the cooperative NGO/state confluence 
when he announced that ‘one does not have to be a global superpower to affect the future 
of international peace and security’6 and that the Ottawa Process was a ‘model of 
international co-operation and action; this proves that a coalition of governments, NGOs, 
international institutions and civil society can set a global agenda and effect change’.7 
 
                                                 
4 Julian Davis. (2004). The Campaign to Ban Landmines: Public Diplomacy, Middle Power Leadership and 
an Unconventional Negotiating Process. Canadian Institute of International Affairs Occasional Papers, 1 
(1), p. 2.  
5 ibid., p. 3. 
6 ibid., p. 4. 
7 Anan in Davenport, The New Diplomacy, p. 22. 
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The Venezuelan Elections: The Carter Centre 
 
With regard to the NGO as an agent (taking on a sub-contracting/facilitative role 
that supports the work of government) there is compelling evidence to suggest a 
symbiotic relationship with the state. Although not a recent development two aspects of 
this growing enterprise in the 1990s and early twenty-first century can be identified as 
significant departures from traditional adversarial state/NGO relationships. The first 
developmental aspect is the ‘diversity of relationships along the engagement-autonomy 
spectrum between government and NGO of many of these activities’.8  
A solid example of this diversity is the work of the Carter Centre, a NGO that 
determines the course of its diplomatic action dependant on the situation. The 
subcontracting/facilitative role of NGOs was clearly illustrated when the Venezuelan 
government’s National Electoral Council (CNE) invited The Carter Centre and the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) to observe the presidential recall process in 
November 20039. The work of the OAS and the Carter Centre Democracy Program10 was 
in turn supported by the US government who were keen to sub-contract the election 
monitoring process to reliable and professionally organised party. What can be deduced 
from the interaction of state and non-state actors in this instance is a public expression of 
the desired outcome and an ad-hoc response to achieve that outcome. The confluence of 
the state and non-state actors in the Venezuelan recall process is a firm example of all 
parties working towards the same goal – stability and a lessening of the anarchical nature 
of the IRS – but employing different methods, techniques and individuals to realise that 
goal. In this case it transpired that the alternate diplomatic methods NGOs favour would 
achieve the desired outcome more efficiently than the traditional methods of diplomacy.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Cooper, Government, NGOs and the recalibration of diplomacy, p. 372. 
9 On August 15, 2004, Venezuelans came out in record numbers to participate in the first popularly 
mandated recall referendum ever to be held. In doing so, the Venezuelan people voted not to recall 
President Chavez from office, with 59 percent of the population voting for Chavez and 41 percent voting 
against him. It was the opinion of the Carter Centre that the August 15 vote clearly expressed the will of the 
people. For more on the process, outcomes, conclusions and recommendations see (2004). The Carter 
Centre Referendum Report: The “Will of the Electorate” Was Expressed, International Debates, 8 (2), pp. 
233 – 236. For a broader view on the recent work of the Cater Center see Clymer, K. Jimmy Carter, Human 
Rights and Cambodia. Diplomatic History, 27 (2), pp245 – 279. 
10 The Democracy Program works in three principal ways: conducting international election monitoring; 
strengthening the capacity of civic organisation to participate in government policymaking; and promoting 
the law. These three tenants are central to the diplomatic idealism paradigm as they advocate the betterment 
or improvement of civil society. The Centre requires an invitation from the country’s electoral authorities 
and a welcome from the major political parties to ensure the Centre can play a meaningful non-partisan 
role. The Centre seeks to work in tandem and even subordination to the dominant state, realising their 
idealistic agenda through diplomatic channels. Observers analyse election laws, asses voter registration, 
voter education efforts, and the openness and fairness of campaign, focusing on competitiveness, 
unhindered participation in the election process, and access to the media. These assessment begin months in 
advance. The presence of impartial observers reassures voters they can safely and secretly cast their ballots 
and that vote tabulation will be conducted without tampering. Thus, election monitoring deters interference 
or fraud in the voting process. The Carter centre has successfully observed 52 elections in twenty four 
countries on four countries.  
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The NGO/UN relationship 
The UN Secretary General has frequently affirmed the importance of NGOs to the 
United Nations. Again and again, he has referred to NGOs as ‘indispensable partners’ of 
the UN, whose role is more important than ever in helping the organisation to reach its 
goals.11 He has affirmed that NGOs are partners in ‘the process of deliberation and policy 
formation’ as well as in ‘the execution of policies.’12 Since the UN adopted Resolution 
1996/31 establishing new accreditation rules for NGOs on July 25, 1996, NGOs have 
enjoyed important advances.         
 NGOs have set new standards of positive contribution to the UN and reached 
further levels of access in new settings. For example, during negotiations towards an 
International Criminal Court, NGOs participated informally but effectively, alongside 
governments, in a high-level negotiating process. They spoke, circulated documents, met 
frequently with delegations, and overall had a major impact on the outcome. While 
NGOs do not enjoy formal decision making rights, they exercise a substantial influence 
over outcomes through their expertise and creative policy proposals.    
 The annual sessions of the Commission on Human Rights, held in Geneva, also 
attracts a large number of NGO participants, who provide vital information and 
substantial input to its deliberations. The Commission has incorporated NGO 
participation extensively, giving NGO representatives the opportunity to speak at plenary 
sessions, as well as broad rights to circulate documents. Public support from the 
worldwide human rights movement has strengthened this process and kept it moving 
forward.           
 To provide additional avenues for NGO participation, delegations and the 
Secretariat have recently experimented with new meeting arrangements in other forums. 
The panels and consultations of the Working Group of the General Assembly on 
Financing for Development, organized in 1999, provide a significant case in point. They 
give NGOs a framework to make presentations and to have discussions with delegations 
in an informal setting, outside the meetings of the Working Group, but still part of its 
overall process.          
 NGOs have also experimented with informal dialogues in new policy arenas, such 
as the Security Council. The NGO Working Group on the Security Council, comprised of 
some thirty NGOs with active program work on Security Council matters, has been 
meeting increasingly frequently with members of the Council since mid-1997 and 
expects to hold over 30 sessions in 2006.       
 At the same time, various institutions in the UN system have affirmed the 
importance of NGOs by establishing new focal point offices and by further opening their 
decision-making process to NGO voices and input. For several years, the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has held important monthly meetings with 
humanitarian NGOs. In early 2004, the High Commissioner for Refugees consulted with 
leaders of about thirty major human rights and relief NGOs - a meeting that resulted in a 
follow-up dialogue process. The pace of such meetings across the UN system has 
                                                 
11 Anan in James A. Paul. (1999). NGOs and the United Nations: Comments for the Report of the Secretary 




markedly increased.          
 The Secretariat and other agencies have also constructed excellent sites on the 
world wide web, making an increasing amount of UN information and documents 
available instantly around the globe. Additionally, the Secretariat has strengthened its 
relations with NGOs by improving some services such as the processing of accreditation 
applications, the NGO Resource Center and NGO training programs. Delegations have 
also set up useful web sites and they increasingly hold meetings and briefings with NGOs 
on matters of common interest.  
 
USAID and NGOs 
 
The subcontracting role of NGOs can be further evidenced by the ‘general trend 
towards off-loading of international development assistance by Western/OECD 
countries’.13 Again, an example serves the purpose of validating the non-adversarial 
relationship states have with NGOs. At the forefront of this shift in emphasis has been the 
US Agency for International Development (USAID)14. In stating its operational approach 
USAID demonstrates the close collaboration that has marked the growing relationship 
between state and non-state actors, ‘USAID will collaborate with other donors, host 
country governments, development agencies, universities and academic organisations, the 
private sector and NGOs. Where appropriate, USAID will pursue and practice joint 
planning and allocation of resources, sharing of methods and pooling of technical 
resources. This will extend from the institutional level to the field’.15  What this statement 
of intent indicates is a melding of state and non-state methods, techniques and expertise 
in pursuit of the same idealistic goal, which is of course bettering international society.  
This state to non-state system has become in effect one of franchise holding, ‘in 
which NGOs tender alongside private sector agencies for contracts for the procurement 
and delivery of food aid, the implementation of development projects and advisory 
services’.16 In all these sub-contracting/facilitative examples of government/NGO 
interface the nation state has realised and actioned that there are alternate and more 
effective methods to deal with areas of increasing importance but not of traditional 
concern, such as power politics, militarisation and trade. The realist state is comfortable 
in outsourcing certain non-traditional agendas to proficient NGOs founded upon and 
practicing diplomatic idealism.  
                                                 
13 Cooper, Governments, NGOs and the recalibration of diplomacy, p. 373. 
14 USAID was established in 1979 to be a focal point for economic matters affecting US relations with 
developing countries. The agencies functions are policy planning, policymaking, and policy coordination 
on international economic issues affecting developing countries. The director of the agency serves as the 
principal international development advisor to the President and the Secretary of State, receiving policy 
guidance from the Secretary of State. USAID administers US foreign economic and humanitarian 
assistance programs world wide in the developing world, Central and Eastern Europe, and the New 
Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. The agency supports programs in four areas: population 
and health, broad based economic growth, environment and democracy. USAID also provides humanitarian 
assistance and aid to countries in crisis and transition. For more on the challenges, strategic goals, areas of 
concentration, operational approaches, programs and methods see (1997) USAID Strategy: World 
Population Growth and Human Health, Congressional Digest, April, 76 (4), pp. 103 – 107. 
15 USAID Strategy, 1997, p. 104. 





The final suggestion concerning the symbiotic relationship between government 
and NGO is that of a ‘joint manage, a pattern by which the activity of NGOs lend 
themselves to some type of institution-building with governments’.17 Essential to this 
relationship is some type of ‘strategic alliance, partnership or multi-party cooperative 
venture’ through which expertise is shared and some element of labour management, 
formal of informal, is evident.18 This form of joint management is best evidenced in 
Western government’s responses to complex humanitarian emergencies.  
An example of a more formal government NGO relationship is the integrative 
model of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness Systems (NOREPS). The NOREPS-
system is a strong and active Norwegian partnership supporting the UN and the NGOs in 
their efforts to reduce the suffering of victims of war and natural disasters. The goal of 
NOREPS is to facilitate, strengthen and support the UN-system and other international 
organisations, without delay.19 NOREPS works in collaboration with five leading 
Norwegian NGOs and, in terms of government organisations, Directorate for Civil 
Defence and Emergency Planning. Its record is impressive; during the first five years of 
its existence approximately fifteen-hundred Norwegian experts were deployed in twenty-




NGOs exerted a significant influence in almost every mediation undertaken on 
behalf of class action suits concerning the whereabouts of dormant accounts once held by 
Holocaust victims. Initial negotiations focused on stolen assets that had been deposited in 
Swiss bank during World War II. Later negotiations were focused on reparations for 
slave and forced labour, insurance, looted art, and other confiscated Nazi property. 
Although the official parties in these negotiation were traditional state actors – Germany, 
Austria, France, the United States and the lawyers on both sides of the issues – all parties 
knew that no final agreement was possible without first obtaining the consent of key 
NGOs, such as the World Jewish Council, The Conference on Jewish Material Claims 
Against Germany, and several German-Eastern European reconciliation commissions that 
had been established in Belarus, the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and Ukraine. 
According to Eizenstat, ‘these NGOs, in effect, were the ultimate arbiters as to whether 
an agreement between governments and the lawyers would be acceptable’ to those 
                                                 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
19 NOREPS guarantees relief products and services to be airborne in 24 hours, a standby force of 300 
experienced professionals trained and prepared for deployment in the field airborne in 72 hours, and a 
service packages – integrated systems combining the most suitable relief products with highly trained 
personnel – airborne in 72 hours. For more on NOREPS activities, structures, objectives and aims visit 
www.NOREPS.com 
20 Norwegian Emergency Preparedness Systems (NOREPS) (2004). Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 
December 23, 2004, from http://www.noreps.com. 
21 See generally, Authers, John & Wolffe, Richard. (2002). The Victim’s Fortune: Inside the Epic Battle 
over the Debts of the Holocaust.  
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initially affected.22 He continues, ‘their blessing was essential for what were essential 
political and diplomatic negotiations. Even though they were not parties to the lawsuits, 
they had a formal role at the negotiating table.’23  
 
 
                                                 
22 Eizenstat, Nongovernmental Organizations as the Fifth Estate, pp. 17 – 18. 
23 ibid. 
